Delhi District Court
Dheeraj Gupta vs Megha Chhabra on 13 May, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-000405-2024
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 15/2024
DHEERAJ GUPTA,
S/o. Shri. Vijay Gupta,
R/o. 177, Ground Floor,
Gyaan Khand-3, Indirapuram,
Ghaziabad, UP-201014. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
MEGHA CHHABRA,
W/o. Dheeraj Gupta, D/o. Anil Chhabra,
R/o. 56/3, Second Floor,
Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi-110060,
Also at; 31, River City Apartment no. 1110,
Jersey City, NJ-07310. ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 09.01.2024
Date of institution : 11.01.2024
Date when judgment was reserved : 13.02.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 13.05.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the 'DV Act') against the common order dated 02.12.2023 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned order'), passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court)-01/Ld. MM (Mahila Court)-01, Central, Tis Hazari Court (hereafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM'), in case titled as; 'Megha Chhabra v. Dheeraj Gupta, Case Regn. No. 1420/2022', PS. Rajinder Nagar, determining the application moved by the respondent, seeking directions against/to the appellant to sign the documents for renewal of passport of the minor son of the respondent and the appellant as well as CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 1 of 34 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:25:35 +0530 application moved by/on behalf of the appellant under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC'). Pertinently, by virtue of the said order/impugned order, Ld. Trial Court, while dismissing the application of the appellant under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, allowed the application of the respondent and directed the appellant to sign the documents pertaining to the renewal of passport of the minor child.
2. Succinctly, the facts leading to the filing of the instant appeals are that the respondent initiated a proceeding under DV Act, by filing an application/petition under Section 12 of DV Act before the Ld. Trial Court. Markedly, in her said application, the respondent inter alia asserted that in the month of August 2012, she joined Colt Technology Services Group Ltd., where she met with the appellant, who was working there since December 2011. As per the respondent, since both she and the appellant were working in the same team, their bond developed and of eight months of courtship, marriage proposal between the two ensued. Consequently, on 22.07.2013 roka ceremony of the respondent and the appellant was performed. However, as per the respondent, soon thereafter, the appellant and his family member started subjecting her as well as her family members for demands in form of money, furniture, jewellery, etc. Soon thereafter, as per the respondent, the appellant and his family members continued to subject the respondent as well as her family members for demand of dowry, which the respondent and her family members were constrained to meet. It was further asserted that all the articles/ stridhan articles given to the respondent at the time of her engagement were taken by the appellant's family members under the pretext that the same would be returned later on. Correspondingly, it was proclaimed CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 2 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:25:40 +0530 under the said complaint by the respondent that her father/family spent a sum of around Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) in cash, in her engagement ceremony and another sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs only) in the respondent's and appellant's marriage, which was solemnised on 13.11.2013 at Vatika Banquet, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi, as per Hindu rites, ceremonies and customs. As per the respondent, soon after marriage, she was subjected to harassment, ridicule and taunts/threats at the behest of/in the hands of the appellant and his family members. As per the respondent, after some days of marriage, respondent's in-laws/relatives of the appellant started harassing her, besides instigated the appellant, leading to the appellant taking out all his vengeance on the respondent by subjecting her to physical and verbal abuse. Correspondingly, the respondent proclaimed that when the appellant decided to shift to Gurugram on the pretext that it was getting difficult for him to commute to his work, the appellant's relatives hurled abuses on the respondent, accusing her of brainwashing the appellant. The complaint further records that the respondent was subjected to persistent demands for money by the appellant as well as his family members, besides her stridhan articles were taken over by the family members of the appellant. Concomitantly, as per the respondent, the appellant even subjected her as well as her family members to purchase a house for him as well as to pay majority of EMI against such purchase. It is further the case of the respondent that the appellant used to harass the respondent for his fertility issues, besides subjected her to extreme cruelty by breaking household articles and in the month of July 2016, even tried to strangulate respondent's neck so as to compel her to fulfil unreasonable monetary demands of the appellant. The complaint CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 3 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:25:44 +0530 further chronicles that even during the respondent's pregnancy, she was imperilled with emotional, verbal and physical abuse in the hands of the appellant. Subsequently, in the month of June 2017, the appellant as well as the respondent are asserted to have shifted to USA for the job of the respondent, however, the appellant is proclaimed to have not deterred in his behavior. As per the complainant, their minor child was born on 15.03.2018, however, the appellant is asserted to have not mended his ways, rather, is avowed to have continued to subject the respondent as well as her mother, who was taking care of the minor child, to verbal abuses. The respondent further proclaimed that on 01.12.2019, the respondent, appellant and their minor child landed in India, however, immediately on such landing, she/respondent was subjected to harassment/abuse in the hand of the appellant at the airport. Consequently, the respondent is avowed to have stayed at her parental house as the appellant cut all his contacts with her and even refused to permit to enter his house. Subsequently, constrained by the conduct of the appellant, the respondent is stated to have filed a complaint at CAW Cell in March 2021, leading to the registration of FIR at PS Kamla Market. Correspondingly, as aforenoted, under such facts and circumstances, the respondent moved the instant/said application under Section 12 DV Act for seeking reliefs, inter alia envisaged under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of DV Act. Correspondingly, the wife also moved an application under Section 23 of DV Act, seeking interim reliefs.
2.1. Notably, upon such complaint being filed, Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 01.09.2022, called for Domestic Incident Report (hereinafter referred to as 'DIR') to be filed through concerned protection officer, besides issued notice to the appellant.
CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 4 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:25:48 +0530
Subsequently, on receipt of DIR and on the appellant's entering appearance as well as filing his reply on the petition/pending applications, matter was listed for consideration on 07.11.2022. Subsequently, the respondent moved an application under Section 23 DV Act seeking directions against the appellant to executed passport documents of minor child, while the appellant moved an application under Section 21 of DV Act for visitation and periodical custody rights of minor child. Thereafter, another application for seeking directions against the appellant for executing passport documents of minor child was moved by the respondent, while the appellant moved an application under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, challenging the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court. Consequently, during the course of proceedings before Ld. Trial Court, the appellant and the respondent filed their respective replies/arguments on the said application and upon completion of such pleadings, arguments were addressed by/on behalf of the appellant and the respondent before the Ld. Trial Court on the pending applications. As aforenoted, upon conclusion of the said arguments, the Ld. Trial Court, vide impugned order/order dated 02.12.2023, while dismissing the application of the appellant under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, allowed the said application of the respondent and directed the appellant to sign the documents pertaining to the renewal of the minor child. Apposite in this regard to reproduce the relevant extracts from the impugned order/order dated 02.12.2023 of the Ld. Trial Court, as under;
"...Record perused.
After perusal of the record, this court is of the view that the object and aim of the Act is to provide more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 5 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.05.13 16:25:52 +0530 for matter connected therewith or incidental thereto. A plain reading of Section 27 of PWDV Act makes it clear that the petition under the D.V. Act can be filed in a court where a person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed.
In the present case, it is alleged by the Ld. Counsel for complainant that after separation from respondent no. 1, complainant came back to her parental home and accordingly, she is permanent resident of 56/3, 2nd floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi, as shown in her Aadhar Card, and temporarily she resides in USA for job purpose along with her minor son, and when the present complaint was filed, then also, she was permanent resident of 56/3, 2nd floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi. As the Ld. Counsel for complainant has prima facie shown the jurisdiction of this court, this court deems it fit to try the present matter. The judgments relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 1 are found not relevant in the present case as the same are distinguished based on facts and circumstances of the present case and they are dealing with temporary jurisdiction of the complainant. Accordingly, the application under Order 7 Rule 10 r/w 151 CPC moved on behalf of respondent no. 1 stands dismissed and disposed of accordingly. Further, with regard to the application of the Ld. Counsel for complainant for seeking direction to respondent no.1 to sign documents for renewal of passport of minor son of complainant namely Varenya Gupta, this court is of the considered opinion that as the presence of the complainant is required to proceed in the present case and the complainant cannot travel without her minor child, hence, in the interest of justice, the application of the complainant seeking direction to respondent no.1 to provide the signed document for renewal of passport of minor son, stands allowed as the same is quintessential for the just decision of the present case. Accordingly, respondent no.1 is directed to sign the documents pertaining to the renewal of the passport of the minor child. Further, complainant is directed to appear before the court along with the minor child on the next date of hearing. Now, be put up on 05.03.2024 for further proceedings..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.2. Noticeably, as per the appellant the facts stated in the instant applications are false and concocted. On the contrary, the CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 6 of 34 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:25:56 +0530 appellant outrightly asserted that the respondent herself left the company of the appellant and despite repeated endeavors on the part of the appellant, respondent has refused to resume cohabitation. As per the appellant, the nuptial bond between the parties was tried with the consent of families of both, the appellant as well as the respondent, besides the wedding ceremony and other functions were undertaken at the wishes of the respondent/respondent's family. It was further proclaimed by the appellant that he entered into the matrimonial bliss to attain love, affection and support along with lifelong of companionship with the respondent, besides the appellants' family welcomed the respondent into their home with love, care and affection. However, it is asserted that immediately after the marriage, the respondent revealed her actual inclination as well as started pressurizing, harassing and emotionally blackmailing the appellant to leave his parental house. The appellant further avowed that even the respondent's nature was indecent, quarrelsome, indecorous and rude since the inception of their marriage. Correspondingly, as per the appellant in April 2014, the respondent succeeded in her ulterior motive to get, the appellant separated from his old-aged parents. Consequently, the appellant started living separately from his old-aged parents in Gurgaon, under the compulsion of respondent and to salvage his married life. At that point in time, as per the appellant, the respondent took all her sridhan articles with her, while she moved to Gurugram in April 2014 along with the entire furniture of the petitioner room and other household things, etc. However, due to complete disregard shown by the respondent as well as owing to such separation, the appellant's mother is asserted to have started facing severe health issues. In fact, it is the appellant's case that he was not even allowed/permitted by the CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 7 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:00 +0530 respondent to meet his aged parents. On the contrary, the respondent, in order to coerce as well as falsely implicate him in a case, used to scream at the gate that she was being subjected to harassment/abuse in the hands of the appellant. Synchronously, as per the appellant, the respondent used to act aggressively over an argument with the appellant over petty issues and on several occasions, is proclaimed to have slapped the appellant. The appellant also avowed that the respondent even induced him to sift and settle abroad in countries like Canada, USA, etc., and in the month of June 2017, the respondent managed to get internal job transfer from American Express India to American Express New York, USA. Subsequently, as per the appellant, the respondent forced the appellant to quit his job and to shift to USA. The appellant further declared that upon the birth of their child on 15.03.2018, the respondent taunted the appellant that he was an impotent and even kicked the appellant out of their house in USA on 21.03.2018. As per the respondent, on 01.12.2019, when they visited India, to attend marriage of respondent's cousin, the respondent started abusing and misbehaving with the appellant's parents and did not even allow them to meet their grandson. The appellant further asserted that while the respondent kept assuring him of return, however, clandestinely and unlawfully took their child to USA on 28.12.2019, without informing about the same to appellant. Correspondingly, as per the appellant, respondent left the appellant in a pre-planned manner and registered a false and fabricated case against him/the appellant and his family members, with an intention to harass them as well as malign their reputation and standing in the society.
3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on surmises and CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 8 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:03 +0530 conjectures, oblivious of the correct facts and the circumstances of the present case as well as, unmindful of the settled law governing the field of grant of interim maintenance. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, impugned order is arbitrary, illegal and perverse, having been passed by the Ld. Trial Court in a cursory manner, overlooking the material placed on record. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order suffers from manifest error of law, which is apparent on face of record, which has resulted in severe miscarriage of justice, hence, is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. It was further asserted that the impugned order is patently based on extraneous consideration and as such, is totally premised on concocted stories set up by the respondent, without demonstrating any proof thereof. In this regard, Ld. Counsel vehemently asserted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the respondent, illegally and without prior consent and/or knowledge of the appellant, took their minor child away from the custody of the appellant and further, the respondent restrained the minor child from interacting with the appellant, demonstrating gross malafide on the part of the respondent in depriving the appellant of his parental rights and duties towards the minor child. Ergo, under such circumstances, the order/direction passed by the Ld. Trial Court, encumbering the appellant to execute the passport documents of the minor child are perverse and liable to be set aside. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court, while passing the said direction, failed to consider that it was devoid of jurisdiction to encumber the appellant to execute the documents, as otherwise directed. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the respondent preferred a vague application(s) before the Ld. Trial Court, without specifying any enabling provision or relevant Sections of law or specifying the source of power, which CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 9 of 34 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:08 +0530 empowers the Ld. Trial Court to pass such order/direction(s). In this regard, it was fervently asserted that the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court is limited to the relief, as envisaged under Sections 17- 23 thereof and not for encumbering the appellant to execute documents, as otherwise directed under the impugned order. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to record that the respondent filed several/frivolous applications for the same relief, which is nothing but an endeavour to harass the appellant and to waste the precious judicial time. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the respondent has no intention of returning to India and has been filing such frivolous applications, solely to arm twist and harass the appellant. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the said application is grossly misconceived and even the respondent misled the Ld. Trial Court by asserting that such documents are necessary for continued stay of their minor child in USA, despite the fact that the said child is a US citizen. 3.1. Learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court further failed to consider that it is devoid of jurisdiction to try the complaint/petition/application under Section 12 DV Act, preferred by the respondent. In this regard, Ld. Counsel argued that the Ld. Trial Court, erroneously passed an order dated 02.12.2023/impugned order, dismissing the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, preferred by the appellant. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the fact that the respondent is neither a temporary nor a permanent resident, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, neither the respondent resides or carries on business nor is she employed, within territorial jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, no cause of action arose CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 10 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:12 +0530 within the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court, as no act of cruelty has been alleged by the respondent, to have been committed by any of the appellant or his family members, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court. As per the Ld. Counsel, even at the time of filing of the instant complaint, the respondent was working and residing in USA. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the instant complaint was preferred by the respondent's mother (as SPA Holder), before the Ld. Trial Court, where such SPA Holder was based, solely to harass the appellant and his family members. Ergo, Ld. Counsel reiterated that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the fact that that the respondent wrongly invoked the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court, as the residence of SPA Holder does not confer jurisdiction under DV Act. Accordingly, as per the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, the respondent is not entitled to any relief or indulgence, as sought for and the impugned order deserves to be set aside, for the reasons, as aforementioned. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Smt. Parvati Kumari & Ors. v. State of U.P., through Principal Secretary, Misc. Bench No. 13419/2018, dated 09.01.2019 (Hon'ble Allahabad High Court); and Afia Rasheed Khan v. Dr. Mazharuddin Ali Khan, WP No. 4184/2021, dated 25.11.2021 (Hon'ble Bombay HC).
4. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for respondent submitted that impugned order suffers with no illegality and/or impropriety, being passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of all the settled judicial precedents as well as being wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. As per the Ld. Counsel, not only is the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period of limitation, rather, the appellant has himself admitted the address of the respondent, being the permanent address of the respondent at 56/3, CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 11 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:16 +0530 2nd floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi, within the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further asserted that the said permanent address of the respondent is specified under her Aadhar Card, marriage certificate and even the passport of the respondent. Ld. Counsel further submitted that while the appellant and his family members have repeated accentuated in need/necessity of respondent's physical presence in India, including in a proceeding before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, on the other hand, the appellant is deliberately refusing to sign the passport documents of their minor child. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the respondent's parents are old and there is no surety of their life/death and even on the occurrence of any untoward incident, the respondent would not be in a position to return to India, considering the blatant disregard of the directions of the Ld. Trial Court by the appellant. As per the Ld. Counsel, the present proceedings have been initiated solely to harass the respondent as well as to further pressurize/humiliate her. Even otherwise, Ld. Counsel asserted that the appellant has misdirected this Court by concocting false and frivolous facts, to prejudice this Court to grant a favourable order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court was well within his jurisdiction/power to pass order, directing the appellant to execute the passport documents of the minor child in view of the provisions under Sections 2/3 and Section 28(2) of DV Act read with Rule 8 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the 'DV Rules'). Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, even the order directing dismissal of the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of the settled judicial precedents as well as the facts of the present case. Ergo, Ld. CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 12 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:20 +0530 Counsel entreated that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed as misconceived and frivolous. In support of the said contentions, reliance has been placed upon the decisions in; Shyamlal Devda & Ors. v. Parimala, AIR 2020 SC 762; Vijay Kumar Gupta & Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi), WP (Crl.) 3155/2023, dated 19.09.2024 (Hon'ble DHC); and Vikram v. Vrushali & Prs., 2023 (2) Bom.CR(Crl.) 884.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant and that of Ld. Counsel for the respondent have been heard and the record(s), including the Trial Court Record(s), written submissions/written arguments as well as case laws filed by/relied upon by the parties have been thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the merits of the present case, this Court deems it apposite to deal with the application/prayer for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. In this regard, it is outrightly noted that against the impugned order dated 02.12.2023, the present appeal was after about delay of about 5 (five) days. Notably, in the application for condonation of delay, the reason for said delay is specified as the appellant's unawareness of the passing of the impugned order and its ramification, as well as of the legal recourse available against the same. In particular, it is specified under the said application that the impugned order was passed on 02.12.2023. However, as per the Ld. Counsel, the appellant was not aware of the actual reasoning of the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order and the same was brought to the attention of the appellant only after a certified copy of the judgment was obtained by the appellant on 16.12.2023. Thereafter, the appellant is asserted to have contacted the counsel as well as duly and diligently filed the instant appeal through on 09.01.2024, however, in the said process delay ensued CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 13 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:25 +0530 in filing of the same. Notably, during the course of arguments, Ld. Counsel for the appellant, while supplementing the said contentions, vehemently contended that the delay in preferring the present appeal was accentuated by the fact that the appellant is not legally educated and unaware of the limitation period in preferring the appeal. Even otherwise, it was asserted by the Ld. Counsel that the delay in preferring the appeal was neither deliberate nor intentional and that in case the delay in preferring the present appeal is not condoned, grave and irreparable loss would accrue upon the appellant, whist, no loss/damage would be caused to the respondent, in case the prayer, as sought for is granted. Needless to mention here, Ld. Counsel for the respondent sternly objected to the said prayer for condonation on the ground that considering the period of delay in filing the present appeal, no relaxation/indulgence may be granted in favour of the appellant herein, besides the conduct of the appellant is such that disentitles the appellant to seek any indulgence/leave from this Court.
7. Ergo, in light of the foregoing and before delving into the arguments addressed before this Court on the aspect of delay, it would be relevant to make a reference to Section 29 of DV Act, which provides, "...there shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later" . Clearly, from the said provision, it is noted that the limitation period of preferring an appeal against the order of magistrate under the said enactment/DV Act, is a period of thirty days from the date on which such an order is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later. However, it is further incumbent to refer to the provisions under Section 29(2) of CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 14 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:29 +0530 the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Limitation Act'), which provides as under;
"29. Savings-(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule , the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law..."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Strikingly, a conscientious and conjoint perusal of the aforesaid provision demonstrates that though, DV Act provides for no specific provisions for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal against the order of a magistrate, however, by virtue of the provisions under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, provisions under the said enactment/Limitation Act, in particular, provisions under Section 4 to 24 of the said enactment shall continue to apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are no excluded by DV Act/such special or local law. Clearly, under such circumstances, this Court unambiguously records that the delay in preferring such an appeal can be condoned in terms of the provisions under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on demonstration of sufficient cause to the court. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in K.M. Revanasiddeshwara v. K.M. Shylaja, MANU/KA/0236/2012, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka explicated the law in respect of the foregoing, as under;
"17. Therefore, it is clear that Sub-section (3) of Section 29 only bars the application of the provisions of the said Act in respect of any law relating to marriage and divorce. Since the matter relating to CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 15 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:32 +0530 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, has not been included in Sub-section (3) of the said Act, the question of provisions of the Limitation Act. not being applicable to the proceedings before the lower appellate court and the question of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act also not being maintainable in respect of the appeal preferred under the Domestic Violence Act therefore cannot arise.
18. The lower appellate court committed serious error in rejecting the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay . It is a different matter, whether the petitioner has made out a case for condonation of delay or not, but i.e., not a ground to hold that the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act itself is not maintainable. Since, a reading of the provisions contained in the Domestic Violence Act does not bar the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act in respect of the appeal, the view taken by the court below cannot be sustained in law."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Reverting now to the relevant legal provision, in particular that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this Court reiterates that the said provision inter alia provides for condonation of delay/extension of prescribed period in certain cases on demonstration of 'sufficient cause', which term(s)/words have been repeated asserted by superior courts to be elastic and liberally construed, in the interest of justice in a given case. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while painstakingly collating the guiding principles governing the exercise of court's power to condone delay as well as the meaning of the said words, enunciated as under;
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 16 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:36 +0530 courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.
That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 17 of 34 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:40 +0530 founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Unmistakably, the rules of limitation, which are premised on the principles enshrined in a Latin maxim, 'interest reipublicae up sit finis litium1', are designed not to destroy the legal rights of parties, rather, to ensure that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics. Ergo, considering the objective of the law and further being wary of the fact that there is no presumption under law that the delay in approaching courts was deliberate, courts 2 have repetitively professed for adoption of a pragmatic, justice- oriented approach, in variance to, technical interpretation, while 1 It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation.
2J.M. Ramachandra & Sons v. Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1082.
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13
16:26:45 +0530
determining 'sufficient cause' in a case. Needless to mention that it is equally a settled law3, "decisive factor for condonation of delay is not length of delay but sufficiency and satisfactory explanation." Apposite in respect of the foregoing to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Satish Chand Shivhare & Brothers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while professing for the adoption of a balanced as well as liberal approach in the determination of a prayer for limitation/condonation of delay, asserted as under;
"22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim on the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the Courts lean towards consideration on merits by adopting a liberal approach towards 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay. The Court considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act may also look into the prima facie merits of an appeal. However, in this case, the Petitioners failed to make out a strong prima facie case for appeal. Furthermore, a liberal approach, may adopted when some plausible cause for delay is shown. Liberal approach does not mean that an appeal should be allowed even if the cause for delay shown is glimsy. The Court should not waive limitation for all practical purposes by condoning inordinate delay caused by a tardy lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Consequently, in light of the aforenoted judicial dictates/principles governing limitation; arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant and Ld. Counsel for the respondent; as well as appreciating the facts and circumstances and brought forth to the notice of this Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prayer for condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal, deserves to be allowed. As aforenoted, the reasons for delay in the present case are stated to have been 3 Dineshbhai Rameshbhai Minama v. State of Gujarat, 2018 SCC OnLine Guj 2610.
CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 19 of 34
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13
16:26:49 +0530
attributed to the fact of appellant's unawareness of the contents of the impugned order, which was received by the appellant only on 16.12.2023, once applied for on 14.12.2023 (as seen from the documents filed along with the application for condonation of delay); appellant's unfamiliarity with the procedure prescribed under law/legal provision; as well as of appellant's lack of proper guidance. Further, it is observed from the records that no reasons for delay or deliberate omission on the part of the appellant in pursuing the instant remedy is forthcoming, rather, as aforenoted, the appellant submitted before this Court that he was not aware of the reasoning under the impugned order, besides he came to know of the same only once a certified copy of the impugned order was received, whereupon the instant appeal was drafted and filed before this Court. Clearly, in light of the foregoing, the reasons for preferring the present appeal by/on behalf of the appellant with delay, as aforenoted, cannot be treated to be intentional, deliberate or dilatory in any manner. On the contrary, the explanation tendered by the appellant appears to be quite plausible and appealing to the senses of this Court. Consequently, this Court unswervingly observes that the prayer for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal deserves to be allowed, in the facts and circumstances placed on record, as well as the submissions made. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court allows the appellant's prayer for condonation of delay and the period of delay in filing/preferring the present appeal is, hereby, condoned.
12. Markedly, proceeding further with the determination of the rival contentions of the parties, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/DV Act, as under;
"2. Definitions-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-(a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 20 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:54 +0530 with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;...
*** *** ***
(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;
*** *** ***
21. Custody orders-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent:
Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit.
*** *** ***
23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders-(1) In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper.
(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 21 or, as the case may be, Section 22 against the respondent.
*** *** ***
27. Jurisdiction-(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which-
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 21 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:26:59 +0530 orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India..."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. At the outset, it is observed that the objective4 behind the enactment of DV Act is to accord statutory protection to victims of violence in domestic sector, who had no proprietary rights. The said enactment provides for security and an armour to a 'victim', inter alia by permitting issuance of protection orders that can prohibit the abuser from contacting or approaching the victim, as well as guarantees, endowment of financial support and victim's access to shared property. In fact, the superior courts have persistently avowed5 that the inherent aspiration for bringing forth the said enactment is to secure various rights to a woman living in matrimony or in a relationship akin to matrimony, or any domestic relationship, "to move to Court for any of the reliefs outlined in Section 12 through either a comprehensive proceeding, claiming maintenance, right to residence, compensation etc. or even move to Court seized of any other pending proceeding, such as divorce and maintenance etc." Reference in this regard is further made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, wherein the Hon'ble Court, noted the objective behind the enactment of DV Act in the following terms;
"15. The DV Act has been enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent occurrence of domestic violence in the society . The DV Act has been enacted also to provide an effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family.4
Ishpal Singh Kahai v. Ramanjeet Kahai, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 412.5
Shambhu Prasad Singh v. Manjari, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2895.
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GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13
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16. "Domestic violence" is undoubtedly a human rights issue, which was not properly taken care of in this country even though the Vienna Accord, 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) had acknowledged that domestic violence was undoubtedly a human rights issue. The UN Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in its general recommendations had also exhorted the member countries to take steps to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family, a phenomenon widely prevalent in India. Presently, when a woman is subjected to cruelty by husband or his relatives, it is an offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. The civil law, it was noticed, did not address this phenomenon in its entirety. Consequently, Parliament, to provide more effective protection of rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution under Articles 14, 15 and 21, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring in the family, enacted the DV Act."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Conspicuously, considering the expansive scope of the DV Act, it is quite intelligible that the said Act provides for a wide jurisdiction under Section 27 thereof, which an aggrieved persons may agitate their concerns. As aforenoted, Section 27 DV Act, confers jurisdiction under the said enactment to court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which, "(a) person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or (b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or (c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act... "
Strikingly, for the purposes of present discourse, it is apposite to confine to the provisions under Section 27(1)(a) of DV Act, which confers jurisdiction on the court, where the persons aggrieved, permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed. At this stage, this Court deems it apposite to make a CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 23 of 34 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:27:08 +0530 reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagir Kaur & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521: 1964 SCR (2) 73, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while explicating the contours of the term, 'resides', remarked as under;
"...In Santpoornam v. N. Sundaregan (1952) 2 M.LJ 573, it was held that the word "resides" implied something more than a brief visit. but not such continuity as to amount to a domicile. In Khairunissa v. Bashir Ahmed, (1929) I.L.R. 53 Bom. 781, on a consideration of the relevant authorities it was pointed out that a casual or a flying visit to a place was excluded from the scope of the word "resides". A full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Flowers v. Flowers, (1910) I.L.R. 32 All. 203, expressed the view that a mere casual residence in a place for a temporary purpose with no intention of remaining was not. covered by the word "resides". In Balakrishna v. Sakuntala Bai, A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 66 it was held that the expression "reside" implied something more than "stay" and implied some intention to remain at a place and not merely to pay it a casual visit. In Charan Das v. Surasti Bai, A.l.R, 1940 Lah. 449, it was held that the sole test on the question of residence was whether a party had animus manendi, or an intention to stay for an indefinite period, at one place; and if he had such an intention, then alone could he be said to "reside"
there.
The decisions on the subject are legion and it would be futile to survey the entire field. Generally stated no decision goes so far as to hold that "resides" in the sub-section means only domicile in the technical sense of that word. There is also a broad unanimity that it means something more than a flying visit to or a casual stay in a particular place. They agree that there shall be animus manendi or an intention to stay for a period, the length of the period depending upon the circumstances of each case. Having regard to the object sought to be achieved, the meaning implicit in the words used, and the construction placed by decided cases thereon, we would define the word "resides" thus: a person resides in a place if he through choice makes it his abode permanently or even temporarily ; whether a person has chosen to make a particular place his abode depends upon the facts of each case..."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Germane for the purpose of present discourse to CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 24 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.05.13 16:27:12 +0530 further refer to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Sharad Kumar Pandey v. Mamta Pandey, Crl.M.C. No. 4044/2009, dated 01.09.2010, wherein the Hon'ble Court while considering the meaning of the terms, residence/temporary residence, in light of the scope and ambit of DV Act, observed as under;
"9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression "residence" means "to make abode" - a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words "dwelling place" or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there..."
(Emphasis supplied) CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 25 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:27:17 +0530
16. Quite evidently, it is seen from the above that the superior courts have repeatedly professed for an adoption of liberal and expansive interpretation to the provisions of DV Act, including the meaning of term, 'residence'/'resides' under the said Act. Needless to mention that that objective behind the same is to ensure effective protection of rights of women/aggrieved persons, who are victims of violence of any kind, manifested upon her. However, the superior courts have also cautioned that where a person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person, courts have to cautioned to nip the tendence of unscrupulous litigants to exploit such beneficial provision to the detriment of the respondent. Ergo, with such understanding, when the facts of the present case are conscientiously evaluated, in light of the material placed on record, it is observed that the respondent explicitly records under her complaint/petition under Section 12 of DV Act, as a permanent place of residence as; 56/3, 2 nd floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi. Apposite in this regard, to reproduce the relevant extract from the respondent's said complaint/petition, as under;
"...10. That the Complainant is the permanent resident of 56/3 Second Floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi-110060 which is the parental house of the Complainant which falls within the jurisdiction of this Ld. Court. Therefore, this Ld. Court has the jurisdiction to try and decide the present matter..."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Relevantly, in the instant case, it is fervently argued by Ld. Counsel for the appellant that the respondent has not been residing with her parents at her parental home, at present or after her marriage. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, the respondent is presently in USA for her job and has CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 26 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:27:21 +0530 been there for quite some time, divesting her from claiming her residence, either temporary or permanent at 56/3, 2 nd floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi, within the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court. However, on scrupulous analysis of the material placed on record, this Court finds it difficult to concede with the said submissions of the Ld. Counsel. On the contrary, the documents placed on record, clearly denote the permanent residence of the respondent as; 56/3, 2nd floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi, besides it is not the case of the appellant that the respondent has since abdicated her citizenship of India by correspondingly obtaining citizenship of USA. Needless to mention that the said residence/respondent's parental home has been set up and acquired by her parents in the ordinary course and it is not the appellant's case that the said premise was set up with a sole intention to file a DV Act case. Au contraire, considering the present nature of stay of the respondent in USA, in light of the ensuing marital discord, should the respondent been encumbered to return to India, from the material on record, the respondent has manifested her animus to reside at 56/3, 2nd floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi. Ergo, under such factual circumstances, this Court unambiguously reiterates that it finds it difficult to concede that the respondent's residence at 56/3, 2nd floor, Old Rajinder Nagar, Delhi is fleeting in nature, disentitling her to invoke the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court. On the contrary, this Court is in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the application of the appellant under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, deserved to be dismissed. As a corollary, this Court concedes that the Ld. Trial Court is within its jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint/petition under Section 12 DV Act, filed by the respondent.
18. In so far as the contention of Ld. Counsel for the CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 27 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.05.13 16:27:26 +0530 appellant pertaining to the directions issued by the Ld. Trial Court to the appellant to provide the signed document for renewal of passport of minor son is concerned, reference is made to the provision under Section 12 of the DV Act, which provides as under;
"12. Application to Magistrate-(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act:
Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider..."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Quite evidently, it is seen from above that DV Act provides for an aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person to move an application before the Magistrate, seeking one or more reliefs under the said Act. Correspondingly, from a scrupulous analysis of the said Act, it is observed that the reliefs which may be so sought by such applicant may be in the form of right to reside in a shared household (under Section 17 DV Act); protection order (under Section 18 DV Act); residence order (under Section 19 DV Act); monetary relief (under Section 20 DV Act); custody order (under Section 21 of DV Act); or compensation order (under Section 22 of the DV Act). Simultaneously, as aforenoted, DV Act, also empowers Magistrates to confer interim/ad-interim orders in favour of said applicant(s) in terms of the provisions under Section 23 DV Act. However, nowhere under the said enactment, there is any provision, which may constrain a parent to execute a document, as directed by the Ld. Trial Court in the instant case. Here, this Court deems it pertinent to note that it is cognizant that a CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 28 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.05.13 16:27:30 +0530 beneficial legislation has to be liberally construed to achieve its purpose and objective. However, even then, no relief, which is not encompassed with the legislative umbrella can be granted by courts, while swaying away with the purpose of introduction thereof. In fact, the superior courts have persistently avowed 6 that a beneficial legislation should not be construed in such a manner so as to bring within its ambit a benefit which was not contemplated by the legislature, to be given to the party. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Regional Director, ESI Corpn. v. Ramanuja Match Industries, (1985) 1 SCC 218: AIR 1985 SC 278, wherein the Hon'ble Court in an akin context, remarked as under;
"...We do not doubt that beneficial legislations should have liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own there is no warrant for the Court to travel beyond the scheme and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered by the scheme..."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Ergo, in light of the foregoing, this Court is in consensus with contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that the Ld. Trial Court could not have passed an order, directing the appellant to provide the signed document for renewal of passport of minor son. Needless to reiterate that the DV Act provides for no such empowering provision upon the Ld. Trial Court to grant the relief of an akin kind, especially when in the instant case the application for custody of the child was still pending adjudication at the time, when directions came to be passed by the Ld. Trial Court. Here, this Court deems it further pertinent to observe that the provisions under Section 28(2) of the DV Act would not come 6 Deddappa & Ors. v. The Branch Manager, National Insurance, AIR 2008 SC 767: 2008 (2) SCC 595.
CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 29 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:27:35 +0530
to the aid and rescue of the respondent in this regard, as pleaded by the Ld. Counsel for the respondent. Clearly, from a conscientious perusal of the said provision, it is observed that Section 28(2) DV Act provides, "...Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23..." Clearly, the powers envisaged therein relate to conferring power on the Ld. Magistrate to device/adopt a procedure for disposal of applications under Section 12 or Section 23(2), as the case may be and does not confer any inherent powers on the Ld. Trial Court in so far as the aspect of substantive provision/right or relief which may be granted in favour of a party is concerned. Correspondingly, this Court is also not convinced that such power can be exercised by the Ld. Trial Court while seeking recourse to the provisions under Rule 8 of the DV Rules. On the contrary, Rule 8(ii) of the DV Rules merely enlists the duty of protection officer to provide an aggrieved person, information on the rights under the Act, as given in Form IV of the said Rules.
21. At this stage, this Court deems it further apposite to note that this Court is not convinced with the submission of Ld. Counsel for the respondent that such order is necessary to ensure the presence of respondent in India, which was within the domain of the Ld. Trial Court to pass by seeking recourse to the provisions under the said Act. On the contrary, under similar situation, superior courts have directed the concerned passport authorities to process the necessary applications for issuance of passport in cases of denial of one of the spouses to consent to such approval, upon furnishing necessary affidavit7/document and corresponding 7 Annexure 'C'-"Specimen Declaration by applicant's parent or guardian for issue of Passport to minor when one parent has not given consent"
CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 30 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.05.13 16:27:40 +0530 provision may be taken recourse to under the U.S. laws for renewal of minor child's passport, where one of the parents denies execution of necessary documents. In fact, under such circumstances, superior courts have ruled that the refusal of consent by father (or any of the parents) to a minor child's passport application, cannot automatically prevent such a minor child from procuring one. Needless to mention, in the considered opinion of this Court, remedy under such circumstances would not lie by seeking recourse to the provisions under DV Act, rather, before the concerned passport authorities by yielding necessary document/affidavit(s), as aforenoted. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Ms. Yushika Vivek Gedam v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. No. 19042/2024, dated 08.01.2025, wherein the Hon'ble Court, remarked under similar context as under;
"17. We may observe that the Passport Authority is certainly bound to consider variety of facts and circumstances in respect of the applications received by it for issuance of a passport and the assessment of such applications is required to be considered on the touchstone of the requirement of the provisions of law under the Rules also deal with variety of situations. The Government being alive of the variety of such requirements is writ large not only from the provisions of the Rules but the different forms which have been prescribed to deal with different situations. All such rules and the forms thereunder are required to be given due effect and on the touchstone of the mandate as prescribed by the provisions of the passport Act. It is in such context, we may observe that a specific provision has been made when a declaration in terms of Annexure-C is required to be made in cases where one parent of the minor has not given consent. For convenience, we note the contents of the declaration issued in Annexure-C by the petitioner's mother's mother which reads thus:
*** *** ***
21. The present case is also quite peculiar in as much as on one hand, the petitioner's father is pursuing his case against the petitioner's mother to obtain a divorce nonetheless he objects to the issuance CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 31 of 34 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:27:44 +0530 of a NOC. It also appears to be clear that the petitioner is staying with her mother. The petitioner is a bright student having secured outstanding marks in the X Standard examination, which has qualified her to be eligible to be selected to participate in the study tour visiting Japan, being undertaken by Kendriya Vidyalaya. In these circumstances, in our opinion, considering the well-settled position in law, it cannot be that the petitioner's right to travel abroad by issuance of a passport can in any manner be scuttled and/or taken away by denying her a passport to be issued/re-issued merely for the reason that the father for the only reason that he has disputes with the mother, is not supporting the petitioner's application by consenting to it. Also the petitioner's mother has submitted a declaration in Annexure-C, which is now required to be considered and processed by respondent no. 2.
22. It is well-settled that the expression "person liberty" which occurs in Article 21 of the Constitution includes right to travel abroad and no person can be deprived of that right except according to the procedure established in law. It is held that the procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. The right to travel abroad is a facet of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India (See. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1978 1 SCC 248)). The petitioner is certainly entitled to such constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21.
23. We may also observe that in the contemporary times traveling abroad cannot be considered to be a fanciful affair but has became an essential requirement of modern life. Such need to travel which may be the requirement of a child, a student or an employee, professional or a person from any other strata of the society, has undergone a monumental change. Thus, the right to travel is required to be not only recognized but made more meaningful. This can be achieved and supported by the authorities implementing the provisions of the Passport Act by effectively recognizing such contemporary needs in dealing with passport applications. The present case is an example of a student being given an opportunity to undertake a study tour by visiting a foreign country. Any action of the Passport Authority in denying the passport would have severe consequence not only adversely affecting the applicant in a given situation, but it may cause irreparable harm to the prospects of the applicant, for any venture she or he intended to CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 32 of 34 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13 16:27:49 +0530 undertake. Thus, a mechanical approach in this regard by the Passport Authority cannot be countenanced..."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Ergo, in light of the foregoing observation and the material placed on record as well as considering the arguments addressed by Ld. Counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that no fallacy can be attributed to the finding of the Ld. Trial Court, rejecting/dismissing the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, challenging the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court for the reasons, as aforestated. However, this Court finds it difficult to concede that by seeking recourse to the provisions under DV Act, Ld. Trial Court have directed the appellant to provide the signed document for renewal of passport of minor son.
23. Conclusively, in conspectus of above, this Court unambiguously reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Ld. Trial Court, rejecting/dismissing the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, challenging the jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court deserves to be sustained and is hereby upheld. while the direction of the Ld. Trial Court to the appellant to provide the signed document for renewal of passport of minor son deserves to be reversed and is consequently, set aside, under the order dated 02.12.2023 (impugned order), passed by Ld. MM (Mahila Court-01), Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in case titled as; 'Megha Chhabra v. Dheeraj Gupta, Case Regn. No. 1420/2022', PS. Rajinder Nagar. Apposite at this stage to note that, though, this Court holds highest regard for the decisions relied upon by Ld. Counsel, however, the same would not, in the considered opinion of this Court come to the aid/rescue of the parties, in the manner as prayed for as the facts and circumstances of the said cases/dictates are clearly, distinguishable.
CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 33 of 34
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.13
16:27:53 +0530
24. Accordingly, the present appeal is partly
allowed/disposed of in above terms.
25. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this order/judgment with directions to proceed as per law.
26. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.05.13 16:27:58 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 13.05.2025. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CA No. 15/2024 Dheeraj Gupta v. Megha Chhabra Page No. 34 of 34