Madras High Court
V.Gowthaman vs The State Rep By Its on 17 December, 2018
Author: V.Parthiban
Bench: V.Parthiban
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 17.12.2018
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.PARTHIBAN
Crl.R.C.No.1453 of 2018 and
Crl.M.P.Nos.16983 and 16984 of 2018
1.V.Gowthaman
2.Y.Arul ... Petitioners
Vs
The State rep by its
Inspector of Police,
St.Thomas Mount Police Station,
Chennai. ... Respondent
PRAYER : Criminal Revision filed under Section 397 r/w 401
of Cr.P.C. against the order dated 23.11.2018 made in
C.M.P.No.6180 of 2018 in C.C.No.633 of 2017, on the file of
Judicial Magistrate, Alandur and set aside the same.
For Petitioners : Mr.R.Prabhakaran
For Respondent : Mr.G.Harihara Arun Somasankar,
Government Advocate (Crl.Side)
http://www.judis.nic.in
2
ORDER
The above Criminal Revision Petition has been filed against the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Alandur, dated 23.11.2018 in C.M.P.No.6180 of 2018 in C.C.No.633 of 2017 dismissing the petition filed under Section 245 Cr.P.C., by the petitioners herein, seeking to discharge them from the prosecution case.
2. The petitioners were charged for the offences under Sections 143, 145, 147, 188, 189, 353 and 506(i) IPC. On the basis of the complaint filed, an FIR was registered against the petitioners along with others. Initially, these petitioners along with others had approached this Court in Crl.O.P.No.1295 of 2018 seeking to quash the FIR registered against them. After hearing the submissions of the parties, the learned Judge of this Court vide his order dated 11.7.2018, dismissed the said Crl.O.P. filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Before the learned Judge, on behalf of the petitioners, lengthy arguments were advanced stating that there was no substance in the complaint which gave rise to filing of the FIR. The learned http://www.judis.nic.in 3 Judge after adverting to the submissions of both sides, has passed a detailed order and finally held that there were sufficient materials available for prosecution to proceed against the petitioners. After holding as such, the Crl.O.P., came to be dismissed.
3. Thereafter, a charge sheet was filed for the offence as aforementioned and these petitioners filed a discharge petition under Section 245 Cr.P.C. to discharge them from the prosecution case. The learned Judicial Magistrate who heard the discharge petition, has passed a detailed order on consideration of the observation made by the learned single Judge of this Court while dismissing the earlier Crl.O.P. filed by these petitioners and on the basis of law laid down by this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and finally found that there was no merit in the petition and hence discharge petition came to be dismissed. As against the said order, the present Crl.Revision Case has been filed.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners http://www.judis.nic.in 4 has reiterated the same submissions which he made before the learned Judge of this Court in the Crl.O.P.No.1295 of 2018. The arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners were thoroughly considered by the learned Judge of this Court while dealing with the petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the learned Judge has discountenanced the arguments and held that the quash petition was without merits and dismissed the same and further went on to hold that there were sufficient materials to proceed against these petitioners and the arguments that were put forth before the learned Judge of this Court in the above Crl.O.P. and the relevant portion of the order passed by the learned Judge as found from paragraph 9 to 14 are extracted herein under:
“9. 9. The contention of Mr.Prabhakaran, that in the U.S. and other democracies, such protests are permitted and therefore, no penal action should be taken against the petitioners herein deserves to be stated only to be rejected, because, when their actions amounted to breach of the law, the police cannot be expected to stand mute. It is the duty of the police to protect ordinary citizens and ensure that there is no disturbance to their day-to-day activities. If a crime http://www.judis.nic.in takes place in the presence of a Police Officer, he can 5 very well be the first informant. In this case, Porkodi, the Woman Inspector of Police was the first informant and the investigation was not conducted by her, but, was conducted by the Inspector of Police, St.Thomas Mount Police Station.
10. As regards the contention that the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 will apply, this Court is unable to persuade itself to this submission, because, the scope and objects of those enactments are entirely different and it can in no way abridge the power of the police to intercede and prevent the situation becoming explosive.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the Preamble and Section 39 of the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 and contended that since Kathipara flyover is a National Highway, the State police would not have the jurisdiction to remove the protesters and arrest them.
He submitted that it is only the officials of the Highways Department who can intervene. To appreciate his argument, it may be relevant to extract Section 39 of the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 Act:
"39. Offence and penalty.(1) If any person, who has been evicted from any unauthorised occupation on a highway land under this Act, again occupies any highway land without permission for such http://www.judis.nic.in 6 occupation under this Act, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees per square metre of so occupied highway land but which shall not exceed two times the cost of such highway land, or with both.
(2) Any court, convicting a person under sub-section (1), may make an order for evicting that person from such occupied highway land summarily and he shall be liable to such eviction without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him.
(3) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the offence punishable under sub-section (1) shall be cognizable.
12. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners smacks of ignorance of first principles of criminal jurisprudence. A bare reading of Section 39 shows that it penalises re-occupation of Highways by those who have been evicted. Sections 4 and 5 of Cr.P.C. clearly states that all investigations will be conducted only in accordance with the Code. Under Section 149 of Cr.P.C., the police have the power to interpose to prevent the commission of an offence. It will be ludicrous to say that only the http://www.judis.nic.in 7 officials from the Highways Department can evict such protesters and not the police.
13. Learned counsel relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh [(2014) 2 SCC 1] and submitted that only after conducting a preliminary enquiry, the police should have registered an FIR. This once again shows that he has not really understood the import of the said judgment. In Lalita Kumari (supra), the Supreme Court has held that an FIR should be immediately registered if the complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. However, the Supreme Court has also held that in certain cases like matrimonial, a preliminary enquiry can be conducted. Obviously, the overt acts attributed to the petitioners herein will not fall under any of the categories enumerated in Lalita Kumari (supra).
14. Though the learned counsel for the accused had failed to argue a particular legal aspect which is favourable to him, this Court does not want to take advantage of his ignorance. A Court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC on a police report filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., but only on the complaint by a concerned public servant in the light of Section 195 Cr.P.C. (See: C.Muniappan and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(2010) 9 SCC 567]. Thus, the prosecution of the accused under Section 188 IPC stands quashed. Except the above, there are sufficient materials for the http://www.judis.nic.in 8 prosecution to proceed against the petitioners. Accordingly, this petition stands dismissed. The petitioners shall face the trial and if any one absconds, it is open to the police to file a fresh FIR under Section 229-A IPC. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.”
5. In fact, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has once again attempted to re-argue the entire matter and went on to draw parallel as between demonstration held at the instance of these petitioners with that of Satyagraha protest by the Father of Nation, Mahatma Gandhi during freedom struggle. According to the learned counsel, his clients are famous filmy personalities and the demonstration was held to highlight the plight of the farmers which demonstration cannot be termed as illegal and which can give rise to the so-called offences which are being charged against the petitioners. In fact, this argument was also considered by the learned Judge in the above Crl.O.P. and he had, in fact, taken judicial notice of demonstration and the consequence of such demonstration which affected the public order and peace in the main arterial road where the http://www.judis.nic.in 9 demonstration was held by these petitioners and others. The learned Judge has dealt with such submissions in paragraph 8, which is extracted hereunder:
“8. This Court is perfectly justified in taking judicial notice of the fact that Kathipara Junction and flyover is an arterial highway that connects the Airport to the city of Chennai. Several hospitals and Courts are located on either side of the flyover. The Air Force and the Army have their establishment on the southern side of Kathipara junction. Bearing this in mind, if one reads the final report and Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. statement of the witnesses, it is seen that the accused herein, along with others, suddenly indulged in blockage of the flyover by putting chains across the entry and exit points around 9.30 a.m. on 13.04.2017, in the peak hour, and thereby, bringing the whole area to a standstill. The complaint of Porkodi, the Woman Inspector of Police shows that when she attempted to untie the chains, she was pushed and threatened by the accused. Though democracy recognizes the right to dissent, yet, we are bound to act within the constitutional means, under which, right to form an assembly is not an absolute right and it is subject to certain restrictions. For example, in New Delhi, Jantar Mantar has been earmarked as the place for conducting demonstrations and protests. Similarly, in Chennai city, State Guest House area and Valluvar Kottam area have been earmarked for the said purpose. Had http://www.judis.nic.in it been the idea of the accused to highlight the plight 10 of the farmers, they could have sought permission and conducted the protest in any of the earmarked places, instead, they, on account of a preconcerted design, gathered at peak hours on 13.04.2017 and physically prevented the flow of traffic over the Kathipara Highway, on account of which, ordinary office goers suffered hardship. The movement of ambulance and people going for interviews and examinations would have been crippled. Further, on a perusal of the case diary, this Court found photographs showing how the accused had blocked the Kathipara Highway with steel chains, which obviously show that they have come well prepared to violate the law, come what may.”
6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that these petitioners have a constitutional right to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly as guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India and such constitutional guarantee was sought to be crushed by the State and these petitioners are sought to be intimidated by slapping them with so many offences under IPC. Such action on the part of the State would amount to legitimate descent being trampled upon by the authoritative act of the State. According the learned counsel, the citizens have a right http://www.judis.nic.in 11 to express their voice in favour of a group of people and they have right to peaceful assembly in order to drive home their point in the democratic set up. Such expression of dissent or demonstration to highlight their grievances cannot be construed as one of committing any illegal act as the essence of democracy is to encourage opposition and descent. According to the learned counsel, unfortunately, the learned Judicial Magistrate, without properly appreciating the constitutional right of the parties as guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, has dismissed the discharge petition. The learned Magistrate was principally guided by the findings of this Court rendered in Crl.O.P. by a Judge of this Court. According to the learned counsel, it is a statutory right for any citizen to file a petition for discharge under the provisions of Cr.P.C. and such statutory right cannot be taken away merely on the basis of certain observations made by the learned Judge in a collateral proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. According to the learned counsel, the learned Magistrate has not appreciated the legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the aspect of freedom of expression and http://www.judis.nic.in 12 assembly. He would therefore submit that the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate is liable to be set aside.
7. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate (Crl.side) appearing for the respondents/State would submit that the order of the learned Magistrate does not call for any interference since it is a well considered order. According to the learned Govt.Advocate, the learned Magistrate has applied the legal principles as evolved by the Courts of India including the Hon’ble Supreme Court and on the basis of the settled legal principles and also on the basis of the facts, took cognizance of the offence under Sections 143, 145, 147, 189, 353 and 506(i) IPC. According the learned Govt.Advocate for the State, the learned Judicial Magistrate was right in dismissing the discharge petition filed by the petitioners since there were enough materials to proceed against them for the offences as made out in the final report of the police. According to the learned Govt.Advocate, in fact, the discharge petition under Section 245 Cr.P.C. was found to be not maintainable since it was a summons case. But however, the http://www.judis.nic.in 13 learned Magistrate has considered the discharge petition on merits and dismissed the same. According the learned Judicial Magistrate, the proper recourse should have been under Section 258 Cr.P.C seeking to discharge and not under Section 245 Cr.P.C. In any event, ultimately, the learned Magistrate has dismissed the petition.
8. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. Perused the entire materials and pleadings placed on record.
9. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners herein, were, in fact, considered by the learned Judge of this Court in the quash petition filed earlier by the petitioners in Crl.O.P.1295 of 2018. The learned Judge after adverting to the materials, has finally held that there existing enough materials against these petitioners for prosecution to proceed against them . Once a finding has been rendered by a learned Judge of this Court in regard to the same offences, this Court is of the view that there cannot be a different conclusion on the basis of same materials which are placed http://www.judis.nic.in 14 for consideration before this Court as well. Even assuming that this Court need not be guided by the findings of the learned Judge of this Court in the quash petition, from the facts as emerged for consideration and as dealt with by the learned Judicial Magistrate, this Court is of the view that there are prima facie materials available for proceeding against these petitioners and the question of discharging these petitioners would not arise in such event. All the Court has to see in discharge petition is, whether there is any prima facie material to proceed against the accused. In the instant case, a detailed order has been passed by the learned Magistrate finding that there is more than prima facie material, is available. In fact, the learned Magistrate has held that the petition filed under Section 245 Cr.P.C. itself was not maintainable and the learned Magistrate has given a detailed reason as found in paragraph 9 of the order which is extracted hereunder:
“9. The petition filed under Section 245 Cr.P.C. Seeking discharge of charges against the petitioners, therefore, on the face of the petition http://www.judis.nic.in itself, this petition is not maintainable. On perusal 15 of provisions related to summons case, i.e. Section 251 to 259 Cr.P.C., the framing of charges does not arise. Therefore, in summons case, no charge will be framed and the substance of accusation alone will be explained to the accused. The Judicial Magistrate has duty to verify the prima facie of the case only at the stage of taking cognizance of the case, i.e. Before issuance of summons to the accused. In the present case, the final report filed stating that the accused locked the busy bridge of road by using the steel chain and caused agitation illegally and restrained the public servant from doing their job. In respect of these accusations, this Court has found prima facie from the final report and enclosed document at the initial stage and it has taken cogniance on 17.7.2017. Once cognizannce was taken, afterwards there is no review of such cognizance is available by way of discharge in respect of summons case.”
10. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate does not suffer from any infirmity and does not call for any interference from this Court.
11. Be that as it may, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, during the course of his submissions would invite the attention of this Court as to how the http://www.judis.nic.in 16 constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, expression and assembly extended to the citizens of this country has been stifled and crushed by the State authority and the revision petitioners who are well meaning citizens of this country, are being unduly targeted, for highlighting the plight of the farmers by holding a peaceful demonstration. The intention of these petitioners was only to draw the attention of the people to the plight of the farmers and holding such demonstration cannot held to be illegal or unjust. Slapping so many offences against these petitioners for holding of a simple demonstration is a result of punitive action on the part of the State to muzzle freedom of expression and denial of the constitutional right to peaceful assembly which freedoms are guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. According to the learned counsel, if the Courts are not recognizing the time- tested constitutional guarantees, it would amount to approving the authoritarian rule of the State. The learned couinsel made a spirited submission and gone to the extent of http://www.judis.nic.in 17 comparing the demonstration held by these petitioners with that of Satyagraha protest by Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of Nation during the freedom struggle.
12. This Court is unable to comprehend the seriousness in which such comparison is drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Such arguments are advanced on behalf of these petitioners without understanding the context of protest during freedom struggle and demonstration during the period of elected governance of today. The learned counsel is only attempting to give a colour of legitimacy and constitutionality to the illegal demonstration which was held at the instance of these petitioners and others on a particular date by holding the entire citizenry to ransom. The petitioners who were involved in holding the illegal demonstration without permission of the authorities by blocking the arterial road of metropolitan city and causing much inconvenience to the road users and the public at large, cannot be allowed to take refuge under the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and assembly. http://www.judis.nic.in 18
13. Freedom of expression or assembly as guaranteed in the Constitution of India, has it is own boundaries as defined from time to time by the constitutional Courts. It is trite in law to say that any freedom which is guaranteed in the Constitution has always been circumscribed by a reasonable restriction as no citizen is guaranteed absolute right to do whatever he likes without there being a reasonable restriction. Recently, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court was confronted with an issue, as to whether group or demonstrators have a right to demonstrate at a particular place in the heart of the city. In this regard, though the learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed the demonstration to take place in the area, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has over turned the single Judge order and held that the right to protest is not a right to cause inconvenience to the general public. In fact, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has followed the legal principles as evolved over the years by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. In order to appreciate the order passed by the Hon'ble http://www.judis.nic.in 19 Division Bench, it is necessary to extract the relevant portion of the order as found in paragraph Nos.15 to 23 as under:
“15. The right to protest, no doubt is available to all the citizens in a democratic country like ours. Unfortunately, this right to protest has been continuously misunderstood as a right to inconvenience the general public. The protesters who claim to espouse the cause of the public, often forget that their right to protest ends when the other person's right to free movement and right to not to listen to starts. Of course, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had recognized the right to protest in Himat Lal K. Shah Vs. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad and another reported in 1973 (1) SCC 227 and a Rule which enables the Authorities to totally ban protests was struck down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while doing so had observed as follows:
"31. It seems to us that it follows from the above discussion that in India a citizen had, before the Constitution, a right to hold meetings on public streets subject to the control of the appropriate authority regarding the time and place of the meeting and subject to considerations of public order. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the impugned rules are ultra vires Section 33(1) of the Bombay Police Act insofar as they require prior permission for holding meetings. "
16. While considering the right to assemble peaceably without arms vis-a-vis Article 19(3) of the http://www.judis.nic.in 20 Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as follows:
"32. This takes us to points (2) and (3) mentioned above. It is not surprising that the Constitution makers conferred a fundamental right on all citzens 'to assemble peaceably and without arms'. While prior to the coming into force of the Constitution the right to assemble could have been abridged or taken away by law, now that cannot be done except by imposing reasonable restrictions within Article 19(3). But it is urged that the right to assemble does not mean that right can be exercised at any and every place. This Court held in Railway Board Vs. Narinjan Singh, [(1963) 1 SCC 502] that there is no fundamental right for any one to hold meetings in Government premises. It was observed:
"The fact that the citizens of this country have freedom of speech, freedom to assemble peaceably and freedom to form associations or unions does not mean that they can exercise those freedoms in whatever place they please."
33. This is true but neverthless the State cannot by law abridge or take away the right of assembly by prohibiting assembly on every public street or public place. The State can only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each citizen and can only impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order. "
17. In the very same judgment the Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.K.Mathew had observed as follows:-
"72. The power of the appropriate authority to impose reasonable regulation in order to assure the, safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with the fundamental right of assembly. A system of licensing as regards the time and the http://www.judis.nic.in manner of holding public meetings on public street has not been regarded as an 21 abridgement of the fundamental right of public assembly or of free speech. But a system of licensing public meeting will be upheld by Courts only if definite standards are provided by the law for the guidance of the licensing authority. Vesting of unregulated discretionary power in a licensing authority has always been considered as bad [see the cases on the point discussed in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Niemotko v. Maryland]. "
18. It is therefore clear that even the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Himat Lal K. Shah Vs. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad and another reported in 1973 (1) SCC 227, did not recognize or advocate an unbriddled right to organize protests or public meetings. While pointing out that a complete ban would amount to an unreasonable restriction, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had upheld the right on the Government to place reasonable restrictions with reference to the time and the place at which such protests or public meetings are to be held.
19. In S.Rangarajan Vs. P.Jagjivan Ram and others reported in 1989 (2) SCC 574, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with freedom of speech and expression in the context of a cinematograph movie criticizing the Government's policy of reservations in Government Service, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once the the Censor Board had permitted the movie, the High Court was not right in revoking the certificate issued by the Censor Board. Even though the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that the right of freedom of expression can http://www.judis.nic.in be reasonably restricted, the premise on which the 22 Hon'ble Supreme Court interfered with the judgment of the High Court revoking the certificate was that two revising Committees of the Censor board had approved the film and therefore a group of persons who were intolerant to the views of others could not hold the right of expression to ransom.
20. In Durai Sankar and others Vs. The Secretary to the Government Home Department, Government of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 2014 (5) LW 865, the learned Single Judge of this Court had considered the provisions of Section 41 of the Chennai City Police Act, 1888. The learned Single Judge on an interpretation of Section 41 concluded that Section 41 will not apply to processions. The learned Single Judge had also considered the effect of Section 41A of the Chennai City Police Act r/w. 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861. The learned Single Judge after referring to various decisions including the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Himat Lal K. Shah Vs. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad and another reported in 1973 (1) SCC 227 had permitted a procession to be taken in a particular route with various restrictions.
21. In K.T.Patchaimal, District Secretary, All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Kanyakumar District Vs. The Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari District reported in 2009 Writ L.R. 65, Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.Chandru had held that refusal of permission to hold a demonstration by a political party would amount to untrammeled exercise of power under the provisions of Section 30 of the Police http://www.judis.nic.in 23 Act, 1861. Even there, the learned Judge had recognized the regulatory power that was available with the Authorities in terms of Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge found that refusal of permission on the facts of the said case did not disclose the existence of even a remote connection with a reasonable restrictions set out in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India.
22. In Ramlila Maidan Incident, in re, reported in 2012 (5) SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the scope and the meaning of the words restriction and prohibition had observed as follows:
33. The Courts must bear a clear distinction in mind with regard to restriction and prohibition. They are expressions which cannot be used interchangeably as they have different connotations and consequences in law. Wherever a prohibition is imposed, besides satisfying all the tests of a reasonable restriction, it must also satisfy the requirement that any lesser alternative would be inadequate. Furthermore, whether a restriction, in effect, amounts to a total prohibition or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined with regard to facts and circumstances of each case.
23. Considering the question of proportionality of the restriction, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 39 of the judgment had observed as follows:
39. There has to be a balance and proportionality between the right and http://www.judis.nic.in restriction on the one hand, and the right 24 and duty, on the other. It will create an imbalance, if undue or disproportionate emphasis is placed upon the right of a citizen without considering the significance of the duty. The true source of right is duty.
When the Courts are called upon to examine the reasonableness of a legislative restriction on exercise of a freedom, the fundamental duties enunciated under Article 51-A are of relevant consideration. Article 51-A requires an individual to abide by the law, to safeguard public property and to abjure violence. It also requires the individual to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of the country. All these duties are not insignificant. Part IV of the Constitution relates to the directive principles of the State policy. Article 38 was introduced in the Constitution as an obligation upon the State to maintain social order for promotion of welfare of the people.
By the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Article 51-A was added to comprehensively state the fundamental duties of the citizens
compliment the obligations of the State.
Thus, all these duties are of constitutional significance.“
14. The above order of the Hon'ble Division Bench would demonstrate the legal position very clearly that the freedom as guaranteed by the Constitution is not unbridled or unfettered.
15. So much so is said, this Court is constrained to record its serious concern about the scourge of incessant http://www.judis.nic.in 25 agitations that have been plaguing the State off late. This Court is, therefore, unable to appreciate the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioners have a right to demonstrate at a place and time they choose without the authority of law and adopt unlawful method only with a view to seek publicity and yet calling such protest as a manifestation of fundamental constitutional expressions speak of their sanctimonious conduct and smugness. Such cheeky submissions are unworthy to say the least to be accorded constitutional patronage. This State has been witnessing agitations galore under the pretext of highlighting the public issues by various sections of the people across the Board. It appears that lately the entire State has been on an agitation mode all the time that one finds agitation happening in every nook and corner of the State grabbing attention of media and the public at large. In most of these agitations, one always finds certain self-serving and self-styled leaders pitchfork themselves in the forefront and shepherd these agitations ostensibly for espousing a public cause, but invariably end up harming public interest more than they http://www.judis.nic.in 26 seek to advance such interest. These self-appointed custodians of public interest, on many occasions, have scant regard for the rule of law and many a time, they hold the public to ransom in the guise of protesting against certain policies of the State. Such self-appointed custodians are not accountable to any authority and in the name of highlighting grievances of the public, are in fact, disturbing the tranquility and larger public order. The ramification of such agitations is the emergence of several fringe groups and elements who have no qualms for the constitutional order and in furtherance of their covert agenda, on many occasions, hijack the otherwise presumable legitimate demonstration by the aggrieved sections of people. These fringe groups under the cover of public agitation, indulge in shenanigans and snatch away the true purpose and social significance of such agitations. Ultimately, such agitations driven by vicious groups cause damage to the democratic polity and the so- called public cause gets derailed, in the bargain.
15. This Court is conscious of the fact that agitations do sometimes represent legitimate resentment of certain http://www.judis.nic.in 27 sections of people against the policies of the Government, but, at the same time, there cannot be endless agitations at the drop of a hat for each and every issue, leading to the subordination of the rule of law to the demonstrative instincts of the so-called aggrieved class. Today, the State has become a fertile place for agitations of all kinds of epidemic proportions resulting in flourishing of fringe groups and elements and their infiltration into the people's movement. Such groups or elements masquerade themselves as crusaders espousing public cause and interest, but in fact, promote fissiparous tendencies among the gullible mass with a view to subvert the established constitutional order. These vigilante groups always exhibit contumacious conduct and seek to polarise the society and when faced with action by the State for their conflict with the rule of law, they unabashedly seek constitutional cover when the law hurts them.
16. Agitation is an acceptable means of protest in a functional democracy, but the agitations cannot be at the cost of public peace and tranquility all the time. The right to http://www.judis.nic.in 28 assemble, expression etc., of course, are part of the fundamental rights which are enshrined in the Constitution, but, such fundamental rights have to be conjuncted with fundamental duty as well. Every citizen has duty towards the fellow citizens not to cause inconvenience and the right and duty have to balance itself for a robust and vibrant democracy. Every right which is guaranteed under the Constitution, must operate only within certain boundaries and such rights cannot be claimed by any section of people as absolute and no holds barred.
17. For the above foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the revision petition has no substance and merits and hence, the same is dismissed.
17.12.2018 Suk Index: Yes/No Internet: Yes/No http://www.judis.nic.in 29 V.PARTHIBAN, J.
suk CRL.REVISION NO.1453 OF 2018 17.12.2018 http://www.judis.nic.in