Karnataka High Court
M/S Lingegowda Detective And vs The Assistant Provident on 28 January, 2020
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2020
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S. INDIRESH
WRIT PETITION NO.22683 OF 2019 (L-PF)
Between:
M/s. Lingegowda Detective and
Security Agency
No.408, Usha Apartments
16th Main, 4th Block
Jayanagar
Bangalore - 560 011
By its then Proprietor
Shri B.L. Chandrashekar
...Petitioner
(by Sri K.S. Abhijith Advocate along with
Shri B.L. Sanjeev, Advocate)
And:
The Assistant Provident
Fund Commissioner (C & R)
Employees Provident
Fund Organisation
Regional Office
Bhavhishyanidhi Bhavan
No.13, Raja Ram Mohan Roy Road
Bengaluru -560 025
...Respondent
2
(by Smt. Nanditha Haldipur, Advocate)
This Writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the order dated
02.05.2019 passed by the Presiding Officer, CGIT-cum-LC,
Bangalore in EPF 11 of 2017 vide Annexure-N; and etc.
This Writ Petition coming on for preliminary hearing in 'B'
Group, this day, ARAVIND KUMAR J., passed the following:
ORDER
Petitioner is assailing the order passed by the CGIT-cum- Labour Court whereunder appeal filed by the Petitioner under Section 7-I of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') came to be dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that it is filed beyond the period prescribed under Rule 7(2) of EPFAT Procedure Rules, 1952.
2. We have heard the arguments of Shri K.S. Abhijith, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Smt. Nandita Haldipur, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
3. Petitioner is a covered establishment under the Act. Proceedings under Section 14B of the Act having been initiated resulted in order being passed on 24th August, 2016. The first 3 attempt made by the respondent-Department to serve copy of the said order during September, 2016 was in vain. Hence, a second attempt was made to despatch the said order to the respondent by Registered Post Acknowledgement Due on 16th November, 2016. It was duly served on the respondent on 17th November, 2016. A memo filed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent today would clearly disclose that on 17th November, 2016 the order passed under Section 14B of the Act dated 24th August, 2016 has been delivered to the petitioner.
4. Section 7-I of the Act provides for an appeal being filed against the order passed under Section 14B of the Act, and as such, appeal came to be filed on 03rd July, 2017. Tribunal, as observed hereinabove, has dismissed the appeal as having been filed beyond the prescribed period of 120 days. Rule 7(2) of the Rules prescribes the period for preferring an appeal is 60 days. Proviso thereto enables the appellant to file such appeal beyond 60 days but not later than 60 days from the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7. In other words, if the 4 appeal is filed beyond 60 days, sufficient cause has to be shown for not filing the appeal beyond 60 days up to 120 days. A plain reading of Rule 7(2) of the Rules also would indicate that authority has to issue the order to the covered establishment and/or on its authorized representative, which is mandate of sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules. In the instant case, the order passed under Section 14B of the Act was despatched by registered post acknowledgement due to the petitioner on 16th November, 2016 and it was received by the Petitioner on 17th November, 2016. However, appeal has been filed on 03rd July, 2019 which is undisputedly beyond the period of 120 days. Sixty days, if reckoned from the date of service of notice, i.e. on 17th November, 2016 would expire on 16th January, 2016. Further sixty days thereafter commence from 17th January, 2016 would expire on 08th March, 2017. When the mandate of the law being clear, unambiguous and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act having been consciously excluded by the law makers from the purview of Act as well as the Rules made thereunder, no applicant/appellant can be heard to contend that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would still be applicable and as 5 such appellant would be entitled to seek for condonation of such delay, if any. The appeal in the instant case having been filed beyond the period of 120 days, Tribunal has rightly exercised its power in not entertaining the appeal as it has been filed beyond the period of 120 days. The impugned order passed by the CGIT-cum-Labour Court does not suffer from any infirmity either in law or on facts calling for interference at our hands. No grounds. Writ petition is hereby dismissed.
SD/-
JUDGE SD/-
JUDGE lnn