Karnataka High Court
State By Sub-Inspector Of Police, ... vs Prakashaiah on 12 January, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000CRILJ3738, 2000(3)KARLJ352
Author: B.S. Sreenivasa Rao
Bench: B.S. Sreenivasa Rao
JUDGMENT M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred by the State of Karnataka and the short point involved is the question as to whether the Trial Court was justified in convicting the accused who was originally charged having committed an offence punishable under Section 326, Indian Penal Code for the lesser offence under Section 335, Indian Penal Code. The incident is within a narrow ambit insofar as it is alleged that on the afternoon of 21-6-1991, the complainant stopped a bullock cart in which the accused was taking some timber. According to the complainant, he found that one of the trees on his land had been cut and he maintains that he saw the timber from that tree being carried in the bullock cart which was why he insisted on stopping it and he told the accused that the timber must be brought to the complainant's house. Because of this, some altercations took place whereupon the accused gave two blows to the complainant on his arm as a result of which, he sustained a fracture. The complainant lodged a complaint with the Police who registered an offence punishable under Section 326, Indian Penal Code. The Trial Court accepted the complainant's evidence which was supported by the medical evidence and convicted the accused. However, having regard to the complexion of the case, the Court held that even though grievous hurt had been caused that this had taken place under provocation and consequently recorded a conviction under Section 335, Indian Penal Code. The accused was fined Rs. 2,000/- out of which Rs. 1,500/- was ordered to be paid as compensation to the complainant. The State has preferred this appeal challenging the acquittal under Section 326, Indian Penal Code.
2. The main point urged by the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor is that the injury sustained by the complainant clearly indicates that it is a fracture and having regard to the definition of grievous hurt under Section 321, Indian Penal Code, it is his submission that the accused ought to have been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 326, Indian Penal Code and awarded a sentence in consonance with what is provided for under that section. He has seriously assailed the finding of the Trial Court whereby the offence has been categorised as one falling under Section 335, Indian Penal Code. His submission is that the accused was the wrong doer insofar as he was taking away the timber which he had illegally obtained by cutting the tree on the complainant's land and that when he was stopped, be has displayed aggression by attacking the rightful owner of the property. His submission is that the evidence does not justify the provocation theory and secondly, that even if there was some cause given by the complainant who stopped the bullock cart, that he was doing so in exercise -of his legal rights because the accused was decamping with stolen property which belonged to the complainant. In substance, he has contended that this is a case which requires interference and that the Trial Court's order will have to be rectified.
3. Since the respondent/accused was unrepresented, we have appointed learned Advocate Sri Somashekhar Angadi as Amicus Curiae. He has submitted that this is a case in which the Court must read between the lines insofar as the contention of the accused was that the timber was from a tree belonging to his father-in-law and that the complainant has nothing to do with it. His case was that he had been wrongly accused of theft and that the complainant had forcibly stopped the bullock cart and that it was the accused who was the aggressor in the incident as is evident from the fact that the complainant admits that there was an altercation prior to the assault. His submission is that the accused was wrongly accused of theft which itself is a provocation and secondly, that the complainant had given more than reasonable cause for the incident that ultimately occurred. Lastly, he has submitted that where the Trial Court has considered the relevant facts and circumstances particularly the complexion of the case, the conduct of the parties, the status of the accused and the inadvisability of sending him to jail that the discretion to impose only a fine is perfectly valid and he points out to us that out of the fine amount a substantial compensation has been awarded to the injured/complainant. In this background, he submits that essential justice has been done and consequently this Court ought not to interfere.
4. We have taken note of certain special factors in this case, the first of them being that even though the complainant makes it out to be a one way assault, that the evidence indicates that this was not so. There is considerable substance in the contention raised by Sri Angadi when he points out that merely because a tree was cut on the complainant's land, that he jumped to the conclusion that the timber in the cart was from that tree and falsely accused the driver of the cart i.e., the accused of having committed theft. Also, it is clear that the complainant was trying to forcibly take away the timber and that he would not allow the cart to proceed and in this background, it would be difficult to hold that there was no provocation from his side. There is nothing on record to indicate that it was the accused who had cut the tree or that the timber belonged to the complainant and in this background, the Trial Court has evaluated all the relevant factors and come to a particular conclusion which is sustainable. It would be incorrect to interfere in appeal. Even on the question of sentence, we note that the Trial Court has exercised judicial discretion very correctly by imposing a penalty by way of a heavy fine and directing substantial compensation to the complainant. There is a basic principle of law which we need to lay down namely, that where the interests of justice have been broadly and correctly satisfied, on the basis of hair splitting technicalities, the appeal Court will not interfere with that decision, merely because it is pointed out that on a very strict construction of the law, the head of conviction ought to be altered. It is essential for us to emphasise that the power of interference in appeal is confined to cases where injustice has occurred or miscarriage of justice has taken place or where, the order of the Trial Court is manifestly wrong in law, but those powers will not be exercised in cases where super-technicalities are argued and it is contended that the conviction ought to be under a slightly different head. In view of this position, no case is made out for interference, the appeal fails on merits and stands' dismissed.
We direct the office to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to the learned Advocate Sri Somashekhar Angadi who has very ably assisted the Court by appearing as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the respondent/accused.