Allahabad High Court
Udit Chandra vs State Of U.P. & Others on 18 January, 2012
Author: Amitava Lala
Bench: Amitava Lala, Ashok Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Reserved Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 50880 of 2009. Udit Chandra. ........ Petitioner. Versus State of U.P. and others. ........ Respondents. ---------- Present: (Hon. Mr. Justice Amitava Lala & Hon. Mr. Justice Ashok Srivastava) Appearance: For the Petitioner : Mr. Udit Chandra, In-person. For the Respondents : Mr. B.K. Srivastava, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Dhiraj Srivastava, & Mr. Pankaj Naqvi (as he then was) -------- Amitava Lala, J.-- This writ petition is made by an Advocate of this Court challenging the constitutional validity of Rule 10 and part of Rule 55 of the Rules/ Constitution of the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad (hereinafter in short called as the ''Rules') insofar as it provides "only Ordinary Members who have put in 3 years of continuous Membership will be entitled to vote and participate in the election". We have gone through the Rules and found that the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad (in short called as the ''Bar Association') came into force after the approval of the Registrar, Societies, Firms and Chits, Government of Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, the Bar Association is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The petitioner wanted to cast vote in the election of the Bar Association immediately after becoming member in the month of July, 2009. According to him, he is a life member, who is to be separately treated from ordinary member. At an interim stage, under an order dated 08th October, 2009 we held that ordinary member includes life member. Therefore, the petitioner is not privileged by any better right to participate in the election of the Bar Association. At the time of final hearing Mr. Udit Chandra, the petitioner appearing in-person, contended before us that right to vote is a constitutional and fundamental right. Right to vote is as good as freedom of speech and expression, therefore, it is protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The submission of the petitioner is totally misconceived in view of the recent Constitution Bench judgement of the Supreme Court reported in 2010 (7) SCC 202 [K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and others Vs. Union of India and another], whereunder it has been held that right to vote has been held to be a statutory right and not a fundamental right and the same position has been consistently upheld in several decisions. It was further held that while the exercise of electoral franchise is an essential component of a liberal democracy, it is a well-settled principle in Indian Law, that the right to vote and contest elections does not have the status of fundamental rights. Instead, they are in the nature of legal rights which can be controlled through legislative means. It was further held that right to vote is not an inherent right and it cannot be claimed in an abstract sense. Furthermore, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 gives effect to the constitutional guidance on the eligibility of persons to contest elections. This includes grounds that render persons ineligible from contesting elections such as that of a person not being a citizen of India, a person being of unsound mind, insolvency and the holding of an "office of profit" under the executive among others. It will suffice to say that there is no inherent right to contest elections since there are explicit legislative controls over the same. In 1992 (4) SCC 80 (Mohan Lal Tripathi Vs. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly and others) the Supreme Court has held that democracy is a concept, a political philosophy, an ideal practised by many nations culturally advanced and politically mature by resorting to governance by representatives of the people elected directly or indirectly. But electing representatives to govern is neither a ''fundamental right' nor a ''common law right' but a special right created by the statutes, or a ''political right' or ''privilege' and not a ''natural', ''absolute' or ''vested right'. ''Concepts familiar to common law and equity must remain strangers to election law unless statutorily embodied.' Right to remove an elected representative, too, must stem out of the statute as ''in the absence of a constitutional restriction it is within the power of a legislature to enact a law for the recall of officers'. Its existence or validity can be decided on the provision of the Act and not, as a matter of policy. From the plain reading of the aforesaid judgements it is crystal clear that the right of the petitioner to cast vote or contest election of the Bar Association is neither a fundamental right nor a constitutional right like the Representation of the People Act, 1951 having constitutional guidance. The right of the petitioner to cast vote or contest election is based on the Rules of the Bar Association. The relevant part of the Rules are quoted hereunder: "4(l) Ordinary Member:- Ordinary Member shall perform all purposes including a Life Member and not an Honorary Member or a Non-Resident Members." "5. CLASSES OF MEMBERSHIP (b) Life Member:- An Advocate on the roll of the Advocate regularly practicing in the High Court at Allahabad by payment of Rs.5,000/- which will provide income by way of interest equivalent to the Membership fee payable by Ordinary member, may become Life Member of that Association. (d) Ordinary Member:- Being an Advocate on the rolls of the High Court regularly practicing in the High Court and who has been admitted by the Governing Council under Rule 7 as Ordinary Member." "10. COMMENCEMENT OF ORDINARY MEMBER Any person, who has been admitted as Ordinary Member by the Governing Council shall from the date of such admission be entitled to all the privileges of Membership, but he shall have no right to be a candidate in the election or cast vote therein for three years to be counted from next year of admission in any election of the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad." "55. PROCEDURE OF ELECTION **** ***** In order to meet the heavy burden of expenditure of the Bar Association, the Elders Committee will also fix security money for various posts, which shall not be refundable after the nomination is filed and found valid. Only Ordinary Members, who have put in 3 years of continuous Membership will be entitled to vote and participate in the Election provided their subscription is paid till before the month in which annual General Body Meeting is fixed. ***** ******" From the plain reading of the Rules, we do not find any deviation from our prima facie view that the ''ordinary member' includes ''life member' and no special right is given to life member to cast vote or to contest election even from the day one of the membership ignoring the procedure of election under Rule 55 of the Rules, which provides that three years of continuous membership is necessary to cast the vote or to participate in the election. Having so, we do not find any merit whatsoever in this writ petition. Moreover, the writ Court cannot be the forum for adjudication of the dispute between members and office bearers in connection with internal election. A Bar Association cannot be equated with the Bar Council, which is a statutory body under the Advocates Act, 1961. Such statutory body itself is both i.e. the licensing authority and the disciplinary authority in connection with the Advocates, who are discharging their duties towards the Court of law. In case of necessity the Court can call upon the Bar Council to take action against an errant Advocate for not properly discharging his functions towards the Court of law. Bar Association is nothing but a club or society for getting an appropriate accommodation to sit together, to exchange their views, to maintain solidarity, to read, to learn from the seniors, etc., and on the basis of the request made by that association, the Courts are providing accommodation/s to them for their convenience. Neither the Advocates Act, 1961 nor any rule made by the Bar Council gives any statutory power to the Bar Association for any purpose far to say about internal election. It can only be resolved before the authority or authorities under the relevant Co-operative Act and/or Rules. Even thereafter, if any, dispute exists then only it can be amenable under writ jurisdiction. The petitioner has strongly relied upon two judgements of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2005 (3) AWC 2864 (Shiv Kumar Akela and others Vs. Registrar, Societies Firms and Chits and others) and 2007 (2) AWC 2011 (Shiv Kumar Akela, Advocate and others Vs. Registrar, Societies, Firms and Chits and others) to establish before us that the writ petition against the Bar Association is maintainable. Both the judgements are arising out of one matter. When first one is a prima facie view, the second one is final view of the Court. In the said matter, the Registrar, Societies, Firms and Chits and others are party respondents and the writ petition basically lies against such respondent/s. Therefore, the decision as regards maintainability of the writ petition against the Bar Association arose incidentally when found that rain water is spoiling the association that too on concession not on contest on the question of maintainability. According to us, both the judgements, from their plain reading, cannot be considered as binding precedent of a coordinate Bench. Without going into the controversy, whether by agreement jurisdiction of the Court can be conferred or not, we are of the view that when the judgement and order is based on concession not on contest on the issue of maintainability, it cannot have any binding effect on the other Benches in passing the order taking an independent view based on contest. When we go through the first decision of Shiv Kumar Akela (supra), as aforesaid, we find respondent nos. 3 and 4 were President and Secretary of the High Court Bar Association and the respondent no. 2 was the High Court Bar Association itself. Against this array of parties, we quote hereunder paragraphs 2 and 19 of such judgement, as under: "2. It is conspicuous to note that none of the other Respondents (viz. the Registrar, Societies Firms and Chits under Societies Registration Act, 1860, Allahabad/ Respondent No. 1, Uttar Pradesh Bar Council/ Respondent No. 5, Bar Council of India through its Chairman, New Delhi/ Respondent No. 6, Advocate General, State of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow/Respondent No. 7, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad through its Registrar General/ Respondent No. 8 and the Advocate Association, 4th floor, New Building (High Court, Allahabad)/ Respondent No. 9) have joined the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 on the above ''Preliminary Objection' regarding maintainability of the writ petition, rather directly or indirectly they support the petitioners and seek court intervention to ensure proper functioning of High Court Bar Association." "19. Second objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on this ground that High Court Bar Association being registered under Societies Registration Act is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, Constitution of India, it will suffice to mention that at this stage writ petition does lie and is maintainable against respondent Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Curiously, none of the respondents except respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have raised objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition." According to us, Bar Council of India or the State Bar Councils are the statutory bodies to control the Advocates in their roll. A Bar Association cannot be equated with the Bar Council. If one has certificate of roll of Advocate issued by the Bar Council of India, he is entitled to act and plead anywhere in the country. Similarly, if certificate of roll of Advocate is given by any Bar Council of the State, he is entitled to practice anywhere in the State. However, for the better understanding a person, who normally practices in the High Court or a District Court, gets his name registered with the local Bar Association for their better identification by the litigants for the sake of his/her professional interest. Similarly, the Court can also identify such Advocates in discharging its onerous duty. In this regard, Rule 3-A under Chapter XXIV of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 framed under Section 34 (1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 was inserted in 2005, which is as follows: "3-A. (i) Unless the court grants leave, an advocate who is not on the roll of advocates in the High Court at Allahabad or Lucknow shall not be allowed to appear, act or plead in the High Court at Allahabad or Lucknow as the case might be unless he files appointment along with an advocate who is on such roll for Allahabad cases at Allahabad and for Lucknow cases at Lucknow. (ii) The High Court shall prepare a roll of advocates in Parts ''A' and ''B' of those who ordinarily practise in the High Court, Part ''A' for Allahabad and Part ''B' for Lucknow. (iii) The roll of advocates shall bear in regard to each advocate entered, his full name, father's name, passport size coloured photograph, enrolment number, date of enrolment, complete postal address both of residence and office which shall be in the Municipal limits of the city of Allahabad or Lucknow as the case might be. (iv) The rolls shall be prepared and revised periodically in the manner and under the authority as may be prescribed by the Chief Justice. (v) This Rule 3-A shall come into force after notification by the Chief Justice that both the rolls for Allahabad and Lucknow Parts ''A' and ''B' are complete." Such Rule 3-A is explanatory to Rule-3 thereof, which is also quoted hereunder: "3. An Advocate who is not on the roll of Advocates of the Bar Council of the State in which the Court is situate, shall not appear, act or plead in such Court, unless he files an appointment along with an Advocate who is on the Roll of such State Bar Council and who is ordinarily practising in such Court. In cases, in which a party is represented by more than one Advocate, it shall be necessary for all of them to file a joint appointment or for each of them to file a separate one." Therefore, existence of such rule cannot make the Bar Association a statutory body. In 1981 (1) SCC 722 (Ajay Hasia and others Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others) a five Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court has laid down certain tests for consideration as to whether an authority can be considered as "other authorities" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India or not, following the ratio propounded by the Supreme Court in 1979 (3) SCC 489 (R.D. Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India). The tests are as follows: "(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor ... whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) "Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government." Such ratio as propounded in the case of Ajay Hasia (supra) was considered by a Seven Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in the judgement reported in 2002 (5) SCC 111 (Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and others) when the question arose as to whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is State or not, and came to the conclusion as in paragraphs 98 to 101 therein, which are quoted hereunder: "98. We sum up our conclusions as under: (1) Simply by holding a legal entity to be an instrumentality or agency of the State it does not necessarily become an authority within the meaning of "other authorities" in Article 12. To be an authority, the entity should have been created by a statute or under a statute and functioning with liability and obligations to the public. Further, the statute creating the entity should have vested that entity with power to make law or issue binding directions amounting to law within the meaning of Article 13(2) governing its relationship with other people or the affairs of other people -- their rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations. If created under a statute, then there must exist some other statute conferring on the entity such powers. In either case, it should have been entrusted with such functions as are governmental or closely associated therewith by being of public importance or being fundamental to the life of the people and hence governmental. Such authority would be the State, for, one who enjoys the powers or privileges of the State must also be subjected to limitations and obligations of the State. It is this strong statutory flavour and clear indicia of power--constitutional or statutory, and its potential or capability to act to the detriment of fundamental rights of the people, which makes it an authority; though in a given case, depending on the facts and circumstances, an authority may also be found to be an instrumentality or agency of the State and to that extent they may overlap. Tests 1, 2 and 4 in Ajay Hasia Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [1981(1) SCC 722] enable determination of Governmental ownership or control. Tests 3, 5 and 6 are "functional" tests. The propounder of the tests himself has used the words suggesting relevancy of those tests for finding out if an entity was instrumentality or agency of the State. Unfortunately thereafter the tests were considered relevant for testing if an authority is the State and this fallacy has occurred because of difference between "instrumentality and agency" of the State and an "authority" having been lost sight of sub-silentio, unconsciously and un-deliberated. In our opinion, and keeping in view the meaning which "authority" carries, the question whether an entity is an "authority" cannot be answered by applying Ajay Hasia tests. (2) The tests laid down in Ajay Hasia case are relevant for the purpose of determining whether an entity is an instrumentality or agency of the State. Neither all the tests are required to be answered in positive nor a positive answer to one or two tests would suffice. It will depend upon a combination of one or more of the relevant factors depending upon the essentiality and overwhelming nature of such factors in identifying the real source of governing power, if need be by removing the mask or piercing the veil disguising the entity concerned. When an entity has an independent legal existence, before it is held to be the State, the person alleging it to be so must satisfy the Court of brooding presence of government or deep and pervasive control of the government so as to hold it to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. CSIR, if "the State"? 99. Applying the tests formulated hereinabove, we are clearly of the opinion that CSIR is not an "authority" so as to fall within the meaning of expression "other authorities" under Article 12. It has no statutory flavour--neither it owes its birth to a statute nor is there any other statute conferring it with such powers as would enable it being branded an authority. The indicia of power is absent. It does not discharge such functions as are governmental or closely associated therewith or being fundamental to the life of the people. 100. We may now examine the characteristics of CSIR. On a careful examination of the material available consisting of the memorandum of association, rules and regulations and bye-laws of the society and its budget and statement of receipts and outgoings, we proceed to record our conclusions. The Government does not hold the entire share capital of CSIR. It is not owned by the Government. Presently, the Government funding is about 70% and grant by Government of India is one out of five categories of avenues to derive its funds. Receipts from other sources such as research, development, consultation activities, monies received for specific projects and job work, assets of the society, gifts and donations are permissible sources of funding of CSIR without any prior permission/ consent/ sanction from the Government of India. Financial assistance from the Government does not meet almost all expenditure of the CSIR and apparently it fluctuates too depending upon variation from its own sources of income. It does not enjoy any monopoly status, much less conferred or protected by Government. The governing body does not consist entirely of Government nominees. The membership of the society and the manning of its governing body- both consist substantially of private individuals of eminence and independence who cannot be regarded as hands and voice of the State. There is no provision in the rules or the bye-laws that the Government can issue such directives as it deems necessary to CSIR and the latter is bound to carry out the same. The functions of the CSIR cannot be regarded as governmental or of essential public importance or as closely related to governmental functions or being fundamental to the life of the people or duties and obligations to the public at large. The functions entrusted to CSIR can as well be carried out by any private person or organization. Historically, it was not a department of Government which was transferred to CSIR. There was a Board of Scientific and Industrial Research and an Industrial Research Utilisation Committee. CSIR was set up as a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 to coordinate and generally exercise administrative control over the two organizations which would tender their advice only to CSIR. The membership of the Society and the Governing Body of the council may be terminated by the President not by the Government of India. The Governing Body is headed by the Director General of CSIR and not by the President of Society (i.e. the Prime Minister). Certainly the Board and the Committee, taken over by CSIR, did not discharge any regal, governmental or sovereign functions. CSIR is not the offspring or the blood and bones or the voice and hands of the Government. CSIR does not and cannot make law. 101. However, the Prime Minister of India is the President of the Society. Some of the members of the Society and of the Governing Body are persons appointed ex-officio by virtue of their holding some office under the Government also. There is some element of control exercised by the Government in matters of expenditure such as on the quantum and extent of expenditure more for the reason that financial assistance is also granted by the Government of India and the latter wishes to see that its money is properly used and not misused. The President is empowered to review, amend and vary any of the decisions of the Governing Body which is in the nature of residual power for taking corrective measures vesting in the President but then the power is in the President in that capacity and not as Prime Minister of India. On winding up or dissolution of CSIR, any remaining property is not available to members but "shall be dealt with in such manner as Government of India may determine". There is nothing special about such a provision in memorandum of association of CSIR as such a provision is a general one applicable to all societies under Section 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. True that there is some element of control of the Government but not a deep and pervasive control. To some extent, it may be said that the Government's presence or participation is felt in the Society but such presence cannot be called a brooding presence or the overlordship of the Government. We are satisfied that the tests in Ajay Hasia case are not substantially or on essential aspects even satisfied to call CSIR an instrumentality or agency of the State. A mere governmental patronage, encouragement, push or recognition would not make an entity "the State"." According to us, the Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Kumar Akela (supra) came to the conclusion to hold the High Court Bar Association as a ''State' basically on the following grounds that Advocate General is ex-officio member of the Governing Body of the High Court Bar Association and ex-officio member of the U.P. Bar Council, secondly the Assistant Registrar of the Societies at Allahabad appeared in person and conceded ignorance over functioning of the High Court Bar Association, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, and thirdly, function of the Bar Association is of public duty. At least two issues, which have been decided by the Division Bench of this Court to hold the Bar Association as ''State' or ''other authority under the State', are not in conformity with the tests laid down by the seven Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra). Mere presence of the Advocate General as ex-officio member of the Governing Body of the Bar Association and ex-officio member of the U.P. Bar Council is totally fallacious consideration when seven Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court says that mere presence of the Prime Minister of India as ex-officio President of the Society is functionally as a President and not as the Prime Minister and, therefore, such society can not be construed as a ''State'. Secondly, according to us, whether the respondent is ''State' or ''other authority under the State' is to be determined on the basis of the positive assertions but not on the negative face value i.e. lack of knowledge of an Assistant Registrar. Thirdly, so far as question of public duty, if any, is concerned, it has been held that no private body is debarred from discharging public duty, if not prohibited by law, but by such action the body would not be made an instrumentality of the State. Bar Council frames its own rules, regulations and guidelines and instead of supplying it to the individual Advocates, it supplies the same to the respective Bar Associations to make similar rules, regulations, guidelines, etc. to maintain uniformity, which are being followed by the respective Bar Associations. Writ petition in Shiv Kumar Akela (supra) was otherwise maintainable since the question of improper action on the part of the Registrar, Societies, Firms and Chits was before it. The Court had gone to the issue of maintainability of the writ petition against the High Court Bar Association when a special circumstance compelled the Court to look into the matter in a writ petition. We find that everywhere the role of the Advocates was taken into consideration by the Division Bench as if the Bar Association is the only controlling body of the Advocates like Bar Council. In other words, the measures of the Bar Council in toto have been discussed taking the name of the Bar Association giving complete go-by to the Advocates Act, 1961. Therefore, when the subject matter of dispute in Shiv Kumar Akela (supra) was between a petitioner and the Registrar, Societies, Firms and Chits and others and when the question of maintainability of the writ petition against the Bar Association arose incidentally and when on concession on a special circumstance the order was passed but not on contest, we are of the view that the ratio of the judgement is treated to be obiter dicta but not ratio decidendi to hold the High Court Bar Association as a statutory body to attract the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Following the ratio of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) again in 2005 (4) SCC 649 (Zee Telefilms Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India and others) the majority view of the Bench in connection with the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) is as follows: "1. The Board is not created by a statute. 2. No part of the share capital of the Board is held by the Government. 3. Practically no financial assistance is given by the Government to meet the whole or entire expenditure of the Board. 4. The Board does enjoy a monopoly status in the field of cricket but such status is not State-conferred or State-protected. 5. There is no existence of a deep and pervasive State control. The control if any is only regulatory in nature as applicable to other similar bodies. This control is not specifically exercised under any special statute applicable to the Board. All functions of the Board are not public functions nor are they closely related to governmental functions. 6. The Board is not created by transfer of a government-owned corporation. It is an autonomous body." By following the ratio of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra), the majority view of such Bench of the Supreme Court is that it would be clear that the facts established do not cumulatively show that the Board is financially, functionally or administratively dominated by or is under the control of the Government. Thus, the little control that the Government may be said to have on the Board is not pervasive in nature. Such limited control is purely regulatory and nothing more. It was further held that even otherwise, assuming that there is some element of public duty involved in the discharge of the Board's functions, even then, as per the judgement of the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra), that by itself would not suffice for bringing the Board within the net of "other authorities" for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution. When the actions of the Board (Bar Association to be read herein) are not actions as an authorised representative of the State, it cannot be said that the Board is discharging State functions. In the absence of any authorisation if a private body chooses to discharge any functions or duties which amount to public duties or State functions which is not prohibited by law then it would be incorrect to hold that such action of the body would make it an instrumentality of the State. Unfortunately, the Division Bench in deciding the case of Shiv Kumar Akela (supra) considered the minority view of judgement of the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra) instead of taking into account the majority view. In a latest judgement of the Supreme Court reported in 2011 (6) SCC 617 (A.C. Muthiah Vs. Board of Control for Cricket in India and another) though there is a conflict of opinion in connection with the merit of the case between the Judges of the Bench but so far as the question of meaning of ''State' or ''other authorities under the State' is concerned, the Bench has uniformly decided that the associations, societies and clubs being bodies discharging public functions cannot be treated to be ''State' following the ratio of Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra). Thus, in totality the ultimate opinion of this Court is that on both the counts the writ petition cannot be sustained. Hence, it is dismissed, however, without imposing any cost. (Justice Amitava Lala) I agree. (Justice Ashok Srivastava) Dated: 18 January, 2012. SKT/- Hon'ble Amitava Lala, J.
Hon'ble Ashok Srivastava, J.
Under the authority of the Hon'ble Chief Justice additional cause list has been printed for the purpose of delivery of judgement and the same has been delivered at 2.00 P.M. in the Court upon notice to the parties.
The writ petition is dismissed, however, without imposing any cost.
Dt./- 18.01.2012.
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For judgement and order, see order of the date passed on the separate sheets (fifteen pages).
Dt./-18.01.2012.
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