Madhya Pradesh High Court
Raghuvir S/O. Bhanwarlalji Pandya vs Industrial Court Of M.P. And Ors. on 8 December, 1988
Equivalent citations: (1993)IIILLJ561MP
ORDER S.K. Dubey, J.
1. The petitioner, an employee of the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation who was employed as a Conductor on permanent post and was on duty on 18-5-1979 at Indore=Hatod route, was found carrying 58 passengers in the vehicle out of whom, 35 passengers were in possession of tickets but the remaining 23 passengers had no ticket with them. However, a bunch of 23 tickets was given to one of the said passengers. The Flying Squad of the Corporation checked the vehicle and found that in the trip-sheet, the entries of the tickets were made but due to inadvertence the tickets to the passengers though issued were in reverse order, i.e. from Hatod to Indore. The Flying Squad issued correct tickets to the passengers and made a remark over the trip sheet. After considering the report of Flying Squad the services of the petitioner were terminated vide order dated 20-5-1979. The petitioner aggrieved of his termination, filed an application under Section 31(3) of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the "the Act" before the Labour Court, challenging the termination order on various grounds. The respondent No. 3/ Corporation, in its written statement, contended that the petitioner was a substitute who committed a misconduct under Clauses 12(1)(b) and (d) of the M.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963. Hence, his services were terminated. There was no retrenchment. The learned Labour Court, after holding an enquiry, recording of evidence of the parties and after perusing the material placed on record, held that it is not proved that the petitioner wilfully issued tickets in reverse order. The entries were already made in the Collection-sheet as such, there was no dishonest intention nor the petitioner misappropriated the fare. In such circumstances, the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated with half back wages from the date of application, i.e. 30-7-1979 till reinstatement. The Corporation preferred a revision under Section 66 of the Act. The learned President of the Industrial Court set aside the order of the Labour Court and maintained the order of the Corporation terminating the services of the petitioner, holding that the petitioner issued correct tickets for shorter distances and issued tickets in reverse order for longer distance, he ought to have realised the mistake. It is not improper to press that he might have utilised the tickets for carrying the passengers from Hatod to Indore on the return trip. Therefore, considering the conduct of the petitioner in issuing a large number of tickets in reverse order, the conduct of the petitioner was considered to be tainted with dishonesty. At any rate, the learned President of the Industrial Court observed that it involved gross negligence of such a magnitude that the Corporation could not afford to continue the petitioner in service. It is this order which the petitioner has challenged under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. After hearing learned counsel Shri K.S. Sharma for the petitioner and Shri H. M. Zelawat, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, we are of the opinion that the order of the learned President of the Industrial Court deserves to be quashed and the petition deserves to be allowed, as indicated hereinafter. From the allegations in the written statement, it is apparent that the services of the petitioner were terminated for a major misconduct, under Clause 12 of the Rules; but before taking an action, according to the petitioner, even if the petitioner was a temporary employee, an enquiry ought to have been made as laid down under Clause 12, Sub-clause (4) of the Rules. The order also did not contain reasons for terminating the services. In any case, when the Corporation came with that stand of misconduct, the Labour Court allowed the opportunity to prove the misconduct before the Court and after affording full opportunity to the parties and after appreciation of material on record, came to a finding of fact that there was no dishonest intention and the misconduct, as alleged against the petitioner, is not proved. Hence, the order of termination was held to be illegal and the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated, as stated above.
3. The learned President of the Industrial Court interfered in findings of fact arrived at in revisional jurisdiction. It is settled that findings of fact cannot be interfered in revision unless it is shown that the findings that have been arrived at, are perverse or the court below has acted illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction (see Kymore Cement Mazdoor Congress, Kymore v. Industrial Court, M.P. Indore and Ors. 1966 M.P.L.J. 94 = AIR 1966 M.P. 88; and The Managing Director (MIG), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited v. Ajit Prasad Tarway: 1972(1) LLJ 170. No serious infirmities have also been pointed out by the learned President of the Industrial Court in the order of the Labour Court so as to call for an interference, but the President, Industrial Court on the evidence so produced and on proved facts, has taken a different view and held that the conduct of the petitioner was tainted with dishonesty. At any rate, the act of the petitioner involved gross negligence.
4. In our opinion, dishonesty on the proved facts cannot be inferred particularly when the correct entries were made in the collection sheet and after making the entries in it, the tickets were issued. The tickets, which were issued in the reverse order, may be because of absent mindedness. For that, a severe penalty of dismissal was not warranted. Misconduct under Clause 12(1)(b), i.e. theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the business or property of the undertaking, cannot be said to be made out. Similarly, misconduct under Clause 12(1)(d), i.e. willful disobedience of any lawful or reasonable order of a superior authority or any person or any other matter having an adverse effect upon the working or wages of another employee, is also not made out. Hence, when the act or omission of the petitioner was not a major misconduct, his services could not have been terminated. Now the question arises whether in the circumstances of the case, can it be said that the action of the Corporation was not bona fide ? It is the act of the petitioner, which gave rise to such an action of termination for issuing tickets in the reverse order, not one or two, but about 23 tickets at a time. This is an act of gross negligence but because of gross negligence, dishonesty cannot be inferred from this fact and as the entries were correctly made in the trip-sheet, hence, the inference of dishonesty cannot be attached to the petitioner. Therefore, the order of the Industrial Court deserves to be quashed and the case deserves to be remitted to the Industrial Court for disposing of the revision in accordance with law.
5. Ordinarily, this is the course open to us in our supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The termination is of the year 1979. The Industrial Court disposed of the revision in 1981 and this petition is pending before this court for disposal since 1981 and has seen the light of the day after almost about 7 years. Therefore, on the question of punishment of gross negligence, we would not like to send the case back to the Industrial Court. As the poor employee has been dragged in litigation for about 10 years, wisdom and justice, therefore, require that the matter is disposed of now once for all under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is intended to do justice between the parties and to save wastage of time and that the circumstances of the case and interest of justice require that the matter be decided once for all, without remitting the case to the Industrial Court, as we have already held that the action of the Corporation was not mala fide but was a bona fide one. It was the act of omission of the petitioner, which gave rise to the action. True, the issuance of 23 tickets in reverse order may not amount to a major misconduct, as enumerated in the Standard Standing Orders in Clause 12(1). As the misconduct has not been defined in the Standard Standing Orders, it would acquire special meaning in industrial law. It may mean his acts or conduct, which may be incompatible with express or implied obligations of an employee vis-a-vis the employer. There are orders of the Corporation that before a passenger boards a bus, a ticket should be issued to the said passenger and under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Sadak Parivahan Seva (Bina Tikat Yatra Ki Rok) Adhiniyam, 1974 if, an invalid ticket is issued to a passenger by a conductor, it amounts to an offence under Section 7 of the said Adhiniyam. Therefore, issuing tickets in the reverse order was not warranted by the conductor, who holds a post of confidence. Hence, forfeiture of back wages will be the sufficient punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case, considering the nature of misconduct, though dishonesty is not inferred, yet some penalty deserves to be imposed on the petitioner, and therefore, forfeiture of back wages would be sufficient. The order of dismissal passed by the respondent Corporation, hence, deserves to be set aside and the petitioner deserves to be reinstated without back wages but with continuity of service.
6. In the result, this petition is allowed and the order of the Industrial Court is hereby quashed. The petitioner is ordered to be reinstated without back wages but with continuity of service. No order as to costs. Security amount, if any, shall, on verification, be refunded to the petitioner.