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[Cites 19, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Uma Shankar Sharma vs Ms Dazi on 24 December, 2025

         IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL,
        ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL
          DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI

CNR No.: DLCT01-015058-2025
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 568/2025
SHRI. UMA SHANKAR SHARMA,
S/o. Shri. Kedar Nath Sharma,
R/o. H. No. 4586, Kucha Bibi Gohar,
Charkhe Walan, Chawri Bazar,
Delhi-110006.                                               ... REVISIONIST/
                                                              PETITIONER
                                   VERSUS
MS. DAZI,
W/o. Shri. Rohit Kumar,
R/o. H. No. 4280/3, Gali No. 3,
Ansari Road, Near Viva Books,
Darya Ganj, Delhi-110002.                                   ... RESPONDENT
         Date of e-filing                                   :    01.10.2025
         Date of institution                                :    06.10.2025
         Date when judgment was reserved                    :    11.12.2025
         Date when judgment is pronounced                   :    24.12.2025

                            JUDGMENT

1. The present revision petition has been filed under Sections 397/378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code')/pari materia with Sections 438/440 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS'), against the order dated 30.07.2025 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned order'), passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI Act)-03/Ld. JMFC (NI Act)-03, Central Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. JMFC') in case bearing, 'Uma CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 1 of 17 Shankar Sharma v. Dazi, Ct. Case No. 5777/2020', in a complaint proceeding under Section 200 Cr.P.C. read with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the 'NI Act'). Pertinently, by virtue of the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court dismissed the said complaint for non-prosecution and non-appearance of the revisionist. Significantly, by means of the present revision petition, the revisionist has inter alia sought setting aside of the said order dated 30.07.2023/impugned order, passed by the Ld. Trial Court and restoration of the said complaint to its original number and stage/position.

2. Succinctly, the genesis of the present proceedings is a complaint, filed by the revisionist before the Ld. Trial Court in terms of the provisions under Section 200 Cr.P.C. read with Section 138 of the NI Act. Under the said complaint, the revisionist inter alia contended that the respondent and her husband were acquainted with the revisionist and in visiting terms with each other, being neighbours. As per the revisionist, the respondent and her husband used to visit the revisionist several times at his shop for purchasing sarees, etc., as also for financial aid. It was further asserted by the revisionist that in the first week of January 2019 the respondent along with her husband and one Ms. Heena Malik came to his/revisionist's shop on 03.01.2019 and all of them requested for financial aid of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand only) as personal/friendly loan for 3-4 (three-four) months. As per the revisionist, based on the entreaty of the said person, the revisionist lent a sum of Rs. ,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand only) on 03.01.2019 by way of RTGS CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 2 of 17 transfer from his Bank, bearing, Union Bank in bank account of the respondent. Subsequently, the respondent, her husband and Ms. Heena Malik visited the revisionist's shop, requesting for a friendly loan of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs only), under the pretext that the said amount was to be deposited with a builder, where they had booked a flat.

2.1. It was further chronicled under the revisionist's complaint that the aforesaid amount was assured to be returned to him, when the said flat would be allotted, which was asserted/proposed to be allotted by December 2019. Consequently, under such facts and circumstances, as per the revisionist, loan of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs only) was lent by the revisionist to the respondent, her husband and Ms. Heena Malik by way of bank transfer and cash, with an assurance of return. However, it is the case of the revisionist that the said amount was not returned to the revisionist, despite repeated entreaties, request and demands of the revisionist. As per the revisionist, in the first week of July 2020, the respondent, her husband and Ms. Heena Malik, again came to the revisionist's shop and all of them handed over individual cheques, i.e., three cheques, out of which, the respondent had issued/handed over cheque bearing no. 124094, dated 15.07.2020 in a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakh only), drawn on Bank of India, Ansari Road Branch, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as the 'cheque in question/dishonoured cheque') in favour of the revisionist. However, when the said cheque was eventually presented by the revisionist with its banker, i.e., Union Bank of India, Chandani Chowk Branch, on CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 3 of 17 29.07.2020, same was returned dishonoured under the remarks, 'Funds Insufficient' vide return memo dated 30.07.2020. It was further proclaimed by the revisionist that soon thereafter, he informed the respondent about the dishonour of said cheque, however, the respondent inter alia avoided to discharge her liability on one or the other pretext. Ergo, the revisionist is asserted to have issued a legal demand notice/notice dated 17.08.2020 (hereinafter referred to as the 'legal demand notice/demand notice') to the respondent inter alia seeking payment of the dishonoured cheque amount. Markedly, the complaint further records that the said notice was duly received by the respondent, despite which, no payment was made by the respondent in favour of the revisionist, leading to the filing of the said complaint by the revisionist before the Ld. Trial Court.

2.2. Markedly, upon such complaint being filed and upon the revisionist's tendering pre-summoning evidence, the Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 29.10.2021, took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 NI Act and issued summons against the respondent/accused. Consequently, upon the respondent's entering appearance before the Ld. Trial Court, notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed against the respondent as well as admission/denial of the documents, conducted in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. on 07.03.2022. Correspondingly, the matter was listed for cross examination of the revisionist. Subsequently, the matter was listed for complainant's evidence/CE/cross examination of the revisionist and was consequently deferred/adjourned on several occasions, CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 4 of 17 i.e., on 23.05.2022, 01.08.2022, 19.09.2022, 12.12.2022, 20.02.2023, 29.05.2023, 09.10.2023, 15.01.2024, 13.05.2024, 28.08.2024, 04.12.2024, 26.03.2025 and 30.07.2025. Markedly, on 26.03.2025, the Ld. Trial Court, adjourned the matter to 30.07.2025, explicitly granting last and final opportunity to the revisionist to lead CE, inter alia under the following observations;

"... The matter is at the stage of CE.
Ld. Counsel for the complainant had moved an exemption application on behalf of the complainant orally. Heard and allowed for today.
The complainant is directed to be physically present on NDOH.
One last and final opportunity granted to the complainant to lead CE.
Relist on 30.07.2025..."

(Emphasis supplied) 2.3. However, even on 30.07.2025, since the revisionist failed to appear before the Ld. Trial Court, Ld. Trial Court, dismissing the revisionist's complaint and acquitted the respondent vide order dated 30.07.2025/impugned order, inter alia under the following observations;

"...Matter is at the stage of CE.
Perusal of the record shows that complainant is highly irregular in prosecuting the present complaint. Perusal of the record further shows that notice against the accused was framed on 07.03.2022. Perusal of the record further shows that since 23.05.2022 and on various occasion adjournment or exemption was sought on behalf of the complainant. The conduct of the complainant is also recorded in the ordersheet dated 04.12.2024. Perusal of the last ordersheet reveals that last and final opportunity was granted to the complainant to lead CE.
CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 5 of 17
Today also complainant has failed to appear before the Court.
Given the fact that matter is pending since the year 2020, the Court is not inclined to give another opportunity to the complainant to pursue the matter. It seems that the complainant is not interested in pursuing the matter. Laxity on the part of the complainant cannot be countenanced any further. Complaint stands dismissed in default as well as for want of prosecution.
Accused is acquitted hereby. Original documents, if any, be returned to the rightful claimant. Bail bond & surety bond, if any, be discharged. All endorsement be canceled. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance..."

(Emphasis supplied)

3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist outrightly contended that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court without properly appreciating the facts of the present case as well as by wrongly applying the law. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order is wrong and contrary to settled law and has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court, in extreme haste as well as mechanically, without due application of mind to the factual and legal position. As per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court, while passing the order of dismissal of the complaint failed to consider that the absence of the revisionist and/or the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist before the Ld. Trial Court was neither intentional nor deliberate, rather, attributed to bona fide reasons. In this regard, Ld. Counsel fervently asserted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that revisionist is a senior citizen, suffering with chronic kidney disease and undergoing dialysis, which constitutes a valid and sufficient cause for non-appearance. Even otherwise, it was argued that the CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 6 of 17 dismissal of the revisionist's complaint at the stage of complainant's evidence/CE is per se arbitrary, particularly when the matter had already progressed beyond framing of notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. It was further argued by the Ld. Counsel that the revisionist has already placed on record, strong documentary evidence including dishonoured cheque, bank return memo, and statutory notice, disclosing a prima facie case under Section 138 NI Act and in case, the present petition is not allowed grave and irreparable loss would ensue to the revisionist.

3.1. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further contended that the order of dismissal of the revisionist's complaint, defeats the object and spirit of NI Act, which aims to ensure credibility of commercial transactions and sanctity of cheques. Correspondingly, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that the superior courts have persistently avowed that the dismissal of NI Act complaints in default should be avoided, and matters should be decided on merits. As per the Ld. Counsel, the acquittal of respondent in default amounts to miscarriage of justice when clear evidence exists against the accused. Further, it was submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to strike a balance between procedural discipline and substantive justice, preferring form over substance. It was further submitted that the impugned order has resulted in serious prejudice to the revisionist, who has been deprived of his statutory right to prosecute the accused/respondent under Section 138 NI Act. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the revisionist had always been diligent in pursuing the matter and had no intention of abandoning the proceedings. However, it was argued that the CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 7 of 17 occasional absence of the revisionist due to medical emergency cannot be equated with disinterest in prosecuting the case. Congruently, it was argued that the consequences of acquittal are drastic and permanent in nature and that the impugned order is contrary to the settled legal principle that dismissal in default should be the last resort and not the first reaction of the Court. 3.2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order, failed to consider that there was no reason for the revisionist not to appear before the Ld. Trial Court or being not to be interested in pursuing the complaint proceedings, especially when the deliberate conduct of respondent led to causing loss to the revisionist. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the dismissal of revisionist's complaint has encouraged abuse of process, allowing the accused/respondent to evade liability despite issuance and dishonour of cheque. Further, it was asserted that the respondent has unjustly benefited from the technical dismissal, frustrating the purpose of penal provisions of the NI Act. As per the Ld. Counsel, while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that judicial discretion must be exercised with sensitivity, particularly when a senior citizen litigant is involved. In this regard, it was further argued that the Court was duty-bound to take a lenient and sympathetic view where absence is due to illness or unavoidable cause. Correspondingly, it was submitted that the dismissal order has ignored the principle that procedural law is meant to advance justice and not to defeat substantive right. Ergo, it was argued that the impugned order is not only against cannon of law, rather, CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 8 of 17 grossly erroneous even on facts and circumstances brought forth. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel fervently asserted that the Ld. Trial Court passed the impugned order, oblivious of the facts of the present case, settled judicial precedents as well as legal provisions, deserving the same to be set aside at the outset.

4. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist have been heard as well as the record(s), including the Trial Court record(s), thoroughly perused.

5. Before proceeding further with the determination of the merits of the case and arguments addressed, this Court deems it apposite to outrightly refer and reproduce the provisions under law/Section 438 BNSS1, as under;

"438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
*** *** *** (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding...."
1

Pari materia provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C., which provides, "397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..." (Emphasis supplied) CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 9 of 17 (Emphasis supplied)

6. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is quite manifest that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated either suo motu or an application of a party, only in the instances where there is a palpable error, non- compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. observed as under:

"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 10 of 17 of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie..."

(Emphasis supplied)

7. Analogously, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC Online Del 1192, in a similar context noted as under;

"67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The Revisional Court has to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the impugned order on the face of record."

(Emphasis supplied)

8. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a settled law2 that in a case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, "merely because of equitable considerations", the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re- consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Taron Mohan 2 Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine MP

958. CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 11 of 17 v. State, 2021 SCC Online Del 312, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi expounded the law, as under;

"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence..."

(Emphasis supplied)

9. Ergo, in light of the foregoing discussion, the question that outrightly falls for consideration before this Court pertains to the maintainability of the present revision petition against the impugned order, dismissing the revisionist's complaint for non-prosecution, post summons were issued qua the respondent. In other words, this Court has to determine, 'whether the dismissal of the revisionist's complaint, after summoning of the respondent/accused can be challenged by way of a criminal revision?'. However, in order to deal with the said issue, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/BNSS, as under;

"2273. Issue of process-***(4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within 3 Pari materia with Section 204 Cr.P.C., which provides, "204. Issue of process-***(4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint***" (Emphasis sup- plied) CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 12 of 17 a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint.*** *** *** *** 2794. Non-appearance or death of complainant- (1) If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day:
Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may, dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non-

appearance of the complainant is due to his death."

(Emphasis supplied)

10. Markedly, it is seen from above that BNSS (and corresponding pari materia provisions under Cr.P.C.) envisages a situation of dismissal of criminal complaint for the reason(s) of non-payment/deposit of process fees or other fees, within a reasonable time, under Section 227 thereof (pari materia with Section 204 Cr.P.C.). In contrast, Section 279 BNSS (pari materia with Section 256 Cr.P.C.) envisions a situation where the summons have been issued on the complaint and on the date appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day 4 Pari materia with Section 256 Cr.P.C. which provides, "256. Non-appearance or death of complainant-(1) If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day:*** Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal atten - dance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case.*** (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death." (Emphasis supplied) CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 13 of 17 subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not enter appearance, either in person or through complainant's appointed counsel. Under such situation, law/Section 279 BNSS/Section 256 Cr.P.C. confers power on the court/Magistrate to acquit such an accused. Unmistakably, the difference between the said two provisions is quite apparent, wherein while the former provision deals with a situation prior to the summoning of an accused, in contrast, the latter provision deals with a case, subsequent to issuance of such summoning. Here, this Court deems it apposite to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Kalpana Tyagi v. Sneh Lata Sharma, 2003 (68) DRJ 14: 2003 Cri. LJ 3395, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while expounding the appropriate legal recourse, available in the aforenoted situations, remarked (in the context of pari materia provisions under Section 256 Cr.P.C.) as under;

"8. A distinction, therefore, has to be drawn in regard to the complaints dismissed prior to the summoning of an accused and those dismissed subsequent to the summoning of the accused if a complaint is dismissed prior to the summoning of an accused the order may be challenged by way of filing a revision but once Section 256 comes into play, the dismissal of a complaint has the effect of acquittal of an accused and only an appeal can be filed under Section 378 of the Code to challenge his acquittal."

(Emphasis supplied)

11. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in H.P. Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. v. M.P.S. Chawla, (1998) 92 Comp. Cas 686 (HP): (1997) 2 Crimes 591 (H&P): 1996 SCC Online HP 54, noted in akin context, as under;

CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 14 of 17
"12. There is no denying that the dismissal of the complaint in default under Section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code, entails the acquittal of the accused. Once an accused has been acquitted of the offence, the law provides a remedy by way of an appeal against the order of acquittal. Once a remedy by way of appeal is available to the petitioner under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the failure of the petitioner to avail of such a remedy, this court is not to exercise the inherent powers for interfering with the impugned order..."

(Emphasis supplied)

12. Ergo, in light of the foregoing, when the facts of the present case are conscientiously analysed, it is reiterated that after the Ld. Trial Court inter alia took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 NI Act and issued summons against the respondent/accused vide order dated 29.10.2021, the respondent entered appearance before the Ld. Trial Court on 07.03.2022. Markedly, on said date, notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed against the respondent as well as admission/denial of the documents, conducted in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C. and thereafter, the matter was listed/adjourned for cross examination of the revisionist. Subsequently, as stated herein, the matter was deferred/adjourned on several occasions, i.e., on 23.05.2022, 01.08.2022, 19.09.2022, 12.12.2022, 20.02.2023, 29.05.2023, 09.10.2023, 15.01.2024, 13.05.2024, 28.08.2024, 04.12.2024, 26.03.2025 and 30.07.2025. Markedly, on 26.03.2025, the Ld. Trial Court, adjourned the matter to 30.07.2025, explicitly granting last and final opportunity to the revisionist to lead CE. However, since even on 30.07.2025, the revisionist failed to enter appearance before the Ld. Trial Court, despite explicit directions, the Ld. Trial Court vide order of the CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 15 of 17 said date/impugned order, dismissed the revisionist's complaint and consequent, acquitted the respondent. Quite evidently, it is seen in light of the above that once the summons were issued against the respondent by the Ld. Trial Court, whereupon the respondent entered appearance and the matter was listed for CE, wherein the complainant failed to enter appearance on the appointed date/date on which the matter was adjourned, the eventual dismissal of the revisionist's complaint for non- prosecution and non-appearance, amounts to an order under Section 279 BNSS/Section 256 Cr.P.C. Needless to mention that by virtue of the provisions under Section 143 NI Act, provisions under Section 279 BNSS/Section 256 Cr.P.C. are squarely applicable to the present case. Correspondingly, as hereinunder noted, the impugned order explicitly records a finding of acquittal of the respondent/accused herein. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, legal provisions as well as judicial precedents cited herein, there remains no doubt that present revision petition is not maintainable because the effect of the impugned order was acquittal of the respondent herein and as aforenoted, such an order cannot be challenged by way of criminal revision.

13. Consequently, in light of the foregoing discussion and keeping in view the aforenoted judicial precedents, law as well as the submissions addressed before this Court, this Court unambiguously reiterates that the order dated 30.07.2025 passed by Ld. JMFC (NI Act)-03, Central Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing, 'Uma Shankar Sharma v. Dazi, Ct. Case No. CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 16 of 17 5777/2020', dismissing the revisionist's complaint for non- prosecution and non-appearance is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, for the aforesaid reasons. Accordingly, in light of the above, this Court unambiguously observes that present revision petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed, as not maintainable.

14. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this order.

15. Revision file be consigned to record room after due Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL compliance. GOYAL Date: 2025.12.24 16:27:52 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal) on 24.12.2025. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CR No. 568/2025 Sh. Uma Shankar Sharma v. Ms. Dazi. Page 17 of 17