Madras High Court
M/S.Ucal Fuel Systems Limited vs The Principal Labour Court on 7 August, 2012
Author: N.Paul Vasanthakumar
Bench: N.Paul Vasanthakumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 07-08-2012 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR Writ Petition No.16326 of 2012 M.P.Nos.1, 2, 3 of 2012 M/s.UCAL Fuel Systems Limited, rep.by its Chief Security Officer, N. Rajendran, Raheja Towers, Delta Wing, Unit 705, 177 Anna Salai, Chennai 600 002. .. Petitioner Vs. 1. The Principal Labour Court, Chennai 600 104. 2. M/s.Bharat Technologies Auto Components Ltd., Raheja Towers (7th Floor), Beta Wing, Unit 708, 177 Anna Salai, Chennai 600 002. 3. Hosur Bharat Technologies Auto Components Employees Union, (5/KR1) rep.by its Secretary, 3 Kamaraj Colony, 3rd Cross, Hosur 635 109. 4. The Management of Sundaram Auto Components Ltd., (Frames Division), Plot No.1, T.V.S.Industrial Estate, Harita, Hosur 635 109. 5. The Management of Thai Summit Neel Auto (P) Ltd., Plot Nos.1 & 6, T.V.S.Industrial Estate, Harita, Hosur 635 109. .. Respondents Prayer: This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying this Court to issue a writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the first respondent in I.A.No.15/2012 in I.D.No.279/2009, order dated 19.6.2012 and quash the same. For Petitioner : Mr.AL.Somayaji, Sr.Counsel for Mr.T.K.Bhaskar For Respondents 1 & 2 : Mr.S.Vaidyanathan For 3rd Respondent : Mr.V.Prakash, Sr.Counsel, for Mr.P.Chandrasekaran For Respondents 4 & 5 : Mr.Karthik for M/s.T.S.Gopalan & Co. O R D E R
The petitioner, who is not a party in I.D.No.279 of 2009 and I.A.No.15/2012 on the file of the Principal Labour Court, Chennai, has challenged the order made in I.A.No.15 of 2012 dated 19.6.2012 by raising a preliminary contention that the Labour Court, without issuing notice of hearing to the petitioner, has passed an order in the said I.A., appointing an Advocate-Commissioner to visit the petitioner's premises on 23.6.2012, after giving notice by the counsel and parties in the interlocutory application.
2. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Labour Court without impleading and hearing the petitioner appears to have viewed that the petitioner Company is running its unit by allegedly closing the second respondent Company, who is the petitioner in I.A.No.15 of 2012 and running the Industry in a bogus manner by prima facie accepting the contention of the third respondent Employees' Union, who raised the I.D., and ordered the Advocate Commissioner to visit two places of the petitioner Company one at Maraimalainagar and another at Ambattur, to take inventory of movables and immovable properties situated in the said addresses; directing the Employees of the Management to produce copies of the list of Employees' name and address in both the premises; file a statement with regard to the nature of work carried out in both the premises, if necessary, by recording evidence, interrogating any person therein in respect of the subject matter of the warrant and also record their statements; and to file the name of the company, list of Directors and shareholders, if any, in both the addresses. The learned Senior counsel submitted that the said order having serious consequences on the petitioner Company, without issuing notice and giving opportunity of hearing and not even making the petitioner as party, the Labour Court ought not to have allowed the interlocutory application. The learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the third respondent Union opposed the application before the Labour Court contending that the inspection would serve no purpose and the stand taken before this Court by the third respondent is inconsistent.
3. The learned Senior Counsel also raised contentions on merits. However, for the purpose of deciding this writ petition relating to the order in I.A.No.15 of 2012 dated 19.6.2012, the merits of the contentions raised need not be traversed.
4. The learned Senior Counsel for the third respondent Union relying on the counter affidavit submitted that the alleged closure of the second respondent Unit at Maraimalainagar is not a genuine closure, but a bogus closure, and the machineries were taken from Maraimalainagar to the premises of UCAL Fuel Systems Limited and UCAL Products Private Limited, where the second respondent is continuing manufacturing activity. The Directors and shareholders of UCAL Fuel Systems Limited, UCAL Products Private Limited and Bharat Technology Auto Components Limited are same. In order to find out the real facts, the Labour Court exercised its discretion and ordered the interlocutory application and the order having been passed in IA, the writ petition filed is not maintainable at this stage.
5. The learned counsel for the second respondent, who filed IA before the Labour Court, justified the order passed by the Labour Court, contending that by merely inspecting the petitioner's premises, no right of the petitioner is going to be affected and before passing award, petitioner would be heard. The learned counsel also relied on Rule 42 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, to substantiate his contentions.
6. I have considered the rival submissions of the respective parties.
7. The issue arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the Labour court was justified in ordering I.A.No.15 of 2012 for inspecting the premises at E-16, Industrial complex, Maraimalai Nagar, and 11B/1, First Cross Road, Ambattur Industrial Estate, Chennai-58, without issuing notice or hearing the petitioner.
8. The Labour Court is entitled to find out the truth regarding the contentions of the third respondent Union for adjudication i.e, whether the closure of the second respondent Unit at Maraimalainagar is the genuine closure, or a bogus closure. Petitioner as well as the second respondent are contending that the closure is a genuine closure. The said fact being disputed by the petitioner and second respondent, before passing the order in IA, the Labour court ought to have directed the petitioner in IA to implead the writ petitioner herein as party respondent. By impleading and hearing the writ petitioner before passing any order in IA, this situation could have been avoided, which according to the third respondent is only to drag on the proceedings.
9. Rules 42 and 43 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Dispute Rules, 1958 are the relevant Rules, which read as follows:-
" Rule 42. Power of entry and inspection.- A Conciliation Officer, a Board or Court, or any member thereof, or a Labour Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrator or any person authorised in writing by the Conciliation Officer, Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator in this behalf may, for the purpose of any conciliation, investigation, enquiry or adjudication entrusted to the Conciliation Officer, Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrator under the Act, at any time between the hours of sunrise and sunset, and in the case of a person authorised in writing by a Conciliation Officer, Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrator after he has given reasonable notice, enter any building, factory, workshop, or other place or premises whatsoever, and inspect the same or any work, machinery, appliance or article therein or interrogate any person therein in respect of anything situated therein or any matter relevant to the subject matter of the conciliation, investigation, enquiry and adjudication.
Rule.43. Power of Courts, Boards, Labour Courts and Tribunals.- (1) In addition to the powers conferred by sub-sec.(3) of Section 11, the provisions of Order XI in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), in so far as they relate to the appearance of plaintiffs and defendants in suits, shall apply to the appearance of parties in the proceedings before a Court, Board, Labour Court or Tribunal.
(2) A Court, Board, Labour Court or Tribunal may summon and examine suo moto any person whose evidence appears to it to be material and it shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act V of 1898)."
10. Rule 42 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, empowers the Labour Court etc., to order inspection by giving reasonable notice, enter any building, factory or workshop or other place or premises, etc., relevant to the subject matter of the investigation, enquiry or adjudication. The said rule nowhere exclude the application of principles of natural justice. The finding of truth is the duty of the Labour Court for adjudication of the issue, as held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 2012 SC 1727 (Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria). In paragraphs 31 to 33, it is held as follows:-
" 31. ...., the Court's serious endeavour has to be to find out where in fact the truth lies. The truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial process.
32. Truth alone has to be the foundation of justice. The entire judicial system has been created only to discern and find out the real truth. Judges at all levels have to seriously engage themselves in the journey of discovering the truth. That is their mandate, obligation and bounden duty.
33. Justice system will acquire credibility only when people will be convinced that justice is based on the foundation of the truth."
However, for ascertaining the truth, the parties are to be heard and without hearing the party, who is likely to be affected, trying to find out the truth may not be proper as the same will lead to non-complying with the principles of natural justice. Rule 43 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Dispute Rules, 1958 empowers the Labour to summon and examine suo moto any person whose evidence appears to be material.
11. From the above said statutory provisions, it is evident that the Labour Court is expected to summon and examine the petitioner whose evidence if appears material for the determination of the issues. Though at a later point of time also the petitioner could be summoned in the light of the objections and contentions raised in the affidavit, I am of the view that the Labour Court is bound to summon the petitioner before deciding the I.A. Even at the preliminary stage, there is no prohibition in issuing summons. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 2011 (2) SCC 258 (Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Assn., v. Designated Authority) can be cited for the above proposition. In paragraphs 80 and 81, it is held thus:
" 80. It is thus, well settled that unless a statutory provision, either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences which obviously cover infraction of property, personal rights and material deprivations for the party affected. The principle holds good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or Tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. It is equally trite that the concept of natural justice can neither be put in a straitjacket nor is it a general rule of universal application.
81. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. As stated above, the question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basis scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power. It is only upon a consideration of these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined.(See Union of India v. Col.J.N.Sinha)"
12. On the above reasons i.e, not summoning the writ petitioner herein while hearing the I.A.No.15 of 2012 in the above ID., and also on the ground that the petitioner was not heard before the inspection was ordered, I am of the view that the principles of natural justice is violated by the Labour Court and therefore the order of the Labour Court made in I.A.No.15 of 2012 dated 19.6.2012 cannot be sustained. As I am setting aside the order made in IA only on the said limited grounds, I am not traversing the merits of the contentions raised by the petitioner and the contesting respondents.
13. In the result, the order in I.A.No.15 of 2012 dated 19.6.2012 is set aside and I.A.No.15 of 2012 in I.D.No.279 of 2009 is restored and remitted to the Principal Labour Court, Chennai, to consider the issue afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner herein, before passing orders on merits. The second respondent in I.D.No.279 of 2009, who filed I.A.No.15 of 2012 is directed to file petition to implead the writ petitioner herein as party respondent in I.D.No.279 of 2009 and I.A.No.15 of 2012, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order and the Principal Labour Court is directed to pass fresh orders, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
vr To The Principal Labour Court Chennai 600 104