Telangana High Court
M/S. 22Nd Century Infrastructures And ... vs Mohd. Ismail Khan on 17 September, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.234 of 2024
Between:
M/s 22nd Century Infrastructures & Projects
Pvt Ltd., Hyderabad, reptd by Challagonda
Ramesh Rao.
... Petitioner
And
Mohd. Ismail Khan,
S/o Late Mohd. Nazeer Khan and
four others.
...Respondent
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON 17.09.2025
HON'BLE JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgment?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes/No
3. Whether her Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes/No
_______________________________________
JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
2
LNA, J
CRP. No.234 of 2024
HON'BLE JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.234 of 2024
% 17.09.2025
Between:
# M/s 22nd Century Infrastructures & Projects
Pvt Ltd., Hyderabad, reptd by Challagonda
Ramesh Rao
.... Petitioner
And:
$ Mohd. Ismail Khan,
S/o Late Mohd. Nazeer Khan and
four others.
....Respondent
< Gist:
> Head Note:
! Counsel for the petitioner: Sri Y.Rama Rao,
^ Counsel for Respondent: Sri Deepak Mishra
For Sri Safdar Mirza
? Cases Referred:
1. (2014) 10 SCC 459
2. (2024) SCC Online 3844
3. (2020) 7 SCC 366
4. (1998) 2 SCC 70
5. (2022)12 SCC 641
6. (2017) 13 SCC 174
7. (2020) 17 SCC 260
8. (2025) 5 SCC 198
9. (2002) 10 SCC 501
3
LNA, J
CRP. No.234 of 2024
10. (2012) 1 SCC 656
11. (2011) 9 SCC 126
12. AIR 2000 SC 3146
13. 2021 SCC Online 1061
14. (2020) 7 SCC 366
4
LNA, J
CRP. No.234 of 2024
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.234 of 2024
ORDER:
The Revision Petition is filed assailing the order dated 23.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.429 of 2021 in OS.No.202 of 2022 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ibrahimpatnam, Ranga Reddy District, whereby and whereunder the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was dismissed.
2. Heard Sri Y.Rama Rao, learned counsel for revision petitioner, and Sri Deepak Mishra, learned counsel appearing for Sri Safdar Mirza, learned counsel-on-record for respondent Nos.1 and 2. It is endorsed in the affidavit that respondent Nos.3 to 5 are only proforma parties.
3. The petitioner herein is defendant No.1, respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein are plaintiff Nos.1 and 2, respectively, in the suit. For convenience, hereinafter, the parties will be referred to as they are arrayed in the suit.
5
LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024
4. The brief facts of the case, required for disposal of the present Revision Petition, are that plaintiffs filed the suit in OS.No.877 of 2020, which was subsequently re-numbered as OS.No.202 of 2022 against the defendants seeking to declare the registered sale deeds bearing document Nos.3806/2017, dated 10.05.2017, 2037/2013, dated 02.04.2013, 3147/2013 dated 09.07.2013 and 47/2015, dated 05.11.2014, executed in respect of suit 'A', 'B' 'C' and 'D' schedule properties, respectively, as null and void and simultaneously, to deliver possession of the suit 'A' to 'D' schedule properties to the plaintiffs, by duly holding the plaintiffs to be owners of the said properties.
5. Pending adjudication of the suit, defendant No.1 filed an application in IA.No.429 of 2021 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint. In the affidavit, filed in support of the said application, defendant No.1, represented by its authorized signatory, inter alia, averred that originally, Mohammed Gouse Ali Khan was the absolute owner and pattedar of a total extent of Acs.273-00 gts, which includes the suit 'A' to 'D' schedule properties; that he expired in the year 1959 and as such, the suit 'A' to 'D' schedule properties devolved upon on his 6 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 wife-Hameed Khatoon by way of succession, vide Faisal Patti of the year 1960 and she continued as pattedar till 1971-1972; that these lands were under the possession of protected tenant by name Chand Khan; that after the death of the said Chand Khan, his son Osman Ali Khan continued to be in possession of the land in Sy.Nos.100, 149, 150 and 151, total admeasuring an extent of Acs.29.25gts; that the said Osman Ali Khan purchased the same from Hameed Khatoon vide registered sale deed bearing document No.1254/1967 dated 10.07.1967, who, in turn, sold the same to one Anugu Raji Reddy (Defendant No.2) vide registered sale deed No.113/1971 dated 03.03.1979; and that defendant No.1 purchased the same from defendant No.2 under registered sale deed bearing document No.3806/2017 dated 10.05.2017.
5.1. It was further averred that Hameed Khatoon died in the year 1981; that in the event, the daughters of Mohammed Gouse Ali Khan, viz., Siraj Khatoon, Rukhiya Khatoon and Hafeez Khatoon, were born by the year 1959, they ought to have claimed partition of the properties either within three years of their attaining majority, if they were minors, (or) within twelve years, if they were already majors by the year 1959. Therefore, for 7 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 computing the limitation, the period should be reckoned from the year 1959 (upon the death of Mohd. Gouse Ali Khan) or from the year 1981 (upon the death of Hameed Khatoon) and the suit ought to have been filed within the limitation period of twelve years from either date, however, the suit is filed in the year 2020, i.e., about 61 years after the death of Mohd. Gouse Ali Khan, and 39 years after the death of Hameed Khatoon, which clearly indicate that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. 5.2 It was further averred that there is no cause of action for filing the suit and that, though the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit schedule properties, they have paid the Court fees under Section 24(d) of the AP Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, instead of under Section 37 of the said Act, which is improper and on the aforesaid grounds, defendant No.1 prayed to reject the plaint.
6. A counter was filed by the plaintiffs denying the averments made in the aforesaid application, wherein it was contended that a clear cause of action for filing the suit for the reliefs mentioned therein is made out in the plaint and therefore, the contention of defendant No.1 that the suit is liable to be rejected on the grounds of lack of cause of action and 8 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 improper payment of Court fee is untenable; that the cause of action is a mixed question of facts and law, which can be decided only after full- fledged trial of the suit and therefore, the application filed by defendant No.1 is pre-mature and the same cannot be entertained and accordingly, prayed to dismiss the application.
7. The trial Court, on considering the pleadings of both the parties and on hearing the learned counsel appearing for both the parties, vide impugned order dated 23.11.2022 dismissed the application by observing that in the plaint, it was the case of the plaintiffs that after their marriage they moved to Hyderabad and as there was no near relative or family member to look after the suit schedule properties, some land grabbers managed to delete the name of their mother-Hameed Khatoon in the revenue records, which appeared till 1971-72 and the name of Osman Khan, who is son of the protected tenant by name Chand Khan, was incorporated; that the said Osman Khan managed to palm off the said lands to defendant No.2, who, in turn, sold the same to defendant No.1 vide registered sale deed dated 10.05.2017; that the plaintiffs are claiming right over the suit schedule properties as being succeeded from 9 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 their mother; and that the plaintiffs have shown the cause of action to bring the suit within the limitation.
8. The trial Court further observed that the issue as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not is a mixed question of fact and law, which can be decided only after full-fledged trial. Challenging the said order, the present Revision Petition is filed by defendant No.1.
9. Learned counsel for revision petitioner/defendant No.1 submitted that defendant No.1 purchased the suit schedule property under registered sale deed bearing document No.3806/2017, dated 10.05.2017 and the vendor of defendant No.1 purchased the same in the year 1971 vide sale deed bearing document No.113/1971 and as such, the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit schedule properties and in such an event, the Court fee should have been paid under Section 37 of the AP Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, however, the plaintiffs have paid Court fee under Section 24(d) thereof, and the trial Court failed to appreciate this aspect. 9.1. Learned counsel further submitted that even if the averments and the allegations made by the plaintiffs in the plaint are taken into 10 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 consideration, the same does not constitute cause of action for filing the suit and therefore, the suit is liable to be rejected on that ground also. 9.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the limitation period of twelve (12) years for filing the suit should be reckoned either from the year 1959, when Mohd. Gouse Ali Khan died, or from the year 1981, when his successor i.e., his wife died, on the contrary, the plaintiffs filed the suit in the year 2020, which is 61 years from the death of Mohd. Gouse Ali Khan and 39 years from the death of Hameed Khatoon and thus, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. 9.3. Learned counsel for revision petitioner submitted that though the plaintiffs are claiming rights over the suit schedule properties by way of Hiba, one of the three essentials under the Mohammadan Law, i.e., delivery of possession is not proved by the plaintiffs, therefore, the Hiba is invalid in the eye of law and as such, no valid title flows to the plaintiffs.
9.4 Learned counsel further submitted that the aspects of absence of cause of action, improper payment of Court fee and limitation are not 11 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 properly appreciated by the trial Court and hence, the trial Court has committed grave error in dismissing the application filed by defendant No.1 and prayed to allow this Revision Petition.
10. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for revision petitioner/defendant No.1 relied upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:
(i) Rasheeda Khatoon (dead) through Lrs. Vs. Ashiq Ali, S/o Lieutenant Mohd (dead) through Lrs 1
(ii) Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others Vs. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another 2
(iii) Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through Lrs and Others 3
11. The categorical observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rasheeda Khatoon's case (cited supra) at paragraph 11 of the 1(2014) 10 SCC 459 2(2024) SCC Online 3844 3(2020) 7 SCC 366 12 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 judgment are extracted as hereunder:-
"In Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail and Others, a two Judge Bench referred to Section 147 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, wherein the essentials of valid gift under the Muhammadan Law have been elucidated and proceeded to explicate the principle. We think the reproduction of the relevant passage would be seemly:- "Under Section 147 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law, by Mulla, 19th Edn., edited by Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, envisages that writing is not essential to the [pic]validity of a gift either of moveable or of immovable property. Section 148 requires that it is essential to the validity of a gift that the donor should divest himself completely of all ownership and dominion over the subject of the gift. Under Section 149, three essentials to the validity of the gift should be, (i) a declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee as mentioned in Section 150. If these conditions are complied with, the gift is complete. Section 150 specifically mentions that for a valid gift, there should be delivery of possession of the subject of the gift and taking of possession of the gift by the donee, actually or constructively. Then only the gift is complete. Section 152 envisages that where the donor is in possession, a gift of immovable property of which the donor is in actual possession is not complete 13 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 unless the donor physically departs from the premises with all his goods and chattels, and the donee formally enters into possession. It would, thus, be clear that though gift by a Mohammedan is not required to be in writing and consequently need not be registered under the Registration Act; for a gift to be complete, there should be a declaration of the gift by the donor; acceptance of the gift, expressed or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and delivery of possession of the property, the subject-matter of the gift by the donor to the donee. The donee should take delivery of the possession of that property either actually or constructively. On proof of these essential conditions, the gift becomes complete and valid. In case of immovable property in the possession of the donor, he should completely divest himself physically of the subject of the gift."
12. In Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust's case (cited supra), Hon'ble Apex Court observed as hereunder:
"In fact, there is no averment in the plaint to the effect that the predecessors were not aware of the transactions. The limitation period for setting aside the sale deed would start running from the date of registration of the same and as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, after three years of the registration, the Plaintiff is barred from seeking cancellation of the said registered sale deed or the decree that was passed before 50 years and the consequential judgments. We have already 14 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 referred to Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The plaintiff, in our view, has miserably failed to ascertain the existence of the fact by being diligent. The question as to when a period of limitation would commence in respect of a registered document is no longer res integra."
13. In Dahiben's case (cited supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
"The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) CPC is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted".
14. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and 2/plaintiffs submitted that it is settled principle of law that while adjudicating an application filed for rejection of plaint, the averments made in the plaint and the documents, if any, filed along with plaint can only be considered, and the averments in written statement and document(s), if any, filed along with the written statement cannot be considered. However, in the present case, the application filed by defendant No.1 is entirely based on the contentions raised in the written statement and the documents filed 15 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 along with the said written statement, which per se cannot be looked into while adjudicating an application filed for rejection of plaint.
15. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 further submitted that Hameed Khatoon was the pattadar of the suit schedule properties and after her demise, defendant No.2 unlawfully tampered/manipulated the revenue records, thereby deleting the name of Hameed Khatoon in the revenue records from the years 1991-1992, and fraudulently got mutated his name in place of late Hameed Khatoon, without following the due process of law and further, with mala fide intention, he executed a sale deed in favour of defendant No.1 in the year 2017. 15.1. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 further submitted that the legal heirs of late Hameed Khatoon, i.e., the mother and aunts of the plaintiffs, who are still alive, have, out of their own volition, orally gifted their respective shares in the suit schedule properties to the plaintiffs by way of an oral Hiba (gift) made in the presence of witnesses on 20.03.2020, which was subsequently reduced into writing by way of a Memorandum of Past Gift, therefore, the plaintiffs are legally entitled to 16 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 pursue the present litigation in their personal capacity, including seeking delivery of possession of the suit schedule properties. 15.2. Learned counsel further contended that the trial Court, on due consideration of the contentions raised and the submissions made on behalf of both parties, has rightly dismissed the application and no grounds are made out to interfere with the well-reasoned impugned order of the trial Court and therefore, the Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed as the same is devoid of any merit.
Consideration:-
16. The principal contentions that were urged on behalf of defendant No.1 for rejection of the plaint are three fold, firstly, there is no cause of action for filing the suit, secondly, the suit is barred by limitation and thirdly, proper Court fee is not paid.
17. As regards the first limb of contention, it is settled principle of law that the averments made in the plaint and the documents, if any, filed along with the plaint, should only be looked into/considered while adjudicating the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, and the 17 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 averments in the written statement and the documents, if any, filed along with written statement cannot be considered.
18. As regards the contention of learned counsel for revision petitioner that there is no of cause of action for fling the suit, it has to be seen that in the plaint, under the heading 'Cause of action', it is mentioned as hereunder:-
"(a) Schedule 'A' the cause of action seeking a Declaration of the Sale Deed dated 10-5-2017 arose when the plaintiff after a strenuous search for the same located it and obtained a C.C. of the same on
19.09.2020 and continues till it is declared as null and void so also a direction to the Tahsildar Maheshwaram Mandal to amend the entries in the pahanies dated 2019 to 2020 by deleting the name of Defendant No.1, and amending the same by mutating the name of the plaintiff therein, arose on 22-2-2020 when the plaintiff during the course of his enquiries in the Tahsildars Office Maheshwaram Mandal.
The cause of action seeking possession of the 'A' premises arose in the month of February 2020 18 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 when the plaintiff found that the defendant No. I was in possession of the schedule 'A' premises.
(b) The cause of action for the declaration of 'B' schedule property as null and void arose In the month of December 2019 when in his search to unearth the invalid executions of sale deeds relating to his ancestral estate the plaintiff came across the sale deed dated 02-04-2013 and his search further led to the illegal entries In the Pahanies dated 1993 1994, which upon them coming to light in around February 2020 need to be cancelled by way of appropriate proceedings, thereby the possession of the premises consequently needs to be delivered, as such the cause of action not only commences on 02-04-2013 which is the date of execution of the Sale Deed but still continues.
(c) The Cause of Action of 'C' schedule property arose on 09-07-2013 i.e., the date on which the Defendant No. 3 and 4 executed a Regd Sale Deed dated 09-07- 2013 in favour of the Defendant No.1 and continues till it being declared as null and void and consequently the Tehsildar Maheshwaram Mandal being issued directions to amend the Pahanies dated 2019-2020 pertaining to Nandupally Village as depicted in the schedule 'C' the cause of action commences from February 2020 which the illegal nature of the entire came to light and continues till appropriate direction are issued to the Tahsildar Maheshwaram Mandal to carry out amendments and possession of the premises handed over the present 19 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 plaintiff.
(d) Cause of action for the 'D' schedule, property arose on 05-11-2014 when a Regd. Sale Deed dated 05-11-2014 was executed by the Defendant No. 4 in favour of Defendant No. 1 and continues till it is declared as null and void and appropriate proceedings seeking the cancellation of the mutated names of the Defendant No.1 are carried out in Pahanies dated 2019-2020 and all future Pahanies, thus the cause of action continues and also shall continue till possession of the premises bearing schedule 'D' is handed over the plaintiff.
19. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit schedule properties. The plaintiffs under the heading 'Cause of action' have referred only to the transactions that have taken place in the years 2017 and prior, i.e., 2013 and 2014, without referring to the earlier transactions that have taken place in respect of the subject property i.e., the sale deeds of the year 1967 and 1971. Interestingly, the plaintiffs have sought declaration of sale deeds that have taken place in the years 2013, 2014 and 2017 as null and void. Hence, it is explicit that the cause of action shown in the suit is not comprehensive.
20. In the instant case, the plaintiffs are claiming rights over the suit schedule properties by way of Hiba executed by three daughters of the 20 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 original owner-Mohammad Gouse Ali Khan. In addition to that, though three daughters of the original owner are claiming to have succeeded to the suit schedule properties after the death of their mother-Hameed Khatoon, in the year 1981, not even a scrap of paper or document is filed either in the form of pahanies, mutation in revenue records, etc., wherein their names were reflected as pattadars in respect of the suit schedule properties from the year 1981 onwards. On the other hand, it is apt to note that in the plaint, the plaintiffs have vaguely stated that defendant No.2, without having any manner of right or title over the suit schedule properties, has got the name of Hameed Khatoon deleted in the pahanies and got interpolated his name. However, in the plaint, there is no whisper as to why the daughters of Mohammad Gouse Ali Khan-the original owner have not chosen to challenge the mutation proceedings issued in favour of defendant No.2. It appears that they have kept silent without agitating their rights before the revenue authorities for getting their names mutated in the revenue records by deleting the name of defendant No.2 and thus, having remained as silent spectators, they allowed multiple transactions to take place in respect of the suit schedule properties. In such 21 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the case, the predecessors-in- title of the plaintiffs, who stepped into the shoes of their mother by way of succession, have utterly failed to establish either their title or possession over the suit schedule properties, thereby, entitling them to gift the same to the plaintiffs. Thus, without the assertion of rights of the predecessors- in-tile of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have no locus standi to seek the reliefs of declaration of sale deeds said to have been executed in the years 2013 or 2014 or 2017 in respect of the suit schedule properties as null and void. By not vindicating/asserting their rights by way of a proper document, the plaintiffs have simply and in fact, vaguely stated that one Osman Ali Khan, the son of the cultivator of the suit schedule properties by name Chand Khan, has managed to palm off the said properties to defendant No.2. Thus, all these facts go to show that the plaintiffs have got the plaint cleverly drafted, thereby creating an illusion of cause of action, which is impermissible in law and has to be curtailed at the threshold.
21. The aforesaid view of this Court is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in I.T.C. Limited Vs. Debts Recovery 22 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 Appellate Tribunal and others 4 , wherein it is held as follows:-
"The question is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. Clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint".
22. This principle has been reiterated by a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Bajoria and others Vs. Hemant Kumar Jalan and others 5, wherein it is observed as hereunder:-
"Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the duty is cast upon the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. This Court has held that the underlying object of Order VII Rule 1 CPC is that when a plaint doesnot disclose a cause of action, the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings. It has been held that in such a case, it will be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation so that further judicial time is not wasted."
23. As regards the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Hon'ble 4 (1998) 2 SCC 70 5 2022(12) SCC 641 23 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 Supreme Court in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy vs. Syed Jalal 6, observed as hereunder:-
"If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage".
24. In the light of the above judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in view of the foregoing discussion as to the existence of cause of action, this Court, on scrutiny of the averments in the plaint read in conjunction with the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs, holds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action for filing the present suit and the plaintiffs have cleverly drafted the plaint creating the illusion of cause of action and as such, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy's case (cited supra) and Rajendra Bajoria's case (cited supra), the same has to be nipped in the bud stage i.e., at threshold so that bogus and sham litigation ends at the earliest, without unnecessarily protracting the proceedings, and further judicial time is not wasted.
25. As regards the contention of learned counsel for revision 6(2017) 13 SCC 174 24 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 petitioner that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and as such, the same is not maintainable, it is settled law that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law.
26. To adjudicate upon the issue as to whether the suit is barred by limitation, as contended by learned counsel for revision petitioner/ defendant No.1, it is seemingly necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act and also the ratio decidendi laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard.
27. It is relevant to note that plaintiffs are claiming that the suit schedule properties were orally gifted to them on 20.03.2020 by Siraj Khatoon, Rukhiya Khatoon, and Hafeez Khatoon, who are daughters to be daughters of Hameed Khatoon.
28. As regards the validity of oral gift i.e., Hiba, the legal position is well settled, which has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again in a catena of decisions, that the three essentials of a gift under Mohammadan Law, i.e., (i) declaration of the gift by the donor;
(ii) acceptance of the gift by the donee and (iii) delivery of possession, 25 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 have to be complied with to make Oral gift (Hiba) valid. Though, the Rules of Mohammadan Law do not mandate that Hiba has to be reduced to writing, only on fulfilling of all the three aforesaid essentials, the Hiba becomes complete and irrevocable.
29. In the present case, admittedly, plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit schedule properties and further, in the suit, they sought the relief of recovery of possession of the suit schedule properties, based on oral gift (Hiba) purported to have given in their favour on 20.03.2020. Therefore, one of the essentials of Hiba i.e., delivery of possession is not complied with, thereby, the Hiba dated 20.03.2020 becomes invalid under the Mohammadan law and consequently, no rights are transferred to plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule properties.
30. Now, the aspect as to whether the suit seeking the reliefs sought for therein has been filed within the prescribed period of limitation, as envisaged under the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be determined.
31. The Limitation Act, 1963, consolidates and amends the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, with regard to limitation for filing of suits, appeals 26 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 and applications, and for purposes connected therewith. The law of limitation contains the procedural Rules and does not confer any substantive right or defines any cause of action, but, simply prescribes that the remedy can be exercised only up to a certain period and not beyond that.
32. There is also another important principle under the Law of Limitation, which is crystallized in the form of maxim that "when once the time has begun to run, nothing stops it".
33. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act defines the expression "period of limitation" as the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule and 'prescribed period' means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.
34. Article-59 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes the period of limitation for filing a suit for cancellation of an instrument or decree or for rescission of a contract, which reads as under:
Description of suit Period of Time from which
limitation period begins to run
27
LNA, J
CRP. No.234 of 2024
59. To cancel or set When the facts entitling the
aside an instrument or plaintiff to have the instrument
decree or for the Three years or decree cancelled or set
rescission of a contract. aside or the contract rescinded
first become known to him.
35. From the said Article-59, it is discernible that period of limitation for filing a suit for cancellation or setting aside of an instrument or decree, is three years from the date of knowledge of the said instrument.
36. Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, read as follows:
Description of suit Period of Time from which period limitation begins to run
64. For possession Twelve years When the date of of immovable dispossession.
property based on previous possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed.
28
LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024
65. For possession Twelve years When the possession of the of immovable defendant becomes adverse to property or any the plaintiff interest therein based on title
37. From a plain reading of Article-64, it is clear that a suit for recovery of possession, based on previous possession and not based on title, should be filed within a period of 12 years from the date of dispossession.
38. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 corresponds to Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which envisages that when possession is sought for based on title, and where the possession of defendant is adverse to the plaintiff, the limitation for filing the suit is twelve years from the date of such adverse dispossession.
39. Adverting the aforesaid provisions of the Limitation Act to the present case, it is to be seen that once the plaintiffs' claim over the suit schedule properties based on Hiba is negatived, since the Hiba is invalid in the eye of law, necessarily, the case of the plaintiffs fall back to claim possession of the suit schedule properties either based on adverse 29 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 possession of the defendants or on previous possession.
40. As regards the aspect of possession of the suit schedule properties, the plaintiffs in the plaint themselves stated that the aforesaid three daughters of the original owner-Mohammed Gouse Ali Khan, subsequent to their marriages, have moved out of Hyderabad and as, there was no near relative or family member to look after the said properties, it has fallen prey in the hands of land grabbers, who managed to get the name of Hameed Khatoon deleted in the pahanies of the years 1971-72.
41. From the above, it is evident that the donors of the alleged Hiba, i.e., three daughters of Mohammad Gouse Ali Khan were not in possession of the suit schedule properties. Therefore, the question of the plaintiffs seeking recovery of possession of the suit schedule properties based on their previous possession does not arise. Even in the contra position, if the plaintiffs seek possession of the suit schedule properties based on their previous possession, the limitation for filing the suit as per Article 64 of the Limitation Act is twelve years from the date of dispossession. The plaintiffs except stating that the suit schedule properties were encroached by the land grabbers, did not give the specific 30 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 date on which they were so dispossessed from the suit schedule properties. In such an event, even under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, the suit cannot be said to be filed within the period of limitation of twelve years from the date of dispossession.
42. Furthermore, except making bald pleadings that the defendants have illegally encroached the suit schedule properties and got their names mutated in the revenue records, the plaintiffs failed to mention as to from which date the alleged possession of the defendants have become adverse to the plaintiffs. This Court cannot loss sight of the fact that in the plaint, the plaintiffs averred that the name of Hameed Khatoon appeared in the pahanies till the year 1971-72 and thereafter, her name was deleted and the name of Osman Ali Khan, who is son of the protected tenant-Chand Khan, has been interpolated in the revenue records. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the possession of the defendants became adverse to three daughters of the original owner since the years 1971-72, however, it seems that they, after sleeping over their rights and having allowed multiple transactions to take place in respect of the subject properties, awoke after a long period of nearly five decades by filing the present suit 31 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 for recovery of possession. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiffs, even based on the title of their predecessors, cannot be said to be filed within the limitation period of twelve years from date when the possession of the defendants has become adverse to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not within the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 65 of the Limitation Act.
43. In view of observation and findings of this Court in the preceding paras that the plaintiffs have created the illusion of cause of action, which in fact does not exist, by clever drafting of the plaint and hence, the same has to be curbed/curtailed by duly rejecting the plaint at the threshold, this Court holds that the plaintiffs have failed to show that "right to sue"
accrued to them.
44. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. vs. Central Bank of India 7, observed that the expression-"when the right to sue accrues" used in Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is markedly distinct from the expression used in other Articles in First Division of the Schedule dealing with suits, which unambiguously refer to 7(2020) 17 SCC 260 32 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 the happening of a specified event. Whereas Article 113, being a residuary clause, does not specify happening of a particular event, but merely refers to the accrual of cause of action on the basis of which the right to sue would accrue.
45. In the instant case, the genesis of cause of action arose after execution of sale deed by Hameed Khatoon in the year 1967 in favour of Osman Ali Khan and thereafter, execution of sale deed by the said Osman Ali Khan in favour of defendant No.2 in 1971 and also when the name of Hammed Khatoon was deleted from pahanies of the years 1971-72 and the name of Osman Ali Khan was incorporated therein.
46. Thus, the right to sue by means of filing a suit arose after execution of sale deed by Hameed Khatoon in the year 1967. The expression "when the right to sue accrues" in Article 113 of the Limitation Act need not always mean "when the right to sue first accrues". For the right to sue to accrue, the right sought to be vindicated in the suit should have already come into existence and there should be an infringement of it or at least a serious threat to infringe the same.
33
LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024
47. In the instant case, as observed supra, when no valid title has been passed to the plaintiffs from their predecessors-in-title, there is no question of their having a right to sue stating their rights in respect of the said properties are infringed or there is threat to the same.
48. Further, as regards the entitlement of the plaintiffs to seek declaration of registered sale deeds as null and void, it is appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi and others versus Anand Kumar and others 8 , wherein it is observed as hereunder:
"In the case at hand, partition took place way back in the year 1968, which is evident from the revenue record entries. The suit is filed in the year 2023, i.e. after a period of 55 years. Further, many of the family members had executed registered sale deeds in the year 1978. These sale deeds have been attached, and on perusal, it is observed that these were in fact registered sale deeds. A registered document provides a complete account of a transaction to any party interested in the property".
49. The categorical observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in 8 (2025)5 SCC198 34 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 Raj Narain Sarain (dead) through Lrs. And others Versus Laxmi Devi and others 9 case are extracted as hereunder:-
"As noticed above, the learned single judge of the Allahabad High Court though elaborately laid down the requirement of Order 7 Rule 11 and the true effect thereof, but in our view, totally misread and misapplied the provision in the contextual facts. No explanation whatsoever is available in the plaint as to the situation under which the suit was filed after about a long period of 40 years. The knowledge of the deed of sale stands accepted by reason of the averments in the plaint itself (vide para 9 of the plaint)."
50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana &Anr 10 in observed as under:
"Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to 9 (2002) 10 SCC 501 10 (2012)1 SCC 656 35 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property.
51. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Khatri Hotels Private Limited &Anr. Vs. Union of India &Anr 11 noted that while enacting Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the legislature had designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court noted that the word "first" has been used between the words "sue" and "accrued". The Court said that the same would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation would begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrued. In other words, the Court held that successive violation of the right would not give rise to fresh cause and the suit would be liable to be dismissed if it was beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued.
52. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in DilbooVs. Dhanraji12 at para 5 of the judgment held as follows:
"...... Whenever a document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases where a 11 (2011) 9 SCC 126 12AIR 2000 SC 3146 36 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend the period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge"
53. Applying the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments to the instant case, it is to be noted that as the suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation would begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrued. In other words, the successive violation of the right would not give rise to fresh cause and the suit would be liable to be dismissed if it was beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued, i.e., when the first sale deed was executed in the year 1967 and the subsequent sale deed in the year 1971 and further, deletion of name of Hameed Khatoon from the pahanies of the years 1971-72 and mutating the name of Osman Ali Khan, who is son of the protected tenant by name Chand Khan, in revenue records of the year 1973-74.
54. In this context, it is also relevant to refer to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case (cited supra) and in Suraj Lamp Industries Pvt Ltd's case (cited supra), wherein it is observed that 37 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 registration provides complete information to the people who may deal with a property as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In the teeth of the said judgments, it is evident that though there are registered sale deeds of the years 2013 and 2014 pertaining to the suit schedule properties, which are in the knowledge of the plaintiffs and are staring at them, the reliefs seeking to declare the said registered sale deeds as null and void, without establishing their rights over the suit schedule properties and the predecessors-in-title of the plaintiffs, having slept over the matter without initiation of any legal proceedings against the mutation of name of Osman Ali Khan right from the years 1972-73 in the pahanies, and after so many decades, through the plaintiffs have ventured to file the present suit, seeking to revive their rights and the same is wholly impermissible in law.
55. In add ition to the afore-mentioned reasons for holding that the suit is not maintainable under law and hence, the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold, the principle of doctrine of acquiescence also applies to the instant case.
56. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman, State Bank of India & 38 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 Anr. v. M.J. James 13 , has elaborately discussed the doctrine of acquiescence and observed as hereunder:
"39. ...... Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after the violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence." The position expounded as above certainly request consideration with reference to the facts of this case. In that regard we will have to consider whether there was acquiescence on part of the respondent and if so, whether lapse of time, if any, is of no importance or consequence, with reference to the factual position, in view of the exposition 13 2021 Scc onLine1061 39 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 thereunder 'that acquiescence would not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence'.
57. The Doctrine of Acquiescence is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. Given the aforesaid legal position, indirect acquiescence on the part of plaintiffs can be inferred till the filing of the suit, and not for the period post filing of the suit. Nevertheless, acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars plaintiffs from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.
58. Interestingly, suit is filed for declaration and cancellation of sale deed bearing document No.3806/2017 dated 10.05.2017 in respect of 'A' schedule property, sale deed bearing documentNo.2037/2013 dated 02.04.2013 in respect of 'B' schedule property, sale deed bearing documentNo.3147/2013 dated 09.07.2013 in respect of 'C' schedule property, sale deed bearing document No. 47/2015 dated 05.11.2014 in respect of 'D' schedule property and also for amendment of pahanies for the year 2019-2020 while showing 'cause of action' as date of execution of above sale deeds. The plaintiffs have not sought for declaration of sale deeds bearing document No.1254/1967 dated 10.07.1967 and sale deed 40 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 bearing document No.113/1971 dated 03.03.1979 (sic 03.03.1971) which are parent documents executed in favour of defendant No.1. Admittedly, suit schedule property was alienated firstly in the year 1967 and subsequently, in the year 1971 and those registered sale deeds are not under challenge in the present suit, therefore, even if sale deed executed in favour of defendant No.1 is declared as null and void, the parent documents 1967 and 1971 still remain in operation. It appears that plaintiffs did not seek for declaration of sale deeds of the year 1967 and 1971 as null and void only because of limitation.
59. It is pertinent to note that suit is filed in the year 2020, which shows that in the interregnum period of more than five decades between the years 1967 and 2020, the plaintiffs have allowed multiple transactions to take place in respect of the suit schedule property, which remained unchallenged, therefore, the doctrine of acquiescence squarely applies to the present case since plaintiffs have sought to declare the sale deed executed in favour of defendant No.1 as null and void, without seeking the relief of declaration of earlier sale deeds which were executed in 1967 and 1979 as null and void. This aspect shows the conduct of the plaintiffs, and 41 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 that apart, for the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the suit filed by plaintiffs is misconceived and is clearly barred by limitation and the plaintiffs, having slept over the matter for decades together and further, having allowed multiple transactions to take place, are not entitled to approach the Court and seek the reliefs sought for in the suit.
60. Perusal of impugned order would disclose that the trial Court except observing that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and that the said issue can be decided only after full-fledged trial, failed to assign any proper reason for dismissing the application filed by defendant No.1 seeking to reject the plaint.
61. Further, in view of the foregoing reasons, discussion and the findings recorded in the preceding paras, by duly following the ratio/principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments, which are cited supra, this Court holds that the trial Court failed to scrutinize the averments in the plaint in conjunction with the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs in a right perspective in order to determine as to whether the plaint discloses cause of action and whether the suit is filed within limitation or barred by limitation. The trial Court has grossly 42 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024 misdirected itself in holding that the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Rai Yantji Bhansulai (Gajra) (dead) through LRs and others 14 is not applicable to the instant case. Furthermore, a perusal of impugned order shows that the trial Court has failed to advert to the provisions of the Limitation Act vis-a-vis the factual matrix of the case as put forth by the plaintiffs in the plaint and grossly erred in holding that the suit is filed within the period of limitation.
62. As regards the disclosure of cause of action in the plaint, this Court, in the preceding paras has elaborately discussed the said issue and after analyzing the same and following the ratio decidendi of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments cited supra, held that plaint does not disclose cause of action and therefore, the sham and bogus litigation shall not be allowed to continue and an end shall be put to it. Hence, this Court holds that the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the facts of the case and committed error in holding that the plaintiffs have shown the cause of action to bring the suit within the limitation.
14 (2020) 7 SCC 366 43 LNA, J CRP. No.234 of 2024
63. In view of the above discussion and the factual matrix of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that mere clever drafting of the plaint creating an illusion of cause of action, which in fact does not exist does not revive the stale claim of the plaintiffs and further, as the suit is clearly barred by limitation, as held supra, the plaintiffs are not entitled to seek the reliefs sought for in the suit and the same is liable to be rejected in limine.
64. Resultantly, this Revision Petition is allowed, setting aside the order dated 23.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.429 of 2021 in OS.No.202 of 2022 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ibrahimpatnam, Ranga Reddy District and consequently, I.A.No.429 of 2021 stands allowed.
65. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.
__________________________________ LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J Date:17.09.2025 Note:
LR copy to be marked.
B/o (dr)