Himachal Pradesh High Court
Kailash Chand And Anr. vs Smt. Gudi And Ors. on 3 August, 1988
Equivalent citations: AIR1990HP17
JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J.
1. Prabh Dayal (now dead and represented by L. Rs.) instituted civil suit No. 136 on May 6, 1968, in the Court of the Senior Sub-Judge, Chamba. He claimed to be the owner of Khasra No. 1631, situate in Mohal Rupani, Pargana Rajnagar, Tehsil and District Chamba. His case further, was that he had planted a number of fruit trees over a part of Khasra No. 1631 which were damaged by the defendants in the month of April 1967, by throwing Malba thereon. He claimed a decree for injunction restraining the defendants from doing so in future. Also, a decree for the damage caused to the trees as well as for the expenses likely to-be incurred by him for removal of the Malba. The defendants, who are appellants in the present second appeal, resisted the suit. They denied that plaintiff Prabh Dayal was the owner of Khasra No. 1631. They also said that the land in suit was being used for a very long time for burying dead animals and for throwing refuse thereon and was also being used by children and others of the village for easing them-selves.
2. Parties led evidence. On consideration of this evidence, the trial Judge came to the conclusion that plaintiff Prabh Dayal was the owner in possession of Khasra No. 1631. He, however, found that the defendants had a right of burying dead animals on the land and also to use the same for easing themselves thereon and throwing wastage. On the latter finding, the reliief for injunction was refused. The decree for damages was refused on the finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish the loss or the quantum of loss allegedly suffered by him. The plaintiff appealed.
3. Before the lower appellate Court the claim for damages was given up. The only relief for which a prayer was made by the plaintiff before the learned Addl. District Judge, Kangra, who heard the appeal, was in regard to injunction restraining the defendants from throwing refuse upon the land or using it for burying dead animals or for easing thereon.
4. The learned Addl. District Judge went into the evidence afresh. On his appraisal of evidence, whole he affirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court that the plaintiff was owner in possession of the plot bearing Khasra No. 1631, the conclusion of the trial Court in regard to the fact of the user of the land for throwing of refuse, burying of dead animals and for easing thereon was reversed. The Addl. District Judge came to the conclusion that all these activities, in regard to which the defendants were claiming right by prescription, were not relatable to the plot bearing Khasra No. 1631. He, therefore, decreed the suit by restraining the defendants permanently from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff on the land in question. Thereafter, the defendants came to this Court in the present second appeal.
5. It has been urged with some emphasis that the lower appellate Court was in error in reversing the conclusion recorded by the trial Judge that the defendants had a right to throw refuse on a part of Khasra No. 1631 and to bury dead animals thereon and using the same for easing themselves. The evidence of the various witnesses in the case was placed before the Court by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants and, in particular, he drew the attention of the Court to the statements made by two of the plaintiffs own witnesses, namely, P.W.6, Nand Lal, and P. W. 7, Chetu Ram, to the effect that the defendants were exercising the right of burying dead animals, throwing refuse and using plot bearing Khasra No. 1631 for easing themselves for a long time. It was urged that in the face of this admission no decree for injunction could be passed in favour of the plaintiff as the statements clearly recognized the easementary right of the defendants to use part of Khasra No. 1631 for the aforesaid purposes.
6. The learned Addl. District Judge has, after evaluating the evidence on record, come to a categorical conclusion that no part of Khasra No. 1631 was being used for these purposes. He has also taken into account the aforesaid statements of the two witnesses, Nand Lal and Chetu Ram, and has drawn his own conclusions about it. The conclusion which the learned Judge has recorded about the nature of user of the land is a conclusion of fact which is normally not interfered with in appeal under Section 100, C.P.C.
7. Even otherwise, the decree passed by the learned Addl. District Judge does not merit any interference in law. And, the reason is obvious. The easementary right which is being claimed by the defendants on the property of the plaintiff is a right to bury the dead animals, to throw refuse and to use the land for purposes of easing themselves thereon. As far as the right to bury dead animals on the property belonging to another person is concerned, it is obvious that such a right can either flow from a grant or from a custom. Neither of these has been set up by the defendants. No easementary right for burying dead bodies on the property belonging to another person can be claimed for no such right is recognized by the Easements Act. It will not be open to the Court to recognize an easementary right of its own.
8. As far as the right to throw refuse and to use the property for purposes of easing thereon is concerned, it amounts to the claim of a right which is per se a nuisance. Commission of a nuisance on the property of another person cannot be claimed by way of an easementary right. The view aforesaid is almost settled. If precedents are needed, they are in abundance. See Gopal Kirshna Sil v. Abdul Samad Chaudhuri, AIR 1921 Cal 569, Mangat Ram v. Siraj-ul-hasan, AIR 1924 Lah 492, Sheo Raj Chamar v. Mudeer Khan, AIR 1934 All 868, Bherulal v. Mohan Singh, AIR 1966 Raj 123, Bankey Lal v. Krishan Lal, AIR 1967 All 43, Jag Narain v. Ram Dularay, AIR 1979 All 71 and Prabhu.Narain Singh v. Ram Niranjan (deceased by L. Rs.), AIR 1983 All 223.
9. In sum, the appeal must be held to be without merit. It is dismissed. However, parties are left to bear their own costs of this Court.