Patna High Court
Ramdutta Trivedi vs Shambhu Nath Sinha And Anr. on 25 January, 1963
Equivalent citations: AIR1963PAT252, 1963CRILJ34, AIR 1963 PATNA 252, 1963 BLJR 442 ILR 42 PAT 389, ILR 42 PAT 389
JUDGMENT Misra, J.
1. This application has been preferred to this Court by the first party. The dispute relates to Municipal Holding No. 217, which is a house situate within the limits of Jugsalai Notified Area Committee. This properly was admittedly recorded in the name of Ramparichrian liwan, uncle of the petitioner Ramdutta Trivedi. The second party (opposite party No. 2) acquired it under a registered sale deed, dated the 4th of July, 1958, for a sum of Rs. 14,000/-in the name of his wife. The case of the petitioner is that this property belonged to him although it stood in the name of his uncle. While he was still a boy, he recited kathas in the locality and out of the income derived from that source he built the house. In the year 1959, opposite party No. 2 started prosecution of the petitioner under Section 448, Indian Penal Code, alleging that he forcibly took possession of this property, but the case was dismissed. On the 16th of August, 1959, however, opposite party No. 2 succeeded in ousting the petitioner from the house with the help of the police. Then a proceeding under section 107, Code of Criminal Procedure, was started in which the petitioner applied for a judicial enquiry. The Magistrate found him to be in possession.
On the 4th of September, 1959, the City Magistrate started a proceeding under Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, which was converted into a proceeding under Section 145 on the 25th of September, 1959, The learned Magistrate thereafter referred the matter to the Munsif at Jamshedpur for a finding. The learned Munsif recorded a finding in favour of the opposite party by order dated the 4th of August, 1962, and the Magistrate passed an order against the petitioner in terms of the finding by the learned Munsif, on the 28th of August, 1962.
2. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha appearing for the petitioner has raised two questions in support of the petition. First, that the finding by the Munsif in the present case is incompetent. The Civil Court of competent jurisdiction referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 146, Code of criminal Procedure, in the present case, would be the court of the Subordinate Judge and not that of a Munsif, inasmuch as the sale deed in favour of the opposite party purports to have been for a sum of Rs. 14,000/- and as such, as a civil suit, it would not be triable in the-court of a Munsif. The second question is with regard to the non-consideration of some of the affidavits filed by the parties.
3. As for the first question, Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha has referred to the various provisions of Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1955, by Act 26 of 1955, and urged that the expression "Civil Court of competent jurisdiction" would refer to the Court of the subordinate Judge in the present case and not the Court of a Munsif. Learned Counsel for the opposite party, however, has drawn our attention to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party, reported in AIR 1958 Pat 308 Eodh Narain v. Deo Narain Singh, wherein an identical question was raised as to the limits of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Court with reference to the value of the property in dispute in a proceeding under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. The question was considered in all its aspects and the answer given in that decision was that the value of the property involved in the proceeding would not affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. We have considered the decision afresh and I am satisfied that there is nothing to add to the reasoning of that decision. Accordingly, it must be held that that case was correctly decided and, as such, the learned Munsif was quite competent in the present case to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to him by the Magistrate, irrespective of the value of the properly in dispute.
Learned Counsel for the opposite party has also drawn our attention to the case of Chokhey Lal Moti Ram v. Babulal Behari Lal, AIR 1960 All 599; Rengammal v. Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar, AIR 1960 Mad 169; Abdul sattar v. Jankivallabh, AIR 1961 Raj 245 and Hasan v. M. Shamsuddin, ILR 30 Pat 896: (AIR 1951 Pat 140). In my opinion, the case of Rengammal AIR 1960 Mad 169, does not directly cover this question; but the Rajasthan case, AIR 1961 Raj 245 has followed the decision of this Court, and the Allahabad decision referred to above also lends support to the view expressed by this Court in the above decision.
4. As for the affidavits, it may be stated that the learned Munsif has considered the principal affidavits in the case and it appears that only those affidavits have not been considered by him which were already taken into account by the learned Magistrate while referring the matter to the Civil Court. Out of the 16 affidavits for the first party, the affidavits of Ramautar Sharma, Mahabir Singh, Jhuna Bai, Ragho Prasad and Dalip Singh Bhatia, Municipal Tax Daroga, were not considered. As I nave said, all these affidavits were taken into account by the learned Magistrate while making the reference. We have ourselves gone into the affidavits filed and I am satisfied that the learned Munsif's finding could not have been affected even if he had taken into account the remaining few affidavits to which he has made no reference. In the result, therefore, nothing turns upon this or the non-consideration, even if it were so, of some of the evidence. It may be stated that the Vice-Chairman of the Notified Area Committee has sworn affidavit in favour of the opposite party supporting his possession and that tact is more important evidence than the affidavit tiled by the Tax Daroga, an employee under the same notified Area Committee.
5. As for the contention that some of the documents filed by the petitioner have not been considered, it may be stated that nothing turns upon that question inasmuch as some of those documents are for a period subsequent to the date of dispute; and some of the circumstances of outstanding character also have been taken into account by the learned Munsif and, in my opinion, there is nothing wrong or unreasonable in the discussion of the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record.
6. Accordingly, I see no reason to interfere with the finding of the learned Munsif. It is unnecessary to refer to the other question as to whether Article 227 of the Constitution of India comes into play and whether under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal procedure, this Court can interfere, inasmuch as these two questions have already been fully dealt with by this Bench in Criminal Revision No. 100 of 1962 : (AIR 1963 Pat 243), which has been heard along with it. The application is dismissed.
Sahai, J.
7. I agree with the order proposed. I do not think that a case for interference with the finding of the Civil Court has been made out.
8. . I also agree that the reference to a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has no relation to pecuniary jurisdiction. As held in AIR 1958 Pat 308, the proceeding, even after it is referred to the Civil court, retains its character as a criminal proceeding. Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure refers to pecuniary jurisdiction over suits. Section 141 of that Code applies to all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction the procedure provided in regard to suits. Those proceedings must necessarily be civil and not criminal proceedings. Hence, it is not at all necessary for a civil court to have pecuniary jurisdiction before it can entertain a reference under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal procedure. It would also be impossible to assess the value of the subject-matter. When the dispute goes to the Civil Court after disposal of the proceeding under Section 143. It will necessarily be a civil matter, and will have to be decided by a Civil Court which has pecuniary jurisdiction. It is not necessary that the same Court should dispose of the reference under Section 146, and also entertain the suit which is filed subsequently, it may further be mentioned that the value of the disputed property will be the value of the suit; but that cannot be the value in a proceeding under Section 146 because only the question of possession without reference to the question of title is involved therein.
S.P. Singh, J.
9. I agree with my learned brethren for the reasons given by them that this application should be dismissed.