Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Allauddin Khan vs The State Of West Bengal on 1 September, 2015
Author: Debasish Kar Gupta
Bench: Debasish Kar Gupta
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Debasish Kar Gupta
And
The Hon'ble Justice Md. Mumtaz Khan
CRA No. 299 of 2014
Allauddin Khan
Versus
The State of West Bengal
For the appellant : Mr. Tirthankar Ghosh
Mr. Satadru Lahari
For the State : Mr. R. Bharadwaj
Mr. K.K. Maity
Judgment on: 01.09.2015.
Heard on: 08.6.2015, 17.6.2015, 24.6.2015 and 26.6.2015.
Debasish Kar Gupta , J. :
The subject matter of challenge in this appeal is a judgment and order of conviction dated July 30, 2013 and sentence dated July 31, 2013 passed by the learned Judge, 3rd Special Judge, Burdwan, in Special Case no.26 of 2010 convicting the appellant for committing offence punishable under Section 20 (b) (ii) (c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the NDPS Act). By virtue of the impugned sentence the appellant was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs.1 lakh in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months.
On July 17, 2010 Sri Soumitra Sarkar, Superintendent of Customs, Burdwan, (PW 1), received a specific information over phone from Sri P. Basu, Senior Intelligence Officer of D.R.I., Calcutta that a truck bearing No.UP-65H- 0385 loaded with 'ganja' would pass through Durgapur Highway. Sri Soumitra Sarkar, Superintendent of Customs (PW 1), left the office with a raiding team for Durgapur Express Highway at 16.15 hrs. after writing down the information in D.R.I.-I register. On receipt of further direction from D.R.I., the above raiding team returned back to the Head Quarter. At about 18.30 hrs. the above raiding team moved to the spot once again receiving direction from D.R.I. Officer. On further direction the raiding team moved towards Gurudwara situated at G.T. Road (Durgapur Highway). After reaching there, Sri Suresh Abraham, Superintendent of Central Excise, Bishnupur Division (PW 3), found the above truck parked near the aforesaid Gurudwara.
Nobody was found inside the above truck. The officers of the raiding team in action ambushed themselves dividing the raiding team into two groups.
On July 18, 2010 at about 04.00 hrs., raiding team found a man to enter into the cabin of the above truck and to close the cabin door after entering into the above cabin. The officer of the raiding team disclosed his identity to the above person. Initially, nothing was disclosed by the above person before them. Subsequently, he confessed that he had 'ganja' in his vehicle. The appellant was informed of his right of searching him in presence of a gazetted officer. After receiving written consent from the appellant he brought the vehicle to the Office of Central Excise and Customs at Birhata, Burdwan. Sri Subhojit Konar (PW 6) and one Sankhadip Dutta, two morning walkers, were asked to be eyewitness of search and seizure. They were requested to come to the above place at 09.30 hrs. on that date.
At about 12.00 noon, Inspector Suresh Abraham (PW 3), rummaged the cabin of the above vehicle and found some papers including the driving licence of the appellant. The appellant was taken to the vehicle. He rode the vehicle on its roof and opened a door of a secret cavity just behind the driver's cabin with a big iron sheet. The raiding team found 103 packets of illicit article (ganja) inside the cavity. An electronic weighing machine was collected from a person in the market. All aforesaid "Ganja" were weighed on the first floor of the office building in presence of two independent witnesses, the appellant, amongst others. The gross weight of the above contraband article was 2048.31 kg. (net weight of "Ganja" was 1909.105 kgs.). Samples were collected through the holes made on each and every packet. Those were mixed up homogeneously and divided into three pieces. A slip containing signature of PW 1, the witnesses, the seizure officer and the thumb impression of the accused was placed inside the pouches containing seized articles. PW 1 sent a report to his superior officer under Section 57 of the NDPS Act, 1985 on July 20, 2010.
After completing the investigation, PW 1 submitted report of investigation in the form of complaint on January 12, 2011 before the learned Judge, 3rd Special Judge, Burdwan. Cognizance was taken on the same date. Charge was framed against the appellant under Section 20 (b) (ii) (c) March 21, 2011. Subsequent, altered charge was framed on June 21, 2013 to remove the error with regard to registration number of the Truck in question.
After considering the documentary and oral evidences including the record relating to examination of the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., amongst others, the impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence were passed against the appellant.
It is submitted by Mr. Tirthankar Ghosh, learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellant that the impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence are not sustainable in law for the following reasons:-
(i) In view of the evidence on record adduced by the PW 1 to PW 9 coupled with the recovery of incriminating articles, the search and seizure were not proved. Therefore, the seizure list was a fabricated document.
(ii) The provisions of Section 50 had not been complied with though the appellant was searched in person. There were contradictions with regard to the time of his search in person as also adherence to the safeguard provided in Section 50 of NDPS Act in view of the evidences of PW 1, PW 3 and PW 5.
(iii) The PW 3 scribed the consent letter of the appellant in Hindi.
The reason for scribing Exbt.-8 by PW 7 remains unexplained. PW 7 put his signature in Exbt.-5 in English. The Exbt.-8 was signed by him in Hindi. The middle name "Kumar" of PW 7 bearing in Exbt.-5 (signed in English) was absent in his signature in Exbt.-8 in Hindi. Withholding of photographs and non- production of annexures to the letter of complaint before the Court below created reasonable doubt with regard to place of recovery of the article transported with the help of the vehicle under reference. Our attentions were drawn towards the provisions of sub-Section (c) of Section 8, Section 20 and sub- Section (a) of Section 43 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, according to the appellant, the commission of offence by the appellant as the driver of the vehicle was not proved beyond doubt taking into consideration the provisions of Section 35 of the NDPS Act.
(iv) In the movement register (Exbt.-1), the contradictions with regard to time and date of movement of the police officers were not considered in the impugned judgment.
(v) According to the appellant, he was deputed by one Mantosh Singh and Bhola Yadav to transport the contraband articles from Manipur to Kusmunda. Appellant was appointed as temporary driver 4 day ago. He was not aware of loading contraband article. The owner of the truck under reference was Prabhu Singh. An amount of Rs.380/- was recovered from the possession of the appellant. According to the appellant, he was engaged by the aforesaid persons for transportation of the contraband articles on payment of Rs.500/- only. No satisfactory step was taken by the respondents to catch hold of those persons for initiation of appropriate proceeding against the aforesaid main culprits for violation of the provisions of Section 20 (b) (ii) (c) of the NDPS Act.
(vi) There was failure to put proper questions to the appellant and to obtain the answers from the appellant thereof while examining the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
Mr. Ghosh relied upon the decisions of Padam Singh vs. State of U.P., reported in (2000) 1 SCC 621, Rama vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2002) SCC (Cri) 829, Iqbal Abdul Samiya Malek vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2002) SCC 312, Jeetu @ Jitendera vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2013) 11 SCC 489 and Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2013) 15 SCC 263 in support of his above submissions.
It is submitted by Mr. R. Bharadwaj appearing on behalf of the respondents that the provisions of Section 42 was not applicable in this case. The search and seizure were conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 43 of NDPS Act. It is also submitted by him that assuming that Section 50 of the NDPS Act were applicable in this case, those provisions were complied with. The deviation pointed out on behalf of the appellant were minor in nature and there was no adverse effect of such deviation on the appellant.
It is submitted by Mr. Bharadwaj that the transportation of illicit articles was well within the knowledge of the appellant. Therefore, the provisions of Section 20 (b) (ii) (c) were applicable in respect of commission of offence by the appellant. According to the Mr. Bharadwaj, the formalities relating to diarising the information received from secret source, interception of the vehicle, conducting of search and seizure and onward transmission of the information to the immediate higher officer complied with in accordance with law. According to Mr. Bharadwaj, PW 5 and PW 6 were independent witnesses. Their evidences corroborated the evidence of other witnesses.
Mr. Bharadwaj relied upon the decisions of Khet Singh vs. Union of India, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 380, Karnail Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 539 and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Pawan Kumar, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 350 in support of his above submissions.
We have heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length and we have considered the facts and circumstances of this case.
The first ground of attacking the impugned judgment is the discrepancies in evidences with regard to the place of search and seizure of the illicit articles from the appellant and the effect of such discrepancies thereof.
It is the settled proposition of law that there bound to be some discrepancies between the depositions of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. But discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. While minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution's case doubtful, contradiction in the statement of witness is fatal for the case. The above principle of law has been laid down in the matter of State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247 and the relevant portions of the above decision is quoted below:-
"7. In support of the impugned judgment the learned counsel appearing for the respondents vainly attempted to point out some discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses for discrediting the prosecution version. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. The normal course of the human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies, such discrepancies in law may render credential to the depositions. Parrot-like statements are disfavoured by the courts. In order to ascertain as to whether the discrepancy pointed out was minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be had to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witness was making the statement. This Court in Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala held that minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. In Jagadish v. State of M.P. this Court held that when the discrepancies were comparatively of a minor character and did not go to the root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue importance. Mere congruity or consistency is not the sole test of truth in the depositions. This Court again in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki held that in the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however, honest and truthful they may be. Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person."
(Emphasis supplied) Whether the discrepancy is minor or the same is contradiction fatal for the case is a matter of fact which is special to each case. The search of the appellant in person is not in dispute in this case. Therefore, in order to ascertain whether the discrepancies pointed out by the appellant were minor or those were contradictions fatal for the case applying the settled proposition of law as discussed hereinabove, the following factors are taken into consideration:-
(a) According to the PW 1, PW 3 and PW 5, the search and seizure were conducted at a point of time in between 10-00 to 12-00 hours on July 18, 2010.
(b) But in view of the evidence of PW 2, he came to the office at about 17-00 hours on July 18, 2010 and the search and seizure had been conducted at about 16-30 hours on that date.
(c) The evidence of PW 7 with regard to time of seizure was also relevant. He was approached by the respondents to render his assistance to record the statement of the appellant in Hindi at about 16.00/16-30 hours. The statements were recorded at 17.00/17.30 hours. According to him, the seizure list was prepared thereafter.
The above facts should not be construed as minor discrepancies. Rather the same were contradictions/variations casting serious doubt with regard to the search and seizure. But those were not considered by the learned Court below.
Regarding the compliance of the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, search of an accused in person in presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer duly authorised under the provisions of Section 41 of the NDPS Act is necessary. There is no bar and/or impediment to conduct above search in presence of a Gazetted Officer of the police department of the State Government. Or in other words there is no absolute rule that police officers cannot be cited as witness and their deposition should be taken with suspect.
Regarding applicability of the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act regarding search of an accused in person in presence of a Magistrate or a gazetted officer duly authorised under the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. The above provision is quoted below:-
"50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted. -
(1) When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to search any person under the provisions of Section 41, section 42 or section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.
(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search be made.
(4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female. (5) When an officer duly authorised under section 42 has reason to believe that it is not possible to take the person to be searched to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate without the possibility of the person to be searched parting with possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance or article or document, he may, instead of taking such person to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, proceed to search the person as provided under section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the officer shall record the reasons for such belief which necessitated such search and within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior."
However, in State of Punjab vs Baldev Singh, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 172, it has been held by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that failure to inform the person concerned about the existence of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate would cause prejudice to an accused.
There was divergence of opinion between two decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 513 and that of Union of India vs. Shah Alam, reported in (2009) 16 SCC 644. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the same in the matter of Vijaysinh Chendubha Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 609 and it has been held, inter alia, that the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, makes it imperative for the empowered officer to inform the person concerned about the existence of his right that if he so requires, he shall be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate; failure to inform the suspect about the existence of his above right would cause prejudice to him.
After considering the documentary evidence (Exbt.5), we find similar breach of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act in asking the appellant "whether he wants to exercise the option of taking him to a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate." The learned Court below did not take into consideration the breach of the above mandatory provision of the statute to pass the impugned judgment.
While considering the next ground for challenging the impugned judgment, the decision making process of the learned Court below for considering the documentary evidence vis-à-vis the order evidence is required to be examined on the basis of the settled principle of law. In the decision of Afzauddin Ansary & Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in 1997 (2) Crimes 53 Cal., it has been decided that the documentary evidence remains unchanged but for the purpose of drawing an inference from the oral evidences, a trial court is required to consider the same dealing with the discrepancies of such evidences. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:-
"20. A well-known dicta has been laid down not only by the apex Court of our country but also by the Privy Council that a man may lie but a document will never lie. It is a well-known adage that one swallow does not make a summer but it is a case where one swallow makes a summer. The question arises in this way as it gyrates the whole issue where the evidence as to recognition is a subsequent creation by the machination of the Ansaries. Exhibit-5 the copy of the general diary book projects an unnatural shadow about recognition of any one of the appellants before us. A silence has been maintained in the said exhibit where none of the names of the appellants found their room in the general diary book. ........"
(Emphasis supplied) At the cost of repetition of observation made hereinabove we find that two documentary evidences, i.e., "Exbt.-5" and "Exbt.-8" that the learned Court below did not take note of the discrepancy occurred in signing of these documents by the PW 7. He signed the "Exbt.-5" in English under the style "Anil Kumar Jadav" and "Exbt.-8" was signed in Hindi by him under the style "Anil Yadav". The middle name "Kumar" of the PW 7 was absent in his signature in "Exbt.-8" in Hindi. The learned Court below was in error in ignoring that the above discrepancy cast serious doubt with regard to the authenticity of same.
That apart, the learned Court below did not consider the discrepancies of the "Movement Register" in the light of the settled proposition of law due to following reasons:-
i) According to "Movement Register" (Exbt.-1), the time of returning back of the raiding team to the Head Quarter at 04-30 hours on July 18, 2010 was recorded on July 17, 2010.
ii) According to the entry dated July 18, 2010 in the above register only three officers namely, Soumitra Sarkar (PW 1), Suresh Abraham (PW 3) and Tapas Mukhopadhyay were present in the "Head Quarter" on the above date from 09-30 hours to 11.15 hours. Their presence in the above office beyond the above period was not reflected in the entry dated July 19, 2010.
The learned Court below did not take note of the reasonable doubt of making those entries and/or antedating of the same.
The next ground of challenging the impugned judgment and order of conviction with regard to the proof of criminal conspiracy between the appellant (driver of the vehicle concerned) and the main culprits as also presence of his culpable mental state, the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 35 of the NDPS Act, are quoted below:-
"35. Presumption of culpable mental state. - (1) In any prosecution for an offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state of the accused, the Court shall presume the exixtence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution.
Explanation. - In this section "culpable mental state" includes intention, motive knowledge of a fact and belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.
(2) For the purpose of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability."
In the decision of Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri (supra) it has been held by the Apex Court that in the event a driver of a vehicle admits that the narcotic drug has been recovered from his vehicle, the burden of proof is on him to rebut the presumption envisaged in Section 35 of the NDPS Act. The above burden of proof cast upon the driver can be discharged through different modes. One is that he can rely on the material available in prosecution evidence. If such evidence indicates that the real culprits would have utilised the services of the driver to transport the contraband articles and no evidence is adduced by the prosecution to any connivance between the driver concerned and the real culprits, then he has discharged the burden of proof to rebut the presumption envisaged in Section 35 of the NDPS Act. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:-
"22. The burden of proof cast on the accused under Section 35 can be discharged through different modes. One is that he can rely on the materials available in the prosecution evidence. Next is, in addition to that, he can elicit answers from prosecution witnesses through cross- examination to dispel any such doubt. He may also adduce other evidence when he is called upon to enter on his defence. In other words, if circumstances appearing in the prosecution case or in the prosecution evidence are such as to give reasonable assurance to the court that the appellant could not have had the knowledge or the required intention, the burden cast on him under Section 35 of the Act would stand discharged even if he has not adduced any other evidence of his own when he is called upon to enter on his defence.
23. In this case non-recording of the vital information by the police at the first instance can be counted as a circumstance in favour of the appellant. Next is that even the information which PW 2 recollected from memory is capable of helping the accused because it indicates that the real culprits would have utilised the services of an autorickshaw driver to transport the gunny bags and it is not necessary that the autorickshaw driver should have been told in advance that the gunny bags contained such offensive substance. The possibility is just the other way round that the said culprits would not have disclosed that information to the autoricikshaw driver unless it is shown that he had entered into a criminal conspiracy with the other main culprits to transport the contraband. The prosecution did not adduce any evidence to show any such connivance between the appellant and the real culprits. There is nothing even to suggest that those culprits and the appellant were close to each other, or even known to each other earlier. Yet another circumstance discernible from the evidence in this case is that the police had actually arrayed two other persons as the real culprits and made all endeavour to arrest them, but they absconded themselves and escaped from the reach of the police.
24. From the above circumstances, we hold that the accused had discharged the burden of proof in such a manner as to rebut the presumption envisaged in Section 35 of the Act. He is, therefore, not liable to be convicted for the offences pitted against him."
It appears from the statements made by the appellant that he was deputed by Mantosh Singh and Bhola Yadav to transport the contraband articles from Manipur to Khusmunda on payment of Rs.500/- only. One Prabhu Singh was the owner of the vehicle under reference. Another circumstance discernible from the evidence of the I.O. (PW 1) in course of cross-examination that he had arrayed the above two persons as the real culprits and made attempts to arrest them but they escaped from the reach of the police. The learned trial court did not take into consideration the above facts and circumstances with regard to the discharging the burden of proof by the appellant to rebut the presumption of his culpable mental state. Though the aforesaid Prabhu Singh was one of the accused, the same did not help the prosecution case in view of the observations made hereinabove.
With regard to the grievance of the appellant relating to recording of his statements under the provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the provision of law that it is not a mere formality has been decided in the matter of Nar Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 496. The relevant portions of the above decision are quoted below:-
"11. The object of Section 313 (1) (b) CrPC is to bring the substance of accusation to the accused to enable the accused to explain each and every circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. The provisions of this section are mandatory and cast a duty on the court to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain each and every circumstance and incriminating evidence against him. The examination of the accused under Section 313 (1) (b) CrPC is not a mere formality. Section 313 CrPC prescribes a procedural safeguard for an accused, giving him an opportunity to explain the facts and circumstances appearing against him in the evidence and this opportunity is valuable from the standpoint of the accused. The real importance of Section 313 CrPC lies in that, it imposes a duty on the court to question the accused properly and fairly so as to bring home to him the exact case he will have to meet and thereby, an opportunity is given to him to explain any such point.
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27. The point then arising for our consideration is, if all relevant questions were not put to the accused by the trial court as mandate under Section 313 CrPC and where the accused has also shown that prejudice has been caused to him or where prejudice is implicit, whether the appellate court is having the power to remand the case for redecision from the stage of recording of statement under Section 313 CrPC. Section 386 CrPC deals with power of the appellate court. As per sub-clause (b) (i) of Section 386 CrPC, the appellate court is having power to order retrial of the case by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate court. Hence, if all the relevant questions were not put to the accused by the trial court and when the accused has shown that prejudice was caused to him, the appellate court is having power to remand the case to examine the accused again under Section 313 CrPC and may direct remanding the case again for retrial of the case from that stage of recording of statement under Section 313 CrPC and the same cannot be said to be amounting to filling up lacuna in the prosecution case.
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29. In Ganeshmal Jashraj v. State of Assam, this Court has examined the scope and object of examination of accused under Section 313 CrPC was completed, the accused admitted his guilt presumably as a result of plea bargaining and the accused was convicted. Pointing out that the approach of the trial court was influenced by the admission of guilt made by the accused and that conviction of the accused cannot be sustained, this Court has remanded the case to the trial court to proceed afresh from the stage of examination under Section 313 CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied) We find that the learned Court below did not take care of facts relating to non-production of any chemical report of the seized illicit articles, procedure followed by the police authority in deviation from the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, amongst others. So, we find substance in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that proper questions were not put to the appellant while examining him under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
In view of the observations made hereinabove with regard to the facts and circumstances in this case in the light of the settled principles of law the decisions of Khet Singh (supra), Karnail Singh (supra) and Pawan Kumar (supra) do not help the respondents for affirming the impugned judgment and the conviction imposed upon the appellant.
Therefore, the contradictions in evidences with regard to search and seizure, non-compliance of the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act when the raiding party was about to search the appellant in person, failure to consider the documentary evidences (Exbts.-5 and 8) vis-à-vis the oral evidences of the prosecution witnesses, authenticity of the entries made in the movement register and reasonable doubt of existence of culpable mental state of the appellant, lead us to interfere with the impugned judgment. The impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence are quashed and set aside.
This appeal is allowed. The appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless wanted in connection with any other case.
Let the Lower Court's records be sent back expeditiously. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, on priority basis.
I agree. ( Debasish Kar Gupta, J.) (Md. Mumtaz Khan, J.)