Allahabad High Court
Parvez @ Shammi vs State Of U.P. And Another on 4 October, 2024
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:162522 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ***** Judgement Reserved on 13.09.2024 Judgement Delivered on 04.10.2024 Court No. - 79 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 23917 of 2019 Applicant :- Parvez @ Shammi Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Padmaker Pandey,Sandeep Kumar Srivastava,Sunil Kumar Srivastava Counsel for Opposite Party :- Anurag Singh,G.A.,Kartikeya Saran,Rajan Tripathi,Saral Singh Hon'ble Anish Kumar Gupta,J.
1. Heard Sri V.P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel and Sri Manish Tiwari, learned counsel assisted by Sri Padmaker Paney, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Anurag Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 and Sri Pankaj Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State.
2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking quashing of the summoning order dated 25.05.2019 in Case No.5702 of 2017, arising out of Case Crime No.139 of 2017 (State of U.P. vs. Pravez Kumar @ Shammi) under Sections (in short, 'u/S') 386 and 304 of the India Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as, 'I.P.C.'), P.S.- Fazalganj, District- Kanpur Nagar, pending in the court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar.
3. The brief facts of the instant case are that on 25.06.2017, an F.I.R. was lodged by the opposite party no. 2/Jasvinder Singh, who is the son of the deceased, alleging therein that the opposite party no.2 alongwith his father, the deceased Manjeet Singh, was present in his medical shop- Manjeet Chemist. At that time, the applicant herein alongwith six-seven other persons came there stating himself to be the Chairman of the Drug Association and demanded from him Rs. 4,00,000/- for Association. The father of the informant has shown his inability to make the aforesaid payment, thereupon, these persons started abusing his father and on provocation of these persons the applicant herein bring out the pistol from his waist and pointed out the same to the father of the opposite party no.2, due to which his father was shaken up and by holding his chest he fell on the ground. Thereafter, the informant alongwith others tried to console his father, at the same time, the applicant alongwith his accomplices ran away from the spot. Thereafter, the informant has taken his father to the hospital where he was declared brought dead.
4. On the basis of the aforesaid incident the instant F.I.R. was registered under Sections 386 and 304 I.P.C. and the matter was investigated and an Inquest Report was prepared. As per the Inquest Report, in which the informant was also one of the members of the punch, appointed by the Inquest Officer and in the opinion of the punch the deceased had died due to heart attack. However, for the purpose of removal of doubts and determination and of actual cause of death, postmortem may be conducted. Accordingly, the postmortem was conducted on 26.06.2017, wherein the following opinion was expressed by the doctors, which reads as under:
"i. Probable time since death (Keep all factors including observation at inquest) about one day ii. Cause & manner of death- The cause of death to the best of my Knowledge and belief is:-
a) Immediate cause---- Shock (cardiac genie)
b) Due to Cardiac arrest (My carded Infection)
c) Which of the injuries are anti-mortem/post-mortem and duration if ante-mortem-----
d) Manner of causation of injuries----
e) Whether injuries (individually or collectively) are sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature or not-----"
5. In the postmortem report, no ante-mortem injury was found on the body of the deceased. Under Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, the informant has supported the allegations as made in the F.I.R. However, on query made by the Investigation Officer(IO) with regard to the names of other unknown persons, he told that he was not aware about the names of other persons and on the query with regard to the CCTV footage, the informant told that the CCTV camera was not functioning from eight-nine months. With regard to the presence of other persons in the shop, the informant has named two persons, namely Deepak Goswami and Rakesh Singh etc. With regard to the query whether any talks happened between the informant prior to the incident with the applicant, he told that no such talks had taken place with him, however, he is not aware about any talks with his father. On the query with regard to the illness to his father, the informant kept mum and on query why he has not intimated the police or had not dialled 100 number, he did not answer but later told that due to such a serious incident he was disheartened and could not inform. On the query whether any recording was done with regard to the said incident, he told that their mobiles were shut down by the applicant
6. Deepak Goswami, whose presence was stated by the informant in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., was also examined by the IO. The said Deepak Goswami has told that he works in the Kumar Medical Store, which is owned by the applicant herein. Deepak Goswami has admitted that he used to stole medicines from the Kumar Medical Shop and used to sell the said medicines to the deceased and on having suspicion the applicant came to the shop of the deceased and has prepared the video recording, photographs while the said Deepak Goswami was giving the medicines to the father of the informant and he informed the office bearers of the Drug Association and a settlement was arrived at. It is alleged by the said Deepak Goswami that neither any misbehaviour or assault was committed by the applicant herein. After the negotiation of the settlement the deceased has taken the cold drink and his condition worsened and he was taken to the hospital, where he had died due to the cardiac arrest.
7. Another witness, namely Rakesh Singh, was examined by the IO who told that at the time of incident he was there in his shop and he heard the noise in the shop of the deceased. Three-four persons were standing there and were loudly talking to the deceased and on hearing the loud noise he also reached at the shop. All these three-four persons were inside the shop and were shouting at the deceased. Thereafter, the deceased told that he is not feeling well. There was no person outside only the crowd was there, thereafter , he drunk the water and had fell down. He was taken to hospital where he was asked to go to the Cardiology Hospital. On the query made by the IO, whether any person who was inside the shop was carrying any pistol, then, he told that yes, a person was carrying a pistol in his waist. However, he has not pointed out the pistol at any one. On the query for what was the dispute there, then, he told that there was some dispute with regard to the transaction of medicines, he asked that if he could identify any of the persons, he answered that they were calling for Shammi Shammi. On the query whether information was given by him at hundred number, he told that he was not supposed to give any intimation, it was the deceased, who ought to have given intimation to the police. On the query whether the persons who were threatening the deceased had taken him to hospital, then, he told that he has not aware about it. On the query that when the persons arguing with the deceased whether the son of the deceased was present in the shop, this witness told that no he came after information was given to him.
8. After concluding investigation, the final report was submitted on 15.09.2017, as on the statement of the other witnesses, inspection of the place of occurrence and independent and circumstantial evidence collected, no offence is found to be proved against the applicant and other alleged accused persons. On submission of such final report, a protest petition was filed by the opposite party no. 2 on 05.01.2018, therefore, vide order dated 12.01.2018, the said final report was rejected by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar and further investigation was directed.
9. During further investigation the statement of Nilesh Kumar, who conducted the postmortem was recorded, who stated that the deceased had died due to cardiac arrest. On the query whether the cardiac arrest had taken place naturally or due to some illness, the doctor told that the cardiac arrest has taken place due to cardiac infusion, which is natural and type of disease. The doctor has further stated that the said cardiac arrest could take place due to the diseases like diabetes and blood pressure. If somebody was shouting on the deceased and thereafter whether the sudden cardiac arrest can take place after an hour of such shouting, despite that person was talking and taking energy drink etc., is not possible.
10. The neighbouring shop owners, namely Pulkit Kapoor, Deepak Mehrotra and Rajesh Chaurasiya have also been examined, however, they have shown their inability to know anything about the incident directly, only some hearsay statements have been made which are of no consequence.
11. After conducting the further investigation, again the final report was submitted on 27.08.2018 in the instant case. Again, a protest petition dated 21.05.2019 was filed by the opposite party no. 2, thereupon, vide order dated 25.05.2019, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar has rejected the final report dated 27.08.2018 submitted by the IO, and has summoned the applicant herein for the offences u/S 386 and 304 I.P.C. against which the instant application has been filed by the applicant herein.
12. Shri V.P. Srivtastava, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant submits that once the trial court has rejected the final report thereby the entire material which was collected during the investigation was rejected. Hence, the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance on the basis of material, which has already been rejected by the Magistrate and proper course would have been that such protest petition ought to have been treated as a complaint case and thereupon, after following the procedure as prescribed in Chapter XVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate could have summoned the applicant herein.
13. In support of his submissions learned Senior Counsel has relied upon an order dated 15.03.2023, passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of the Court in Application under Section 482 No. 8563 of 223 (Smt. Bhuri vs. State of U.P. and Another), which held as under:
"5. Having heard the learned counsel for applicant, the learned A.G.A. for State and upon perusal of record, this Court finds that once the Magistrate has rejected the police report (final report) then he could not have taken cognizance upon aforesaid Police report. The proper course of action open to the Magistrate was to disapprove (Aswikar) the police report and proceed with the matter as a State case by exercising jurisdiction under Section 190(1) (b) Cr.P.C. This having not been done, the Impugned order is illegal and perverse. Consequently the same is liable to be quashed by this Court."
(Emphasis Supplied)
14. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgement of this Court in Chandrashekhar v. State, 1978 SCC OnLine All 733, wherein while answering the question whether the information contained in the First Information Report and the medical report, this information received from the police officer is within the meaning of Section 190 (c) of Code of Criminal Procedure? The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held as under:
"6. If the police report is in respect of a case in which it appears to the officer-in-charge of a police station that an offence has been committed by the accused he is required to submit under S. 173(5), Cr. P.C.--
(a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation,
(b) the statements recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses, to the Magistrate along with the police report. The Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence on the basis of such a report only under S. 190(1)(b), Criminal P.C. He cannot take cognizance of the offence under S. 190(1)(c), Criminal P.C. on the basis of the information contained in the first information report and the medical report or documents that are sent to him under S. 173(5), Cr. P.C. along with the police report.
7. If the police report is in respect of a case in which it appears to the officer-in-charge of a police station that an offence has not been committed by an accused then he is not required to send the first information report or the medical report or the other documents mentioned in S. 173(5), Cr. P.C. to the Magistrate along with the police report. Normally, therefore, the question of his taking cognizance of an offence under S. 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. on the basis of the information contained in the first information report or the medical report does not arise.
8. In the present case it appears that the Investigating Officer submitted the first information report and the medical report to the Magistrate along with the police report in which it was stated that the accused-applicants did not commit any offence although he was not required to do so. We are, however, clearly of the opinion that the information contained in the first information report and the medical report was not received by the Magistrate from a person other than a police officer but was received by him from a police officer, as the first information report and the medical report were sent to him by the Investigating Officer. The information received from a person other than a police officer upon which a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence under S. 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. is information which he receives directly from such a person and not information which is given by such a person to a police officer and which is sent to him by a police officer as in that case he would be receiving information from a police officer and not from a person other than a police officer. Our answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in affirmative.
9. Let this opinion be placed before the learned Single Judge for necessary orders."
(Emphasis Supplied)
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant has further placed reliance upon the order of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court dated 05.08.2024 in Application u/S 482 No. 16876 of 2024 (Aridaman Singh vs. State of U.P. and Another), which reads as under:
"13...........this Court finds that the solitary issue that has emerged for consideration before this Court is as to:- whether after rejecting the police report submitted by the Investigating Officer in terms of Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., yet the Magistrate can exercise jurisdiction under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. by taking cognizance upon the said police report and proceed with the matter as a state case.
14. The issue so raised is no longer res-integra and stands concluded by the judgments of this Court in following cases;- (1) Hari Ram Vs. State of U.P. and Another, 2016 ADJ Online, 0185 (Criminal Revision No. 695 of 2001) and (2) Application U/s 482 Cr.P.C. No. 8563 of 2023 (Smt. Bhuri Vs. State of U.P. and Another) decided on 15.03.2023. This Court in aforementioned judgments has held that once the Magistrate has rejected (NIRAST) the police report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. then the Magistrate is denuded of his jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and proceed with the matter as a state case. In view of above, the order impugned cannot be sustained and is, therefore, liable to be set aside."
(Emphasis Supplied)
16. In Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2019) 8 SCC 27, the Apex Court has considered the question whether the protest petition was filed after the submission of a final report can be treated as a complaint case. The Apex Court has held as under:
"38. In H.S. Bains [H.S. Bains v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (1980) 4 SCC 631 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 93] , there was a private complaint within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a) of the Code. The matter was referred to the police under Section 156(3). The investigating officer filed a final report. Therein, the court took the view that apart from the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance notwithstanding the final report, under Section 190(1)(b), he could also fall back upon the private complaint which was initially lodged but after examining the complainant and his witnesses, as contemplated under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code. In regard to taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of a final report, undoubtedly, it is not necessary to examine the complainant or his witnesses though he may do so.
39. In Mahesh Chand [Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy, (2003) 1 SCC 734 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 425] , no doubt the matter was commenced by a first information report and followed up by the complainant in the court under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code. On the first information report, after investigation, a final report was filed. The final report came to be accepted and it was closed. This is despite the fact that there was the protest petition. A third complaint, as it were, came to be filed by the complainant. This Court went on to hold that acceptance of the final report would not stand in the way of taking cognizance on a protest/complaint petition.
40. In Kishore Kumar Gyanchandani [Kishore Kumar Gyanchandani v. G.D. Mehrotra, (2011) 15 SCC 513 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 633] , after the final report was accepted on a protest petition which was treated as a complaint, evidence was taken within the meaning of Section 200 of the Code.
41. In Rakesh [Rakesh v. State of U.P., (2014) 13 SCC 133 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 611] , the final report was filed which was accepted by the Magistrate but he simultaneously directed the case to be proceeded as a complaint case and statements under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code came to be recorded.
42. In the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the allegations contained in the protest petition and the annexures which essentially consisted of affidavits, if the Magistrate was convinced on the basis of the consideration of the final report, the statements under Section 161 of the Code that no prima facie case is made out, certainly the Magistrate could not be compelled to take cognizance by treating the protest petition as a complaint. The fact that he may have jurisdiction in a case to treat the protest petition as a complaint, is a different matter. Undoubtedly, if he treats the protest petition as a complaint, he would have to follow the procedure prescribed under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code if the latter section also commends itself to the Magistrate. In other words, necessarily, the complainant and his witnesses would have to be examined. No doubt, depending upon the material which is made available to a Magistrate by the complainant in the protest petition, it may be capable of being relied on in a particular case having regard to its inherent nature and impact on the conclusions in the final report. That is, if the material is such that it persuades the court to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the investigating officer, cognizance could be taken under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code for which there is no necessity to examine the witnesses under Section 200 of the Code. But as the Magistrate could not be compelled to treat the protest petition as a complaint, the remedy of the complainant would be to file a fresh complaint and invite the Magistrate to follow the procedure under Section 200 of the Code or Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. Therefore, we are of the view that in the facts of this case, we cannot support the decision of the High Court.
43. It is true that law mandates notice to the informant/complainant where the Magistrate contemplates accepting the final report. On receipt of notice, the informant may address the court ventilating his objections to the final report. This he usually does in the form of the protest petition. In Mahabir Prasad Agarwala v. State [Mahabir Prasad Agarwala v. State, 1957 SCC OnLine Ori 5 : AIR 1958 Ori 11] , a learned Judge of the High Court of Orissa, took the view that a protest petition is in the nature of a complaint and should be examined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVI of the Criminal Procedure Code. We, however, also noticed that in Qasim v. State [Qasim v. State, 1984 SCC OnLine All 260 : 1984 Cri LJ 1677] , a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, inter alia, held as follows: (Qasim case [Qasim v. State, 1984 SCC OnLine All 260 : 1984 Cri LJ 1677] , SCC OnLine All para 6) "6. ... In Abhinandan Jha [Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 : 1968 Cri LJ 97 : (1967) 3 SCR 668] also what was observed was "it is not very clear as to whether the Magistrate has chosen to treat the protest petition as complaint". This observation would not mean that every protest petition must necessarily be treated as a complaint whether it satisfies the conditions of the complaint or not. A private complaint is to contain a complete list of witnesses to be examined. A further examination of complainant is made under Section 200 CrPC. If the Magistrate did not treat the protest petition as a complaint, the protest petition not satisfying all the conditions of the complaint to his mind, it would not mean that the case has become a complaint case. In fact, in majority of cases when a final report is submitted, the Magistrate has to simply consider whether on the materials in the case diary no case is made out as to accept the final report or whether case diary discloses a prima facie case as to take cognizance. The protest petition in such situation simply serves the purpose of drawing Magistrate's attention to the materials in the case diary and invite a careful scrutiny and exercise of the mind by the Magistrate so it cannot be held that simply because there is a protest petition the case is to become a complaint case."
44. We may also notice that in Veerappa v. Bhimareddappa [Veerappa v. Bhimareddappa, 2001 SCC OnLine Kar 447 : 2002 Cri LJ 2150] , the High Court of Karnataka observed as follows: (SCC OnLine Kar para 9) "9. From the above, the position that emerges is this: Where initially the complainant has not filed any complaint before the Magistrate under Section 200 CrPC, but, has approached the police only and where the police after investigation have filed the 'B' report, if the complainant wants to protest, he is thereby inviting the Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC on a complaint. If it were to be so, the protest petition that he files shall have to satisfy the requirements of a complaint as defined in Section 2(d) CrPC, and that should contain facts that constitute offence, for which, the learned Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC. Instead, if it is to be simply styled as a protest petition without containing all those necessary particulars that a normal complaint has to contain, then, it cannot be construed as a complaint for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 CrPC."
45. "Complaint" is defined in Section 2(d) of the Code as follows:
"2. (d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
Explanation.--A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant;"
46. If a protest petition fulfils the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a complaint and deal with the same as required under Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. In this case, in fact, there is no list of witnesses as such in the protest petition. The prayer in the protest petition is to set aside the final report and to allow the application against the final report. While we are not suggesting that the form must entirely be decisive of the question whether it amounts to a complaint or is liable to be treated as a complaint, we would think that essentially, the protest petition in this case, is summing up of the objections of the second respondent against the final report."
(Emphasis Supplied)
17. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant has further placed reliance upon which the judgement of the of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21, in which the Apex Court has laid down the following guidelines for exercising the powers under Section 561-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, which was analogous to Section 482 Cr.P.C.
"6. .............If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings..........."
(Emphasis Supplied)
18. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant has further relied upon the judgement of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy : (1977) 2 SCC 699, wherein the Apex Court has held as under :
"7. ........In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
19. The aforesaid judgement in L. Muniswamy (supra), has been relied upon in the subsequent judgement of the Apex Court in R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739, the Apex Court has held as under:
"28. The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be exercised with care. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, a High Court can examine whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has been given a cloak of a criminal offence. Where the ingredients required to constitute a criminal offence are not made out from a bare reading of the complaint, the continuation of the criminal proceeding will constitute an abuse of the process of the court."
(Emphasis Supplied)
20. In Rashmi Chopra v. State of U.P., (2019) 15 SCC 357, relying the various earlier judgements including State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], the Apex Court has held as under:
"21. The criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed. This Court has observed that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment. If the High Court finds that the proceedings deserve to be quashed as per the parameters as laid down by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , the High Court shall not hesitate, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings."
(Emphasis Supplied)
21. Sri Manish Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel, who also appeared for the applicant, relying the provisions of Sections 299 and 304 I.P.C., submits that taking all the allegations as levelled in the instant case as true, even then, no offence under Section 304 I.P.C., would be attracted in the instant case against the applicant herein, as the ingredients of Section 299 I.P.C. are not fulfilled. Even if it is assumed that the applicant herein was carrying the pistol as alleged and the witnesses have suggested that he has not pulled down the pistol from his waist and only the negotiation and quarrel were going on with regard to some medicines, which were allegedly, stealthy being sold to the deceased. Merely, the act of the applicant, keeping the pistol in his waist or pointing at the deceased would not constitute the offence of culpable homicide, as there was no intention on the part of the applicant to cause death of the deceased and there was no injury caused by the applicant, which would be attributed to the applicant herein in the entire incident except they were talking to the deceased and also quarrelling with him for some issue of sale of medicines, which by no stretch of imagination can be covered within the definition of culpable homicide as defined in Section 299 I.P.C. Thus, learned Senior Counsel seeks quashing of the entire proceedings of the instant case against the applicant herein.
22. Per Contra, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 submits that there is ample evidence available on record that the applicant herein had pointed out the pistol towards the deceased due to which the cardiological shock took place and the deceased had died. There are ample evidences available on record that the applicant has gone there to extort money from the deceased. The statement of Harjendra Singh Manchanda is categorical with regard to pointing out of revolver by the applicant towards the deceased. Presence of the informant in the shop and the demand being raised by the applicant herein. When the deceased had died the applicant has run away from the spot, saying that the deceased is pranking his death.
23. Learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 further submits that in the judgement and order dated 29.08.2023 in SLP (Crl. Nos. 8507/8507/2022 (Zunaid vs. State of U.P.), the Apex Court has categorically held that even after rejecting the conclusions drawn in the police report submitted under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C., it is open for the Magistrate to take cognizance in the matter under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. Therefore, as argued by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant submits that after rejecting the police report it is not open for the Magistrate to take cognizance in the matter under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C., is a misleading argument. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 that it has been highlighted that the deceased was selling the medicines, which were allegedly the stolen property and for which a video was prepared by the employee of the applicant herein. The aforesaid video clip was sent to Forensic Science Laboratory and as per the Forensic Lab report dated 31.05.2018, no such data was recovered at the Forensic Lab as per the Forensic Lab Report. Further, the presence of the applicant has been found at the place of incident, which has been stated by various witnesses and the call detail reports also proved the location of the applicant herein at the place of incident.
24. In view of the evidence available on record, it is a clear case of extortion of money by the applicant at the gun point and on pointing out of the revolver by the applicant herein the deceased had died on the spot. Therefore, the applicant herein is responsible for the death of the deceased caused during the incident of the extortion being committed by the applicant herein.
25. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 further submits that since a prima facie case is made out on the basis of the material available on record, no interference is called for in the instant application and prays for dismissal of the instant application.
26. Learned A.G.A. also supports the submissions so made by learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 and submits that since the involvement of the applicant herein is amply established from the material available on record, therefore, no interferences called for in the instant case.
27. Having heard the submissions made by learned counsels for the parties, this Court has carefully gone through the record of the case. To appreciate the first submission advanced by learner Senior Counsel, Sri V.P. Srivastava appearing on behalf of the applicant herein, it would be relevant to take note of Section 190 Cr.P.C., which reads as under:
"190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.
(1)Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence -
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
(2)The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try."
28. From bare reading of the aforesaid provisions it is clear that as per Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C., it is open for the Magistrate to take cognizance on a police report irrespective of the conclusion drawn by the Investigating Officer.
29. The Apex Court in the case of H.S. Bains Vs. State (1980) 4 SCC 631, in paragraph 7 has held as under:
"7. In Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra [AIR 1968 SC 117 : (1967) 3 SCR 668 : 1968 Cri LJ 97] , the question arose whether a Magistrate to whom a report under Section 173(1) had been submitted to the effect that no case had been made out against the accused, could direct the police to file a charge-sheet, on his disagreeing with the report submitted by the police. This Court held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet. It was open to the Magistrate to agree or disagree with the police report. If he agreed with the report that there was no case made out for issuing process to the accused, he might accept the report and close the proceedings. If he came to the conclusion that further investigation was necessary he might make an order to that effect under Section 156(3). If ultimately the Magistrate was of the opinion that the fact set out in the police report constituted an offence he could take cognizance of the offence, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police expressed in the report. .............................. We find it impossible to say that a Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence on the basis of the facts disclosed in a police report must be said to have taken cognizance of the offence on suspicion and not upon a police report merely because the Magistrate and the police arrived at different conclusions from the facts. The Magistrate is not bound by the conclusions arrived at by the police even as he is not bound by the conclusions arrived at by the complainant in a complaint. ................"
(Emphasis Supplied) 30 In the case of M/s India Carat Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka and another, (1989) 2 SCC 132, the Apex Court in paragraph 16 and 17 has held as under:
"16. The position is, therefore, now well settled that upon receipt of a police report under Section 173(2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. Section 190(1)(b) does not lay down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, in exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190(1)(a) though it is open to him to act under Section 200 or Section 202 also. ..........
17. ............ It has been held in Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 459 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 621 : (1978) 1 SCR 615] that if the police, after making an investigation, send a report that no case was made out against the accused, the Magistrate could ignore the conclusion drawn by the police and take cognizance of a case under Section 190(1)(b) and issue process or in the alternative he can take cognizance of the original complaint and examine the complainant and his witnesses and thereafter issue process to the accused, if he is of opinion that the case should be proceeded with."
(Emphasis Supplied)
31. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and another : (2003) 6 SCC 195 in paragraph 14 has held as under:
"14. The Magistrate is no doubt not bound to accept the final report (sometimes called as closer report) submitted by the police and if he feels that the evidence and material collected during investigation justify prosecution of the accused, he may not accept the final report and take cognizance of the offence and summon the accused but this does not mean that he would be interfering with the investigation as such. He would be doing so in exercise of powers conferred by Section 190 CrPC. The statutory provisions are, therefore, absolutely clear that the court cannot interfere with the investigation."
(Emphasis Supplied)
32. In Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra : (2004) 7 SCC 768, the Apex Court in paragraph 9 has held as under:
"9. .....The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, exercise his powers under Section 190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190(1)(a) though it is open to him to act under section 200 or Section 202 also."
(Emphasis Supplied)
33. Paragraph 27 of the judgment in the case of Vishnu Kumar Tiwari (supra), relied by learned counsel for the applicant reads as under:
"27. It is undoubtedly true that before a Magistrate proceeds to accept a final report under Section 173 and exonerate the accused, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to apply his mind to the contents of the protest petition and arrive at a conclusion thereafter. While the investigating officer may rest content by producing the final report, which, according to him, is the culmination of his efforts, the duty of the Magistrate is not one limited to readily accepting the final report. It is incumbent upon him to go through the materials, and after hearing the complainant and considering the contents of the protest petition, finally decide the future course of action to be, whether to continue with the matter or to bring the curtains down."
(Emphasis Supplied)
34. In the same judgement of Vishnu Kumar Tiwari (supra) it is worth mentioning that the Apex Court has held in paragraph 18 and 42 as under:
"18. Thus, when he proceeds to take action by way of cognizance by disagreeing with the conclusions arrived at in the police report, he would be taking cognizance on the basis of the police report and not on the complaint. And, therefore, the question of examining the complainant or his witnesses under Section 200 of the Code would not arise. This was the view clearly enunciated.
42. In the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the allegations contained in the protest petition and the annexures which essentially consisted of affidavits, if the Magistrate was convinced on the basis of the consideration of the final report, the statements under Section 161 of the Code that no prima facie case is made out, certainly the Magistrate could not be compelled to take cognizance by treating the protest petition as a complaint. The fact that he may have jurisdiction in a case to treat the protest petition as a complaint, is a different matter. Undoubtedly, if he treats the protest petition as a complaint, he would have to follow the procedure prescribed under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code if the latter section also commends itself to the Magistrate. In other words, necessarily, the complainant and his witnesses would have to be examined. No doubt, depending upon the material which is made available to a Magistrate by the complainant in the protest petition, it may be capable of being relied on in a particular case having regard to its inherent nature and impact on the conclusions in the final report. That is, if the material is such that it persuades the court to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the investigating officer, cognizance could be taken under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code for which there is no necessity to examine the witnesses under Section 200 of the Code. But as the Magistrate could not be compelled to treat the protest petition as a complaint, the remedy of the complainant would be to file a fresh complaint and invite the Magistrate to follow the procedure under Section 200 of the Code or Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. Therefore, we are of the view that in the facts of this case, we cannot support the decision of the High Court."
(Emphasis Supplied)
35. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Application u/s 482 No. - 5500 of 2023 (Asif Ahmad Siddiqui Vs. State of U.P. and another) decided on 26.4.2023 has held in paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 as under:
"19. It is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the parties that the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance under Section 190(1) CrPC in either of the three contingencies namely:-
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
20. The cognizance of the offence can be taken on the basis of the police reports as envisaged in Clause (b) of Section 190(1) CrPC irrespective of the opinion of the Investigating Officer that prima facie no case is made out, if the material collected and the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC, in the opinion of the Magistrate, are sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused persons.
21. Thus the position is very clear and well settled that upon receipt of a police report under Section 173(2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issuance of process to the accused. Section 190(1)(b) does not lay down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit in exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190(1)(a), though, it is open to him to act under Section 200 or Section 202 also."
(Emphasis Supplied)
36. In the judgement of Zunaid (Supra), the Apex Court has held as under:
"11. In view of the above, there remains no shadow of doubt that on the receipt of the police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can exercise three options. Firstly, he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action. Secondly, he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue process; and thirdly, he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200. It may be noted that even in a case where the final report of the police under Section 173 is accepted and the accused persons are discharged, the Magistrate has the power to take cognizance of the offence on a complaint or a Protest Petition on the same or similar allegations even after the acceptance of the final report. As held by this Court in Gopal Vijay Verma Vs. Bhuneshwar Prasad Sinha and Others, as followed in B. Chandrika Vs. Santhosh and Another, a Magistrate is not debarred from taking cognizance of a complaint merely on the ground that earlier he had declined to take cognizance of the police report. No doubt a Magistrate while exercising his judicial discretion has to apply his mind to the contents of the Protest Petition or the complaint as the case may be."
(Emphasis Supplied)
37. Therefore, from the above noted judgements it is crystal clear that where an F.I.R. has been filed and the Magistrate chooses to take cognizance of the matter disagreeing with the conclusion arrived at in the police report then such cognizance is taken on the basis of the police report and it is not mandatory for him to treat the protest petition so filed by the informant as a complaint and then proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 200 Cr.P.C. If the Magistrate take cognizance on the police report itself, then the procedure under section 200 Cr.P.C. is not required to be followed. From the aforesaid observations made in the judgements referred above it is crystal clear that when a final report is submitted by the police the Magistrate may agree or disagree with such police report and if he wants to agree with such final report filed by the police then it is mandatory for him to issue notice to the complainant and consider the protest petition after giving the opportunity to the complainant and if he found that the conclusion drawn by the police in its report is wrong or not sustainable then he may straight away proceed to take cognizance in the matter under section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. on the basis of the material brought on record alongwith the police report.
38. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, there is no merit on the submissions of learned Senior Counsel that once the Final Report submitted by the police is rejected by the Magistrate, he is incompetent to take cognizance in the matter under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. as while rejecting the Final Report the Magistrate is rejecting only the conclusion drawn by the Investigation Agency not the entire report as such and all the materials collected during the investigation is available before the Magistrate to form his opinion whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused persons and thereupon he can overrule the opinion drawn by the Investigation Agency and record his own opinion and take cognizance in the matter under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C., on the basis of said police report, which is available before the learned Magistrate, without undergoing the procedure for treating the protest petition as a complaint. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court there is no error in the cognizance/summoning order dated 25.05.2019, passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the applicant herein for the aforesaid offences.
39. The second argument raised by learned Senior Counsel for the applicant is with regard to the scope and ambit of the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which has been well established by the Apex Court in the judgements of R.P. Kapur (supra), L. Muniswamy (supra), Bhajan Lal (supra) and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) etc.
40. In the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and Others : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Apex Court has held as under:-
"33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
33.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence.
33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences.
33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.
33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the "rarest of rare cases" (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
33.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.
33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule.
33.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere.
33.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping.
33.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.
33.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.
33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
33.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court.
33.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.
33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.
33.16. The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438CrPC before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
33.17. Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
33.18. Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.
(Emphasis Supplied)
41. From the aforesaid judgements the principles of law are well settled and once a prima facie offence is made out from the material available almost all the judgements have restrained the High Court from exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The criminal proceedings can be quashed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., when from the entire material available on record, there is no prime facie case is made out. Further, if there is any legal bar against the institution or continuation of the proceedings or the allegations as made against the accused do not constitute the offence, however, it has been repeatedly held that while doing so it is not incumbent upon which High Court to embark upon a detailed enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not as this function of testing the reliability of the evidence is to be exercised by the concerned Magistrate or the trial court. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. further can be exercised while in the opinion of the court, the criminal proceedings instituted are nothing but an abuse of process of the court and ends of justice required by the proceedings ought to have been to be quashed.
42. With regard to the submissions, which has been advanced by Sri Manish Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant that even if the allegations as have been made made against the applicant herein are presumed to be true, no offence under Section 304 I.P.C., is made out against the applicant and the ingredient of Section 299 I.P.C. are not fulfilled. However, it would be appropriate to take note of Section 299 I.P.C. and Section 304 I.P.C. which reads as under:
Section 299 and Section 304 I.P.C.
"Section 299. Culpable Homicide- Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide."
Section 304.- Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder- Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with 1 [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death."
43. In the instant case, the allegation that the applicant who claims himself to be the Chairman of the Drugs Association has gone into the medical store of the deceased and has demanded money illegally by pointing out a gun towards the deceased due to which a sudden shock was there and the deceased has died due to the cardiac arrest due to such sudden shock. The applicant herein has been charged for the offence under Sections 386 and 304 I.P.C. From the evidence available on record, there is ample evidence that the applicant herein has pointed out the gun towards the deceased and thereby had asked the deceased to deliver the money to him. In view thereof, a prima facie case of extortion is made out against the applicant herein. Further, from the allegation as made in the instant case, five-six persons have surrounded the deceased and the applicant herein had pointed out the gun for extorting the money. Due to such activities done by the applicant and his associates, the deceased had suffered a shock and thereby suffered the cardiological failure and had died on the spot.
44. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, it can't be said no offence whatsoever is made out against the applicant herein, warranting quashing of the entire proceedings of the instant case against the applicant. Therefore, this Court does not find any good reason to entertain the instant application and the same is according dismissed. However, it is open for the trial court to take all relevant factors, into considerations, at the appropriate stage, while framing the charges looking at the entire material available on record.
Order Date :- 04 October, 2024 Shubham Arya (Anish Kumar Gupta, J.)