Jharkhand High Court
Satya Narayan Pandey And Ors. And ... vs The State Of Jharkhand And Ors. on 3 December, 2002
Equivalent citations: [2005(4)JCR132(JHR)]
Author: Ramesh Kumar Merathia
Bench: Ramesh Kumar Merathia
ORDER
1. Education is the foundational edifice of the Rule of law. Rule of law, in turn, is so inextricably interlined with democracy that one can not survive without the other. Rule of law and democracy are so synonymous with each other that both co-exist in each other's companionship and blemish or attack on the one directly results in the other becoming non-functional. Education to the citizens of a country practicing Rule of law and democracy is one medium which readies the citizens not only to profess, but practice Rule of law and democracy. Education with it brings literacy; literacy in a way is a consequence of being educated. If the citizens are properly educated and are literate, they are in a position to differentiate between evil and the good, between that is required and desired by them and what should be rejected and discarded by them. That is why it is often said that the educated masses are the assets of a democracy and that democracy in it pristine glory props up Rule of law which in turn upholds the foundations of democracy.
2. Education promotes development. Literacy, which comes only by education brings about a state of mind in the citizens where they are able to free themselves from the shackles to exploitation. Education, indeed more and higher education, equips the citizens in properly identifying the right choice for the election of their representatives in various Elective Bodies as prescribed by the Constitution and the laws. All said and done, education, perhaps, is the single-most important virtue that a human being can possess. Up till now, despite the passage of 55 years of Independence of our Country, a vast majority of the toiling millions of the Country have been deprived of this single-most important virtue. The recently concluded 10-yearly national Census has established that in Jharkhand State, the levels of education and literacy are not very high; if at all, they are very very low, as compared to the national level.
3. In a recently pronounced landmark judgment, in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and others (reported in JT 2002 (9) SC 1) an 11 Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on the subject of education clearly found itself deliberating on the quality of teachers because it is the community of Teachers who, mainly and primarily would be responsible in educating the citizens of this country. Actually their Lordships in the aforesaid case were also deliberating upon and discussing the issue of child education and while reconsidering the propositions of law, earlier founded by the Supreme Court in the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (reported in JT 1993 (1) SC 474), (even while in the process of re-considering the correctness of the aforesaid judgment on some other issues and aspects) reconfirmed and reiterated the one and only one basic philosophy that child education, in other words, education up to the age of 14 years, is a fundamental right, an enforceable right, of all citizens of this country. In other words, what their Lordships held was that education up to the age of 14 years is compulsory in nature*. It is the fundamental right of these children to be educated. Infraction of this right is not Constitutionally permissible. On the question of the excellence and the quality of teachers, the following observations in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) are apposite. We quote :--
"All education is expected to be liberal. It should free us from the shackles of ignorance, prejudice and unfounded belief. If we are incapable of achieving the good life, it is due to faults in our inward being, to the darkness in us. The process of education is the slow conquering of this darkness. To lead us from darkness to light, to free us from every kind of domination except that of reason, is the aim of education.
An educational institution is established only for the purpose of imparting education to the students. In such an institution, it is necessary for all to maintain discipline and abide by the rules and regulations that have been lawfully framed. The teachers are like foster-parents who are required to look after, cultivate and guide the students in their pursuit of education. The teachers and the institution exist for the students and not vice versa. Once this principle is kept in mind, it must follow that it becomes imperative for the teaching and other staff of an educational institution to perform their duties properly and for the benefit of the students."
4. Article 45 of the Constitution of India finding a place in the Part relating to Directive Principles of State Policy, casts upon the State an obligation coupled with a binding endeavour to provide free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years. We were informed at the Bar that, perhaps, in the current Session of the Parliament, a Constitutional Amendment Bill has been passed whereby the aforesaid has now been converted into a Fundamental Right, the same having thus been incorporated in Part III of the Constitution.
5. Viewed in aforesaid background, we now come to the issues involved in this case. This facts first.
Jharkhand Primary Schools Appointment Rules, 2002 (2002 Rules, for the short) have been framed by the Government, regulating the entire appointment procedure for the Teachers in Primary Schools. "Primary School" under the aforesaid Rules has been defined as one where students are taught up to Standard VII. In the eligibility criteria for appointment of Teachers inter alia, it is provided that as candidate for appointment on the post of a Teacher in the Primary School should hold an academic qualification of Matriculation or above. It is also provided therein that he should be a "Trained Teacher". The training eligibility criteria is prescribed in Rule 2(b). In Rule 4, it has been provided that even though for normal appointment, the lower and upper age limits as are fixed by the Government for appointments in Govt. Service shall be applicable with respect to all the candidates, but in so far as the first advertisement to be issued for appointment of the Teachers is concerned, the limitation of upper age limit may be dispensed with. The Rules also provide that such candidates who have obtained training from recognized Institutions would be expected to be at the "knowledge level" of Middle Level Examination as and when they are to take written examination for their selection as teachers. Consequently, an Advertisement indeed was issued by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission, in which, inter alia, in purported compliance with the aforesaid Rules, it has been provided that as an one-time arrangement, (1) no upper age limit of the candidates is prescribed and that (2) for assessing the merit of the candidates in the competitive written examination for selection, the question papers should be set in such a manner so as to indicate that the candidate's knowledge level is Middle Level academic standards.
6. Various arguments were put forth during the course of hearing by the learned counsel for the parties. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned Advocate General appearing for the State also took us through various Rules and sub-rules relevant to the subject matter of the controversy in this petition.
7. Examined from any angle and considering from any point of view, we feel that the respondent-State has gone too far in diluting considerable the standard that it has set and fixed for judging the capabilities and the level of performance from the candidates who apply for the posts of teachers in Primary Schools. As is well know, education in Primary Schools is up to Class/ Grade VII. The expression "Middle Level School" connotes that a person who knows his academics up to Class/Grade VI also, perhaps, may fall within the scope and ambit Of this expression. What, therefore, it means is that a person whose own level of academics is up to Class/Grade VI, would be required to teach students in a Primary School. After all, what was the consideration, the compelling need in so grossly diluting the standard and level of academics for selection of Teachers, we fail to understand. In a Country where there are millions of unemployed graduates and post-graduates, lowering down the level at such a depth surely means that the State is not interested in recruiting quality Teachers, in the process jeopardizing for generations to come the level of imparting education to the students.
8. It has been more than two years since the State came into existence. On the own showing of the respondents, more than 9000 vacancies have been lying vacant and the respondent-State has taken two years in initiating steps for filling up of those vacancies. It means, in other words, for the past two years, Schools in the entire State were lying unattended because of lack of Teachers. When, therefore, the vacancies are being now proposed to be filled up, the performance level has been diluted to such an extent that the Teachers recruited on the basis of such a performance-level are not expected to do justice to their Job, viz. of teaching the young pupils.
9. Whoever has been responsible for taking the aforesaid decision of grossly diluting the examination standard so as to bring it at par with Middle level Examination.
has greatly undermined the educational foundation of the State. Whoever was responsible for taking this decision appears to be holding a very poor opinion about the prevalence of appropriate education standards in the State as well as in the Country. Such a person apparently himself is so ignorant about the prevalent standards in the field of education and academics that he misguided the policy-making process by his sheer ignorance of thought and lack of knowledge and perspective. We wish to say nothing more on the subject.
10. Coming to the question relating to the non-fixation of any upper age limit, even as an one-time arrangement, we find that this also is patently contrary to sound public policy. It is commonly known that in all Government appointments, the State fixes lower and upper age limits and that the relevant Recruitment Rules insist on prescribing for such age limits, both on the lower side as well as on the upper side. But not prescribing the age limit in the present case means that such candidates who have even reached the age of 59 years may also come to be appointed. A young little pupil studying in a Primary School requires tender care. He requires the concentration of a dedicated, committed teacher. He requires a very close rapport and physical, mental and spiritual interaction with his teacher. Can a teacher who is merely of middle-level academic capabilities and who is at an advanced stage of his life, be expected to perform these functions? We do not think so. Why the upper age limit has not been prescribed was sought to be explained by the learned Advocate General by saying that there is an apprehension in the mind of the State that adequate number of candidates may riot be available and secondly that many people who have remained unemployed for many years in the past may have become over-aged by now and, therefore, to accommodate them, the State decided not to fix any upper age limit. We do not agree with the aforesaid contention advanced on behalf of the State for the simple reason that even as an one-time arrangement, the public policy requires that some upper age limit should be prescribed. If the State thinks that, as by way of a departure from the existing Rules and Regulations, as an one-time arrangement, the upper age limit should be enhanced/increased, it might be open to the State to suitable and appropriately do so, but leaving the upper age limit totally unprescribed will have the potential of introducing an element of so much uncertainty that candidates very very old in age may also come to be appointed as teachers in Primary Schools. We have no doubt that these persons may not be capable of performing their duties because of the old age and because of a very short period of Government service at their disposal. Such a situation may amount to play fraud to the entire concept of providing compulsory basic education to children up to the age of 14 years.
11. About the non-fixation and non-prescription of any upper age limit, there is another angle which cannot be lost sight of Rule 4(d) of the 2002 Rules suggest that for the first set of appointments with respect to the previously trained teachers, on their induction in Government service it shall be open to the State Government to dispense with any upper age requirement. The Advertisement issued by the State Public Service Commission is a mere repetition of Rule 4(d) (supra). It does not at all suggest as to whether the State Government did take any conscious decision or not by issuing a definite order providing for such relaxation in upper age limit so as to do away with it completely. Surely Rule 4(d) (supra) vested this power of relaxation only in the Government. It did not vest any such power in the Commission. If the Commission, without any order having been passed by the Government on the subject, on its own, by itself decided to do away with any upper age limit, it was not permissible for the Commission to do so. In doing so (if it has done), the Commission has transgressed its power and jurisdiction. It is besides the point (as has been observed earlier in this judgment) that even the State Government had no jurisdiction to do so.
12. Based upon the aforesaid observations and the accompanying reasoning, we have no hesitation in holding and decla-
ring that both the impugned stipulations, viz. non-prescription of upper age limit and the fixation of the middle-level examination knowledge expected of candidates are arbitrary, suffering from non-application of mind and not based on intelligible differentia or any nexus sought to be achieved. We also hold and declare that these two stipulations are against public interest. We, therefore, strike down both the aforesaid two stipulations in 2002 Rules, but leave open to the State in the light of the aforesaid observations to suitably re-cast the same in best public interest.