National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Devendra Kumar Goel S/O. Shri Suresh ... vs M/S. Pearls Infrastructure Projects ... on 14 June, 2024
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI FIRST APPEAL NO. 274 OF 2024 (Against the Order dated 26/09/2017 in Complaint No. CC/382/2016 of the State Commission Punjab) 1. DEVENDRA KUMAR GOEL S/O. SHRI SURESH KUMAR GOEL R/O. 78 SKYNET ENCLAVE LOAHGARH, PATIYALA ROAD ZIRAKHPUR, MOHALI, PUNJAB 2. SMT. SHEELA GOEL D/O. LALA PURAN MAI KC 102/2, OLD KAVI NAGAR, GHAZIABAD, UTTAR PRADESH ...........Appellant(s) Versus 1. M/S. PEARLS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS LIMITED THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN, NIRMAL SINGH BHANGOO A WING, 2ND FLOOR STATEMENT HOUSE BARAKHAMBA ROAD CANNAUGHT PLACE, NEW DELHI-110001 2. M/S. P.A.C.L LTD. THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN, A WING, 2ND FLOOR STATEMAN HOUSE BARAKHAMBA ROAD, CONNAUGHT PLACE NEW DELHI 3. M/S. INDIABULLS HOUSING FINANCE LTD. THROUGH ITS BRANCH MANAGER, SCO NO. 337-338, GROUND FLOOR, SECTOR-35 B, CHANDIGARH ...........Respondent(s)
BEFORE: HON'BLE DR. INDER JIT SINGH,PRESIDING MEMBER
FOR THE APPELLANT : MR. DEVENDRA KUMAR GOEL, IN PERSON
Dated : 14 June 2024 ORDER
1. The present First Appeal (FA) has been filed by the Appellant against the order dated 26.09.2017 of the State Commission Punjab in CC No. 382/2016. The First Appeal has been filed with a delay of 2321 days as per calculations made by the Registry of NCDRC.
2. In order to condone the delay in filing the First Appeal, the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the FA after the stipulated limitation period. An IA No. 6275 of 2024 dated 10.02.2024 has been filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. In the said IA, period of delay mentioned is 78 months and following reasons for delay/grounds for condonation have been mentioned:-
(i) In CC/382/2016, decided by the State Commission on 26.09.2017, the complainant filed an execution application under Sections 25 and 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, in December 2017. Execution is pending due to a Supreme Court stay in Civil Appeal No. 13301/2015 and delays by the decree debtor. The complainant is not a Ponzi scheme customer, and no revival scheme exists for Mohali Sectors 100 & 104 under the Punjab Apartment and Property Development Act, 1995.
(ii) The Pearls City Mohali project, involving Rs.11,000 Crores, is a political scam under Punjab's 2003 Industrial Policy. The State Government, through OP-2 as subsidy of OP-1, backdated a 2006 Project Management Agreement without adhering to the Punjab Apartment and Property Regulation Act (PAPRA) requirements for advertising, licensing, and escrow accounts. Funds collected were transferred to Australia via subsidiaries for hotel purchases. OP-3 failed to verify transactions or comply with PAPRA norms and audit standards, approving housing loans improperly. Despite project inactivity, customers were issued EMI notices. The complainant filed FIR No. 16/18 at Barakhamba Road Police Station, New Delhi, after false progress reports. Payments of 95% of the Rs.69 lakhs were made, with possession due in May 2014.
(iii) The recovery certificate under Section 25, returned by the District Collector of Vadodara for Pearls Infrastructure Projects Limited properties, was ineffective because the properties had already been sold by brokers despite a Supreme Court stay. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and Lodha Committee had directed all Chief Secretaries to prevent property sales, but individually properties are being sold as 95% and more are in individual name due to Jamindari Act.
(iv) The Criminal proceedings under Section 27 against Mr. Nirmal Singh Bhangoo, the scam's instigator, remain unresolved. Mr. Bhangoo politically influenced the process, changed five advocates at the State Commission, and then filed Civil Writ Petition No. 31990/2019 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court. Though the High Court ruled against the decree debtor in December 2022, no order for execution was issued. The complainant lacks confidence in the State Commission's commitment in applying the principles of alter ego, lifting the corporate veil, or relevant company law provisions to determine liability for payments to the decree holder.
(v) There was no intention to delay the filing of this appeal. Despite seven years since the execution application was filed, there is no hope of refund as ordered by the Punjab State Commission. The complainant did not deliberately delay and seeks acceptance of this appeal to avoid irreparable loss. The appellant urgently requires possession of the residential plot to provide shelter for his family and fulfill social responsibilities. It is requested that this appeal be accepted and decided on its merits in the interest of justice.
(vi) The appellant requests condonation of a 78-months' delay from 26.09.2017 to 12.04.2024, during which execution proceedings continued under EA/220/2017 (Section 25) and EA/221/2017 (Section 27) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Despite attending every proceeding before the Punjab State Commission at Chandigarh, there has been no resolution, contrary to the Supreme Court's directive to complete execution within six months. The Punjab & Haryana High Court has affirmed that consumers should not suffer endless delays.
3. A perusal of the records before us show that the impugned order of the State Commission was pronounced on 26.09.2017 and the present First Appeal has been filed on 17.04.2024 i.e. after a period of 2395 days. Allowing the period of 44 days for obtaining the first free certified copy of the impugned order which was obtained on 09.11.2017, and the statutory permissible period of 30 days, as well as covid exempted period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and granting them an additional 90 days from 01.03.2022 i.e. till 29.05.2022 as per judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the delay in filing the First Appeal comes to 1515 days.
4. Appellant, who appeared in person, was heard on 02.05.2024. The said order dated 26.9.2017 of the State Commission in CC No.382/2016 was in favour of the appellant herein who was the complainant before the State Commission and the complaint before the State Commission was filed for refund of the amount and the same was allowed by the State Commission vide said impugned order dated 26.9.2017. Thereafter, the complainant filed execution petition before the State Commission and the same is still pending. As the appellant/complainant is not able to get the said order of the State Commission executed despite execution application(s) which are still pending, he has now filed this appeal, inter alia praying for (a) setting aside said of the impugned order (b) modifying the order dated 26.09.2017 of the State Commission to the extent that possession is allowed with modification to the penalty clause (c) directions to OP-3 to recover the balance principal amount from the appellant as on date 26.09.2017 with the assurance that if in future the delay penalties received through successor or through any source, will be paid by customer. Although, copy of the complaint filed by petitioner is not on record, appellant, who appeared in person, admitted that in the complaint, his prayer was only for refund and not for possession and possession was not even an alternate prayer. The appellant also drew our attention to order dated 03.05.2018 in FA No.476/2018, which was an appeal filed by Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. (OP-3) against the Appellant herein. Appellant also drew our attention to order dated 13.12.2018 of JMIC, Gurugram, which was the case filed by Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. in which the Court has directed for proceedings against the appellant under section 25 of Payment and Settlement System Act, 2007.
5. We have carefully gone through the reasons for delay/grounds for condonation mentioned in IA No. 6275/2024 as well as those adduced during the hearing in the light of observations/decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases, especially the ones mentioned below.
(i) Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Respresentative and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Anr. (2023) 10 SCC 531.
(ii) Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81.
(iii) Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649].
(iv) Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321]. (v) Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765. (vi) Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) 14 SCC 578. (vii) H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Nahar Exports Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 680. (viii) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513. (ix) State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654. (x) Bappanand Narshimman Annu Vs. Hirmanidevi G.S. Gupta & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 2605.
6. In Sheo Raj Singh (Supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the appeal filed against an order of the High Court condoning the delay, observed that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the lengths of delay being immaterial, each case for condonation of delay based on the existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. In Basawaraj (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when a case is filed beyond the limitation period, the applicant must demonstrate "sufficient cause," meaning an adequate and enough reason for not approaching the court within the prescribed time. If the party is found to be negligent, lacking bona fides, or not acting diligently, there is no justified ground for condoning the delay. Courts are not justified in condoning such delays by imposing any conditions and must adhere to the established parameters for condonation of delay. Condoning delay without sufficient cause and proper justification would violate statutory provisions and show disregard for legislative intent. In Esha Bhattcharjee (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed a distinction between inordinate delays and delays of short duration or a few days. In cases of inordinate delay, the doctrine of prejudice is invoked, warranting a strict approach, while delays of short duration may not necessitate such a stringent view and instead call for a more lenient interpretation. The Court expressed concern over the growing tendency to perceive delay as a trivial matter and to exhibit a lackadaisical attitude towards it, which needs to be addressed within the confines of legal parameters. In Sridevi Datla (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the precedent set in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, highlighting that a strict standard of proof can sometimes fail to uphold public justice and may result in public harm. The Court emphasized that there is no universal formula to determine whether sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay, and each case must be assessed based on its individual facts and surrounding circumstances. The Court reiterated that no rigid criteria exist to evaluate whether sufficient and good grounds have been presented for condoning delay and emphasized the need for a case-specific approach in such matters. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane (Supra), the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the law of limitation must be applied rigorously as prescribed by statute, even if it causes hardship to a particular party. The court cannot extend the limitation period on equitable grounds. Despite any inconvenience or hardship caused, the court must enforce the statutory provision fully, adhering to the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex," meaning "the law is hard but it is the law." It is established that inconvenience is not a decisive factor in interpreting a statute, and a court cannot disregard a statutory provision to alleviate perceived distress resulting from its application. In Anshul Aggarwal (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when considering applications for condonation of delay in consumer cases, it is crucial to bear in mind the special limitation period set forth in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions. The Court highlighted that entertaining significantly delayed petitions against consumer forum orders would defeat the objective of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes. In H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that the law of limitation is based on sound public policy, and therefore, applications for condonation of delay should be strictly construed in the absence of genuine reasons. The failure of the respondents to demonstrate due diligence in filing appeals and the significant delay in refiling are viewed as indicative of gross negligence and lack of bona fides, especially in the absence of a valid explanation. Allowing inordinate delays necessitates stringent scrutiny and cannot be accepted without proper reasons. The court underscored the need to balance the scales of justice for both parties, emphasizing that even in cases of refiling, a liberal approach should not disregard this principle. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Supra) observed that the law of limitation is rooted in the public policy of concluding litigation by forfeiting the remedy rather than the right itself, emphasizing that rights or remedies not exercised within a specified time should cease to exist; while Section 3 of the Limitation Act should be strictly construed, Section 5 should be interpreted liberally. Despite considering justice-oriented approaches, the court cannot override the limitation law under Section 3. Discretion to condone delay is granted to courts, but may not be exercised in cases of inordinate delay, negligence, or lack of due diligence. The granting of relief to some does not automatically extend to others if sufficient cause for delay is not established. Merits of the case need not be considered in delay condonation, and applications must adhere to statutory provisions to be granted. In Bherulal (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that the notion that merit in a case justifies disregarding a period of delay is preposterous. Regardless of a case's merit, the limitation period can bar its consideration, potentially excluding even strong cases. However, this does not negate the court's jurisdiction to condone delay in appropriate circumstances. In Bappanand Narshimman Annu (Supra), the National Commission observed that in accordance with the broad principles established by numerous decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the term 'sufficient cause' cannot be interpreted liberally when negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides are attributable to the party seeking such discretion. Emphasizing the importance of applying the statutory period of limitation rigorously, the Commission observed that unlimited leniency in time limits fosters uncertainty.
7. In the present case, the main reason for filing the Appeal before this Commission is that the Appellant has not been successful in getting the order of the State Commission executed, which was otherwise in his favour, as his complaint was allowed by the State Commission. In the Appeal, the Appellant now wants modifications to the order of the State Commission and is seeking a different relief, which was not even part of his original complaint before the State Commission. Per se he is not aggrieved with the order of the State Commission as it was in his favour. It is only on account of the said order not getting executed due to various reasons that he wants a different relief now. Hence, he has approached this Commission in the present Appeal with a delay of 1515 days. This, in our considered view, is not a valid reason for condonation of delay in filing Appeal before this Commission. Even if the delay is condoned and his Appeal is considered on merits, we are of the considered view that the said Appeal is not maintainable as whatever relief he sought in his Complaint before the State Commission, was allowed by the State Commission vide order dated 26.09.2017. Reliefs, which he seeks now in the Appeal, by way of modification to the State Commission's order, were not even the part of his original complaint. Hence, such prayers cannot be allowed in Appeal. Hence, even on merits, the Appeal in question is not maintainable.
8. In view of the foregoing, FA No. 274 of 2024 is dismissed on account of limitation as well as being not maintainable on merits. In the present case, the right of course of action for the Appellant is to pursue his remedies under the execution petition(s) for execution of the said order dated 26.09.2017 of the State Commission, which according to him are already pending before the appropriate Forum.
9. Pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed off.
................................................ DR. INDER JIT SINGH PRESIDING MEMBER