Karnataka High Court
The Divisional Controller vs Syed Naveed on 16 July, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 11.07.2025
Pronounced on : 16.07.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.14203 OF 2025 (GM - CPC)
BETWEEN:
THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER
B.M.T.C NORTH DIVISION
YASHAWANTHAPURA
BENGALURU - 560 022
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF LAW OFFICER
B.M.T.C., CENTRAL OFFICE
K.H.ROAD, SHANTHINAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 027.
... PETITIONER
(BY SMT. H.R.RENUKA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
SYED NAVEED
S/O SYED SATTAR
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
R/O KURUVELI, URDIGERI HOBLI
TUMAKUR TALUK,
TUMAKUR DISTRICT - 560 026
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI NAVEED AHMED, ADVOCATE)
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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE AWARD DATED
17/04/2025 IN EX PETITION NO. 2642/2023 PASSED BY THE XI
ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE
(ANNEXURE-E).
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 11.07.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner/Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation' for short) is at the
doors of this Court calling in question an order dated 17-04-2025
passed in Execution Petition No.2642 of 2023.
2. Heard Smt. H.R.Renuka, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and Sri Naveed Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent.
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3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
The respondent is appointed in the Corporation as a Driver on
01-07-2002. The respondent is said to have remained
unauthorizedly absent from 26-01-2012. A domestic inquiry is
instituted against the respondent to enquire into the charge of
unauthorized absence. The Inquiry Officer, after a detailed inquiry,
is said to have held the charges as proved. The Disciplinary
Authority accepts the findings of the Inquiry Officer and holding
that the respondent was unauthorizedly absent between
26-01-2012 and 24-04-2013 imposed penalty of dismissal from
service.
3.1. The said order of dismissal is questioned by the
respondent by raising an industrial dispute under Section 10(4-A) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act' for short) in I.D.No.136
of 2014. The Labour Court is said to have recorded a finding that
the Disciplinary Authority was not justified in holding the
respondent guilty of the charges and on that basis sets aside the
order of dismissal and directs reinstatement into service with
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continuity of service but without back wages. The Corporation
challenges the same in Writ Petition No.55896 of 2015. For 6 years
the respondent did not file any application seeking wages under
Section 17B of the Act. Such an application comes to be filed during
the year 2021. The said application is heard and is allowed on 28-
06-2022 directing compliance with Section 17B wages, from the
date the award was notified. Immediately thereafter, the
Corporation seeks recalling of the order which was also rejected.
The respondent institutes a contempt petition against the
Corporation in C.C.C.No.81 of 2023 alleging disobedience of the
order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No.55896 of 2015. The
Division Bench hearing the contempt, without issuing notice,
dismisses the contempt permitting the respondent to avail of
remedy available in law.
3.2. The respondent then registers execution in Execution
Petition No.2642 of 2023 seeking to execute the order of payment
of Section 17B wages. The learned single Judge hearing Writ
Petition No.55896 of 2015 rejects the same on 08-04-2024. A writ
appeal against the said order also comes to be rejected. Again, a
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contempt petition is preferred alleging disobedience of the order.
During the pendency of the said contempt petition, the concerned
Court noticing the absence of the Corporation, issues attachment
warrant. It is then, the petitioner/Corporation is at the doors of this
Court calling in question issuance of the order of attachment and
the very institution of execution before the concerned Court.
4. Learned counsel Smt. H.R.Renuka appearing for the
petitioner would take this Court through the entire order sheets in
all those cases. It is her emphatic submission that the Corporation
filed an application before the learned single Judge seeking recall of
the order. The order was recalled and reinstatement was offered in
lieu of Section 17B wages. The respondent accepts the
reinstatement but complains that he is not able to work, therefore,
Section 17B wages should be restored. The learned single Judge
dismisses the petition but no observation with regard to Section
17B wages. The Division Bench rejects the writ appeal where also
there is no order with regard to Section 17B wages. The respondent
is reinstated and is working today. The issue now is only with
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regard to any order under Section 17B wages to be executed before
the executing Court.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel Sri Naveed Ahmed would
refute the submissions in contending that Section 17B is a statutory
right. It is automatic once there is an order of reinstatement.
Therefore, from the date of the award even if the workman does
not ask, the employer should pay Section 17B wages. He would
contend that the respondent was right in seeking execution of the
order. The execution was permitted by the Division Bench in
contempt. Therefore, the Corporation cannot escape payment of
Section 17B wages, even if there is no direction to that effect. He
would seek dismissal of the petition.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. Certain dates
assume significance in the case at hand. The dispute raised on the
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dismissal of the respondent comes to be allowed by the Labour
Court on 20-04-2015 directing reinstatement, continuity of service
but without back wages. The Corporation aggrieved by the award
challenges it in Writ Petition No.55896 of 2015. No application is
made by the respondent under Section 17B of the Act. In the year
2021 application is preferred seeking wages as obtaining under
Section 17B. Then comes a slew of orders passed by coordinate
Benches of this Court. A coordinate Bench on 28-06-2022 has
passed the following order:
"ORDER
Sri.Devaraj., learned counsel on behalf of
Sri.B.L.Sanjeev., for petitioner has appeared through video
conferencing.
Sri.Naveed Ahmed., learned counsel for respondent has
appeared in person.
Counsel for respondent submits that an application
in I.A.No.1/2021 is filed to direct the petitioner to pay
wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 from the date of the Award i.e., 20.04.2015.
Counsel further submits that Sri.Syed Naveed - the
respondent has sworn to an affidavit stating that he is
not gainfully employed in any establishment and he is
ready and willing to join duty immediately if petitioner -
Corporation provide him with employment.
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Counsel also submits that petitioner has not filed
objection to I.A.No.1/2021. Accordingly, he submits that
I.A.No.1/2021 may be allowed.
Submission is noted.
I have perused the application and also affidavit
filed by the respondent seeking 17-B wages.
The conditions of 17-B are satisfied. Hence the
respondent is entitled for 17-B wages. The petitioner -
Corporation is hereby directed to pay 17-B wages to the
respondent from the date of the award became
enforceable till the disposal of the Writ Petition.
Accordingly, I.A.No.1/2021 is allowed.
Petitioner shall comply the order within two weeks."
(Emphasis supplied)
The coordinate Bench allows the application in I.A.No.1/2021 and
directs Section 17B wages to the respondent from the date the
award became enforceable. The Corporation then files an
application to recall the said order. The application to recall comes
to be rejected with imposition of costs on 21-09-2022. The order
reads as follows:
"ORDER
Sri.Sanjeev.B.L., learned counsel for petitioner and
Sri.Naveed Ahmed., learned counsel for respondent have
appeared in person.
Counsel Sri.Sanjeev.B.L., submits that the Writ Petition
was listed on 28.06.2022 and the Court allowed the application
I.A.No.1/2021 and Corporation was directed to pay 17-B wages.
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The petitioner has filed an application in I.A.No.1/2022 to recall
the order dated:28.06.2022.
Learned counsel for petitioner submits that reasons are
narrated in the application to recall the order dated:28.06.2022.
Counsel therefore, submits that the same may be taken note of
and the application may be allowed and order dated:28.06.2022
may be recalled.
I have considered the submission made on behalf of
petitioner and also perused the application with utmost care.
Heard, the learned counsel for petitioner and respondent
on I.A.No.1/2022.
I have carefully perused the daily order sheet and the
Writ papers. The 17-B application is filed on 07.12.2021 and
thereafter the matter was listed from time to time.
The matter was listed on 19.01.2022. On that day,
Sri.Srinivas., learned counsel on behalf of Sri.Sanjeev.B.L.,
appeared through video conferencing and sought a week's time
to file statement of objections to I.A.No.1/2021. Accordingly,
time was granted.
Thereafter, the matter was again listed before the Court
from time to time and as could be seen from the Writ papers,
the petitioner has not made any efforts to file statement of
objections to I.A.No.1/2021 till date. The order is passed to pay
17-B wages. I find no reason to recall the order
dated:28.06.2022.
Accordingly, I.A.No.1/2022 is rejected with cost of
Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) payable to Advocates'
Association Library Fund, High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru."
A memo is then filed by the Corporation that it would reinstate the
respondent instead of payment of Section 17B wages. This is
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accepted and the order comes to be passed on 02-11-2022. The
order reads as follows:
"Learned counsel for petitioner has filed a memo
along with receipt for having paid the cost.
With regard to payment of Section 17B wages it is
the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that the
petitioner would reinstate the respondent subject to
result of writ petition.
Learned counsel for respondent is agreeable to
report for employment with the petitioner.
In view of the said submission, respondent shall
report for duty to the Head Office on 07.11.2022 at 10:30
a.m. and petitioner shall assign him suitable duty.
Report of the same to be filed in the Court before
the next date of hearing.
Call on 14.11.2022."
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid order is clear that the respondent was directed to
report for duty on 07-11-2022 and further directed that the
Corporation would assign him suitable duty. The order can only be
read as reinstatement in lieu of wages under Section 17B of the
Act. Again on 14-11-2022, the petitioner filed a memo. On the
memo the following order is passed on 14-11-2022:
"Learned counsel for petitioner has filed a memo
dated 14.11.2022 placing on record the fact that the
respondent has been reinstated into service and is
deputed to Depot-8.
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Copy of the order is also enclosed along with the memo.
Learned counsel for the respondent confirms the same.
Learned counsel for the respondent submits that
the respondent has been assigned to do heavy work.
However he is not been able to do so and observation to
that effect is also available in the impugned order.
In the event the respondent makes any
representation with regard to his inability to do heavy
work together with necessary certificates and medical
records as may be required, the petitioner shall consider
the same as expeditiously as possible.
At request call on 06.12.2022."
(Emphasis supplied)
Again, the mater was posted to 06-12-2022 and on 06-12-2022,
the following order is passed:
The learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned
counsel for the respondent are present.
The learned counsel for the respondent submits
that pursuant to the order dated 14.11.2022, the
respondent has furnished a representation with regard to
his inability to do heavy work along with the necessary
documents. However, the said representation has not
been responded to by the petitioner and the counsel
further submits that a copy of the representation will be
filed during the course of the day. Counsel for respondent
further submits that despite an order of this Court, the
petitioner has not paid the wages to the respondent as
contemplated under Section 17B of the Industrial
Disputes Act upto the date of his reinstatement.
Counsel for the petitioner seeks for a short
accommodation to get instructions.
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Counsel for the petitioner to take instructions regarding
payment of 17B wages also and submit on the next date of
hearing.
Call on 08.12.2022."
(Emphasis supplied)
Now the demand is that the respondent does not want work but
wants Section 17B wages. On 08-04-2024 the aforesaid petition viz
W.P.No.55896 of 2015 comes to be dismissed confirming the order
of the Labour Court. The operative portion of the order of the
learned single Judge is as follows:
".... .... ....
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order
passed by the Labour Court does not warrant interference
and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as devoid
of merit with the aforesaid observation."
(Emphasis supplied)
It was dismissed being devoid of merit. In the entire order there is
nothing said about wages under Section 17B. A writ appeal is
preferred by the Corporation only to be dismissed. The dismissal of
the writ appeal is as follows:
".... .... ....
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6. About the case of the workman that he was
unable to discharge the duty as a driver, learned single
Judge has proceeded to observe that it will be open for
the workman to make a representation in this regard to
the Corporation seeking assignment of light work on the
basis of medical report. In these observations also, this
Court is not inclined to interfere with.
7. The challenge to the judgment and order of the
learned Single Judge is merit less. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed.
In view of dismissal of the appeal, the contempt
petition will not survive. However, it is observed that the
compliance of the order of learned single Judge shall be
effect within four weeks from the date of service of
certified copy of this order."
(Emphasis supplied)
The order of the Division Bench was hearing both the writ appeal
and the contempt petition preferred. The contempt was with regard
to Section 17B wages. The Division Bench permitted compliance of
the order of the learned single Judge within four weeks. It appears,
the respondent had preferred a contempt petition, in which no
notice was issued, and the petition was dismissed reserving liberty
to the respondent to avail of the alternative remedy available.
Based upon that, the respondent had preferred the execution
petition in Execution No.2642 of 2023. In the execution the main
claim is Section 17B wages to an extent of ₹21,26,619/-.
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8. The issue now would be, whether there is any order that is
executable for demand of wages under Section 17B of the Act? The
submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that wages
under Section 17B is automatic and even without asking, the
employer should make payment is the submission, which is noted
only to be rejected. It is trite law that only when the employee who
is the beneficiary of an order of reinstatement from the hand of the
Labour Court files an application along with an affidavit the he has
not gainfully employed, it is from the said date the wages under
Section 17B would spring.
9. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the High
Court of Delhi in the case of MCD V. SANTOSH KUMARI,1 wherein
the court holds as follows:
".... .... ....
29. We are of the considered view that the Single Bench in
Food Craft Instt. (supra) gave a balanced interpretation to
the aforesaid provision taking into consideration the interest
of both the workman as well as the employer. It is the most
equitable. What follows from a conjoint reading of Para (xii)
and (xvi) enumerated therein that normally, the workman
would be paid wages with effect from the date of the award.
It should be in those cases where application is filed with
promptitude and immediately on notice of writ petition
1
2012 SCC OnLine Del 4390
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staying the operation of the order of reinstatement or
proceedings against such an award. It should be within
reasonable period. Thereafter, that would mean that such an
application should normally be filed with the filing of the
counter affidavit or reply to an application for interim relief
and in the case of absence of such counter affidavit or reply,
within the reasonable period from the date when workman
has appeared himself or through counsel in the writ
proceedings. This would be so even when the management
has delayed in filing the writ petition challenging the award
inasmuch as with such a delay, it cannot deprive the
workman under Section 17B from the date of award. Thus,
the expression "during the pendency of proceedings before
the High Court" under Section 17B of the ID Act would not
mean from the date of filing the writ petition. However, if
there is a long or abnormal delay in filing application
under Section 17B of the ID Act, we are of the opinion
that in such an eventuality, it becomes an obligation of
the workman to satisfactorily explain the delay. It
would become relevant consideration for deciding as
to whether the benefit is to be accorded from the date
of application or the award. In case, it is unreasonable
and unexplained delay, it would be within the
discretion of the writ Court to direct payment of wages
from the date of the application. There could be several
reasons for adopting this course of action. One of us (Rajiv
Sahai Endlaw, J.) had taken the justification by providing
following reasons:
"12.3.......
A. Section 17B is in the nature of a subsistence allowance.
It is intended to provide to the workman whose
reinstatement has been directed by the Industrial
Adjudicator, at least minimum wages, during the time that
the judicial review of the award of the Industrial Adjudicator
is pending consideration before this Court. The payment
thereunder is a month by month payment and is not a
payment of any lumpsum amount. Further, the said
payment is subject to the workman, on affidavit, stating
that he is unemployed and/or has been unable to find
employment. The employer has a right to rebut the said
averment of the workman and if succeeds in rebutting the
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same, the workman under Section 17B would not be
entitled to payment.
B. The payment under Section 17B is not an automatic
payment which starts running immediately on
institution of proceedings to challenge the award. For
the workman to be entitled to such payment, he is
required to file an affidavit. Thus, payment is
dependent upon a positive act of the workman. The
High Court is not empowered to make the payment till
such affidavit has been filed by the workman.
C. Once payment/order requires a positive act of the
workman, entitled to such payment of filing in court such
affidavit, the ordinary rule of litigation is (as reiterated in
Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 726 : AIR
2003 SC 833) that the right to relief should be decided by
reference to the date on which the party approaches the
Court. The Supreme Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari v. U.O.I.,
1993 Supp (3) SCC 2 : AIR 1993 SC 2127, in relation to the
pension of Freedom Fighters also held that the "benefit
should flow only from the date of application and not from
any date earlier". Thus but for Section 17B providing for
payment during pendency of the writ proceeding (and which
has been interpreted as not from date of institution of the
writ petition but from the date of the award impugned
therein) under general law, an order under Section 17B
would have been only from the date of the application under
Section 17B.
D. However such benefit given to the workman, of
direction/order for payment from a date anterior to the
filing of application should not be tilted against the
employer by interpreting it to mean that the workman can
apply under Section 17B at his whim and fancy and at any
time. The workman cannot be permitted to apply under
Section 17B when the writ petition matures for hearing and
be held entitled to payment for several years together. To
allow so, would be inequitable to the employer.
E. In most cases, it is impossible for the employer to verify
whether the workman is employed in another establishment
or not. It would be more so difficult if the employer is
required to verify the employment, if any, for say the last
10 years, as the petitioner herein would be required to, to
rebut the affidavit filed by the workman.
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F. If the application under Section 17B is made within a
reasonable time, the employer can make arrangements for
the payment. However, non-filing of the application by the
workman can reasonably entitle the employer to believe
that the employee is employed in another establishment
and will not make any claim under Section 17B. The
employer may arrange its financial affairs accordingly. An
employer who has acted on the basis of such a
representation of the workman cannot after a long period,
10 years as in the present case, be burdened with the
liability under Section 17B from a back date which as a
lump sum may represent an enormous amount and wreck
the employer. Moreover it will provide a bounty rather than
subsistence.
G. The Supreme Court in Excel Wear v. U.O.I., (1978) 4
SCC 224 : AIR 1979 SC 25 held that principles of socialism
and social justice cannot be pushed to such an extreme so
as to ignore completely or to a very large extent the
interests of the employer.""
(Emphasis supplied)
The Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, holds that the
payment of wages under Section 17B of the Act is not automatic
and does not start immediately upon institution of the proceedings
challenging the award. In cases of unreasonable and unexplained
delay in filing the application under Section 17B it would be within
the discretion of the court to direct payment of wages and it would
be the obligation of the workman to satisfactorily explain the delay.
10. Admittedly, the respondent files the application after 6
years of the Corporation filing the petition. An order under Section
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17B is granted but that tacitly gets modified by a memo filed by the
Corporation that it would reinstate the respondent in lieu of Section
17B wages. Therefore, the claim of payment of Section 17B wages
was modified with reinstatement.
11. The respondent accepts reinstatement, reports to duty,
complains of the work to be heavy comes back to the Court and
demands Section 17B wages yet again. The respondent's later
dissatisfaction with the nature of work assigned, does not revive the
statutory claim that was by consensus substituted and waived.
There is no order while rejecting the petition with regard to
payment of wages under Section 17B. There is no order by the
Division Bench with regard to payment of wages under Section 17B.
It is ununderstandable as to what order the respondent is wanting
to execute before the executing Court. There is no determination by
any judicial fora that the respondent is entitled to receive huge
amount of ₹21,26,619/- as wages under Section 17B. Having
accepted the offer of reinstatement in lieu of Section 17B wages,
the respondent now complains that he is entitled to Section 17B
wages and seeks execution of the order.
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12. The execution is admittedly sought in thin air, as what
can be executed is only what is already determined. As observed
hereinabove, there is no determination in the case at hand.
Therefore, the very institution of execution petition, in the teeth of
the aforesaid order, is a misconception of the respondent and the
Court passing the order of attachment is again contrary to law. On
all these facts, the petition deserves to succeed, more so in the
light of the fact that the respondent is reinstated and is now
working in the reinstated post with light work assigned to him.
13. The issue now would be, whether the execution petition
must be permitted to be continued or not. Both the learned single
Judge and the Division Bench did not have explicit directions for
payment of 17B wages. Execution presupposes an executable
order. The claim of entitlement cannot be conjured from the
void, in the absence of a judicially mandated command for
payment of Rs.21,26,619/-. The execution petition thus
rests on shaky foundation. The institution of execution
proceedings on the aforesaid frail footing and the
attachment order arising therefrom cannot be sustained in
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law and if permitted to continue, it amounts to seeking
enforcement of a non-existed entitlement. In that light, the
petition deserves to succeed in its entirety and the prayers sought
to be answered.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) The proceedings in Execution Petition No.2642 of 2023 pending before the XI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru stand quashed. Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2025 also stands disposed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:SS