Kerala High Court
T.A.Jose & Company vs State Of Kerala on 3 March, 2009
Equivalent citations: AIR 2009 (NOC) 1839 (KER)
Author: Antony Dominic
Bench: Antony Dominic
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C).No. 30292 of 2007(F)
1. T.A.JOSE & COMPANY
... Petitioner
Vs
1. STATE OF KERALA
... Respondent
2. COMMISSIONER, CIVIL SUPPLIES,
3. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TRICHUR.
4. DISTRICT SUPPLY OFFICER,TRICHUR.
5. TALUK SUPPLU OFFICER,
6. THRISSUR TALUK RATION DEALERS
For Petitioner :SRI.V.V.ASOKAN
For Respondent :SRI.K.RAMAKUMAR (SR.)
The Hon'ble MR. Justice ANTONY DOMINIC
Dated :03/03/2009
O R D E R
ANTONY DOMINIC,J.
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W.P.(C).Nos.30292 OF 2007
---------------------------------
Dated this the 3rd day of March, 2009.
JUDGMENT
The main prayer in this writ petition is to quash Exts.P4,P7,P8 and P14 orders.
2. Facts of the case are that, Ext.P1 is an order passed by the 3rd respondent, appointing the petitioner as the Authorized Wholesale Distributor at Mundoor and Kuttanelloor in Trissur District. However, this order was not implemented and seeking its implementation, petitioner filed O.P.No.2072/97 before this court. By this time, Government policy had changed and as a result of which, the first respondent entrusted AWD-1 at Mundoor to a Co-operative Society and AWD No.2 at Kuttanelloor, to the Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation. This arrangement, appears to have continued till 2004 when the Civil Supplies Corporation abandoned the distributorship WP(c).No.30292/07 2 and AWD entrusted to the Co-operative Society was suspended.
3. At this stage, the petitioner herein filed WP(c). No.14615/04, again claiming implementation of Ext.P1, appointing him as AWD at Mundoor and Kuttnelloor. In that writ petition a learned Single Judge of this court passed Annexure-A2 order dated 18.5.2004, directing that if the Government is appointing anybody other than the Civil Supplies Corporation, the same shall be done only in accordance with law after issuing notification. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed W.A. No.1308/04, in which a Division Bench of this court passed Ext.P2 order directing that the AWDs at Mundoor and Kuttanellor shall not be entrusted to anybody other than the appellant (the petitioner herein), if the shops have not already been entrusted to any other person.
4. Thereafter it would appear that the matter was discussed at various levels, as is seen from Exts.P18 to P22. Ext.P18 is the letter issued by the District Supply officer (D.S.O), to the Secretary to Government, Ext.P19 is WP(c).No.30292/07 3 the letter issued by the DSO to Deputy Secretary of the first respondent, Ext.P20 is the letter issued by the Director of Civil Supplies to Secretary to Government, Ext.P21 is yet another letter issued by the D.S.O to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies. In all these communications, reference is made to Ext.P2 order passed by the Division Bench of this court and directions were sought for the arrangement to be made in the context of Ext.P2 order. Ext.P22 is the note files of the first respondent, in which it is seen that after elaborate consideration of the matter at varous levels, the Minister for Food and Civil Supplies, vide his order dated 3.10.2005 ordered to issue directions to the District Collector, Trissur to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment in the light of Ext.P2 order. In pursuance to Ext.P22 referred to above, Annexure-A4 order was issued by the first respondent directing the District Collector, Trissur to take steps for starting the AWD at Mundoor and Kuttanelloor and to entrust its running to the petitioner in the light of Ext.P2 order.
WP(c).No.30292/07 4
5. In pursuance to Annexure-A4 referred to above, petitioner states that he was called upon to submit an application for appointment as AWD and accordingly Annexure-A5 application was submitted by him to the District Collector on 7.10.2005. It is stated that finally the District Collector issued Ext.P3 order dated 13.10.2005 appointing the petitioner as AWD at Mundoor and Kuttanellor exercising his powers under Clause 51(1) of the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966. Although the date of service of Ext.P3 order is not seen disclosed in the pleadings, petitioner submits that in implementation of Ext.P3 he lifted the stock on 14.10.2005 and commenced business from that date itself.
6. While the petitioner was thus continuing as the AWD at Mundoor and Kuttanellor, it is stated that complaint dated 4.1.2006, was received from one Sri. P.B. Mohanan, Secretary, Kerala State Ration Consumers Association, Vittyla, Ernakulam and on its receipt, the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, by order dated 28.1.2006 WP(c).No.30292/07 5 called for the files regarding the appointment of the petitioner and it is so stated in Annexure-A9. Accordingly, under the cover of Annexure-A10 dated 6.2.2006 the files were forwarded to the Director of Civil Supplies. It would appear that acting upon the complaint thus received on 4.1.2006, the second respondent issued Ext.P4 dated 19.4.2006, cancelling the appointment of the petitioner exercising his powers under clause 51(11) of the Kerala Rationing Order.
7. The petitioner challenged Ext.P4 order in WP(c). No.11625/06 and by Ext.P5 order dated 21.4.2006, the oder was stayed by this Court. The writ petition was finally heard by a Division Bench of this court and the case was disposed of by Ext.P6 judgment dated 9.10.2006 relegating the petitioner to pursue the remedy of appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision before the first respondent, as provided in clause 71 of the Rationing Order, a copy of which is Ext.P7. It is stated that complaining of delay in the disposal of the revision, the petitioner filed WP(c).No.27315/06. That writ petition was WP(c).No.30292/07 6 disposed of by Ext.P9 judgment, after hearing the 6th respondent also, directing that the first respondent shall hear the petitioner and the 6th respondent herein and dispose of the revision and that in the meanwhile, allow the petitioner to continue the business. Here it should be stated that although in Ext.P6 judgment, taking note of the submission made by the 6th respondent, this court directed the petitioner to file an appeal, what the petitioner filed was a revision under clause 71 of the Rationing Order. Despite this, the 6th respondent did not question the maintainability of the revision petition while WP(c). No.27315/06 was heard and disposed of by Ext.P9 judgment.
8. In pursuance to Ext.P9 judgment, the first respondent heard the parties and disposed of the revision by Ext.P14, Government Order No.G.O(Rt) No.484/07/FCSD dated 22.10.2007. Paragraph 7 to 10 of that order being relevant, are extracted below for reference.
"In order to dispose of the Revision Petition filed by T.A Jose and Company, the Secretary(F&CS WP(c).No.30292/07 7 Dept.) conducted a hearing on 3.10.2007 at 11 AM. Advocate Sri. S. Sreekumar represented for the Thrissur Taluk Ration Dealers Association and Advocate V.V. Asokan represented M/s. T.A Jose and company.
8. Arguments for Thrissur Taluk Ration Dealers Association.
a. The Court Direction and Govt. Direction are only to the limit that M/s. T.A Jose and company may be entrusted only with sub-depots and they are permitted to run the depots only on temporary measures till permanent alternate arrangements are made.
b. By misinterpreting the court order dated 18.5.04 in O.P.No.14615/04 and the Govt. direction, the collector appointed M/s. T.A. Jose ad Company as permanent authorized wholesale dealer without due notification and also in a hasty manner. Hence the Commissioner of Civil Supplies rightly cancelled the order of the District Collector and it is in order. The counsel has requested to dismiss the revision petition, vacate the stay order of Civil Supplies Commissioner and entrust the AWD 3 & 4 to Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation.
9. Argument for T.A Jose and Company.
a. The Commissioner of Civil Supplies has cancelled the AWD license without notice or afford an opportunity of being heard.
b. The appeal petitioner Sri. V.B. Mohan is a fictitious person since he has not appeared before Civil Supplies Commissioner or the Secretary for hearing.
c. A person from Ernakulam District has no locus standi to challenge the order as the subject AWD WP(c).No.30292/07 8 Depots are in Thrissur Distrct.
d. The Commissioner of Civil Supplies has no power to invoke suo motu revisional jurisdiction after a period of six months of the original order.
e. Against the High Court order in O.P filed by M/s. T.A Jose & Company No.14615/04, they filed a writ application in which the court has given an interim direction to entrust the sub depots at Mundoor and Kuttanellor to M/s.T.A. Jose and Company. He had requested to set aside the order of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies and allow the revision petition.
10. The arguments put forward by the counsel and the information gatheredThe the records has Commissioner of in examined since the appointmentSupplies Civildetail. fromfindings of Company as AWD 3 and of in Thrissur was inof M/s.isT.A Jose and seen correct 4 a haste, misinterpreting bothHigh directionThe the Govt.
procedure followedHon'ble regard was also not and the Court.
in this correct. Moreover, Govt. is examining the feasibility of entrusting whole sale distribution of ration articles throughwith Kerala State Civil the supplies Corporation a view to avoid diversion of ration articles in open market. Hence it is better to entrust the AWD 3 and 4 of Thrissur District to Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation.
containedthese
In circumstances, the request
in the revision petition filed by M/s.
T.A. Jose and Company is liable to be rejected and hereby dong so by upholding the decision of the Commissioner of Civildated Supplies in his proceedings NO.CS A8.895/06District19.4.2006.
The AWD 3 & 4 Thrissur is hereby WP(c).No.30292/07 9 ordered to entrust with Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation. The Revision petition filed by M/s. T.A Jose and Company is thus disposed of. This order is issued under Rule 71 of the Kerala Rationing Order 1966 and in compliance with the directions contained in the judgment read 4th,7th and 8th paper read above."
By this order, the revision was rejected and it is in these circumstances the writ petition is filed with the prayers as mentioned above.
9. Sr. V.V. Asokan, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that, Ext.P4 order cancelling the petitioner's appointment as AWD was issued by the 2nd respondent, without issuing notice, giving him an opportunity to make his representation and also without an opportunity of hearing. It was also contended that Ext.P4 order has been passed beyond the time limit prescribed in clause 5(11) of the Rationing Order. It was also contended that, although the 2nd respondent has power to condone the delay in entertaining the complaint, nothing has been stated in Ext.P4 to show whether delay has been condoned and that in any case, delay could not have been condoned without notice to the petitioner.
WP(c).No.30292/07 10
10. It was also argued that in terms of the scheme of the Kerala Rationing Order only a person aggrieved could have made a complaint and that in this case the complaint dated 4.1.2006, on the basis of which Ext.P4 order was passed has been filed by a person from Vytilla, who could not have had any grievance about petitioner's appointment and therefore no action whatsoever could have been taken by the authorities. Lastly, it was argued that Ext.P14 order passed by the first respondent exercising the power of revision under clause 71 of the Rationing Order is also illegal for the reason that the contentions raised by the petitioner were not considered.
11. On behalf of respondents 1 to 5, the Additional Advocate General Sri. Renjith Thampan appeared. Although he did not dispute the factual correctness of the case of the petitioner that Ext.P4 order was passed without giving him any notice or hearing, he contended that Ext.P3 order having been passed in violation of the provisions contained in the Kerala Rationing Order and also Annexure-A6 Government Order, is a void one and WP(c).No.30292/07 11 hence, no right whatsoever can be claimed on the basis of the said order. It is stated that if Ext.P3 is a void order, petitioner cannot claim that he should have been issued notice or given hearing before cancelling such an order.
12. In so far as the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner that Ext.P4 order has been passed beyond the time limit prescribed in Clause 51(11) of the Rationing Order, learned Addl. Advocate General contended that the time limit prescribed in clause 51(11) of the Rationing Order is only for initiating the proceedings and not for passing the final order. According to him, proceedings have been initiated on 4.1.2006 or at least on 28.1.2006, when the records were called for and therefore the case of the petitioner that the order was passed beyond the time prescribed is erroneous. He also referred to Section 85A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and the judgments of this court in Subramania Mudaliar V. Taluk Land Board (1986 KLT 338), Glen Leve Estate (P) Ltd. V. State of Kerala (1999(3) KLT 239 and Balan V. State of Kerala (2006(4) KLT 229) to contend that the time WP(c).No.30292/07 12 limit is only for initiating proceedings.
13. Answering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that delay has not been condoned, it was argued that once proceedings have been initiated that necessarily means that the delay has been condoned. Finally he argued that for technical reasons if Ext.P4 order is set aside, the result will be the resurrection of Ext.P3, an illegal order, and that in such a case, this court should not set aside the impugned order. He placed reliance on the judgment of this court in Shenoy V. Central Bank of India (1983 KLT 381) and that of the Apex Court in M.C. Metha V. Union of India & Ors. 1999(6) SCC 237 and Rajkumar Soni V. State of U.P and another.(2007(10) SCC
635).
14. Sri. K. Ramakumar, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the 6th respondent contended that Ext.P4 order has become final and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable. According to him, Ext.P3 being a void order no right flows from Ext.P3 and therefore the petitioner has no legal right to be issued notice or to be WP(c).No.30292/07 13 heard. He also contended that for the above reason itself, the petitioner has no right to invoke Art.226 of the Constitution and seek a discretionary relief from this court. Counsel also argued that petitioner being a back door entrant, is liable to go out through the back door itself.
15. Elaborating his contention that Ext.P4 has become final and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable, it was contended that Ext.P4 is an appealable order in terms of clause 51(10) of the Rationing Order and that in Ext.P6 judgment, the petitioner was relegated to pursue the appellate remedy. However, the petitioner did not file an appeal and therefore Ext.P4 has become final. According to him, when clause 51(10) of the Rationing Order provides a right of appeal, it being a specific remedy provided under the Statute, the residuary remedy of revision could not have been invoked.
16. In so far as his contention that Ext.P3 being a void order and that no right flows from the said order and that as a result the petitioner has no legal right to be heard, counsel placed reliance on R. Vishwanatha Pillai V. WP(c).No.30292/07 14 State of Kerala and Ors. (2004(2)SCC 105), State of U.P & Ors. V. Desh Raj (2007(1)SCC 257), M.P. State Co. Op. Bank Ltd. V. Nanuram Yadav & Ors. (2007(8)SCC 264), Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. V. K. Brahmanandam & Ors.(2008(5) SCC 241) and Pramod Kumar V. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Ors.(2008(7)SCC 153. He also reiterated the contention that the petitioner's appointment being illegal they cannot seek the assistance of this court to remain in business.
17. On behalf of the 7th respondent the Standing Counsel Mrs. Molly Jacob entered appearance. According to her, Ext.P3 appointment was only a temporary arrangement and therefore the Government is always competent to entrust the AWD to anybody it deems appropriate. She also canvassed for the position that after Ext.P3, petitioner has not been issued an order of appointment as contemplated in the Rationing Order. It was therefore argued that in the absence of such a valid and proper order of appointment, the petitioner cannot WP(c).No.30292/07 15 claim any legal right.
18. Among the various contentions raised by the respective parties, I shall first deal with the contention of the petitioner that Ext.P4 order was passed without notice to make representation and hearing and therefore is illegal. I choose to deal with this contention for the reason that in case if I agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order is illegal for this reason, then the matter should necessarily be reconsidered by the 2nd respondent, in which case, it is for the 2nd respondent to decide on the other contentions of the respective parties.
19. As already noticed, Ext.P4 itself shows that the order was passed by the 2nd respondent exercising his powers under Clause 51(11) of the Rationing Order. Clause 51(11) being relevant is extracted below for reference.
The Commissioner may either suo motu or on application, call for and examine the records of any order passed by a subordinate authority under the provisions of this clause, for purpose of satisfying himself as to the legalitythe or to the propriety of such order and may-
WP(c).No.30292/07 16
(a) confirm, modify or set aside the order.
(b) impose any penalty or set aside, reduce confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order:
(c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or any other authority directing such further action or enquiry as the commissioner considers proper in the circumstances of the case; or
(d) commissioner may deem fit;order pass such other as the (Provided that the power under this sub- clause shall not be exercised:-
(I) Suo motu, after the expiry of six months from the date of service of such order.
(ii) On application, if the application has been filed after the expiry of sixty days from the date of service of such order;) (Provided further that the commissioner may entertain application under this sub-
clause after expiry of the said period, if he is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not submitting the application in time).
Provided further that no order to the disadvantage of a person shall be passed under this sub-clause unless the person concerned is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such order(and also an opportunity of hearing him in person.)"
20. A reading of this provision makes it clear that either suo motu or on application, the 2nd respondent has power to call for any order passed by any subordinate WP(c).No.30292/07 17 authority under clause 51, examine and satisfy himself about the legality or propriety of such order. The nature of orders to be passed by the 2nd respondent are those provided in clause (a) to (d) of Clause 51(11). First proviso states that the power shall not be exercised suo motu after the expiry of 6 months from the date of service of such order and that on application, the 2nd respondent is forbidden from exercising the power if the application has been filed after the expiry of 60 days of the date of service of such order. The 2nd proviso confers power on the 2nd respondent to entertain an application after the expiry of the period specified, if he is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not submitting the application in time. The 3rd proviso prohibits passing of any order to the disadvantage of a person unless he is given an opportunity of making representation against such an order and an opportunity of hearing is given.
21. Thus under the 3rd proviso to clause 51(11) it is mandatory that the petitioner should have been given the opportunity of making his representations and also an WP(c).No.30292/07 18 opportunity of hearing. Admittedly, this proviso has not been complied with in this case and none of the respondents have a case to the contrary. While considering his revision, this contention was urged by the petitioner and it has been noted at paragraph 9(a) of Ext.P14. A reading of paragraph 10 of the order shows that the Government however did not deal with this contention. Therefore, Exts.P4 and P14 orders, deserve to be set aside for violation of the 3rd proviso to clause 51 (11) of the Kerala Rationing Order.
22. The contention raised by the respondents is that Ext.P3 being a void order, no right whatsoever flows from the said order. It is therefore argued that the petitioner cannot claim any right to make representation or an opportunity of hearing even though these are statutory requirements. As already noticed, Sri. K. Ramakumar counsel appearing for the 6threspodnent relied on the judgments referred to above and those judgment rendered in cases dealing with service matters, do support his contention that no right flows from a void order. But what WP(c).No.30292/07 19 is to be examined is whether Ext.P3 order can be ignored for all purposes even in the absence of a challenge against the same.
23. It is true that in the judgments and also in text books the word "void" is sometimes used to mean voidable with the result that expressions such as null and void, absolutely void, void ab initio have had to be used to make it clear that what is meant is void, in the strict sense of that term. "Void", it is true, means an empty space and is in strict legal parlance, used to denote a transaction that is altogether devoid of the legal results contemplated. So far as those results are concerned, it is legally a nullity; it is as if it never were. But to say, as is often done, that such a transaction is void as against the whole world is misleading in as much as that implies that the whole world would have the right to question it. For, the whole world would neither be interested in, nor even entitled to, question such a transaction. Only a person having at least a title or interest in the subject matter of the transaction, would have the right to question it. Nor would it be correct WP(c).No.30292/07 20 to say that a void act is, for all purposes and in all circumstances, a nullity. Similarly, a voidable transaction is one which a person affected thereby can, at his option, either affirm or avoid. If he chooses to affirm or ratify it, he is thereafter precluded from avoiding or repudiating it. Once he successfully avoids it, it is, at any rate so far as he and persons claiming under him are concerned, as if the transaction had never existed, it is deemed to have been void ab initio. The avoidness of it will relate back to the making of it, although, until avoidance, it is regarded as operative, not absolutely but only conditionally being subject to defeasance by avoidance.
24. Effect of an order which is void, has been the subject matter of various judicial pronouncements. In Patel Narsh Thakershi & Ors. V. Shri Pradyuman Singh (1971(3)SCC 844, dealing with the effect of an order passed by the Government exercising power of review which it did not have, the Apex Court held that;
"If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order. The question whether the Government's order is WP(c).No.30292/07 21 correct or valid in law does not arise for consideration in these proceedings so long as that order is not set aside or declared void by a competent authority. Hence the same cannot be ignored. The subordinate Tribunals have to carry out that order.
25. Later in State of Kerala V. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil & Ors.(1996(1)SCC
435), this very issue was again considered by the Apex Court and it was held that even a void order cannot be said to be non-existent in all situations and will remain effective inter-parties until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. It was also held that the question whether an order can be avoided will depend upon the degree of its invalidity, as to whether it is fundamental or otherwise. On this reasoning it was held that there was no fundamental infirmity with the proceedings initiated by the State Land Board without intimation regarding the non filing of return under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Proceeding further, their Lordships have quoted from the Judicial Review of Administrative Action in De Smith, Woolf and Jowell 1995 Edn., which reads as under;
WP(c).No.30292/07 22
"The erosion of the distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors has, as we have seen, correspondingly eroded the distinction between void and voidable decisions. The courts have become increasingly impatient with the distinction to the extent that the situation today can be summarized as follows;
(1)All official decisions are presumed to be valid until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction."
26. Again in the judgment in Howrah Daw Mangla Hat B.B. Samity V. Pronab Kumar Daw( 2001(6) SCC 534, after referring to several authorities, the question has been considered in paragraph 22, in the following words.
"Thus the expressions "void and voidable" have been the subject-matter of consideration on innumerable occasions by courts. The expression "void" has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceedings or otherwise. The other type of void act e.g. may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is a good transaction against the whole world. So far as the minor is concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceedings the transaction becomes void from the very beginning. Another type of void act may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made. Voidable act is that which is a good WP(c).No.30292/07 23 act unless avoided, e.g. if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent and/ or forged and fabricated, it is voidable as the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs and a party who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. If it is proved that the document is forged and fabricated and a declaration to that effect is given, a transaction becomes void from the very beginning. There may be a voidable transaction which is required to be set aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and not any day prior to it. In cases where legal effect of a document cannot be taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be treated to be void but would be obviously voidable ."
27. In M. Meenakshi & Ors. V.Metadin Agarwal (dead) By lrs. and others (2006(7) SCC 470), the Apex court again reiterated that even a void order is required to be set aside by a competent court of law in the following words.
"It is a well-settled principle of law hat even a void order is required to be set aside by a competent court of law in as much as an order may be void in respect of one person but may be valid in respect of another. A void order is necessarily not non est. An order cannot be declared to be void in a collateral proceeding and that too in the absence of the authorities who were the authors thereof. The orders passed by the authorities were not found to be wholly without jurisdiction. They were not, thus, nullities."
28. The aforesaid position has been reiterated in the WP(c).No.30292/07 24 judgment in Pune Municipal Coporation V. State of Maharashtra & Ors.(2007(5) SCC 211). Paragraph 36 to 40 of the judgment reads as under.
"It is well settled that no order can be ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded that it was illegal, void or not in consonance with law. As Prof. Wade states;
"The principle must be equally true even where the `brand of invalidity' is plainly visible' for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court."
He further states;
"The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason,. In any such case the `void' order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another. "
In smith V. East Elloe Rural District Council Ac at.p.769, Lord Radcliffe had an occasion to consider a similar argument(that the order was null and void.) Negativing the contention, the Law Lord made the following oft- quoted observations(All ER P.871 G-H) This argument is, in reality, a play on the meaning of the word nullity. An order , even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.(emphasis supplied) A similar question came up for consideration before this court in State of Punjab V. Gurdev Singh. In Gurdev Singh a suit for declaration was instituted by the plaintiff contending that the WP(c).No.30292/07 25 order dismissing him from service was ultra vires, unconstitutional, violative of principles of natural justice and void ab initio and he continued to be in service.
accordance with the provisions ofSuch Articlesuit, of in 113 the Limitation Act, 1963, must be filed within three years from the date of passing of order or when departmental appealdismissal or revision is filed from appeal/revision. Theofsuit was, however, filed the date of such beyond the period of three years. The High Court held that since the order was void, the provisions of the limitation Act would not apply to such order. The aggrieved State approached this Court.
Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the Court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the Court within the period prescribed by limitation." If the statutory time of limitation expires, the court cannot give the declaration sought for.
The Court then stated (Gurudev singh case SCC p.6 para 7) "If an Act is void or ultra vires it is enough for the court to declare it so and it collapses automatically. It need not be set aside. The aggrieved party can simply seek a declaration that it is void and not binding upon him. A declaration merely declares the existing state of affairs and does not `quash' so as to produce a new state of affairs".
29. Again in Deepak Agro Foods V. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2008(7) SCC 748) it has been held that; WP(c).No.30292/07 26
"All irregular or erroneous or even illegal orders cannot be held to be null and void as there is a fine distinction between the orders which are null and void and orders which are irregular, wrong or illegal. Where an authority making order lacks inherent jurisdiction, such order would be without jurisdiction, null, non est and void ab initio as defect of jurisdiction of an authority goes to the root of the matter and strikes at its very authority to pass any order and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties(See Kiran singh V.Chaman Paswan). However, exercise of jurisdiction in a wrongful manner cannot result in a nullity- it is an illegality, capable of being cured in a duly constituted legal proceedings.
Proceedings for assessment under a fiscal statute are not in the nature of judicial proceedings, like proceedings in a suit in as much as the assessing officer does not adjudicate on a lis between an assessee and the State and therefore the law on the issue laid down undertotheassessmentmay not stricto civil law sensu apply proceedings.
Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the distinction between a null and void order and an illegal or irregular order it would be profitable to notice few decisions of this court on the point.
In Rafique Bibi V. Syed Waliuddin explaining the distinction between null and void decree and illegal decree, this Court has said that a decree can be said to be without jurisdiction, and hence a nullity, if the court passing the decree has usurped a jurisdiction, which it did not have; a mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The lack of WP(c).No.30292/07 27 jurisdiction in the court passing the decree must be patent on its face in order to enable the executing court to take cognizance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction. The court further held that a distinction exists between a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordancedecree the procedure laid down by with law. A suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed in executable."
30. In the light of the law as laid down in the binding pronouncements referred above, one has to appreciate whether Ext.P3 order passed by the District Collector, appointing the petitioner as AWD, at Mudoor and Kuttanelloor is a void one and whether it can be ignored for all purposes and in all circumstances. The argument of voidness is set up only on the basis that the order was issued, without inviting applications as required under the provisions of the Rationing Order and that it violates Annexure-A6 Government Order. The jurisdiction of the District Collector to make appointment of AWD is not disputed. If that be so, the resultant position is that, the District Collector who has acted within his jurisdiction WP(c).No.30292/07 28 to appoint the petitioner as AWD, at best has committed an irregularity or illegality in appointing the petitioner without inviting applications. If that be so, such an irregular or illegal order can be avoided only if it is set aside in an appropriate proceedings before a competent forum. The appropriate proceedings is the one provided under clause 51(11) of the Rationing Order and it is in exercise of this power that the 2nd respondent has issued Ext.P4 order setting aside Ext.P3 order of appointment. Such order can be passed only in compliance with the provisions of clause 51 (11) of the Rationing Order itself. If that be so, an opportunity to make his representations and an opportunity of hearing to the affected party are the essential requirements of exercising the power and these mandatory requirements could not have been dispensed with. Admittedly, this has not been complied with and for that reason I must hold that Ext.P4 order is illegal. If that be so, Ext.P4 order should necessarily be set aside and the matter has to be reconsidered.
WP(c).No.30292/07 29
31. The argument that if Ext.P4 is set aside that would result in the resurrection of Ext.P3, an illegal order also has not impressed me. As already stated, Ext.P3 order, irrespective of the nature of it, is binding inter- parties, unless it is avoided by an order in an appropriate proceedings before a competent forum. Therefore, so long as the order remains effective, the petitioner is entitled to continue as AWD and the consequence of that order cannot be avoided. Even otherwise, in view of Exts.P18 to P22 and Annexure-4 Govt. Order, I have considerable doubt whether such an argument can be raised by the State. In any case I do not think it proper for me to do a deeper probe on this issue, since a reconsideration of the matter is necessary.
32. I should also make reference to Ext.P14 order passed by the first respondent on the revision filed by the petition under Clause 71 of the Rationing Order. A reading of the order itself show that the petitioner has raised the contention that Ext.P4 order was passed without notice or hearing and that proceedings initiated WP(c).No.30292/07 30 was beyond the time limit prescribed. However, none of these contentions have been considered by the Government. Therefore, on this ground itself Ext.P14 order needs to be invalidated.
33. Here I should also deal with the contention raised by Sri. Ramakumar, Learned Sr. Counsel that Ext.P4 order has become final and therefore the petitioner cannot ask for any relief in this proceedings. This contention was raised, on the basis that in Ext.P6 judgment in WP(c). No.11625/06, though the petitioner was relegated to pursue the remedy of appeal, the petitioner filed only a revision. It is stated that in view of the directions in Ext.P6 judgment and since clause 51(10) provides for an appellate remedy, the revision was not maintainable and consequently Ext.P4 has become final. First of all irrespective of the directions in Ext.P6 judgment, clause 71 of the Rationing Order provides for a revisional remedy and if the petitioner has that remedy available, there cannot be any estoppal against him.
WP(c).No.30292/07 31
34. Further, it is also not open to the 6th respondent to dispute the maintainability of the revision filed by the petitioner at this distance of time. This is for the reason that after filing the revision, the petitioner herein filed WP
(c).No.2731/06 before this court, complaining of delay in the disposal of the revision. That writ petition was disposed of by Ext.P9 judgment, after hearing the 6th respondent also. The judgment does not show nor has he got a case before me that the question of maintainability of the revision was raised by the 6th respondent. Further in Ext.P7 revision which resulted in Ext.P14 order also, the 6th respondent was heard. Admittedly, the question of maintainability of the revision was not raised on that occasion also. If that be so, the 6th respondent cannot now be permitted to raise a contention on the maintainability of Ext.P7 revision filed by the petitioner. Therefore the argument of the learned Sr. Counsel that Ext.P4 order has attained finality is only to be rejected and I do so.
35. Since I have held Exts.P4 and P14 order to be invalid for not complying with the 3rd proviso to clause WP(c).No.30292/07 32 51(11) of the Rationing Order, I do not think it necessary or proper for this court to enter into a finding on the competence of the complainant at whose instance, Ext.P4 order was rendered or the contention that proceedings initiated were beyond the time specified in clause 51(11) or that in spite of delay the same was not condoned by the 2nd respondent and all other contentions raised by the parties. These are issues which necessarily will have to be raised by the petitioner, before the 2nd respondent, if and when fresh proceedings are initiated and are left open.
Therefore, the writ petition will stand disposed of quashing Ext.P4 and Ext.P14 and leaving it open to the 2nd respondent to initiate fresh proceedings, in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Rationing Order.
(ANTONY DOMINIC) JUDGE vi/ WP(c).No.30292/07 33