Madras High Court
Surana Industries Ltd vs M/S.Good Earth Maritime Ltd on 25 August, 2005
Equivalent citations: AIR 2006 MADRAS 93, (2005) 4 MAD LJ 375 (2006) WRITLR 3, (2006) WRITLR 3
Bench: Markandey Katju, A.Kulasekaran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED:25/08/2005
CORAM
THE HONBLE MR.MARKANDEY KATJU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
THE HONBLE MR.JUSTICE A.KULASEKARAN
W.A.Nos. 1616 of 2005
and
1626 of 2005
and
W.A.M.P.Nos.3005, 3006 and 3016 of 2005
W.A.No.1616 of 2005
Surana Industries Ltd.,
29, Whites Road,
Second Floor, Royapettah,
Chennai 600 014. ..Appellant.
-Vs-
1. M/s.Good Earth Maritime Ltd.,
Owners of the Vessel Good Day
Rep. by its Streamer Agents,
East Coast (I) Maritime Agencies Pvt. Ltd.,
No.92, Dr.Radhakrishnan Road,
Mylapore,
Chennai 600 004.
2. The Trustees of Port Trust of Madras,
Rep. by its Chairman,
Chennai Port Trust,
Chennai. ..Respondents.
PRAYER: Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge
dated 29.06.2005 passed in W. P.No.20761 of 2005.
W.A.No.1626 of 2005
!The Board of Trustees of the
Chennai Port Trust,
Rep. by its Chairman,
Rajaji Salai,
Chennai 1.
..Appellant.
Vs
^M/s.Good Earth Maritime Limited,
Owners of the Vessel Good Day
Rep. by its Streamer Agents,
East Coast (I) Maritime Agencies Pvt. Ltd.,
No.92, Dr.Radhakrishnan Road,
Mylapore,
Chennai 600 004. ..Respondent.
PRAYER: Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge
dated 29.06.2005 passed in W.P.No.20761 of 2005.
--------
Mrs.R.Vagai For Appellant in W.A.1616/2005
Mr.R.Karthikeyan :: For Appellant in W.A.1626/2005
& For R2 in W.A.1616/2005
Mr.Ramkumar
For R1 in both the W.As.
:J U D G M E N T
THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE Writ Appeal No.1616 of 2005 has been filed against the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge dated 29.06.2005 in W.P.No.20761 of 2005.
2. Admittedly the appellant viz., Surana Industries Limited, Chennai in W.A.No.1616 of 2005 was not impleaded as a respondent in the writ petition which was decided by the learned single Judge. The only party impleaded in the writ petition as a respondent was the Trustees of the Port Trust of Madras. The appellant Surana Industries Limited, Chennai who filed Writ Appeal No.1616 of 2005 before us was granted leave by our order dated 09.08.2005 to file this writ appeal.
3. The other writ appeal being W.A.No.1626 of 2005 has been filed by the Board of Trustees of the Port Trust of Madras.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. We are of the opinion that the impugned order of the learned single Judge dated 29.06.2005 deserves to be set aside on the short ground that the appellant in W.A.No.1616 of 2005 viz., Surana Industries Limited, Chennai was a necessary party to the litigation and it should have been impleaded and heard in the Writ Petition No.20761 of 2005 before disposing it off. The rules of natural justice require that a necessary party should be heard in a case, before deciding it.
5. The facts of the case are that the appellant-Surana Industries Limited, Chennai was the Purchaser/Consignee of cargo viz., Steel Scrap amounting to 22530.77 Metric Tonnes which it purchased from M/ s. Midland Resources Holding Ltd., Channel Islands, United Kingdom. The appellant purchased the said cargo from the seller under the Sale Contract dated 20.01.2005. The writ petitioner (respondent-1 in this appeal) viz., M/s.Good Earth Maritime Limited, Chennai is the owner of the vessel which was chartered by the seller.
6. It is alleged in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed by the writ petitioner namely., M/s. Good Earth Maritime Limited, Chennai (1 st respondent in W.A.1616 of 2005) that the petitioner Good Earth Maritime Limited, Chennai are the owners of ocean going vessels and are engaged in transportation of cargo by sea. The vessel m.v.Good Day was one of such ocean going vessels owned by the petitioner. It is further alleged that it is the normal practice of the ship owners either to carry cargo of several consignors in their vessel at one time, or to hire out the entire vessel to a Charterer for transportation of the Charterers cargo alone. It is alleged that when a vessel is on Charter to a Charterer, it is the Charterers responsibility to produce sufficient cargo for carriage by the vessel, load the cargo on board the vessel, and discharge it within the time stipulated for such loading and discharge. It is further alleged that if there is any delay in loading of cargo at the load port or in discharge of cargo at the destination port, the Charterer is liable to pay demurrage to the ship owner for every day of such delay to compensate for the loss caused by the delay in taking on subsequent engagements. If on the other hand the Charterers complete the loading and dischage before the maximum time stipulated, the vessel owner give dispatch money as a sort of a bonus for quick loading and saving the ships time.
7. In paragraph 4 of the writ petitioners affidavit it is stated that their vessel m.v.Good Day was chartered by one M/s.Midlands Resources Holdings Limited, United Kingdom for carriage of goods from GDANSK, Poland to Chennai, India. It is alleged that as per the terms of the Charter, the said Charterer placed on board the said vessel steel scraps covered by 6 Bills of Lading Nos.1 to 6 all dated 23.0 4.2005 for carriage of a total of 22530.77 Metric Tonnes of steel scrap. As per the Charter Party Agreement the Charterers of the vessel and/or their consignees were required to discharge the cargo from the petitioners vessel at the rate of 2,000 Metric Tonnes per day which means that in the instant case, the Charterers/Consignees ought to have discharged the cargo within 11 days and 6 hours of the notice of readiness to commence discharge. Notice of readiness to commence discharge was given by the petitioner on 27.05.2005 at 11.30 hrs and discharge of cargo by the consignees commenced on 27.05.2005 at 23.15 hrs. However, it is alleged that right from the inception the discharge had been very slow and thoroughly inefficient and more than 5000 tonnes of cargo remains to be discharged on the vessel though more than 2 7 days had elapsed. It is alleged that there has therefore been an inordinate delay in discharge of the cargo and as per the terms of the Charter Party Agreement for everydays delay the Charterers are liable to pay the petitioners US$25,000 towards demurrage. It is alleged that the total amount due and payable by the Charterers/Consignees to the petitioner as on the date of filing of the writ petition worked out to Rs.1,76,00,000. It is alleged that the petitioner sent several e-mails to the Charterers and the Consignees complaining against the slow rate of discharge and asking for furnishing security for payment of huge demurrage that had accrued. The Charterers/Consignees having failed to pay the accrued demurrage or even providing security for the same, the petitioners exercised the right of maritime lien for demurrage due over the cargo and sent a letter dated 18.06.2005 to the respondent under Section 60 of the Major Trust Act, 1963, intimating that the petitioners were exercising their lien on the cargo. It is alleged that under Section 60 of the Major Trust Act, 1963 the ship owners lien for freight and other charges are recognized even after discharge of the cargo and while it is in the custody of the Port Trust.
8. Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 states as follows:-
60. Ship-owners lien for freight and other Charges:-
(1)If the master or owner of any vessel or his agent, at or before the time of landing from such vessel any goods at any dock, wharf, quay, stage, jetty, berth, mooring or pier belonging to or in the occupation of a Board, gives to the Board a notice in writing that such goods are to remain subject to a lien for freight or other charges payable to the ship-owner, to an amount to be mentioned in such notice, such goods shall continue to be liable to such lien to such amount.
(2)The goods shall be retained in the custody of the Board at the risk and expense of the owners of the goods until such lien is discharged as hereinafter mentioned; and godown or storage rent shall be payable by the party entitled to such goods for the time during which they may be so retained.
(3)Upon the production before any officer appointed by the Board in that behalf of a document purporting to be a receipt for, or release from, the amount of such lien, executed by the person by whom or on whose behalf such notice has been given, the Board may permit such goods to be removed without regard to such lien, provided that the board shall have used reasonable care in respect to the authenticity of such document.
9. It was alleged by the writ petitioner that Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 gives the right to the petitioner to exercise lien on the cargo discharged into the custody of the respondent-Port Trust, and it is the duty of the respondent to retain the cargo in their custody and at the risk and expenses of the consignees of the goods until such lien is discharged. However, it is alleged that the Port Trust failed to act on the petitioners letter dated 18.06.2005 and the reminder dated 21.06.2005 issued to them by the petitioner, and on the contrary, allowed the consignees to remove part of the cargo already discharged in violation of their duty under Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.
10. In paragraph 6 of the petitioners affidavit it is alleged that in view of the invocation of maritime lien, it has become necessary for the petitioner to themselves discharge the cargo from the vessel and entrust the same to the respondent to exercise lien under Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 so that the vessel is not unnecessarily detained and does not incur further demurrage. It is alleged that under Section 42(2) of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 the respondent is statutorily obliged to receive cargo discharged by the petitioners vessel and hold the same as a statutory bailee till clearance by the consignees. However, the respondent-Port Trust had not permitted the petitioner to discharge the cargo and entrust the same to it, and on the contrary asked the petitioner to shift the vessel to the anchorage, forcing the petitioner to retain the cargo on Board the vessel, entailing further delays and avoidable expenses in shifting. Every days delay of the vessel causes enormous loss of US Dollars 25 ,000/- per day. It is alleged that the respondent cannot plead lack of space for storage of the cargo discharged from the petitioners vessel inasmuch as the space allotted to the petitioners sister concern M/s.Archean Granites Pvt. Ltd., is available within the port premises and the said M/s.Archean Granites Pvt. Ltd., is ready and willing to have the cargo stored in the space allotted to them. Further, though as per Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 the onus of payment of port demurrage for storage of cargo is on the owner of the cargo, the petitioner is ready and willing to bear the said charges.
11. The writ petitioner alleged that the respondent-Port Trust neglected to perform its statutory duty under Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, and hence the petitioner had to file this writ petition for a writ of mandamus for a direction directing the respondent-Port Trust to perform its duty under Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 by receiving the cargo from the petitioners vessel and recognize the maritime lien of the petitioner on the discharged cargo and hold the cargo as statutory bailee of the petitioner until the lien is discharged.
12. A counter affidavit was filed by the Port Trust in the aforesaid writ petition, and we have perused the same. In paragraph 4 of the said counter affidavit it is stated that the said vessel m.v.Good Day was berthed at JDI on 27.05.2005 and started discharging the cargo on the same day. Since the cargo discharged from the said vessel is an Overside Delivery Order cargo, the delivery of the cargo was started from 27.05.2005 itself. Subsequently, the vessel was shifted to outer anchorage on 08.06.2005 due to low productivity. Again on 10.06 .2 005 the said vessel was berthed at SQIII berth and the cargo was discharged will 19.06.2005. Then the vessel was shifted to outer anchorage on 21.06.2005. Out of the total quantity of cargo they have discharged 18,001 MTs till 19.06.2005, and 4500 MTs are still to be discharged from the vessel.
13. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit it is stated that the petitioners letter dated 18.06.2005 was received by the Trust only on 20.06.2005 after a lapse of 25 days from the date of arrival of the vessel. It is submitted that the petitioner did not give any notice at the time of or before, landing the cargo. Admittedly, it was only after a period of 25 days that the petitioner issued the notice under Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. Even in that notice the petitioner did not specify the exact amount. Hence, it is alleged that Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 is not attracted at all, and the present writ petition is devoid of merits.
14. In paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit it is denied that Section 60 gives the right to the petitioner to exercise lien on cargo discharged into the custody of the Port Trust. It is denied that the Port Trust allowed the consignees to remove the cargo already discharged in violation of their duty. It is stated that the cargo discharged is an Overside Delivery Order cargo and hence the Port Trust has no control over the said cargo once it is discharged from the vessel. Hence, the question of retaining the cargo does not arise.
15. In paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent - Port Trust it is stated that the petitioner having failed to issue a notice either at or before the time of landing of the cargo from the said vessel, it is not open now to the petitioner to seek any relief against the respondent-Port Trust. After the receipt of the notice on 20.06.2005, the remaining cargo of 4500 MTs was not discharged and it is still in the vessel. It is further stated that the consignee had already removed more than 16012 MTs of the cargo from the wharf but 2019 MTs cargo is still lying in the wharf.
16. In the impugned order dated 29.06.2005 the learned single Judge observed:-
In my considered opinion, the stand taken by the respondent with regard to 4500 MTs of cargo, which is still to be discharged from the vessel, is equally applicable to 2019 MTs of cargo, which is still lying in the wharf. Therefore, except to record the above statement of the respondent and to direct the respondent to discharge the cargo of the petitioner from the impugned vessel M.V.GOOD DAY, of course on condition that the petitioner meets the expenses that may be incurred by the respondent-Board, no further orders are required in this writ petition.
The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.
17. The appellant has alleged that though in the above order the prayer of the writ petitioner regarding lien was not granted by the learned single Judge, yet taking advantage of the order the Port Trust has refused delivery of the consignment although the appellant has paid full consideration for the same.
18. Several points have been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-Surana Industries Limited, Chennai, but we are not inclined to go into the points on merits as we are of the opinion that the appellant in W.A.No.1616 of 2005 is entitled to succeed on the sole point that the appellant namely, Surana Industries Private Limited, Chennai was a necessary party in the writ petition, but was not impleaded or heard, and hence, on this ground alone the impugned order of the learned single Judge dated 29.06.2005 is liable to be set aside.
19. There is no dispute that the appellant in W.A.No.1616 of 2005 was the consignee of the goods in question which it had purchased from the seller, and was entitled to receive the same.
20. Ms.R.Vaigai, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the writ petition itself should have been dismissed as not maintainable, in view of the fact that there were disputed rights and liabilities over the concerned cargo between the writ petitioner ( the vessel owner), the Charterer and the appellant (the consignee). The learned counsel for the appellant relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Visa Comtrade (Asia) Ltd. Vs. The Chennai Port Trust passed in Writ Appeal No. 7 of 2005 and Writ Petition No.37432 of 2004 dated 0 4.01.2005. In the said decision the Division Bench observed:-
3. We are not going into the merits of the case as we are of the opinion that the writ petition itself should have been dismissed by the learned single Judge on the ground of availability of equally efficacious remedy by way of filing an injunction suit in the civil court.
4. The prayer of the petitioner in the writ petition was for a mandamus directing the Chennai Port Trust to create a lien under Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 over the goods covered by the Bill of Lading No.KBU/IND 01 dated 31.10.2004 and thereby retain custody of the goods subject matter of the said Bill of Lading until discharge of such lien by the petitioner.
5. In our opinion, this relief could have been obtained by the petitioner by filing a civil suit in the civil court. Since, the petitioner had equally efficacious alternative remedy by way of filing a civil suit, the petition should not have been entertained. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition.
It is no doubt correct that alternative remedy is not an bar to a writ petition but it is equally true that writ is a discretionary remedy. Writ petition should not ordinarily be entertained when there is equally efficacious alternative remedy available. Since, in this case such a remedy was available by filing a civil suit, we dismiss the writ petition itself. Consequently, the impugned order calls for no interference. The writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. W.A.M.P.Nos.13 and 14 of 2005 are dismissed. We however make it clear that the observation made by the learned single Judge in the impugned order being an observation in an interlocutory order will not influence the civil court while hearing and deciding a suit if any filed by the appellant.
21. Ms.R.Vaigai, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the writ petitioner suppressed various correspondences between the owner of the vessel (the writ petitioner) and the appellant (the consignee). She further submitted that in the counter filed by the Port Trust it was clearly stated that the concerned cargo is an overside delivery order cargo, and hence the Port Trust has no control over the same. Hence, it is contended that the learned single Judge ought not to have passed the impugned order, but should have held that the writ petitioner had no statutory lien over the cargo, and Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 does not confer any lien on the owner of the vessel. She further contended that the writ petitioner had not followed the statutory procedure contained under Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 viz., giving notice to the respondent Port Trust at the time of the landing or before the landing of the cargo, and hence any lien stands forfeited for the purposed of Section 60 of the Act. It was also contended that since the respondent Port Trust had specifically stated that Section 60 of the Act had not been complied with by the writ petitioner, no duty was cast on the Port Trust to honour the writ petitioners lien, even assuming it existed. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned single judge failed to appreciate that the writ petitioner had not even produced any document to show how the quantum of lien mentioned in the writ petition had been arrived at, particularly, when the Port Trust in its counter affidavit had stated that no such quantum was specified in the communication to it in the letter dated 18.06.2005. It is contended that taking advantage of the impugned order dated 29.06.2005 the appellant had been refused delivery of the consignment by the 2nd respondentChennai Port Trust despite the fact that the appellant had paid full consideration for the consignment. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to decide and interpret the terms of a contract between private parties. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the appellant Surana Industries Limited, Chennai had disputed their liability to pay any part of the demurrage claimed by the writ petitioner.
22. It was further contended that the writ petitioner is responsible for the delay in discharging the consignment arising out of any act or omission of the Stevedores. It is alleged that from the reports of the Surveyor appointed for this purpose the Stevedores who are under the control of the writ petitioner had delayed in discharging the consignment from the vessel.
23. Apart from that the learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that there was an arbitration clause in the agreement, and hence any dispute between the owner of the vessel and the charterers were subject to arbitration and cannot be resolved in a writ petition.
24. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the cargo was booked as an overside delivery order cargo which means it is a bulk cargo which gets discharged directly from the ship to the consignee without being handed over to the Port Trust. It is admitted in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit filed by the Port Trust that the cargo in dispute is an Overside Delivery Order Cargo and hence the Port Trust had no control over the said cargo once it is discharged from the vessel. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that notice dated 18.06.2005 under Section 60 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 given by the writ petitioner requesting the Port Trust to recognize its right of lien on the cargo did not comply with the conditions mentioned in Section 60 of the Act because
1)notice should be given either before or at the time of landing of cargo, and
2)the exact amount of lien over the cargo should be mentioned in the notice itself.
This fact has been expressly stated in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit of the Port Trust filed before the learned single Judge.
25. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent M/s.Good Earth Maritime Limited, Chennai submitted that the accrual on demurrage has not been disputed by the appellant. He further submitted that the Charterers/Consignees namely, the appellant was responsible for the huge delay during the discharge, and hence the vessel owner was entitled to exercise his lien on the cargo for the demurrage. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellant Surana Industries Private Limited was not a necessary party in the writ petition as the matter is entirely between the ship owner (the writ petitioner) and the Chennai Port Trust. He further submitted that Section 60 of the Act does not contemplate objection on the part of any person to exercise of lien by a carrier. Hence, it is alleged that the appellant was not a necessary party in the writ petition, and notice was not required to be given to it nor was it necessary for the Court to hear it. We do not agree with this submission. In our opinion the appellant Surana Industries Limited, Chennai was certainly a necessary party in the writ petition as its rights were directly affected, as it was admittedly the consignee of the goods in question.
26. In our opinion, it is not necessary to go into the factual and legal controversies on the merits of the case as this appeal deserves to be allowed on the short ground that the appellant Surana Industries Limited, Chennai was a necessary party, but was not impleaded in the writ petition before the learned single Judge. Hence, in our opinion, the impugned order of the learned single Judge is a nullity. The appellant Surana Industries Limited, Chennai is certainly a necessary party because it was the consignee of the goods in question and was entitled to have a hearing in the writ petition. The prayer in the writ petition was for a mandamus directing Port Trust, Chennai to perform its duties under Section 60 and 42(2) of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 by receiving cargo from the petitioners vessel m.v.Good Day, recognize the maritime lien of the petitioner on the discharged cargo and hold the cargo as statutory bailee of the petitioner until the lien was discharged. In our opinion, the prayer in the writ petition directly affects the rights and interest of the appellant who was the consignee/purchaser to take delivery and possession of the cargo. As a result of the impugned order of the learned single Judge, the appellant had been divested of its rights as per its contract with the seller, because taking advantage of the said order the respondents have refused delivery of the consignment to the appellant.
27. It is well settled that any order having civil consequences i.e. affecting the rights of the parties can validly be passed only after giving an opportunity of hearing to the party concerned who will be affected by the said order, vide State of Orissa Vs. Binapani De, AIR 1967 SC 1269 (vide paragraph
12) . As a result of the impugned order of the learned single Judge the writ petitioner has withheld cargo worth more than Rs.9 crores of the appellant. No doubt the impugned order of the learned single Judge does not expressly mention that the ship owner (the writ petitioner) has a lien on the goods, but it has been interpreted in that manner by the Port Trust which has consequently refused delivery of the consignment to the appellantSurana Industries Limited, Chennai.
28. We are not going into the merits of the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties as that can be looked into by the learned single Judge to whom we are remanding the matter.
29. It is well settled that before passing an order in a proceeding for mandamus all persons who would be affected or who must comply with the order if the relief sought for is granted must be impleaded, vide State of Orissa Vs. Binode Kishore Mohapatra, AIR 1969 SC 1249, Monghibai Hariram Vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1966 SC 882, N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore, AIR 1965 SC 136, P.Rajendran Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1012, Ranjeet Mal Vs. General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 170 1 , etc. This is because an order of the High Court on the judicial side must comply with natural justice.
30. In National Textile Workers Union Vs. P.R.Ramakrishnan, AIR 1983 SC 75 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that although there is no statutory requirement in the Companies Act, the workers of a company are entitled to be heard in a winding up petition against the company as their rights will be adversely affected by the order to be passed.
31. In our opinion, the appellant Surana Industries Limited, Chennai was directly affected by the prayer in the writ petition, and by the impugned order passed therein, and hence it should have been impleaded and heard before the writ petition was finally disposed off.
32. For the reasons given above, the Writ Appeal No.1616 of 2005 is allowed. The impugned order of the learned single Judge dated 29.06.2 0 05 is set aside and the matter is remanded to a learned single Judge for a fresh decision in accordance with law, after impleading the appellant Surana Industries Limited, Chennai as a respondent. Surana Industries Limited, Chennai can file a counter affidavit in the writ petition within one week from today. We request the learned single Judge, who shall be nominated by Honble the Chief Justice, to decide the matter afresh very expeditiously after hearing all the parties concerned, in accordance with law.
33. We make it clear once again that we have not decided any of the points raised by the learned counsel for the parties on merits except that the appellant Surana Industries Limited, Chennai was a necessary party and should have been impleaded in the writ petition. All other points (including the point that the writ petition was not maintainable or that it should have been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy before the civil court or the arbitrator or elsewhere) can be raised before the learned single judge before whom the matter shall be listed.
34. Since the matter is extremely urgent (as there is day to day heavy loss by way of demurrage) we request the learned single Judge nominated by Honble the Chief Justice to decide the case on top priority basis in accordance with law.
35. Since we have set aside the impugned order of the learned single Judge in W.A.No.1616 of 2005, Writ Appeal No.1626 of 2005 becomes infructuous and it is dismissed as such. No costs. Consequently, all the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Index: YesNo Internet: Yes sm Copy to:-
The Trustees of Port Trust of Madras, Rep. by its Chairman, Chennai Port Trust, Chennai.