Madras High Court
The Management Of Vanniar Estate ... vs Kamatchi And The Commissioner For ... on 4 May, 1990
Equivalent citations: II(1991)ACC633
ORDER Somasundaram, J.
1. This Appeal coming on for hearing on Wednesday the 25th day of April 1990 upon perusing the petition of Appeal, the order of the lower court, and the material papers in the case, and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. T.S. Gopalan, Advocate for the appellant, and of Mr. C. Smatharma Arasu, Govt. Advocate on behalf of the respondent No. 2, and the 1st respondent not appearing in person or by Advocate and having stood over for consideration till this day, he court made the following order:
This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Madurai in W.C. Application No. 96/80 dated 28.7.1982, awarding a compensation of a sum of Rs. 18,000/- to the 1st respondent. W.C Application No. 96/80 is an application filed by the first respondent herein under Section 10 of the work-men's Compensation Act claiming compensation from the appellant herein on account of the death of the workman Kalimuthu by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment under the appellant.
2. The case of the first respondent in W.C.A. N0. 96/80 is as follows:- She is the dependent of the deceased workman Kalimuthu, being his wife. The deceased worker was employed as a gardener in the bungalow of the estate manager. During the course of his employment in the garden he fell own and fainted. Subsequently he was taken to the estate hospital in an unconscious state and died there at 5 p.m. on 29.5.1980. The respondent claimed a lump sum compensation of Rs. 80,000/- for the death of her husband Kalimuthu by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment under the appellant herein.
3. The appellant herein resisted the claim for compensation contending as follows:
The deceased Kalimuthu was employed as a temporary worker and that he died of heart attack. The deceased worker Kalimuthu had not died due to any injury during the course of and arising out of employment. There was no connection between the death of Kalimuthu and that of his employment and there was no contributing factor on account of his employment or his duty which he was performing that resulted in his death.
4. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation after considering the entire evidence on record held that the deceased Kalimuthu was a workman under the appellant herein. The Commissioner further held that the death of the workman Kalimuhu was on account of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Consequently the Commissioner held that the appellant herein is liable to pay a compensation of Rs. 18,000/- to the 1st respondent.
5. Aggrieved by the said order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, the appellant herein has filed the present civil miscellaneous appeal.
6. There is no dispute in this case that the deceased Kalimuthu was a workman under the appellant. Mr. T.S. Gopalan, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the workman Kalimuthu died of heart attack and that the first respondent failed to establish that the workman Kalimuthu died in the course of and out of employment and that the first respondent failed to establish the causal connection between the work an the injury and, therefore the appellant is not liable to pay compensation. In support of his contention learned Counsel relied on the decisions in Smt. Laxmibai v. Port Trust, Bombay 1954 I LLJ 614 Kamlabai v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway 1971 ILLJ603 and Sarat Chatter jee & Co. v. Khairunnessa 1968 I LLJ 329. The contention of the learned Counsel is without substance. The oral evidence let in on behalf of the first respondent herein discloses that on 29.5.1980 the deceased Kalimuthu came for lunch at 12 noon and then went back to work at 1 P.M. after taking his lunch and while he was working he fainted and died later in the Hospital. Under these circumstances, in view of the evidence of A.Ws. it has to be held that the deceased workman died in the course of his employment.
7. The next question is, whether the accident arose out of the employment i.e. whether the first respondent established the nexus between the work and the injury of the causal connection between the work and the injury. The specific case of the appellant is that the workman Kalimuthu died of heart attack and not out of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as he Act, provides that if personal injury is caused to a workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation. The expression 'out of and in the course of his employment' has been the subject of interpretation in numerous cases. There is also the expression 'Accident' in the Section. The basic and indispensable ingredient of accident is unexpectedness. A second ingredient, however, has been added in most judicial decisions. The injury must tracable within reasonable limits to a definite time, place and occasion or cause. Larson in his Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, while dealing with heart diseases, observes at page 548 as follows:
In the heart cases, the issue almost from the start has centred about the question whether there was anything unusual about the exertion producing the attack or the circumstances surrounding it. Tracing the course of the decisions, Larson cited the decision in Massee v. James H. Robinson Company 301 N.Y. 34 where the following statement has been made:
A heart injury such as coronary occlusion or thrombosis when brought on by over-exertion or strain in the course of daily work is compensable, though a preexisting pathology may have been a contributing factor.
8. Larson concluded thus again quoting from a judgment (pages 552 and 553):
However, whether an event is to be found an industrial accident is not to be determined by legal definition out by common sense view-point of the average man...Hence the issue almost invariable falls within the realm of fact, and if the facts and circumstances sustain, upon any reasonable hypotheses, the conclusion that an average man would view the event as accident, then the determination of the board is final....
Applications of this principle, though often not expressed, are inherent in many decisions.
VenkatadriJ., in the decision in Madras State Electricity Board v. Ambazhtingal Ithachutti Umma 1966 II LLJ 12 after extracting the above passages from Larson has held as follows:
The principle in heart cases seems to be that, if death or disability is due to heart attack which resulted from the exertion of the employee in the performance of the duties of his employment, compensation should be awarded. If death of an employee is brought about by an injury due to some mishap, or accident, happening during the course of his employment, the fact that deceased had a chronic ailment which rendered him more susceptible to such injury than an ordinary person would be, will not defeat the right to compensation. The fact that the injury and the pre-existing disease combined to produce the disability does not prevent the injury being compensable in nature and it is not necessary to prove that the injury accelerated or aggravated the disease or that the accident complained of was a contributory cause to the injury. If the accidental injury suffered in the course of his employment is the proximate cause of the employee's death, the previous physical condition is unimportant.
Venkatadri, J., in the above decision further held:
Acceleration or aggravation of an employees' heart condition, thereby causing death or disability, may constitute a compensable injury within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The sudden manifestation of the heart condition from the effect of strain or over-exertion at work constitutes an accidental injury within the meaning of the Act.
9. On a review of the entire case law on the subject, Venkatadri, J., in the above mentioned decision, has further held that it is desirable and in accordance with the general rule that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be broadly and liberally construed, in order to effectuate their evident intent and purpose, in the application of the provisions which govern the nature and determination of the injuries for which compensation may be had. Courts should favour adoption of liberal construction of the words 'by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment'.
10. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the decision in B.M. Sodha v. Hindustan Tiles 1977 II L.L.J 95 dealing with heart cases has laid down the following principle:
The sudden collapse of the worker after he suffered this injury resulting in his chest pain was clearly the result of his work connected with the work he was doing. In fact, this was a clear case where the old age got coupled with the employment and, therefore, the employment was a contributory cause and the causal connection being established, the conclusion was inescapable that the accident arose out of and during the course of the employment.
Unless there were circumstances to the contrary, it would be justifiable to resume that the workman was discharging and had discharged the work that was usually assigned to him at the particular time, and it would also be natural to presume that it such work involved some strain, the disease, infirmity or old age, that was existing was likely to contribute to or accelerate the death. In such cases, the pre-existing disease, infirmity or old age is the pre-disposing factor which will supply the necessary causal link to make this a work-connected injury, if death takes place while the workman is engaged in his normal work.
On the evidence available on record in this case, in the light of the proposition laid down in the decisions referred to above, it has to be held that if the workman Kalimuthu died of heart attack, there was a pre-existing heart condition which was aggravated by the strain of the work of the deceased which resulted in his death. In the instant case, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has rightly held that the Workman died of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The decisions relied on by learned Counsel for the appellant can be distinguished on facts and they are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is unassailable. The quantum of compensation is just and reasonable, in the circumstances of the case. The civil miscellaneous appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.