Calcutta High Court
Food Corporation Of India vs Shree Tulshi Commercial Co. Ltd on 29 March, 2019
Author: Ravi Krishan Kapur
Bench: Soumen Sen, Ravi Krishan Kapur
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Original Civil Jurisdiction
ORIGINAL SIDE
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble Justice Soumen Sen
and
The Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur
APD 473 of 2015
With
C.S.No. 85 OF 1982
Food Corporation of India
Versus
Shree Tulshi Commercial Co. Ltd.
For the Appellant : Mr. Partha Sarathi Bose, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Kamal Kumar Chattopadhyay, Adv.
For the Respondent : Mr. Sakya Sen, Adv.
Ms. Sormi Dutta, Adv.
Mr. C. K. Saha, Adv.
Hearing concluded on : 20.03.2019 Judgment on : 29.03.2019
Soumen Sen,J.:-The appellant is aggrieved by a decree for a sum little over 18.50 lakhs directed to be paid towards godown rents for 18 months.
Shorn of details, in or about October, 1976, the defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 formulated a scheme to increase their hired storage capacity of Food Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as "FCI") by offering private parties guaranteed occupation of such godowns for three to five years, implying a mechanism to repay the loans that may be advanced by banks to private entrepreneurs availing the scheme out of the rent receivable. In order to achieve the purpose, the said Scheme provided for constructing of godowns for storing foodgrains and other food stuff by FCI, the nationalized banks and the defendant no.3 would meet the financial requirement of private parties. The commitment of the banks in the shape of financial assistance would be up to 75% of the money required, the balance 25% would be borne by the owners of the godowns and the defendant no.3 would give refinance assistance to banks to the extent of 80% of the loans given. The plaintiff availed of the scheme and constructed 20 godowns for the defendant no.1 at Burdwan. According to the plaintiff, the defendant no.1 had agreed to take on rent 20 godowns to be constructed by the plaintiff for an agreed period at an agreed rate. The plaintiff constructed the godowns in accordance with the specifications of the defendant no.1. The plaintiff alleged that although the plaintiff had constructed 20 godowns and offered all the godowns to the defendant no.1, the said defendant, however, took on rent only two godowns and refused to take the remaining 18 godowns. The plaintiff thereafter approached this Court and obtained leave to let out those 18 godowns to third parties. The 18 godowns were thereafter let out to third parties on and from November 20, 1980. The plaintiff accordingly has prayed for compensation on account of rent for a period of 19 months at the agreed rate of 40 paise per sq. ft. for the remaining 18 godowns along with a claim for interest of the bank loans from 6th April, 1979 to 20th November, 1980.
The defendant no.1 entered appearance in the suit and filed its written statement. The defendant no.1 alleged that the construction of the godowns was not as per specifications. Moreover the construction of the godowns was not completed within the stipulated time. There were defects in the godowns constructed which the plaintiff did not cure and as such the defendant no.1 is not liable to pay any rent or compensation.
It appears from the impugned judgment that though the plaintiff claimed various reliefs, it limited its claim at the hearing of the suit to two claims, namely the claim for compensation on account of unpaid rent for the period between 6th April, 1979 and 20th November, 1980 for about 19 months at the agreed rate of 40 paise per sq. ft. for an aggregate area of 238560 sq. ft. and a direction upon the learned Advocate on record for the defendant no. 1 holding the sums receivable by the plaintiff as rent to be made over to the plaintiff.
On the basis of the pleadings and the evidence, both oral and documentary, the learned Single Judge has arrived at a finding that the plaintiff would be entitled to a sum of Rs.18,59,515.20p being the rent liable to be paid for 18 months for the period from May, 1979 till October 1980. The defendant was directed to pay the said sum within one month of the date of decree. In default, the plaintiff would be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the said sum of Rs.18,59,515.20p on and from 1st November, 1980 till realization.
In so far as the two godowns are concerned, it was held that the plaintiff would be entitled to the rent deposited in respect of two godowns of which the defendant no.1 had possession. The plaintiff would be entitled to the proceeds of the fixed deposits made by the Advocate-on-Record for the defendant no.1 together with all accruals thereto.
This decree now under challenge.
Mr. Partha Sarathi Bose, the learned Senior Counsel representing the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that there was no concluded contract between the parties in respect of the remaining 18 godowns inasmuch as no agreement was executed by and between the parties in relation to the said godowns. Mr. Bose has referred to Exbt.D being the agreement dated 19th March, 1977 between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 and submits that Clause 6 of the said agreement clearly stipulated that upon completion of the construction of the said godowns and after obtaining the completion certificate from the Sr. Regional Manager, FCI, the plaintiff would hand over the godown or the godowns to the defendant no.1 under a lease agreement to be executed between the parties in the standard form of the FCI. Mr. Bose submits that admittedly no lease agreement in the standard form of FCI was executed by and between the parties. The said agreement only contemplates execution of a further agreement and in absence of any formal agreement concerning the 18 godowns no decree could have been passed for the 18 godowns in favour of the plaintiffs. Mr. Bose submits that there is no enforceable right as against the appellant as no agreement was, in fact, executed by and between the parties. It is submitted that the plaintiff was required and obliged to handover the godowns within 6 months from 19th March, 1977. From time to time, the plaintiff requested the appellant/defendant to extend the time of completion under the agreement and such extension was granted from time to time. In spite thereof, the plaintiff failed and neglected to construct and complete the godowns and provide the required services within the said extended time. On or about 1st September, 1978 the defendant no.1 gave notice to the plaintiff that the godowns must be completed on 30th September, 1978 and that no further extension of time would be granted. None of the godowns were completed or any service was provided by 30th September, 1978. At that stage the plaintiff requested the defendant to take over at least 2 of the godowns, namely godown nos. 9 and 10. At the insistence of the plaintiff, in spite of deficiency, the defendant no. 1 agreed to take over the said two godowns. The plaintiff undertook to remove the said deficiencies within a month from the date of taking over. Although the defendant was not obliged to take over the said godowns from the plaintiff, the defendant took over the possession of two godowns in view of the urgency of the defendant's requirements. Even on 7th April, 1980 it was found that the godowns were not completed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and accordingly the appellant/defendant was under
no obligation to take over any of the said godowns under the said agreement dated 10th March, 1977.
Mr. Bose submits that the learned Trial Judge has erred in relying upon Exbt. K and L being the letter dated 20th September, 1978 and 30th January, 1979 to arrive at a conclusion that the performance of the contract was mutually extended when the fact remains that none of these letters either was addressed to the plaintiffs or they speak about extension of time beyond 30th September, 1978. Furthermore the letter dated 9th January, 1980 being Exhibit R upon which the learned Trial Judge has relied in arriving at the conclusion that the defence of the defendant no. 1 that the construction was not in accordance with the specifications was also without substance inasmuch as the same is an inter- departmental letter of the defendant no. 1 in which the Zonal Manager of the defendant no. 1 informed the Regional Manager of the defendant no. 1 that GM (PO) is being asked to depute an officer to join his inspecting team and that there was no need to depute any officer from the Zonal office.
The main argument on behalf of the defendant no. 1 is that specific performance of the agreement dated 19th March, 1977 as prayed for by the plaintiff in the instant suit cannot be granted (although the same has not been granted in the impugned decree) in the absence of a valid and binding contract between the parties in respect of which parties should be consensus ad idem and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff seeking performance of the contract. Reference in this connection was made to Mayawanti Vs. Kaushalya Devi reported in (1990) 3 SCC 1.
It is submitted that in the instant suit the plaintiff has also prayed for decree for Rs.2,49,58,068.94 in the event it is held that specific performance cannot be had. The agreement of the defendant no. 1 in any event has to be established to claim compensation under Section 21 sub-section (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provides that if in any such suit, the Court decides that specific performance ought not to be granted, but that there is a contract between the parties which has been broken by the defendant and that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for that breach, it shall award him such compensation accordingly. In order to invoke this provision, there must be a valid and binding contract between the parties.
Furthermore, as Clause 6 of the agreement dated 19th March, 1977 contemplates a lease agreement to be executed between the parties in the standard form of FCI upon completion of the constructions of the godowns and the service referred to in the said agreement in all respects and after obtaining a completion certificate from the defendant no. 1. It was further provided in Clause 7 of the said agreement that it should be understood that in the event of any undue delay in completion of the building or services or if there is faulty workmanship or the construction is defective on the basis of the findings of the FCI officers which will be final, the defendant no. 2 would not be bound to take the structure on lease.
Mr. Bose has referred to the Privy Council decision in Currimbhoy & Co. Ltd. Vs. L.A. Creat and others reported in AIR 1933 Privy Council 29 in which it is stated that where the documents or letters relied on as constituting a contract contemplate the execution of a further contract between the parties, it is a question of construction whether the execution of the further contract is a condition or terms of the bargain or whether it is a mere expression of the desire of the parties as to the manner in which the transaction already agreed to will in fact go through. In the former case there is no enforceable contract either because the condition to enter into a contract is unfulfilled or because the law does not recognize a contract to enter into a contract. In the latter case there is a binding contract and the reference to the more formal document may be ignored. Inasmuch as in the instant case the condition mentioned in the agreement dated 19th March 1977 remains unfulfilled there is no enforceable contract here. Mr. Bose, accordingly, submits that the decree is liable to be set aside.
Per contra, Mr. Sakya Sen learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has supported the judgment and submitted that the exchange of correspondence between the parties would clearly show that the defendant no.1 has agreed to extend the time and was aware of the fact that the godowns were made ready during the extended period but could not be made operational due to lack of electrification. The defendant no.1, in fact, had written numerous letters to the State Electricity Board for giving supply of electricity to the said godowns so that the said godowns could be made operational. The defendant no.1 at no point of time had rescinded the contract. It was on the basis of the representation of the FCI, that they would take on hire 20 godowns, that the plaintiff availed the scheme and invested the amount and constructed the said godowns to be taken on lease by FCI for a minimum period of 5 years at an agreed rent which shall be remitted directly to the bank from which the plaintiff had taken loan under the scheme for making construction of the said godowns. Although the plaintiff constructed the godowns as per the specifications laid down by the FCI under the close supervision of the engineers of the FCI, the appellant, out of the 20 godowns, took possession of only two godowns and thereby acted in breach in failing to take possession of the remaining 18 godowns. The plaintiff filed a writ petition praying inter alia for a direction upon FCI to take over possession of the remaining godowns in which the interim order was passed on 23rd July, 1980 by which the plaintiff was granted leave to let out the remaining godowns to third party without prejudice to the rights and contentions. The suit was filed for specific performance of the agreement dated 19th March, 1977 and for compensation on account of rent for a period of 19 months at an agreed rent of 40 paise per sq. ft. for the area which the appellant/defendant no.1 did not take over from the dated when it was ready till the date they were let out to the third party as per the interim order of court.
Mr. Sen submits that the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 19th March, 1977 envisage discharge of reciprocal obligations and it constitutes a binding contract. It was the obligation of the appellant to take possession and entered into a lease agreement in the standard form of FCI which the plaintiff sought to enforce in the suit. The agreement is neither contingent nor an executory contract. The obligation of the appellant as envisaged by the agreement namely, to take possession of the godowns and thereafter execute a lease deed, is capable of being specifically enforced.
Mr. Sen further submits that the time for completion of godowns was mutually extended from time to time. In this regard the learned counsel has referred to the letters dated 27th March, 1978 (Exhibit - I), 29th July (Exhibit - J), 20th September, 1978 (Exhibit - K), 30th January, 1979 (Exhibit - L) and 7th April 1979 (Exhibit - Y). It is submitted that the aforesaid letters would show that the appellant was satisfied with the quality of the construction of the godowns and was eager and willing to take over possession of the said godowns and put the said godown into operation. The appellants have also realized that although the godowns were made ready for delivery, it could not be made operational due to want of electricity. The said letters would show that the appellant had extended the time for completion of construction of the godowns initially up to 30th September, 1978 and thereafter till installation of electricity. The godowns were constructed as per the specification laid down by the FCI well within the extended time period. The appellant was satisfied with the quality of construction of the godowns which were constructed under the strict supervision of the FCI officers. The requirement of completion certificate was never insisted upon as precondition for taking possession of godowns which according to the appellant completed in accordance with the specifications.
Mr. Sen also submits that as the appellant has failed and/or refused to take possession and thus committed breach causing damages to plaintiff. The plaintiff in order to mitigate their loss gave the godowns on rent on the basis of the order dated 23.07.1980 at 40 paise per sq. ft. per month. The respondent accordingly has claimed compensation on account of breach committed by the appellant for the period from 06.04.1979 i.e. the day from which the godowns were made ready for consumption till the date when the respondent leased out the godown complex to the third party in terms of the interim order dated 23.07.1980 at a rate at which the godowns were let out to the third party. Had the said godowns been taken possession of by the Appellant on 06.04.1979 when the godowns were made ready for use, the respondent would have earned a rent therefrom at a rate of Rs.0.40 per sq. ft. per month on and from 06.04.1979. Even after installation of electricity connection on 06.04.1979 the appellant failed to take over possession of the same as a reason whereof the respondent had suffered a loss on account of rent being earned from the said godowns. In such circumstances it is submitted that the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff does not suffer from any illegality and is required to be affirmed.
We have perused the judgment and the evidence, both oral and documentary.
It is elementary that a contract is concluded when the offer is accepted. The offer and acceptance could be oral. It need not to be in writing unless the law requires that to be enforceable, such contract has to be in writing. An oral agreement is also enforceable in law provided it is proved and established. What is important is that the plaintiff has to establish that there is a concluded and binding contract between the parties and a breach has occurred in order to claim compensation. In a suit for specific performance under section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff, in a suit for specific performance of contract, can also claim compensation for breach, either in addition to or in substitution of such performance. However, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Bose, there has to be an existence of a contract. In a concluded contract there are two elements: offer and acceptance. Once the contract is reduced in writing and evidenced by a written document, the task of the court becomes easier. The offer and acceptance can also be inferred from circumstances. It need not be in writing. The Court on an appreciation of the evidence can always come to a finding that the parties have entered into a contract which is binding on both the parties. It is not a statutory contract. Section 8 of the Contract Act provides for the acceptance of the proposal by conduct as against other modes of acceptance. It can be divided in two parts: (i) performance of the conditions of a proposal; and (ii) acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal. The latter corresponds to general divisions of proposals into those which offer a promise in exchange for an act or acts and those which offer a promise for exchange for a promise.
The requirement of a valid contract is that there should be consensus ad idem. It must be consensual. The agreement dated 19th March, 1977 was followed by a communication dated 26th May, 1977 from FCI to the Branch Manager, State Bank of India by which the appellant had promised to take on lease after construction of the godowns for a period of 5 years on rent at an agreed rate of 40 paise per sq. ft. per month. The said communication clearly records that the FCI officials had inspected the land where the godowns are to be constructed and have approved the layout, designs and estimates which must be as per specification laid down by the FCI. The work of construction would be supervised by the FCI's Executive Engineer from time to time and it would be ensured that all constructions are made as per approved specification of FCI. Item wise cost of construction was also approved by the FCI as also list of materials for construction work of FCI estimated total cost of Rs.96 lakh. The FCI recommended for loan to the plaintiff up to 75% of the amount that is 4 lakh for each unit of 2500M.T. as per the model scheme formulated by FCI ARDC and banks. This was followed by an agreement dated 19th March, 1977. The said agreement was acted upon.
In the instant case, we have noticed that following the agreement dated 19th March, 1977 the plaintiff started constructing godowns. The time to complete the construction was mutually extended. Time was never the essence of the contract. In fact, by a communication dated 27th March, 1978 the Senior Assistant Manager, FCI had informed the Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Burdwan that the matter relating to grant of extension of time beyond 31st March, 1978 was under consideration and FCI was also prepared to accept possession of the godown in phases within the extended period. On 29th July, 1978 a request was made by the District Manager, FCI to the Divisional Engineer, State Electricity Board, Burdwan for immediate supply of electricity to the newly constructed the godowns at Hatsimul complex so that the proposed godown space could be brought into use as FCI was in dire need of storage space for storing of food grains. It also acknowledged that they have taken possession of the godown but they could not properly utilize it due to lack of supply of electricity and it has caused heavy financial loss. There are numerous letters addressed by the District Manager, FCI to the Divisional Engineer, State Electricity Board, Burdwan requesting the said authority to provide electric connection to the godowns. Copies of all such letters were marked to the plaintiff. We may mention here few of the letters forming the plethora of correspondence between the parties concerning the said godowns being letters dated 20th September, 1978 (Exhibit K), 30th September, 1979 (Exhibit L) and 7th April, 1979 (Exhibit Y). In the communication dated 29th September, 1978 addressed to the General Engineer State Electricity Board to the State Manager, FCI recorded that "The godowns complex ... have been constructed by M/s. Tulsi Commercial Co. Ltd. Jahuripatty and the same will be taken over on 30th September, 1978 by Food Corporation of India". The appellant in the said communication has requested the State Electricity Board to provide electric connection urgently so that the FCI would take over the charge of the godown by 30th September, 1978 which shows that the godowns were otherwise ready for use and constructed to the satisfaction of the appellant but could not be taken possession of due to want of electricity. On 30th January, 1979 a further letter was issued by the District Manager FCI to the Divisional Engineer State Electricity Board requesting the said board to provide electricity connection. In the said letter the appellant admitted that the godowns already were constructed under the supervision of the Senior Regional Manager FCI and the complex would be taken over by the Joint Manager (Port Operation). By a further communication dated 7th April, 1979 the Bank Manager, State Bank of India, Burdwan Branch requested the District Manager, FCI to take over possession of the godowns already completed without any further delay as electric connection was installed at the complex on 6th April, 1979. Copies of all the said letters were marked to the plaintiff. This correspondence would show that the godowns were ready for possession on 30th September, 1978 and in any event by 6th April, 1979 when the electricity connection was ultimately installed. It is not alleged by the appellant that the quality of the construction was defective or there had been any intentional failure on the part of the appellant to obtain necessary electricity connection. That the plaintiff had fulfilled all its obligations under the agreement is clearly acknowledged by the defendant and would be evident from the correspondence referred to above. The plaintiff accordingly had discharged its obligations under the agreement. It was then for the defendant to execute a formal lease deed in favour of the plaintiff.
It is trite law once the contract is concluded orally or in writing, the mere fact that a formal contract has to be prepared and initialed by the parties would not affect either the acceptance of the contract so entered into or implementation thereof even if the formal contract has never been initialed (See. Trimex International Fze Ltd. v. Vedanta Aluminium Ltd reported in (2010) 3 SCC
1).
The concept of formation of contract which has its two important limbs namely, offer and acceptance came up for consideration in Trimex International (supra), where it is stated that:
"Unless an inference can be drawn from the facts that the parties intended to be bound only when a formal agreement had been executed, the validity of the agreement would not be affected by its lack of formality".
In Currimbhoy & Co. (supra), at page 31 of the report, it is stated:
"Where the documents or letters relied on as constituting a contract contemplate the execution of a further contract between the parties, it is a question of construction whether the execution of the further contract is a condition or term of the bargain or whether it is a mere expression of the desire of the parties as to the manner in which the transaction already agreed to will in fact go through. In the former case there is no enforceable contract either because the condition is unfulfilled or because the law does not recognize a contract to enter into a contract. In the latter case there is a binding contract and the reference to the more formal document may be ignored."
In the instant case, the parties have already agreed to the manner in which they would perform and discharge their obligations inasmuch as the agreement dated 19th March, 1977 was acted upon. It contains all the essential terms, namely, the duration of the lease and the lease rent that it needs to be incorporated in the lease agreement. The petitioners were ad idem on such essential terms. The execution of the lease deed on completion of the construction of godowns was a mere formality. The parties by their conduct have never intended that they would not be bound by the earlier agreement or perform their obligations unless a formal agreement is entered into after construction of the godowns.
The intention of the parties in the instant case is clear, from the oral and documentary evidence, that upon completion of the godowns the appellant would take on hire all the godowns of lease initially for a period of 5 years. The intention of the defendant to take on hire is also established by their conduct as well as from the communication made by the appellant to various authorities including the plaintiff. There was no explanation offered by the appellant for not taking over possession of the 18 godowns out of the 20 godowns. In fact, two godowns under the same agreement were taken over without any protest or murmur. The appellant did not allege that the construction of the remaining godowns were defective or not suitable or not in accordance with the agreement. The defendant having extended the time with the intention to take over the said godowns on hire cannot now be allowed to contend that the time to complete construction of the said godowns had expired.
We have not been shown any evidence which would show that the appellant prior to the filing of the writ or the present suit had denied their obligation to be performed under the agreement dated 19th March, 1977 and/or subsequent promises or any evidence to show that the godowns constructed for the FCI were defective or not in accordance with the specifications of FCI. That conduct can play a vital role in drawing an inference of a contract as has been discussed in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Great Eastern Shipping Company Ltd. reported at (2008) 1 SCC 503. In paragraph 19 of the report it is stated that:
"It is, no doubt, true that the general rule is that an offer is not accepted by mere silence on the part of the offeree, yet it does not mean that an acceptance always has to be given in so many words. Under certain circumstances offeree's silence, coupled with his conduct which takes the form of a positive act, may constitute an acceptance - an agreement sub silentio. Therefore, the terms of a contract between the parties can be proved not only by their words but also by their conduct."
Although the appellant did not advance any argument at the time of final hearing of the suit, the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the aforesaid communications and the other evidence before arriving at a conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the 18 godowns that were ready for delivery. The learned Single Judge did not allow the entirety of the claim but restricted the claim to 18 months for the period of August, 1978 to October 1980. The learned Single Judge has taken into consideration that the defendant by their conduct had extended the period of completion of godowns and the defendant no.1 having extended such period could not now refuse to accept the said godowns on the ground of delay in construction by the plaintiff. The defence of the defendant no.1 that the construction was not in accordance with the specifications was also found to be without substance as the document would speak otherwise and in this regard the learned Single Judge has referred to Exhibit R which would show that as late as in 1980 the appellant was in discussion for taking over of the said godowns. Although we were not shown any deficiency in the construction but even if it is assumed that there were minor deficiencies, the evidence would show that the deficiencies were not of such nature which would prevent the appellant to take possession of the godowns or to use the said godowns for storing the foodgrains. The use and purpose of the said godowns would in no way be affected. The defendant also could not at the trial establish any such significant deficiency which could be a reason for refusal to take possession. On the contrary, there is evidence on record to show that the plaintiff, in fact, had offered to rectify all the minor defects in the construction to which there was no response from the appellant. The appellant did not produce any evidence to show that they refused to take possession due to alleged defects in the construction. As mentioned earlier all the godowns were constructed under the supervision of FCI with the intention to take over the said godowns on completion on lease for minimum 5 years; and when all the godowns were made ready for delivery, the defendant refused to take possession of 18 godowns out of 20 godowns. The plaintiff had immediately approached the court for mitigation of loss and damages. The learned Single Judge has taken into consideration such fact before determining the compensation. The learned Single Judge only allowed compensation from May 1979 till October 1980 (incorrectly stated from August 1978 till October 1980) for 18 months and not for the balance claim. The learned Single Judge has also directed the release of the rent in respect of two godowns which were kept in the fixed deposit account in terms of earlier orders.
On the basis of the aforesaid discussion we do not find any infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge. The said judgment and decree is affirmed. The appellant/defendant no. 1 is liable to pay rent @ 40 paise per sq. ft. on 2,50,266 sq. ft. from May 1979 till October 1980 for 18 months (0.40 X 2,58,266 X 18) aggregating to a sum of Rs.18,59,515.20. The impugned decree stands corrected to the aforesaid extent.
In view of the pendency of the appeal, the time for making payment of the decreetal dues is extended by one month from date. In default, the plaintiff would be entitled to interest at 6% per annum on the sum of Rs. 18,59,515.20p on and from November 1, 1980 till the date of realization, as was directed by the learned Single Judge. It is also reiterated that the plaintiff shall be entitled to release of the rent deposited in respect of the two godowns of which the defendant no. 1 had possession. The plaintiff will, therefore, be entitled to the proceeds of the fixed deposit made by the Advocate-on-Record of the defendant no. 1 together with all accruals thereto, as directed by the learned Single Judge.
The appeal stands dismissed. However there shall be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on the usual undertakings.
I agree (Soumen Sen, J.)
(Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.)