Allahabad High Court
Chatrapal vs State Of U.P. And Others on 8 January, 2019
Author: Suneet Kumar
Bench: Suneet Kumar
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 2 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 297 of 2008 Petitioner :- Chatrapal Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Pankaj Naqvi,Jai Pal,R.M.Saggi,S.P.Singh,Tejpal Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ashish Mishra,Neeraj Upadhyaya Hon'ble Suneet Kumar,J.
Heard Sri S.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the first respondent and Sri Ashish Mishra learned counsel for the second respondent and perused the record.
The instant writ petition is directed against the order dated 19.09.2017 passed by the third respondent, appellate authority/Administrative Judge, affirming the order dated 30.04.2017 passed by the second respondent, disciplinary authority/District Judge, Bareilly, imposing punishment of dismissal.
The facts, briefly stated, is that petitioner, a class IV employee, in the Judgship of Bareilly was chargesheeted for two charges on 28.08.2003, alleging that petitioner vide communication dated 05.06.2003 had used inappropriate, derogatory and objectionable language and made false allegations against the officials including the District Judge. Earlier, similar allegations was made against the presiding officer of Aonla Court. The second charge against the petitioner was that he communicated letters and representations to the Registrar General of High Court and other officials of the State Government including the then Chief Minister without routeing the communications through proper channel.
In support of the charge, letter dated 05.06.2003 and report dated 20.06.2003 was relied upon and the Central Nazir was the sole witness. Petitioner contested by filing written statement on 19.09.2003. The enquiry officer, upon considering the written statement, evidence and material placed before him, submitted enquiry report to the District Judge holding the petitioner guilty on both counts. Petitioner was called upon by way of show cause notice to reply to the report and on the quantum of punishment proposed. The second respondent having due regard to the findings returned by the enquiry officer and submissions made by the petitioner to the show cause notice imposed major punishment of dismissal by the impugned order dated 30.04.2007. Aggrieved, petitioner preferred an appeal before the Administrative Judge. The appellate authority on considering the submissions made in the memorandum of appeal, in particular, the allegation of the petitioner that the charge was vague and that the copies of some of the documents were not supplied, was of the view that the charge was not vague but specific and definite, the relevant material and documents as required were supplied, however, the document that was demanded by the petitioner was of no relevance, neither the said document was relied upon nor considered by the enquiry officer. The appellate authority was of the opinion that the petitioner was not prejudiced. Consequently, the appeal came to be dismissed by the impugned order dated 19.09.2007. The order of the appellate authority and the disciplinary authority is under challenge.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits: (i) that charge no. 1, in particular, is vague; (ii) no finding has been recorded by the enquiry officer with regard to the allegations made by the petitioner in the letter dated 05.06.2003, against the officials, is correct or not; (iii) the quantum of punishment imposed on the petitioner is not commensurate to the guilt; (iv) the document dated 16.03.2003 was not supplied to the petitioner, therefore, causing prejudice to him.
In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decisions of Supreme Court rendered in Sawai Singh Versus State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 995 and Santosh Bakshi Versus State of Punjab, AIR 2014 SC 2966.
In rebuttal, Sri Mishra submits that petitioner is habitual of making false allegations against the senior officers of the Judgship, including, the District Judge. The charges framed against the petitioner is specific and definite and not vague. Petitioner was given full opportunity, he replied to the charge sheet and participated in the enquiry. The contention that is being put forward before this Court was raised by the petitioner, which was duly considered by the appellate authority and rejected. The petitioner did not show any remorse or regret with regard to his conduct, rather, in reply to the charge sheet and in the memo of appeal he has justified his conduct and has made further allegations against the officers. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
Rival submissions fall for consideration.
It is not in dispute that the petitioner is a class IV employee and had made allegations which in the opinion of the disciplinary authority was serious, inappropriate and false and it tantamounts to intimidate the officers. Petitioner was in the habit of making false allegations, thereby, threatening the superiors to take undue advantage. Petitioner was served with the charge sheet which was duly received and replied, petitioner was permitted to cross examine the witness relied upon by the authority to prove the charges. After conclusion, the enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty. The enquiry report was duly supplied to the petitioner along with show cause notice by the disciplinary authority. Petitioner replied to the show cause notice and upon considering the reply and the enquiry report, major punishment was imposed dispensing with the service of the petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal which was duly considered by the appellate authority, wherein, specific plea was taken that the charge was vague and certain document was not supplied to the petitioner, the appeal, however, came to be rejected. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that charge is vague lacks merit. The first charge categorically alleges that the first petitioner in communication dated 05.06.2003 has used inappropriate, derogatory language and allegations stated therein is far from truth. Further, it is stated that earlier he had made a complaint against the presiding officer of Aonla which was also false.
The petitioner did not object that the charge was vague and beyond his comprehension either before the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority and for the first time such a plea was raised before the appellate authority. Petitioner in his reply has not denied that he had not sent the communication dated 05.06.2003 to the authority, rather, he admitted the contents of the communication but failed to substantiate the allegations stated therein. Further, it is noted by the disciplinary authority that the then District Judge had assumed the charge on 21.06.2003, whereas, the petitioner is alleged to have stated that he met him between 24.08.2001 to 15.01.2003. On the face of it, the allegations against the District Judge was false. Further, petitioner has not alleged any malafide against the then District Judge nor any motive has been attached to his conduct insofar it relates to the petitioner so as to draw an inference of bias or prejudice against the petitioner. The enquiry officer has returned a finding, on the material placed on record, that the petitioner is in habit of making false allegations and uses inappropriate and derogatory language against the senior officials, including, the District Judge to threaten them to extract benefits and take undue advantages from them.
As regards, the non supply of certain documents, particularly letter dated 16.03.2003 referred to in the reply of the witness to the District Judge, the said letter is merely a communication issued by the District Judge to the Central Nazir seeking his explanation. On specific query, learned counsel for the petitioner admits that the letter dated 16.03.2003 has not been relied upon by the enquiry officer nor there is any reference of the said letter in the enquiry report. The communication has been brought on record but the learned counsel for the petitioner failed to show as to how it helps the petitioner.
In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g)the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
(Refer: Union Of India and others vs P.Gunasekaran1) In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao2, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus:
"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh3. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions:
"4. .... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act....................."
(Refer: Union of India and others Versus P. Gunasekaran) Finally the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the quantum of penalty is not commensurate to the guilt. It is urged that even accepting that the petitioner had used inappropriate and derogatory language against the higher officials and the District Judge, a lessor punishment would have sufficed.
In rebuttal, it is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner did not show any remorse or regret with regard to his conduct, either before the disciplinary authority or before the appellate authority, rather, he tried to justify his conduct in the stand taken by him in the written statement, as well as, memo of appeal. This fact has been noted by the appellate authority in the impugned order. Quantum of punishment is the sole prerogative of the disciplinary authority. The appellate authority was of the opinion that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is justified, he being a class IV employee, is habitual in attaching false motive to the District Judge, as such, his conduct tantamounts to gross misconduct entailing imposition of maximum penalty.
Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. It is not open to the Court to substitute the same with a lesser or different punishment. These aspects have been discussed at quite length by the Supreme Court in several decisions including B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others4, Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham5, Om Kumar and others v. Union of India6, Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Association and another7, Chairman-cum- Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others8 and the recent one in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu9.
Having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.
No costs.
Order Date :- 08.01.2019 K.K. Maurya