Supreme Court - Daily Orders
State Of U.P.(Now Uttarakhand) Thr. ... vs R.B.Narain Singh Sugar Mills Ltd. Thr. ... on 16 February, 2022
Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, M.M. Sundresh
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1843-1844/2009
STATE OF U.P.(NOW UTTARAKHAND)
THR. COLLECTOR HARIDWAR & ANR. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
R.B.NARAIN SINGH SUGAR MILLS LTD.
THR. CHAIRMAN SARDAR HARDEV SINGH & ANR. Respondent(s)
WITH
C.A. Nos.1845-1846/2009 (X)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1387/2022
[@ SLP(C) No. 35030/2015]
O R D E R
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1843-1844/2009 & C.A. Nos.1845-1846/2009 We have heard learned counsel for the appellant(s) for over an hour and a quarter and are not persuaded to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. It is not disputed that there is a registered sale deed of 1939 in favour of the respondents and there is a mutation entry of 1959. Insofar as the mutation entry is concerned, it is the say of the appellant(s) that in view of consolidation proceedings starting in 1959 which culminated in 1995, there was no occasion to look into the entries made, or that the entries were not properly made. However, the Signature Not Verified khatauni entry is also accepted as having been made in Digitally signed by Charanjeet kaur Date: 2022.02.28 19:04:33 IST Reason: 1968. It is only in the year 1990 that the appellant(s) sought to raise the issue that there were arrears of land which were banjar and, therefore, must vest with 2 the State Government under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951. We may note that there is a functioning sugar mill on the land in question but it is the say of the appellant(s) that there are some lands which are still vacant and not being utilized.
We do believe that this is not a fit case for becoming a fourth Court of scrutiny to scrutinize the findings of two concurrent Courts below, apart from the fact that a settled position of more than three decades is sought to be altered so far as entries are concerned. The sale deed is even older, i.e. of 1939, which in any case is not being doubted.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed. CIVIL APPEAL NO.1387/2022 [@ SLP(C) No. 35030/2015] Leave granted.
The appellant claims title to the land based on a sale deed registered in 1939. The appellant established a sugar factory which is working at the site. It appears that the mutation in the registry was not carried out. The UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 came into force on 01.07.1952. The appellant applied for and obtained mutation entry dated 10.08.1959 by the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer.
There was silence on the part of the respondents for the next 31 years until an order was passed on 21.08.1990 by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Laksar 3 seeking to direct what was a correction of the entry of the land in possession of the appellant. It may be noticed that this order was passed without even a notice to the appellant.
The appellant thereafter approached the Sub- Divisional Officer seeking restoration of the original entry which was granted in terms of the order dated 21.08.1990. However, respondent No.1 preferred a Revision Petition before the Additional Commissioner, Meerut who allowed the same and sent the matter to the Board of Revenue for confirmation.
The Board of Revenue remanded the matter back to the Additional Commissioner who decided the relegated issues vide an order dated 03.12.1998. The Board was pleased to confirm the same vide an order dated 22.05.2000. The effect was the confirmation of the order dated 21.08.1990 by setting aside the earlier order dated 10.08.1959 which had been passed in favour of the appellant. We may notice that in the meantime, respondent No.1 had filed two suits for permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the peaceful possession of the disputed property before the Civil Court. These suits were decreed, confirmed in appeal and second appeal, and we have passed an order today in Civil Appeal Nos.1843- 1844/2009 & Connected Matters. (State Of U.P.(now Uttarakhand) Thr. Collector Haridwar & Anr. v. 4 R.B.Narain Singh Sugar Mills Ltd. Thr. Chairman Sardar Hardev Singh & Anr.) dismissing the appeal against the two concurrent findings by a short reasoned order.
The appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital against the order dated 22.05.2000 in the year 2001 and the High Court confirmed the order by dismissing the Writ Petition vide order dated 26.06.2015. We may note that at that stage, the first appeal order in the suits had already been passed on 15.05.2007, though the appeal filed by the State and the Department received an order of grant of leave.
We have heard learned counsel for parties. In our view, the process adopted against the appellant suffers from many infirmities. The first infirmity we may note is that the revenue entry of 10.08.1959 was sought to be reversed vide order dated 21.08.1990, after a gap of 31 years. This was done ex parte. It suffers thus in two aspects – that order being passed ex parte and the earlier revenue entry being reversed after 31 years, a huge period of time.
Learned counsel for the respondents did seek to contend before us that the consolidation proceedings had commenced in village Khera on 22.04.1959 and thus, the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer could not have passed an order on 10.08.1959. He further submitted that the consolidation proceedings were completed in 5 the year 1965. The entry of 1959 was only in the Malikan register and the entry in the Khatauni register was made only in the years 1965 and 1968. Thus, even the Khatauni entries were 25 and 22 years hence from when they are sought to be disturbed and as pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, the consolidation proceedings only recorded one of the two villages – Khera and not the other village Simli.
Learned counsel has also taken us through the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901, more specifically, Section 32 which deals with the record of rights which reads as under:-
“32. Record-of-rights. - [There shall be a record-of-rights for each village subject to such exceptions as may be prescribed by rules made under the provisions of Section 234. The record- of-rights shall consist of a register of all persons cultivating or otherwise occupying land specifying the particulars required by Section 55]” The record of rights thus are to consist of persons cultivating or “otherwise occupying land” and there is no doubt that the appellant has been in continued possession.
The subsequent Section deals with the annual register which requires the Collector to maintain a record of rights, and for that purpose, annually or as otherwise as prescribed by the State Government, to 6 prepare an amended register of rights as mentioned in Section 32. We may clarify that the proviso to Sub- Section 2, requiring the Collector to cause to be recorded in the annual register all transfers, states that the power to record changes is not be construed to include the power to decide a dispute involving any question of title.
We now turn to Section 39 which deals with correction of mistakes in the annual register which is to be made by the Tahsildar on an application. The subsequent Section 40 is material, which reads as under:-
“40.Settlement of disputes as to entries in annual register. - (1) All disputes regarding entries in the annual registers shall be decided on the basis of possession.
(2) If in the course of inquiry into a dispute under this Section, the [Tahsildar] is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession, he shall ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to the property and shall put such person in possession.” The aspect emphasized by learned counsel for the appellant is that it is a summary proceeding of settlement of disputes, and what is material is only possession, which was undisputedly with the appellant.
We have no cavil to the reading of the Sections as 7 submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant and thus are in agreement on that aspect.
We next turn to Chapter X of the Act which deals with Appeals and Revision. Section 210 provides the Courts to which the appeals will lie and Sub-Section 6 prescribes that no appeal shall lie against an order passed under Sections 28, 33, 39, or 40. Thus, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that actually no appeal at all was maintainable as the appeal was sought to be filed in respect of orders passed under Sections 33/39 of the said Act.
Learned counsel for the respondent did seek to argue, by reference to the High Court Judgment, that the order dated 10.08.1959 should not be read as one of mere correction. In that case however, the order which had been passed on 21.8.1990, in any case, purported to be under Section 33/39 of the said Act and can hardly be called as one of correction. If the argument of the respondent is to be accepted that only clerical errors can be corrected, then one must see the factual scenario where both the orders are passed purportedly under the same provisions.
It is not as if the State is powerless or remedy-less. Section 219 provides for the remedy of revision and reads as under:-
“219. Revision. -(1) The Board or the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner or 8 the Collector or the Record Officer, or the Settlement Officer, may call for the record of any case decided or proceeding held by any revenue Court subordinate to him in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed or proceeding held and if such subordinate revenue Court appears to have -
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the Board or the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner or the Collector or the Record Officer, or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, pass such order in the case as he thinks fit.
(2) If an application under this section has been moved by any person either to the Board, or to the Commissioner, or to the Additional Commissioner, or the Collector or to the Record Officer or to the Settlement Officer, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by any other of them.]” There is some change in the said provision in the year 1997 but that would not have a bearing as the revision power is not what was sought to be exercised.
Be that as it may, even if the revision power was to be 9 exercised, it had to be exercised within a reasonable period of time.
Learned counsel for the respondents repeatedly sought to emphasis that if a fraud permeates all these actions, then there is no bar of time within which action can be taken. On this aspect, learned counsel for the appellant rightly points out that this would not be the correct legal position in view of various judicial pronouncements and seeks to refer this Court to the judgment in Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District & Anr. v. D. Narsing Rao & Ors.- (2015) 3 SCC 695 where two concurrent judgments had been pronounced by the two Hon’ble Judges constituting the Bench. In paragraph 16, one of the learned Judges has observed that if no time limit is prescribed in the Section in question, while dealing with the Andra Pradesh (Telangana Area) (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1948, that cannot give a license to exercise a suo motu power after a period of 50 years. Not only that, in the concurrent judgment, the other learned Judge has clearly stated that apart from the fact that such power must be exercised within a reasonable period of time, this principle would equally apply where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of corrective power. Additional references have been made to different decisions of this Court. 10
We do believe that the aforesaid principles would apply to the facts of the present case and there would be no deviation from this principle merely because in the present case the power is sought to be exercised after 31 years instead of 50 years or 25 and 22 years so far as the khatauni entry is concerned. The point is, it is an extraordinarily belated exercise of power and that too of suo motu exercise of power without notice. It is also a salutary principle that a settled position should not be permitted to be unsettled after a prolonged period of time.
In view of our aforesaid observations and orders passed in the Civil Appeal Nos.1843-1844/2009 & Connected Matters. (State Of U.P.(Now Uttarakhand) Thr. Collector Haridwar & Anr. V. R.B.Narain Singh Sugar Mills Ltd. Thr. Chairman Sardar Hardev Singh & Anr.) filed by the Department, we are of the view that the orders passed by the Board of Revenue dated 22.05.2000 as confirmed by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The original orders passed by the Additional Commissioner, Meerut on 04.12.1991, restoring the entry of 10.08.1959 and setting aside the order dated 21.08.1990 were liable to be confirmed by the Board of Revenue.
The order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 21.08.1990 was sought to be set aside by the Additional 11 Commissioner, Meerut in exercise of the revisionary power on account of absence of any hearing and the matter was referred to the Board of Revenue for confirmation. The Board of Revenue had remanded the matter back to the Additional Commissioner to decide three issues vide the order dated 26.09.1995 and the Additional Commissioner decided the three issues in favour of the appellant vide the order dated 03.12.1998. However, the Board of Revenue interfered with the same vide the order dated 22.05.2000, which is not sustainable as also the impugned judgment of the High Court confirming the said order. The Board ought to have accepted the recommendations dated 03.12.1998.
The result of the aforesaid is that the appeal stands allowed in the aforesaid terms, leaving parties to bear their own costs.
At this stage, learned counsel for the respondent states that there is a practical problem as the Laksar-Haridwar Road passes through the land of the appellant. Admittedly, it has not been acquired because according to the respondents the title was not with the appellant. In the larger interest of public, we put to the learned counsel for the appellant whether the appellant is willing to give an assurance to this Court not to disturb the functioning of that road or any travel on that road. He gives the said assurance and 12 we take the same on record. The said road can thus be used as a public thoroughfare.
………………………………………..J. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL] ………………………………………..J. [M.M. SUNDRESH] NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 16, 2022.
13
ITEM NO.104 COURT NO.6 SECTION X
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 1843-1844/2009 STATE OF U.P.(NOW UTTARAKHAND) THR. COLLECTOR HARIDWAR & ANR. Appellant(s) VERSUS R.B.NARAIN SINGH SUGAR MILLS LTD.
THR. CHAIRMAN SARDAR HARDEV SINGH & ANR. Respondent(s) IA No. 111574/2021 - APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION WITH C.A. No. 1845-1846/2009 (X) SLP(C) No. 35030/2015 (X) (PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS) Date : 16-02-2022 These matters were called on for hearing today. CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. SUNDRESH For Appellant(s) 104.2 Mr. S.R. Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Vineet Bhagat, AOR Mr. K.G. Bhagat, Adv.
Mr. Ajoy Bhushan Kalia, Adv.
Mr. Navneet Kaushik, Adv.
Ms. Manju Bhagat, Adv.
Ms. Archna Midha, Adv.
Mr. Aksveer Singh Saggu, Adv.
Mr. Sanat Kumar, AAG Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, AOR Ms. Rachna Gandhi, Adv.
Mr. Sajal Singhai, Adv.
Mr. Ramesh P. Bhatt, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Kailash Pandey, Adv.
Mr. Rajeet Singh, Adv.
Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, Adv.
Shri. Gaichangpou Gangmei, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. S.R. Singh, Sr. Adv. 104 Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Vineet Bhagat, AOR 14 Mr. K.G. Bhagat, Adv.
Mr. Ajoy Bhushan Kalia, Adv.
Mr. Navneet Kaushik, Adv.
Ms. Manju Bhagat, Adv.
Ms. Archna Midha, Adv.
Mr. Aksveer Singh Saggu, Adv.
104.1 Mr. S.R. Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Vineet Bhagat, AOR Mr. K.G. Bhagat, Adv.
Mr. Ajoy Bhushan Kalia, Adv.
Mr. Navneet Kaushik, Adv.
Ms. Manju Bhagat, Adv.
Ms. Archna Midha, Adv.
Mr. Aksveer Singh Saggu, Adv.
Mr. Ramesh P. Bhatt, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Kailash Pandey, Adv.
Mr. Rajeet Singh, Adv.
Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, Adv.
Shri. Gaichangpou Gangmei, AOR Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, AOR UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1843-1844/2009 & C.A. Nos.1845-1846/2009 The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable order.
Pending application(s) stand(s) disposed of. SLP(C) No. 35030/2015 Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable order. Pending application(s) stand(s) disposed of.
(ASHA SUNDRIYAL) (POONAM VAID) ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
[Signed reportable order is placed on the file]