Jharkhand High Court
Raghuveer Son Of Sri Udal Singh vs The Union Of India on 13 October, 2023
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 3041 of 2018
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Raghuveer son of Sri Udal Singh, resident of Vijaypura, PO PS
Banmor, District Morena (Madhya Pradesh).
... Petitioner
-versus-
1. The Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, North
Block, Raisina Hills, PO PS & District New Delhi, through its
Secretary.
2. The Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force, Ministry
of Home Affairs, East Division Headquarter, Boring Road, PO PS
Boring Road, District Patna.
3. The Deputy Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force,
Ministry of Home Affairs, CISF Unit, Lalpania, PO PS Lalpania,
District Bokaro.
4. The Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, Ministry of
Home Affairs, CISF Unit, CTPS, Chandrapura, PO PS Chandrapura,
District Bokaro.
... Respondents
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CORAM : SRI JUSTICE ANANDA SEN
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Pandey Niraj Rai, Advocate
Mr. Rohit Ranjan Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Akshansh Kishor, Advocate
Mr. Saurabh Sagar, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Madan Prasad, C.G.C.
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ORDER
RESERVED ON 17.01.2023 PRONOUNCED ON 13.10.2023 The petitioner in the present writ petition has challenged the order dated 04.02.2012 passed by Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, (CISF) Unit, Chandrapura by which the petitioner has been terminated from the service. He also challenged the appellate order dated 03.07.2012 of by Inspector General / ES, CISF whereby his appeal stood rejected.
2. Petitioner was appointed as Constable / GD No 107361165 in CISF on 02.03.2010 who completed his training successfully at RTC Deoli, State of Rajasthan and later on posted at CISF Unit, Chandrapura. As the petitioner had concealed the factual information in attestation form regarding previous criminal case against him, considering the gravity of such suppression, Commandant, CISF Unit CTPS Chandrapura vide letter No V- 15099/ Misc/ CTPS/ 2012-1235 dated 04.04.2012 terminated the services of the petitioner in accordance with Rule 25(2) of CISF Rules, 2001 with one month pay and allowances. Being aggrieved by such termination, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 07.05.2012 before the Appellate Authority 2 praying therein to set-aside the termination order. However, vide order dated 03.07.2012 the Appellate Authority has rejected the appeal, affirming the dismissal.
3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner's service was terminated without disclosing the reasons and without complying the provisions of Rule 25(2) of CISF rule, 2001, which prescribes for at least one month's notice. He further submits that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before issuing order of termination. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that earlier the petitioner was falsely implicated in a criminal case in which he was acquitted on merits but he admits that under bonafide understanding, he did not disclose the factum of prosecution in the attestation form for his candidature for appointment in CISF, but in the form had informed about his arrest.
4. Counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioner has not approached the Hon'ble Court with clean hands and has suppressed the material facts in a distorted manner. He submits that petitioner while submitting his candidature for appointment in CISF has submitted an attestation form on 19.02.2010 in which he did not disclose the fact that he was prosecuted in a case being Banmor Crime No 234/2006 registered on 17.09.2006 for offence punishable under Sections 327, 323/34, 324/34, 341, 394, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but the same came to light only during verification. He further submits that the petitioner has willfully concealed the factual information by ignoring the instructions given in the attestation form, thus has rendered himself unfit for continuation in service in CISF. Hence the commandant CISF Unit, Chandrapura vide letter dated 04.04.2012 terminated the services of the petitioner in accordance with Rule 25(2) of CISF Rule, 2001 after giving one month's pay and allowances.
5. Having heard both the parties and after going through the record, I find that in the attestation form, which is at page 47 of the writ petition. In column No. 12 the candidate had to disclose about any prosecution, arrest or conviction against him which he had to answer in "Yes/No" in questionnaire form by putting a mark. The petitioner in the said column had accepted the arrest and prosecution and denied his conviction. In the said column there was a clause that "If the answer of any of the question is affirmative, the candidate has to give full particulars of his arrest, prosecution, and conviction etc. at the time of filling of this form". Admittedly the petitioner has not submitted the full particulars which were required to be given. Thus, there is a suppression on 3 the part of the petitioner, as knowing fully well about the case, he did not gave the details.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs Union of India &Ors reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471 has held as follows:-
32. No doubt about it that once verification form requires certain information to be furnished, declarant is duty-
bound to furnish it correctly and any suppression of material facts or submitting false information, may by itself lead to termination of his services or cancellation of candidature in an appropriate case. However, in a criminal case incumbent has not been acquitted and case is pending trial, employer may well be justified in not appointing such an incumbent or in terminating the services as conviction ultimately may render him unsuitable for job and employer is not supposed to wait till outcome of criminal case. In such a case non-disclosure or submitting false information would assume significance and that by itself may be ground for employer to cancel candidature or to terminate services.
34. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.
In the said judgment [Avtar Singh (supra)] at paragraph 30, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held as follows: -
30. The employer is given "discretion" to terminate or otherwise to condone the omission. Even otherwise, once employer has the power to take a decision when at the time of filling verification form declarant has already been convicted/acquitted, in such a case, it becomes obvious that all the facts and attending circumstances, including impact of suppression or false information are taken into consideration while adjudging suitability of an incumbent for services in question. In case the employer comes to the conclusion that suppression is immaterial and even if facts would have been disclosed it would not have adversely affected fitness of an incumbent, for reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse. However, while doing so employer has to act prudently on due consideration of nature of post and duties to be rendered.
For higher officials/higher posts, standard has to be very high and even slightest false information or suppression may by itself render a person unsuitable for the post. However, same standard cannot be applied to each and every post. In concluded criminal cases, it has to be seen what has been suppressed is material fact and would have rendered an incumbent unfit for appointment. An employer would be justified in not appointing or if appointed, to terminate services of such incumbent on due consideration of various aspects. Even if disclosure has been made truthfully, the employer has the right to consider fitness and while doing so effect of conviction 4 and background facts of case, nature of offence, etc. have to be considered. Even if acquittal has been made, employer may consider nature of offence, whether acquittal is honourable or giving benefit of doubt on technical reasons and decline to appoint a person who is unfit or of dubious character. In case employer comes to conclusion that conviction or ground of acquittal in criminal case would not affect the fitness for employment, incumbent may be appointed or continued in service.
Further, at paragraph 31 of the said judgment [Avtar Singh (supra)], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: -
Coming to the question whether an employee on probation can be discharged/refused appointment though he has been acquitted of the charge(s), if his case was not pending when form was filled, in such matters, employer is bound to consider grounds of acquittal and various other aspects, overall conduct of employee including the accusations which have been leveled. If on verification, the antecedents are otherwise also not found good, and in number of cases incumbent is involved then notwithstanding acquittals in a case/cases, it would be open to the employer to form opinion as to fitness on the basis of material on record. In case offence is petty in nature and committed at young age, such as stealing a bread, shouting of slogans or is such which does not involve moral turpitude, cheating, misappropriation, etc. or otherwise not a serious or heinous offence and accused has been acquitted in such a case when verification form is filled, employer may ignore lapse of suppression or submitting false information in appropriate cases on due consideration of various aspects.
7. In the instant case, the petitioner herein was acquitted on 25th February, 2009 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muraina (Madhya Pradesh) in Criminal Case No.5551 of 2006. The judgment of acquittal has been brought on record. The ground for acquittal is that even the complainant and others did not support the prosecution case. The Attestation Form was filled up on 19.02.2010, i.e., much after the acquittal. Be it noted that in the Attestation Form, in one column where he was asked "whether he was arrested or not", he has mentioned "yes". He also mentioned that he was prosecuted, but he did not give the details of the prosecution case in which he was acquitted. It is also an admitted fact that there was no other case against him, save and except the criminal case mentioned above in which he was acquitted.
8. Thus, I am of the opinion that in the case of the petitioner, observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 31 of the judgment in the case of [Avtar Singh (supra)] would be applicable. Since the offence alleged against the petitioner in which he was acquitted, does not involve any moral turpitude and is not heinous in nature and also since he has 5 been acquitted much before his appointment, the respondents should have considered the nature of offence, his conduct during his service and the grounds of acquittal and the accusation also and should have considered the case of the petitioner accordingly. Be it noted that as per aforesaid judgment, there is a scope of condonation by the employer. The impugned order of dismissal / termination suggests that there was no such consideration at all.
The effect of acquittal and the nature of the case and whether it is absolutely necessary to remove the petitioner keeping in view the acquittal and the allegations, has also not been considered. His conduct during the service tenure has not also been considered
9. Thus, in view of what has been held above, following the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (Supra), I hereby set aside the order dated 04.02.2012 passed by the Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, (CISF) Unit, Chandrapura as also the consequent appellate order dated 03.07.2012 passed by the Inspector General / ES, CISF, and remit the matter to the Disciplinary Authority, i.e., respondent No.4 to reconsider the case of the petitioner in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) within 8 (eight) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is expected that the respondents shall pass an appropriate speaking and reasoned order and communicate the same to the petitioner. Setting aside the punishment order and the appellate order in this case by this judgment will not amount to reinstatement of the petitioner. The same will depend upon the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
10. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this writ petition stands allowed.
(Ananda Sen, J.) Kumar/Cp-02