Delhi District Court
Labour Court No. Vii vs Smt. Nisha Arora Raised An Industrial on 5 September, 2007
IN THE COURT OF SH. O.P. SAINI, PRESIDING OFFICER,
LABOUR COURT NO. VII, DELHI.
I.D. NO. :2/2000
BETWEEN
The workman Smt. Nisha Arora
W/o Sh. R.S. Arora,
R/o Qu.25-C, Pitampura, Delhi-34.
AND
The management of M/s The Vaish
Cooperative Adarsh Bank Ltd.,
3, Netaji Subhash Marg,
Darya Ganj, New Delhi-2.
Ref.: F.24(4605)/99-Lab./90250-54 dated 17.12.99.
AWARD
1. Workman Smt. Nisha Arora raised an industrial
dispute against her illegal removal from the services, which
was referred to this court for adjudication by the Secretary
(Labour), Government of NCT of Delhi, in the following
terms of reference :
"Whether Smt. Nisha Arora has resigned her
job of her own free will or her services have
been terminated illegally and /or unjustifiably
by the management, and if so, to what relief is
1
she entitled and what directions are necessary
in this respect?"
2. Brief facts of the case as made out from the record
are that since September 1986, the workman has been
employed with the management on the post of accountant on
the last wages drawn Rs.7,611/- p.m. The workman lastly was
given an ornamental post of accountant by the management
but the nature of duties were those of general clerk including
to sit on cash counter, posting in the books, vouchers &
cheques posting under the supervision and direction of Branch
Manager . It is further alleged that during the course of
employment the workman had not given any chance of
complaint, whatsoever, to the management Bank and the
management on numerous occasions had appreciated the work
and conduct of the workman. It is further alleged that on
14.11.1998 the workman under compulsive circumstances,
coercion and pressure submitted a notice to the management
Bank intending to resign from the services of the management
Bank as per the rules. However, after submitting the said
notice intending to resign from the service, the workman in
the next moment informed the management Bank to withdraw
her said notice and the Branch Manager of the management
2
Bank agreed even to return the said notice itself to the
workman as he had not forwarded the same to the Head Office
for further action. It is also claimed that the Branch Manager
of the management Bank did not attend the Bank branch and
reported to remain on leave on 18th and 19th November 1998,
as such, the workman sent her said withdrawal letter written in
her own handwriting direct to the Additional General
Manager of the management Bank in the Head Office.
However, the Branch Manager of the management Bank
joined his duty on 20.11.1998 and the workman again
submitted her withdrawal in writing but the Branch Manager
of the management Bank kept the same under consideration
for the reasons best known to him and acknowledged the same
only on the next morning, that is, on 21.11.1998. It is further
claimed that on 21.11.1998 at the time of closing of business,
the Branch Manager of the management bank informed
verbally the workman that Head Office had instructed him to
convey the workman that her services were not required any
more by the management as the Management Bank had
decided to relieve the workman and allegedly accepted the
notice of resignation retrospectively from 20.11.1998. The
Branch Manager of the management bank forcefully snatched
3
the keys of the almirah and the workman being a lady had no
other option except to lodge protest orally with the
management. The management through Branch Manager
directed the workman not to enter the bank premises on
22.11.1998. It is pertinent to state here that till this day the
workman has not handed over the charge to any other
employee of the management.
3. It is further claimed that the workman was terminated
by illegal, arbitrary and highhanded action of the
management. It is also claimed that the workman had not
submitted any resignation letter voluntarily and there was no
occasion and reason to resign from the services of the
management Bank and the notice intending to resign as per
rules submitted under compulsive circumstances on
14.11.1998 was withdrawn orally in the next available
moment and also in writing twice by the workman but the
management with malafide intension accepted the alleged
notice of intending to resign after the same was already
withdrawn by the workman and more so retrospectively as
such the management terminated the services of the workman
in flagrant violation of the provision of Industrial Disputes
4
Act (hereinafter to be referred as the "Act") and different
Awards as applicable to an employee of a Bank. It is
submitted that on 21.11.1998 no notice of resignation of the
workman was pending before the management. It is claimed
that the workman has been approaching the management to
reinstate her with full back wages and other consequential
benefits though the management orally assured the claimant to
reinstate her with full back wages and other consequential
benefits but failed to do so with some malafide intention. It is
alleged that when the management failed to give any response
to the workman she sent a notice dated 27.3.1989 to the bank
but to no use. It is repeatedly claimed that the workman had
not resigned voluntarily but had only given a notice intending
to resign and acting on that notice the workman has been
terminated illegally and unjustifiably. She raised an industrial
dispute but the same could not be settled due to adamant and
non-cooperative attitude of the management and ultimately
came to be referred to this court in the above terms of
reference. The workman is unemployed since the date of her
termination and despite her best efforts she could not secure
alternative employment. It is prayed that since the termination
of the workman is illegal and unjustified, the management
5
may be directed to reinstate her with all consequential benefits
including continuity of service and full back wages.
4. Management contested the claim and filed its written
statement admitting that the workman was employed with it.
However, preliminary objections have been taken to the effect
that claimant is not a workman as she was working as
accountant. She was next to the Branch Manager and was
engaged in managerial and administrative capacity. It is also
claimed that the reference is not competent as the
management is engaged in banking industry and the
appropriate government to make the reference in the present
case is Central Government but the reference has been made
by the Government of NCT of Delhi, as such, it is
incompetent. On merits, it is claimed that the claimant was
working with the bank as an accountant doing mainly the
administrative and managerial nature of duties. She submitted
her resignation on 14.11.98, which was accepted by the
management. The said resignation was accepted by the
management on 20.11.98 and the letter of acceptance of
resignation dated 21.11.98 was handed over to the claimant
11.30 a.m. on 21.11.98 by the Branch Manager but the
6
claimant refused to give acknowledgment on the letter after
reading the contents of the letter dated 21.11.98. The non-
acknowledgment of the letter dated 21.11.98 by the claimant
was for the reasons best known to her. She was relieved of her
duties on 21.11.98 in terms of letter of acceptance of
resignation served on the claimant on 21.11.98 in the morning
at 11.30 a.m. and she also handed over the keys of the bank to
the Branch Manager . However, on the same day on 21.11.98
in the evening at about 5.00 p.m., the claimant came to the
Branch Manager and delivered a letter dated 20.11.98
expressing her desire to withdraw the resignation. The
claimant was told by the Branch Manager that since the
resignation has been accepted by the management and she was
communicated about the same in the morning vide letter dated
21.11.98 which she refused to accept, there is no question of
withdrawal. It is stated that after the acceptance of the
resignation, the relationship of the claimant with the bank
severed and there was no question of taking the letter dated
21.11.98 into consideration. It is claimed that the claimant
also handed over the keys to the Branch Manager on being
relieved of her duties from the services of the bank in the
evening of 21.11.98. It is also stated that the claimant sent
7
one legal notice to the management through Sh. Sudhir
Kumar, Advocate, 334, New Lawyers' Chambers, Patiala
House Courts, New Delhi stating that she addressed a letter
dated 14.11.1998 to the manager of the bank of Shakarpur
Branch that she was unable to continue with her services and
requested that the letter dated 14.11.98 should be accepted as
resignation letter. The said notice was duly replied to by the
management through its Advocate Mr. Gulshan Chawla. After
receiving the reply of the said notice, the claimant got another
legal notice served on the bank through her Advocate Sh.
H.N. Takkar making a contradictory statement by putting
false and baseless allegations against the management. It is
also claimed that the claimant submitted her resignation on
14.11.98, which was accepted by the management and the
same was communicated to the claimant on 21.11.98 at 11.30
a.m. and she was relieved of her duties. It is not correct that
the claimant had withdrawn the resignation before its
acceptance and even before she was relieved of her duties and
when she handed over they keys. It may be stated that after
the acceptance of the resignation letter the relationship of the
claimant with the management severed. It is also stated that
resignation once accepted becomes final and cannot be
8
withdrawn.
5. It is repeatedly claimed that the claimant submitted
her resignation voluntarily. It is denied that she was
compelled by circumstances or coerced into submitting the
resignation. It is claimed that her resignation was accepted on
20.11.1998 by the Chairman of the bank and it was conveyed
vide letter dated 21.11.1998 and was served upon her on the
same day at 11.30 a.m. by the Branch Manager but she
refused to accept. She was relieved of her duties on her
resignation being accepted by the bank and she also handed
over the keys of the bank to the Branch Manager. It is
repeatedly claimed that since the resignation was accepted and
communicated to the claimant, there is no question of its
withdrawal. It is claimed that since the resignation was
voluntary and was never withdrawn and was accepted
lawfully and was communicated to the workman in due
course, the workman ceased to be an employee of the bank, as
such, her claim is without merit. Other allegations contained
in the claim have also been denied and it is prayed that claim
may be dismissed.
9
6. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were
settled for trial by my learned predecessor vide order dated
18.4.2002:-
(i) Whether the claimant is not a workman
as defined u/s 2 (s) of the Act?
(ii) Whether the claimant has resigned on
her own?
(iii) Whether the reference made to this
court by Govt. of Delhi is bad for want of
jurisdiction?
(iv) As per terms of reference.
7. In support of her case, workman examined herself as
WW-1 and placed on record her affidavit EX.WW1/A
alongwith documents EX.WW1/1 to 4.
8. On the other hand, management has examined MW-1
Sh. Baljeet Sambyal, Manager of the bank, who has placed on
record his affidavit EX.MW1/A alongwith documents
EX.MW1/1 to 4.
9. Management has also examined MW-2 Sh. S.C.
Mehrotra, the then Additional General Manager of the bank,
10
who has placed on record his affidavit EX.MW2/A.
10. I have heard the arguments in detail at the bar and
have carefully gone through the file.
11. My findings on the issues are as under:-
ISSUE NO. 1:
12. It is submitted by the learned Authorized
Representative (AR) for the management that the claimant
was employed in administrative and managerial capacity. She
was second in hierarchy to the Branch Manager as she was in
the rank of accountant. It is submitted that she was
empowered to issue vouchers, bank draft, etc. and also used to
look after the entire branch in the absence of the Branch
Manager. It is repeatedly claimed that claimant is not a
workman under the of the Act.
13. On the other hand, learned AR for the workman
submitted that she was only performing clerical duties. It is
submitted that accountant is not a senior enough in position to
take workman out of the provisions of the Act. It is repeatedly
submitted that she used to perform only clerical and
11
ministerial work of posting of ledgers and other related work.
My attention has been invited to an authority reported as Pillai
G.M. Vs. Lakhanikar, Judge, III Labour Court & Others,
1998, I LLJ, 44.
14. Section 2(s) of the Act, defines "workman" as
under :-
"Workman" means any person (including
an apprentice) employed in any industry
to do any manual, unskilled, skilled,
technical, operational, clerical, or
supervisory work for hire or reward
whether the terms of employment be
express or implied, and for the purposes
of any proceeding under this Act in
relation to an industrial dispute, includes
any such person who has been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched in connection
with, or as a consequence of, that
dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment has led that dispute, but
does not include any such person :-
(i) who is subject to the Air Force
Act, 1950, or the Army Act, 1950, or the
Navy Act, 1957; or
(ii) who is employed in the police
service or as an officer or other employee
of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a
managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a
supervisory capacity, draws wages
exceeding one thousand six hundred
rupees per mensem or exercises, either by
the nature of the duties attached to the
12
office or by reason of the powers vested
in him, functions mainly of a managerial
nature"
15. In an authority reported as G.M. Pillai Vs. A.P.
Lakhanikar & Ors. 1998 I CLR 281, Hon'ble Bombay High
Court while dealing with the question whether a person is a
"workman" or not, observed as under :-
".................................................................
...................................................................
In determining the question whether a person employed by the employer is workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act or not, the Court has principally to see main or substantial work for which the employee has been employed and engaged to do. Neither the designation of the employee is decisive nor any incidental work that may be done or required to be done by such employee shall get him outside the purview of workman, if the principal job and the nature of employment of such employee is manual, technical or clerical. In hierarchy of employees, some sort of supervision by the employees over the employees of lower ladder without any control may not by itself be sufficient to bring that employee in the category of supervisor, yet if the principal job of that employee is to oversee the work of employees who are in the lower ladder of the hierarchy and he has some sort of independent discretion and judgment, obviously such employee would fall 13 within the category of supervisor. Each case would depend on the nature of the duties predominantly or primarily performed by such employee and whether such function was supervisory or not would have to be decided on facts keeping in mind correct principles. In John Joseph Khokar V. B.S. Bhadange & two others, 1997 II CLR 921. I observed, "where the employee possess the power of assigning duties and distribution of work such authority of employee may be indicative of his being supervisor doing supervision. In a broad sense supervisor is one who has authority over others :
someone who superintends and direct others. An employee who in the interest of the employer has responsibility to directly control the work done by the other workers and if the work is not done correctly to guide them to do it correctly in accordance with norms shall certainly be a supervisor. A supervisory work may be contradistinguished from managerial and administrative work, and so also a supervisor from manager and administrator. Supervisor's predominant function is to see that work is done by workers under him in accordance with the norms laid down by the management :
he has no power to take any disciplinary action......................................................... ................................................................."
16. Similarly, in another authority reported as Union Carbide India Ltd. Vs. D. Samuel & Ors. 1998 II CLR 736, Hon'ble Bombay High Court observed in paragraphs 8 & 14 9 as under:-
"8. From a consideration of the aforesaid judgments a supervisor other than one who is not exercising either by nature of duties attached to the office or by reasons of powers vested in him functions mainly of a managerial nature must exercise supervisory functions and draw wages exceeding Rs.1,600/- per mensem. The laws as laid down, thus can be summarised as under :-
(1)Designation is not material but what is important is the nature of work.
(2) Find out the dominant purpose of employment and not any additional duties the employee may be performing.
(3)Can he bind that Company/employer to some kind of decisions on behalf of the Company/employer.
(4)Has the employee power to direct or oversee the work of his subordinates.
(5)Has he power to sanction leave or recommend it; and (6) Has he the power to appoint, terminate or take disciplinary action against workmen.
From the judgments of this Court and the other High Court some of the tests apart from what the Apex Court has stated are :-
(a) Whether the employee can examine the quality of work and whether such work is performed in satisfactory 15 manner or not;
(b) Does the employee have powers of assigning duties and distribution of work;
(c) Can he indent material and distribute the same amongst the workmen;
(d) Even though he has no authority to grant leave does he have power to recommend leave;
(e) Are there persons working under him;
(f) Has he the power to supervise the work of men and not merely machines
(g) Does he mark the attendance of other employees;
(h) Does he write the confidential reports of his subordinates
9. These tests are not the only tests. There can be a situation where there may be other tests to indicate whether the person is doing supervisory work or not. However, what is material is to note is that a supervisor must be in a position to bind his employer in respect of the decisions that he has taken or in exercise of such power have control on them. It is true that this test to some extent may indicate functions which are managerial or administrative in nature. However, this was the test applied by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Mcleod & Co.
(Supra) and approved by the Apex Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd.
16V. Shri Kishan Bhageria & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 329. The Apex Court therein noticed the distinction between expression 'supervisory', 'managerial' and 'administrative'. The Apex Court has also noted that these terms or expression cannot be put in a water tight compartment. However, the Apex Court has observed that on must always look into the main work and that must be found out from the main duties. A supervisor is one who could bind the company to take some kind of decision on behalf of the company. One who was reporting merely as to the affairs of the company and making assessment for the purpose of reporting was not a supervisor. The Court therefore will have to bear in mind these tests while examining, as to what is the main work of an employee."
17. Similarly, in an authority reported as Anand Regional Co-op. Oil Seedsgrowers Union Ltd. Vs. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah 2006 III LLJ 767, Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case of an employee working as Assistant Executive in the Quality Control Department of the management, in which the issue was whether the claimant was "workman" or not observed in paragraphs 11 to 17 as under:-
"11. In the disciplinary proceeding while 17 asserting that he did not take part, the Respondent in his evidence stated that he was the Head of the Department and there was no officer superior to him except the Managing Director. To a query made, whether the employees named by him were under his control; he, however, stated that as a senior he gives guidance. He, however, did not state that he was authorized to initiate any departmental proceedings against his subordinates.
12. Section 2(s) of the Act, defines "workman" as under :-
"Workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, or supervisory work for hire or reward whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led that dispute, but does not include any such person :-
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Army Act, 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957; or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages 18 exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature"
13. The ingredients of the definition of 'workman' must be considered having regard to the following factors:
(i) Any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled work, but does not include any such person employed in any industry for hire or reward.
(ii) There must exist a relationship of employer and employee.
(iii) The persons inter alia excluded are those who are employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity.
14. For determining the question as to whether a person employed in an industry is a workman or not; not only the nature of work performed by him but also terms of the appointment in the job performed are relevant considerations.
15. Supervision contemplates direction and control. While determining the nature of the work performed by an employee, the essence of the matter should call for consideration. An undue importance need not be given for the designation of an employee, or the name assigned to, the class to which he belongs. What is needed to be asked is as to what are the primary duties he performs. For the said purpose, it is necessary to prove that there were some persons working under him whose work is required to be supervised. Being incharge of the Section alone and that too it being a 19 small one and relating to quality control would not answer the test.
16. The precise question came up for consideration in Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. vs. Workmen 1970 (3) SCC 248 :
1969-II-LLJ-670 wherein it was held at p.671 of LLJ:
"The question, whether a person is employed in a supervisory capacity or on clerical work, in our opinion, depends upon whether the main and principal duties carried out by him are those of a supervisory character, or of a nature carried out by a clerk. If a person is mainly doing supervisory work, but, incidentally or for a fraction of the time, also does some clerical work, it would have to be held that he is employed in supervisory capacity; and, conversely, if the main work done is of clerical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory duties are also carried out incidentally or as a small fraction of the work done by him will not convert his employment as a clerk into one in supervisory capacity."
17. A person indisputably carries on supervisory work if he has power of control or supervision in regard to recruitment, promotion, etc. The work involves exercise of tact and independence."
18. In Tata Sons Ltd. Vs. S. Bandyopadhyay & Anr.
2004 LLR 506. Hon'ble Delhi High Court dealt with the case of Deputy Manager (Engineering) and observed in paragraphs 7,9,10,18 and 19 as under :-
20"7. The question that arose in T.P. Srivastava vs. M/s National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., 1991 LLR 813 (SC) : AIR 1991 SC 2294 was whether a Section Salesman was a workman or not. The Supreme Court discussed the nature of work of a Section Salesman and concluded that since his duties require an imaginative and creative mind, his duties could not be termed as either manual, skilled, unskilled or clerical in nature. Consequently, it was held that such an employee cannot be termed as a workman. This is what the Supreme Court said in paragraph 3 of the Report :
"It is seen from the facts found that the appellant was employed to do canvassing and promoting sales for the company. The duties involve the suggesting of ways and means to improve the sales, a study of the type or status of the public to whom the product has to reach and a study of the market condition.
He was also required to suggest about the publicity in markets and melas, advertisements including the need for posters, holders and cinema sides. These duties do require the imaginative and creative mind which could not be termed as either manual, skilled, unskilled or clerical in nature. The supervising work of the other local salesmen was part of his work considered by the Tribunal as 21 only incidental to his main work of canvassing and promotion in the area of his operation. Such a person cannot be termed as a workman is also the ratio of the decision of this Court in Nurmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company Vs. Burmah Shell Management and Staff, AIR 1971 SC 922, D.S. Nagraj Vs. Labour Officer Karnal (1972) 42 FLR 440 (AP), J.J. Dechane Distributor Vs. State of kerla (1974) 2 Lab LJ 9 : (1974 Lab IC 379) (Kerala)."
9. Tata Risk Management Services is said to be a division of Tata Sons Ltd. and performs consultancy service in the field of risk management. While the exact nature of duties of the Respondent employee is not specifically available on record various documents filed before the learned Labour Court indicate the nature of work done by him and these document show that his work required imagination and creativity, as one would expect of a consultant.
10. What does the employee say about the nature of work done by him? He says in paragraph 3 of his statement of claim that he was employed with the Petitioner since 15th January, 1985 as a highly skilled workman. He was doing work with his own hands and he had no power to appoint or charge sheet any worker. He had no power to grant leave and could not take independent decisions. He was working on instructions from the management. He repeats this in his 22 affidavit by way of evidence and adds that he was performing duties like checking with his own hands machines, buildings, electrical installations and fire fighting equipments. In other words, his case was that he was a skilled manual worker.
18. None of these documents have been controverted by the employee and these really from the basis for determining the nature of duties performed by him. Even a cursory reading of these documents suggests that the employee was highly educated (as per his visiting card, he is a chartered engineer) and was certainly not doing any manual work as claimed by him. Manual work (or inspection) may have been incidental to his primary duties as a consultant in risk management, but that will not make him a workman for the purposes of the Act. The nature of work clearly involved a considerable amount of mental inputs related to creativity and imagination. It can hardly be said that the employee was someone doing manual work.
19. The word "skilled" as in Section 2(s) of the Act has to be construed ejusdem generis, as held in Adyanthava. So construed, it means skilled work, whether manual or non-manual, which is of a genre of the other types of work mentioned in the definition. The documentary evidence on record clearly shows that the work of the employee was that of a highly qualified and specialized consultant, in the field of risk management. By no stretch of imagination can he be called a skilled workman doing manual or non-manual 23 work.
19. Similarly, in Narsinha Anand Joshi Vs. Century Shipping & Ors. 1994 LLR 440 Hon'ble Bombay High Court dealt with the case of a technical officer and observed in paragraphs 7 to 9 as under :-
"7. I have carefully considered the evidence of the Technical Manager as well as the petitioner-employee. On careful consideration of the same it is clear that the petitioner-employee was not workman or a clerk. In fact, he was working in an administrative capacity. His job was not to do the filing of the papers himself but "he was responsible for ensuring proper filing of papers and maintenance of filing papers" as is evident from the show-cause notice given to him (which is Exh.'E' to the Writ Petition No. 3047 of 1988). It appears that the Labour Court has carefully scanned the entire evidence on record and only on a careful appraisal of the same, arrived at a conclusion that the dominant nature of the duties of the petitioner- employee was administrative. I do not find any infirmity in the said finding which might justify interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
8. I have carefully perused the decision of the Supreme Court in S.K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra & Anr. AIR 1958 SC 130. In this case the Supreme 24 Court while interpreting the definition of workman in Section 2(s) of the Act, has observed in no less clear terms that :
"Quite obviously the broad intention is to take in the entire "labour force" and exclude the "managerial force". That, of course, is as it should be."
9. The sole question for determination, in the present case, therefore is whether the petitioner- employee can be called a workman employed to do the clerical work or employed mainly in administrative capacity. The nature of work of the petitioner-employee, the various duties performed by him, his status and position in the company, his ranking-all clearly go to show that he was employed mainly in the administrative capacity and any work which can be termed as work of clerical nature done by him was only incidental to his employment in the administrative capacity. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the Labour Court was justified in holding that the petitioner was not a workman and, hence, the reference was not maintainable. Writ petition No. 3047 of 1988 has, therefore, no merit and is dismissed."
20. It is the admitted case of the parties that the claimant/ workman was working as accountant with the management.
Workman claims that she is a workman as she had no administrative, managerial or supervisory powers whereas the 25 management claims that she was working in managerial capacity and, as such, is not a workman within the meaning of the Act. MW-1 Sh. Baljeet Sambyal and MW-2 Sh. S.C. Mehrotra have not specified in their affidavits as to what types of administrative and managerial duties she was performing.
They only claimed that she had the authority to pass vouchers, make bank drafts and sign bank cheques but no document has been placed on record wherein she was able to exercise her discretion and tact independently. There is no material on record that she was competent to take action against any staff or she was competent to terminate or appoint anyone. She has claimed in her cross-examination that whenever the manager was on leave another manager used to come from head office for discharging the duties of manager. She denied that she ever officiated as branch manager. MW-1 Sh. Baljeet Sambyal has admitted in his cross-examination that she used to look after posting of cash in accounts books and other kinds of posting relating to her work. He also admitted that she never worked as manager though he claims that she used to officiate in his absence. In an authority reported as Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. R.S. Bhatia, 1975 (31) FLR 26 326, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that work of accountant is mainly of clerical nature unless he is vested with supervisory or administrative duties.
21. In the instant case workman has claimed that she was performing mainly and substantially clerical duties but the management has not come forward to show as to what type of supervisory or administrative duties she was performing. In view of the facts and law referred to above, I am satisfied that she was not conferred with any supervisory or discretionary powers. She had no occasion to exercise her independent discretion and tact. Accordingly, I hold that claimant is a workman within the meaning of the Act. The issue is accordingly decided in favour of the workman and against the management.
ISSUE NO. 3:
22. It is submitted by learned AR for the management that the reference is bad as the workman was employed in a bank and banking is industry under the jurisdiction of Central Government and only Central Government is competent to 27 make the reference but the instant reference is made by Government of National Territory of Delhi and the same is bad in the eyes of law. My attention has been invited to section 2(a) of the Act wherein for banking industry Central Government has been shown to be appropriate Government.
It is submitted that the reference is bad and it may be rejected.
23. On the other hand, learned AR for the workman submitted that reference is competent as Co-operative Bank is not covered by section 2bb of the Act. It is submitted that the workman is employed in a co-operative bank and, as such, reference is competent. My attention has been invited to an reported as Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vs. Coop.
Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685.
24. Section 2(bb ) of the Act defines banking company as under:-
"banking company" means a banking company as defined in section 5 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), having branches or other establishments in more than one State, and includes [the Export-Import Bank of India] [the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India,] [the Small Industries Development Bank of India established under section 3 of the Small 28 Industries Development Bank of India Act, 1989], the Reserve Bank of India, the State Bank of India [a corresponding new bank constituted under section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970) [a corresponding new bank constituted under section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 (40 of 1980), and any subsidiary bank], as defined in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959)].
25. In Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vs. Coop. Bank Employees Union, (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph 30 as under:-
"30. For all these reasons, we have no hesitation in upholding the view taken by the High Court that for the purpose of deciding as to which is the "appropriate Government", within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the ID Act, the definition of the "banking company"
will have to be read as it existed on the date of insertion of Section 2(bb) and so read, the "appropriate Government" in relation to a multi-State cooperative bank, carrying on business in more than one State, would be the State Government."
26. In view of the fact that workman was employed in co-operative bank and co-operative bank is not covered within definition of banking company referred to above, Government 29 of NCT of Delhi was competent to make the reference. The issue is accordingly decided in favour of the workman and against the management.
ISSUES NO. 2 & 4:
27. Both issues shall be disposed of together as they are inter-connected.
28. It is submitted by the learned AR for the workman that the workman never tendered her resignation. The resignation said to have been tendered by her vide EX.WW1/2 was only "a notice to resign". It is repeatedly claimed by her that this notice to resign / wish to resign has been designated by the management as resignation and has been accepted much against the wishes of the workman. It is submitted that after tendering the said letter to the management she requested the branch manager to withdraw it and not to pursue the same but the branch manager kept delaying the matter on one pretext or the other and, thereafter, forwarded it to the head office where it was accepted much after the date on which it has been shown to have been accepted. It is repeatedly claimed that if it is a resignation 30 letter, then it was accepted after its withdrawal by the workman and, as such, acceptance is of no use. My attention has been invited to the following authorities:-
(I) Secy. Technical Education U.P. & Others Vs. Lalit Mohan Upadhyay and another, (2007) 4 SCC 492.
(II) Shambhu Murari Sinha Vs. Project & Development India Ltd. and another, (2002) 3 SCC 437.
(III) J.N. Srivastava Vs. Union of India and another, (1998) 9 SCC 559.
(IV) National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. S. Partha and ors., 1996 1 LLJ 1019.
(V) Punjab National Bank Vs. Shri P.K. Mittal, 1989 1 LLJ 366.
(VI) Balram Gupta Vs. Union of India and another, 1987 1 LLJ
541.
(VII) Union of India Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra and others, AIR 1978 SC 694.
(VIII) Gopal Krishanji Katkar Vs. Mohd. Haji Latif , AIR 1968 SC 1413.
(IX) Automobile Assoc. Upper India Vs. P.O. Labour Court, 130 (2006) DLT 160.
(X) Shubhangi Sopanrao Bhosle Vs. A.D. Deshpande and ors., 1 LLJ, 1995, Bombay High Court, 1124.
29. On the other hand, learned AR for the management submitted that workman had tendered her resignation vide EX.WW1/M2 on 14.11.1998 and she requested the 31 management to accept it. The resignation was accepted by the management as per rules on 20.11.98 and it was conveyed to her on 21.11.98 but she refused to accept the letter whereby she was relieved of her duties. It is also submitted by him that this letter was resignation letter in proper and the workman herself had designated the same as resignation letter in her notice dated December 13, 1998, EX.WW1/M1 sent to the management by her with prayer to take the workman back on duty. It is repeatedly submitted by him that the EX.WW1/M1 was a resignation letter and it was not notice to resign and it has been accepted properly in accordance with rules and the workman stood relieved with effect from 20.11.1998 and, thereafter, she is not entitled to any relief. My attention has been invited to the following authorities:-
(I) Raj Kumar Vs. Union of India and another, 1970, 1 LLJ, SC,
13.
(II) North Zone Cultural Centre & Anr. vs. Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar, 2003 LLR 583.
(III) Rajesh Garg vs. Labour Court, Chandigarh and another, 2003 LLR 587.
(IV) Aditya Nath Banerjee Vs. State Bank of India and others, Calcutta, 226-II LLJ, 74.
(V) M/s J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Company Ltd., Kalpi Road, Kanpur Vs. State of U.P. & others, 1990 (SC), LLR, 503.
32(VI) Laffans India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Pancham Singh Rawat & Anr., 2003 LLR 147.
(VII) Union Carbide India Ltd. Vs. D. Samuel & Ors. 1998 II CLR 736.
30. Management has also submitted its written submissions, copy of which has been supplied to the workman.
31. Now the question is: Whether the letter EX.WW1/M2 dated 14.11.1998 is a resignation letter? For better appreciation, the letter is extracted as under:-
"To, The Manager, The Vaish Cooperative Adarsh Bank Ltd Branch Shakarpur Delhi - 110091 Dear Sir, Due to some unavoidable circumstances I am unable to continue my service, therefore I request you to please accept my resignation. Amount of festival advance due towards me can be deducted from my November month salary. Please pay my full and final.
Thanking you, 33 Nisha Arora 14/11/98"
32. It is the admitted case of the parties that the workman was working as accountant with the management since 1986.
It is also admitted case of the parties that she tendered her resignation on 14.11.1998. There is no previous record of any misconduct and bad blood between the parties. As such, it is clear that she tendered her resignation after twelve years of service. Now the question is: As to why a workman would tender her resignation after a long service of twelve years to her credit, that too, in the rank of accountant in a bank? In her statement of claim it is mentioned that she tendered the resignation under compulsive circumstances, coercion and pressure. It is also submitted by her in the course of arguments that she was a permanent employee. She was a young lady with one kid and was under a lot of mental pressure on account of family work as well as official work. On account of this, she tendered the resignation. In her affidavit also, she has claimed that she tendered the resignation under compulsive circumstances. In her cross-examination she claimed that she was forced to resign. She denied the 34 suggestion that she tendered her resignation voluntarily on 14.11.1998. In these circumstances, it appears that she tendered the letter as an act of threat or exasperation without meaning it.
33. In an authority reported as Dr. Prabha Atri Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2003 I LLJ (SC), 1123, a doctor had tendered her resignation in a similar fashion after putting in about two decades of service on account of some harassment by the management. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it was not a resignation and the workman never meant it to be so. Dealing with the situation Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 7 to 10 as under:-
"7. The only question that mainly requires to be considered, is as to whether the letter dated January 9, 1999 could be construed to mean or amounted to a letter of resignation or merely an expression of her intention to resign, if her claims in respect of the alleged lapse are not viewed favourably. Rule 9 of the hospital service rules provided for resignation or abandonment of service by an employee. It is stated therein that a permanent employee is required to give three months notice of resignation in writing to the appointing authority or three months' salary in lieu of notice and 35 that he/she may be required to serve the period for such notice. In case of non- compliance with the above, the employee concerned is not only liable to pay an amount equal to three months salary, but such amount shall be realizable from the dues, if any, of the employ lying with the hospital. In WORDS AND PHRASES (permanent edition) vol. 37 at page 476; it is found that, "To constitute a "resignation", it must be unconditional and with intent to operate as such. There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. It is to give back, to give up in a formal manner, an office."
At page 474 of the very same book it is found stated: "Statements by club's president and corresponding secretary that they would resign, if constant bickering among members did not cease constituted merely threatened offers, not tenders, of their resignation". It is also stated therein that: "A 'resignation' of a public office to be effective must be made with intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by act of relinquishment." In the ordinary dictionary sense, the word 'resignation' was considered to mean the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right, as conveyed by the maxim. Resignation est juris proprii spontanea refutatio [Black's Law Dictionary -6th Edition]. In Corpus Juris secundum Vol. 77, page 311, it is found stated - "It has been said that 'resignation' is a term of legal art, having legal connotations which describe certain legal results. It is characteristically, the voluntary surrender of a position by the one resigning, made freely and not under 36 duress and the word is defined generally as meaning the act of resigning or giving up, as a claim, possession or position."
8. In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., 1984 (2) SCC 141, this Court had an occasion to consider the nature and character of a letter written by one of the petitioners in that case who after stating in the letter that he has been all along patiently waiting for the redressal of his grievance, yet justice has not been done to him, and "as much, after showing so much patience in the matter, I am sorry to decide that I should resign from the membership of the faculty in protest against such a treatment and against the discrimination and victimisation shown to me by the head of the division in the allotment of students of 1968 and 1969 batches and departmental candidates". In that context, this Court observed that the callous and heartless attitude of the academic council in seizing an opportunity to get rid of him by treating the said letter to be a letter of resignation when really he was all along making representations seeking justice to him and "out of exasperation the said person wrote that letter stating that the only honourable course left open to him was to resign rather than suffer". In Moti Ram v. Param Devi & Anr., JT 1993 (2) SC 251: (1993) 2 SCC 725: 1993 LLR 337, this Court observed as hereunder:-
"As pointed out by this Court, 'resignation' means the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office, it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. It has been held that in the general 37 juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation there must be the intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. It has also been observed that the act of relinquishment may take different forms of assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office and the conditions governing it. [See Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra]. If the act of relinquishment is of unilateral character, it comes into effect when such act indicating the intention to relinquish the office is communicated to the competent authority. The authority to whom the act of relinquishment is communicated is not required to take any action and the relinquishment takes effect from the date of such communication where the resignation is intended to operate in present. A resignation may also be prospective to be operative from a future date and in that event it would take effect from the date indicated therein and not from the date of communication. In cases where the act of relinquishment is of a bilateral character, the communication of the intention to relinquish, by itself, would not be sufficient to result in relinquishment of the office and some action is required to be taken on such communication of the intention to relinquish, e.g. acceptance of the said request to relinquish the office, and in such a case the relinquishment does not become effective or operative such action is taken. As to whether the act relinquishment of an office is unilateral or bilateral in character would depend upon the nature of the office and the 38 conditions governing it."
9. In traversing the contention on behalf of the appellant that the letter in question dated January 9, 1999 could not be construed as a letter of resignation, on behalf of the respondent-hospital authorities it is strenuously contended that such a letter coming from the appellant in the teeth of suspension order and proposed domestic enquiry expressing a desire to tender resignation and that too with immediate effect, cannot but be a resignation outright and simpliciter to avoid facing disciplinary proceedings and that, therefore, the competent authority acted well within its rights in treating it to be a resignation and accepting the same forthwith and as a consequence thereof, directing further not to proceed with the domestic enquiry already ordered. Finally, it has been submitting that if this Court is pleased to interfere in the matter the right of the hospital authorities to pursue the disciplinary action already initiated from the stage at which it stood on the date of acceptance of the resignation should to be jeopardized and liberty may be granted in this regard.
10. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side, in the light of the materials and principles, noted (supra). This is not a case where it is required to consider as to whether the relinquishment envisaged under the rules and conditions of service is unilateral or bilateral in character but whether the letter dated January 9, 1999 could be treated or held to be a letter of resignation or relinquishment of the 39 office, so as to severe her services once and for all. The letter cannot be construed, in our view, to convey the spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish her office accompanied by any act of relinquishment. To constitute a 'resignation', it must be unconditional and with an intention to o0perate as such. At best, as observed by this Court in the decision in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (supra) it may amount to a threatened offer more on account of exasperation to resign on account of a feeling of frustration born out of an idea that she was being harassed unnecessarily but not, at any rate, amounting to a resignation, actual and simple. The appellant had put in about two decades of service in the hospital,that she was placed under suspension and exposed to disciplinary proceedings and proposed domestic enquiry and she had certain benefits flowing to her benefit, if she resigns but yet the letter dated January 9, 1999 does not seek for any of those things to be settled or the disciplinary proceedings being scrapped as a sequel to her so called resignation. The words 'with immediate effect' in the said letter cannot be given undue importance de hors the context, tenor and language used and the purport as well as the remaining portion of the letter indicating circumstances in which it was written. That the management of the hospital took up such action with, as a result of acceptance of the resignation is not of much significance in ascertaining the true or real intention of the letter written by the appellant on January 9, 1999. Consequently, it appears to be reasonable to view that as in the case 40 reported in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (supra) the respondents have seized an opportunity to get rid of the appellant the moment they got the letter dated January 9, 1999, without due or proper consideration of the matter in a right perspective or understanding of the contents thereof. The High Court also seems to have completely lost sight of these vital aspects in rejecting the writ petition."
34. The fact that the letter was not a resignation letter is further strengthened by the fact that she admittedly tendered the resignation on 14.11.1998. MW-1 Sh. Baljeet Sambyal, who was posted as branch manager at the relevant time, has stated in cross-examination that he immediately forwarded the resignation letter on the same day as it was required to be forwarded immediately. However, he has not been able to prove the same by the production of receipt and despatch register. The relevant part of the cross-examination in this regard is extracted as under:-
"I have brought the despatch register from 7.10.98 to 28.10.99. The register was being maintained by despatch clerk. It is correct that in this register there is no entry on 14.11.1998 regarding the sending of workman's resignation to the headquarter. It is correct that there is no entry of such a letter even on 20.11.1998. It is correct that there is no entry on 21.11.1998 regarding receipt of 41 the acceptance of the resignation letter of the workman from the headquarter. The acceptance letter was sent to the workman at her residential address on 27.11.1998 and there is entry in this register at sl. no. 645 in this regard......."
35. This admission strengthens the case of the workman that she kept orally requesting the branch manager not to act on her resignation letter. Resignation has not been established on the record. Management is a co-operative bank and a bank in normal course is required to keep the record of all its correspondence but the bank has failed to prove movement of the resignation letter. If the resignation letter was forwarded on the same day to the head office its movement must have been recorded in the despatch register but it is not so. Thus the entire case of the management is under doubt that the resignation was manipulated and accepted in a manner other than claimed by it. In view of the above discussion I am satisfied that on the face of it the letter EX.WW1/M1 is not a resignation intending to sever the relationship between the workman and the management. If, at all, it was a resignation letter it was accepted by the management after the prayer of the workman to withdraw it or not to act upon the same. As 42 such, the termination of the workman is illegal and unjustified as the same amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of the act without compliance with the relevant provisions.
36. Section 2 (oo) of the Act defines "retrenchment" as under:-
"retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include -
(a) voluntary retirement of the
workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on
reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf ; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-
health"
37. Section 25 F of the Act, provides conditions to be complied with at the time of retrenchment of a workman and 43 lays down as under :-
"No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette"
38. In an authority reported as S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. Vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 27, Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the meaning of "retrenchment" and observed in paragraph 12 as under :-
"12. "Retrenchment" in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work itself is continued. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial 44 pieces of legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take two views of a provision. It is also well settled that Parliament has employed the expression "the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever" while defining the term "retrenchment", which is suggestive of the legislative intent to assign the term "retrenchment" a meaning wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There are four exceptions carved out of the artificially extended meaning of the term "retrenchment", and therefore, termination of service of a workman so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of "retrenchment" dehors the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of "retrenchment" the termination of service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall within categories
(a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of "retrenchment.
39. Since the workman has been retrenched under the garb of the resignation in violation of the law referred to above, her termination is illegal and unjustified and the same is set aside.
40. Now the question is: To what relief the workman is entitled? It is submitted by the workman that she is unemployed since the date of her termination. It is submitted 45 by her that she may be ordered to be reinstated with full back wages while the management has opposed it. In an authority reported as The workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. etc. vs. The Management & Ors.
etc, 1973 (1) SCC 813, Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the relief to be granted to the workman observed in paragraph 32 sub paragraph 10 as under:
"10. In a particular case, after setting aside the order of dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid compensation is, as held by this Court in The Management of Panitole Tea Estate Vs. The workmen (1971) 1 SCC 742 within the judicial decision of a Labour Court of Tribunal."
41. Similarly, in another authority reported as Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Vs. Union of India & Ors. 2000 IV AD (Delhi) 709, Hon'ble Delhi High Court dealt with the question of reinstatement and back wages and observed in paragraphs 27 and 28 as under :-
"27. We find from the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the 1970s and 1980s that reinstatement with back wages was the norm in cases where the termination of the services of the workman was held inoperative. The decisions rendered in the 46 1990s, including the decision of the Constitution Bench in the Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh seem to suggest that compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages is now the norm. In any case, since we are bound to follow the decision of the Constitution Bench, we, therefore, conclude that reinstatement is not the inevitable consequence of quashing an order of termination; compensation can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement and back wages.
28. Considering the facts of this case, we are persuaded to award compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages to the workman.......................................................... ......................................................................."
42. In another authority reported as M.L. Binjolkar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2005 VI (S.C.) 413, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph 7 as under :
"................ Though the High Court has not specifically dealt with the question as to what would be the appropriate quantum, keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in various cases e.g. Hindustan Motors Ltd. Vs. Tapanj Kumar Bhattarcharya & Anr. (2002 (6) SCC 41), Rajendra Prasad Arya Vs. State of Bihar (200 (9) SCC 514), Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Ajit Singh (2005 (3) SCC 232), Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Vs. Neelam (2005 (5) SCC 91), Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore Vs. S. Mani & 47 Ors. (2005 (5) SCC 100) and Allahabad Jal Sansthan Vs. Daya Shankar Rai & Anr. (2005 (5) SCC 124), we do not find any scope for interference. The earlier view was that whenever there is interference with the order of termination or retirement, full back wages were the natural corollary. It has been laid down in the cases noted above that it would depend upon several factors and the court has to weigh the pros and cons of each case and to take a pragmatic view. ........."
43. Similarly in a recent authority reported as U.P. State Brassware Corporation Limited and another Vs. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph 56 as under:-
56. A Division Bench of this Court in M.L. Binjolkar v. State of M.P. (2005) 6 SCC 224, referring to a large number of decisions, held:
(SCC p. 228, para 6) "6 [7] ... The earlier view was that whenever there is interference with the order of termination or retirement, fullback wages were the natural corollary. It has been laid down in the cases noted above that it would depend upon several factors and the Court has to weigh the pros and cons of each case and to take a pragmatic view."
44. The workman was terminated on 20.11.1998. Long 48 period of time has elapsed since her termination. On perusal of record I find that she herself was responsible for the delay in the disposal of the case and her evidence could be concluded only in 2005. She acts impulsively and lands herself in trouble as is clear from the facts referred to above.
In these circumstances, I deem it proper that reinstatement would not be an appropriate option. Considering the length of service, that is, about twelve years for which she worked with the management, I deem it proper that a compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakh fifty thousand) would be good enough to serve the ends of justice. I accordingly, grant her compensation of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakh fifty thousand) to be paid by the management within one month of the publication of the award. Both issues are accordingly decided in favour of the management and against the workman.
45. In view of above discussion, reference is answered in above terms and award is passed accordingly. Six copies of the award be sent to the appropriate Govt. for publication. File be consigned to record room.
Announced in open court. ( O.P. SAINI ) DATED : 05.9.2007 PRESIDING OFFICER :
LABOUR COURT NO.VII : DELHI 49 50 ID No. 21/00 05.9.07 Present: Workman in person.
None for management.
Case Law of the workman is traced and placed on file. Vide my separate order award is passed in favour of the workman and against the management. Six copies of the award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication. File be consigned to record room.
POLC-VII/ 05.9.07 51 (II) Raj Kumar Vs. Union of India and another, 1970, 1 LLJ, SC, 13.
(III) North Zone Cultural Centre & Anr. vs. Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar, 2003 LLR 583.
(IV) Rajesh Garg vs. Labour Court, Chandigarh and another, 2003 LLR 587.
(V) Aditya Nath Banerjee Vs. State Bank of India and others, Calcutta, 226-II LLJ, 74.
(VI) M/s J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Company Ltd., Kalpi Road, Kanpur Vs. State of U.P. & others, 1990 (SC),LLR, 503.
(VII) Laffans India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Pancham Singh Rawat & Anr., 2003 LLR 147.
(VIII) Union Carbide India Ltd. Vs. D. Samuel & Ors. 1998 II CLR
736. 52