Madras High Court
Nirmala Devadoss vs T.Pauline Victoria on 10 September, 2008
Bench: M.Chockalingam, M.Venugopal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 10.09.2008 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.CHOCKALINGAM AND THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL O.S.A.NO.218 OF 2007 Nirmala Devadoss, Principal, Gnanodhaya Training Institute, 1/60,Powells Road, St. Thomas Mount, Chennai-600 016 .. Appellant Vs. 1.T.Pauline Victoria, Principal, Gnanodhaya Teacher Training Institute, 1/60, Powells Road, St. Thomas Mount, Chennai-600 016. 2.Rt. Rev. Dr.V.Devasahayam, Bishop of CSI Diocese of Chennai, 226, Cathedral Road, Chennai-600 089 .. Respondents This Original Side Appeal has been preferred under Clause 15 of Letters Patent read with Order 36 Rule 9 of Original side Rules against the order and decreetal order of the learned Single Judge made in Application No.2432/2007 in Tr.C.S.No.966 of 2001, dated 25.04.2007. For Appellant : Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, SC for M/s.AL.Gandhimathi For Respondents: Mr.Ravikumar Paul, for M/s.Paul & Paul for R-1 No appearance for R-2 - - - - JUDGMENT
(The judgment of the Court was made by M.CHOCKALINGAM, J.) This appeal challenges an order of the learned Single Judge made in Application No.2432 of 2007, whereby the order of interim injunction originally granted in Tr.C.S.No.966 of 2001 was discharged.
2.The facts which led the respondents/applicants to file the said application can be stated thus:
The appellant herein filed O.S.No.8559 of 1998 before the City Civil Court, Chennai, challenging an order of suspension, dated 21.8.1998. At the time of initiation of the suit, she filed I.A.No.20630 of 1998 for injunction pendente lite not to interfere with the peaceful administration and running of the Gnanodhaya Teacher Training Institute by her as Principal. An interim order of injunction was originally granted. Aggrieved over the same, the defendant preferred C.M.A.No.47 of 1999, which came up for consideration before the learned II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, whereby the order of injunction was confirmed. The same was also taken up by way of revision before this Court in C.R.P.No.3101 of 1999. On dismissal of the same, it was taken up before the Apex Court and the same was also dismissed. While the said suit was transferred to this court and taken on file as Tr.C.S.No.966 of 2001, an another suit was filed by the applicants as plaintiffs against the appellant herein and 5 others in C.S.No.553 of 1999 for a declaration that the defendants 1 to 6 are not entitled to claim or to act as members or office bearers of Gnanodhaya Teacher Training School Association and also for a declaration that the 6th defendant is not entitled to claim or act as the Correspondent of Gnanodhaya Teacher Training Institute and also for permanent injunction, in which interim injunction was granted against all the defendants therein. While the matter stood thus, the present application was filed by the defendants in Tr.C.S.No.966 of 2001 for discharging the interim injunction originally granted and subsequently affirmed. On enquiry, the learned Single Judge had discharged the same. Hence this appeal.
3.Advancing arguments on behalf of the appellant, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, would submit that interim injunction originally granted in favour of the appellant was affirmed not only in appeal and revision, but the S.L.P. made at the instance of the respondents was also dismissed, whereby the injunction has been affirmed. The interim injunction was prayed for and granted till the disposal of the suit and the suit is yet pending. Under these circumstances, no question of discharge of interim injunction originally granted would arise. Even in the suit and also in the affidavit filed in support of the application, it was made clear that the respondents had no authority to pass an order of suspension and only after looking into that position, the court was convinced that the respondents have no authority to do so and prima facie found a case in favour of the appellant and has granted interim injunction. Under these circumstances, there is no occasion to discharge the interim injunction.
4.Added further the learned Senior Counsel that apart from that, in the instant case, her original period of superannuation was 58 years and subsequently, it was extended to 60 years and it has also been extended to 65 years. It was her consistent case from the very beginning that she could continu in service till her superannuation at the age of 65 years. Further, in the instant case, now the application for discharging the interim injunction has been filed by the defendants, who, according to the appellant, had no authority to pass an order of suspension and who had not vested with the management and administration of the institution. Accepting the said contention, interim injunction has been granted. Hence they are not competent to file the instant application seeking discharge. On the strength of such application made by the persons not competent to make so, the court should not have discharged the interim injunction originally granted. By doing so, much prejudice has been caused. Under these circumstances, the order of the learned Single Judge has got to be set aside by allowing this appeal.
5.Contrary to the above contentions, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that in the instant case, originally, a suit was filed, questioning the suspension order and its validity. The court has granted only an interim injunction and the suit is pending. The said order of granting injunction could have the effect only till the period of superannuation. It was a candid admission that her superannuation period was 58 years and it was further extended by 2 years and now, she has crossed the age of 60 years in the month of May, 2008. Now, she comes forward with a case, stating that her superannuation period is 65 years. Pending proceedings, she has now presented a letter, stating that an order was passed by the present President of the Association. It is pertinent to point out that when interim injunction was made against all the six persons in the suit in C.S.No.553 of 1999 that they should not interfere with the management and administration of the institution by the plaintiffs, three preferred appeal and when it came before the Bench on appeal, so far as the appellant was concerned, the court took the view that she could continu as the Principal, but so far as the other two are concerned, they had nothing to do with the management at all and they should not interfere and it confirmed the injunction order. It is pertinent to point out that the communication now placed and relied on by the appellant before the learned Single Judge was one which has emanated from the President, whose activities were injuncted by the Court. Under these circumstances, he was not competent to pass any resolution or to pass any order extending the period upto 60 years.
6.Added further the learned counsel that in the instant case, since the suit itself was questioning the suspension, though injunction was granted, she could work till the period of superannuation and as on today, superannuation is over. Under these circumstances, the appellant by herself cannot extend the period and retain herself in the post without any order or otherwise. Under these circumstances, the learned Single Judge had discharged the interim injunction and hence it has got to be affirmed by this court.
7.The Court has paid its anxious consideration on the submissions made and looked into the materials available.
8.This appeal challenges an order of discharge of interim injunction originally granted in favour of the appellant. The appellant, originally, filed a suit before the City Civil Court and on transfer, it is now pending in this Court as Tr.C.S.No.966 of 2001. The appellant has sought for declaratory relief that the order of suspension dated 21.8.1998 made by the first defendant against the plaintiff was null and void and also for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from in any manner interfering with the plaintiff's administration of running of Gnanodhaya Teacher Training Institute as Principal of the said institution. It is not in controversy that originally, interim injunction was granted and the order was tested in C.M.A. and subsequently in the revision and also by way of S.L.P. before the Apex Court. The same was affirmed. Hence it was in force. It could also be seen that the suit was filed in C.S.No.553 of 1999 against six defendants, stating that they should not interfere with the administration and management of the said institution. What was contended by the appellant before the learned Single Judge and equally here also is that injunction must be continued to be in force till the disposal of the suit, since it has been confirmed by all the courts and apart from that, the period of superannuation of the appellant was 65 years and the suit in which relief was sought for is also pending and under these circumstances, it should not be discharged and further, discharge application was filed by a person, who was found to be not competent to pass an order of suspension and on that ground also, injunction should not be discharged.
9.It could be seen from the contention put forth by the respondents' side that even as per the admission made by the appellant, the age of 58 years was extended to 60 years by a communication and it was further extended to 65 years and now, she has actually crossed 60 years in the month of May, 2008. The communication now placed before the Court was the resolution alleged to have been made by the Association and its signatories is one, who has also been restrained by the court not to interfere in the management affairs of the institution and under these circumstances, injunction if allowed to be continued, it would cause hardship and prejudice to the administration of the institution and hence it has got to be discharged.
10.After considering the rival submissions made, the court is of the considered opinion that the order of the learned Single Judge has got to be sustained. It is not in controversy that an order of interim injunction was granted in favour of the appellant and this was also affirmed and the suit in Tr.C.S.No.966 of 2001 is also pending. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the appellant, who was working as Principal of the institution, has got different stand to put before the court. She has consistently stated that her period of superannuation is 65 years, but no material is placed before the court to accept the said contention. Even as per the counter affidavit, it could be seen that it was originally 58 years and it was extended to 60 years and thus, she was conscious of the fact that her superannuation period was 58 years and subsequently, it has been extended to 60 years and a communication was also relied on before the learned Single Judge.
11.It is pertinent to point out that C.S.No.553 of 1999 was filed by the plaintiffs therein against six defendants including the appellant herein and the relief sought for was that they should not interfere with the administration and management of the institutions, including the one in question. Further, it remains to be stated that originally, interim injunction was granted and O.S.A. was made and in that, two of six defendants, in respect of whom interim injunction originally granted was affirmed. Now, it could be seen that a communication was relied on by the appellant and it was signed by one of those two, who was restrained by the court not to interfere with the management in C.S.No.553 of 1999. Now, it could be stated that he was not competent to sign any resolution as found in the communication and it was the material relied on by the appellant to show that the period of suspension was extended from 58 years to 60 years. Under these circumstances, it was one made by the person not competent to do so. Under these circumstances, it would be quite clear that it is an admitted position that she has crossed the age of 60 years in the month of May, 2008. If to be so, now the document relied on by her is of no consequences and hence claiming that she wants to continu the post of Principal on the basis of that communication, in the opinion of the court, cannot be accepted.
12.Apart from that the other contention is that she could continu till the age of 65 years, but no material is placed before the court. In short, it can be stated that in order to show that she could continu to be in the post of Principal, no material is available to accept the same. Now, the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant that injunction order originally granted should continu till the disposal of the suit cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that it was a suit challenging an order of suspension and the said suspension order could work till the time of superannuation. A person like the appellant should not be allowed to take advantage of the interim order of injunction, which was actually sought for in a case where suspension order was challenged and to state that she could continu even after superannuation merely because of pendency of the suit. It is true, the suit is pending. The questions have got to be decided there. At the same time, injunction originally granted could be in force only till the time of superannuation and not beyond that. Under these circumstances, the court is of the considered opinion that the order of the learned Single Judge has got to be sustained. Accordingly, this original side appeal fails and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their costs.
13.The learned Single Judge is required to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible. It is needless to say that even the decision made in the interlocutory application will not have any control over the final decision to be taken in the suit. It is made clear that no one of the observations made by the court above will have any influence over the decision of the case on the merits of the matter.
(M.C., J.) (M.V., J.) 10.09.2008 Index : Yes Internet : Yes vvk M.CHOCKALINGAM, J.
AND M.VENUGOPAL, J.
vvk O.S.A.NO.218 OF 2007 10.09.2008