Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Yagnamurthy Kesava Chandra vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 27 February, 2026
APHC010260302024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY,THE TWENTY SEVENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos: 4147/2024 & 904/2025
Crl.P.No.4147 of 2024
Between:
1.YAGNAMURTHY KESAVA CHANDRA, B
2.YAGNAMURTHY PRASANNA LAKSHMI, W/O Y. KESAVA CHANDRA
AGE 51 YEARS, OCC HOUSE WIFE, R/O 50-348-1-24, ARORA
NAGAR, B CAMP, KURNOOL, KURNOOL DISTRICT .
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF AP, AMARAVATI
2.AVULA SURYA NARAYANA, S/O ANJINEYULU, AGE 69 YEARS, OCC
BUSINESS, R/O 2-4-190, OBULADEVA NAGAR, ANANTAPUR,
ANANTAPUR DISTRICT
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S):
1.N CHANDRA SEKHAR REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1.S VARADARAJULU CHETTY
2.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
2
Crl.P.No.904 of 2025
Between:
1.K SUDHARSHAN, S/O K.RAGHURAMA RAO, AGE 70 YEARS, OCC
ADVOCATE, R/O 4-168, GOOTY FORT, GOOTY ANANTAPUR
DISTRICT .
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF AP, AMARAVATI .
2.AVULA SURYA NARAYANA, S/O ANJINEYULU, AGE 69 YEARS, OCC
BUSINESS, R/O 2-4-190, OBULADEVA NAGAR, ANANTAPUR,
ANANTAPUR DISTRICT
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1.N CHANDRA SEKHAR REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1.S VARADARAJULU CHETTY
2.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
COMMON ORDER:
Criminal Petitions have been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity 'the Cr.P.C.,') by the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 3 seeking quashment of the proceedings in C.C.No.916 of 2023 on the file of the learned Special Judicial First Class Magistrate (Mobile Court), Anantapur.
2. Sri N.Chandra Sekhar Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the prosecution, in its zeal to implicate, has failed to appreciate 3 the fundamental distinction between civil disputes and criminal liability. The substratum of the case, even if taken at its highest value, is nothing more than a contest over title and saleable interest in agricultural land. Accused No.1, stands implicated solely on the basis of a legal opinion tendered upon examination of documents produced by Accused Nos.2 and 3. It is trite law that the rendering of a professional opinion, absent any overt act of inducement or misrepresentation, cannot constitute cheating within the meaning of Section 415 of 'the I.P.C.,' nor can it be elevated to the penal consequences contemplated under Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.' To foist criminal liability upon a legal professional for discharging his duty of examining documents is manifestly untenable and amounts to a gross abuse of process of law.
3. It is further submitted that the allegations against Accused Nos.2 and 3, even if accepted in toto, are rooted in their assertion of title under a decree passed in O.S.No.7 of 1985 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Gooty. Whether such decree confers valid title or whether LW3, LW4, and LW5 have a superior claim is a matter squarely within the province of civil adjudication. Indeed, the de-facto complainant has already invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by instituting O.S.No.420 of 2023 before the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Anantapur, seeking cancellation of the Sale Deed. When the matter is sub judice before the competent Civil Court, the simultaneous invocation of criminal jurisdiction under Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.,' is nothing but a stratagem to exert pressure upon the accused persons. 4 In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish any such dishonest intention attributable either to the Accused No.1 or to Accused Nos.2 and 3.
4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the charge sheet is conspicuously silent on any independent incriminating material against the Petitioners. The allegations, even if accepted, only suggest that Accused Nos.2 and 3 executed a Sale Deed dated 15.02.2020 in favour of LW2, while claiming title under the decree of 1985. The Accused No.1 neither participated in the execution of the Sale Deed nor derived any benefit therefrom. His involvement is restricted to a professional assessment of title documents, which by itself cannot be construed as an act of deception. The absence of any overt act, inducement, or misrepresentation on his part is fatal to the prosecution case. The continuation of criminal proceedings against him would therefore amount to harassment and miscarriage of justice.
5. It is also submitted that the invocation of Section 34 of 'the I.P.C.,' is wholly misconceived. There is no material to suggest any common intention shared by Accused No.1 with Accused Nos.2 and 3. The Petitioners merely asserted their rights under a decree of a competent Civil Court, and the Petitioner, in his professional capacity, examined the documents produced. The mere fact of rendering a legal opinion cannot be stretched to infer common intention to cheat. The prosecution has thus failed to establish even a prima facie case of common intention, and the continuation of proceedings against the Petitioners would amount to a travesty of justice. 5
6. It is submitted that to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.916 of 2023 on the file of Special Judicial First Class Magistrate (Mobile Court), Anantapur, insofar as they pertain to the Accused Nos.1 to 3, as continuation thereof would be an abuse of process of law and contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.
7. Sri S.Varadarajulu Chetty, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.2 and Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submit that the present petition filed by Accused Nos.2 and 3 seeking quashment of proceedings in C.C.No.916 of 2023 is wholly devoid of merit and unsustainable either in law or on facts. The Petitioners, in collusion with Accused No.1, deliberately misrepresented their title and possession over the subject property, induced the Respondent and his daughter into purchasing the plots, and thereby caused wrongful loss to the Respondent while securing unlawful gain for themselves. The record clearly demonstrates that the Petitioners executed registered sale deeds dated 15.02.2020 in favour of Avula Haripriya, daughter of Respondent No.2, by falsely asserting absolute ownership and unencumbered title, notwithstanding the fact that they had no lawful right or possession over the property. Such fraudulent inducement squarely attracts the penal provisions of Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.,' read with Section 34 of 'the I.P.C.,' and the Petitioners cannot be permitted to cloak their fraudulent acts under the guise of a civil dispute.
8. It is further submitted that the Respondent, acting in good faith and relying upon the representations of the Petitioners, expended substantial 6 sums not only towards the sale consideration but also towards registration charges and subsequent development of the plots, including levelling, fencing, borewell installation, and electrification. The Respondent and his daughter were assured by the Petitioners that there existed no dispute or defect in title. However, subsequent to the purchase, third parties asserted superior title and possession, thereby exposing the fraudulent misrepresentation of the Petitioners. The Respondent, upon discovering the deceit, issued legal notice dated 06.02.2023 seeking redress, but the Petitioners failed to resolve the dispute and instead issued a false and untenable reply. The conduct of the Petitioners, viewed cumulatively, reveals a deliberate design to cheat and defraud, thereby justifying the registration of Crime No.84 of 2022 and the filing of charge sheet in C.C.No.916 of 2023.
9. Learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 further submits that the contention of the Petitioners that the matter is purely civil in nature is wholly misconceived. In the present case, the Petitioners knowingly executed sale deeds without lawful title, misrepresented facts to the Respondent, and thereby induced him to part with valuable consideration. Such acts constitute cheating under Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.,' and the Petitioners cannot escape prosecution by merely pointing to the pendency of O.S.No.420 of 2023 before the learned Civil Court. The civil proceedings for recovery of consideration do not absolve the Petitioners of criminal liability for fraudulent inducement and deception.
7
10. It is urged to dismiss the quash petition filed by Accused Nos.1 to 3, as the same is devoid of merit, and direct the Petitioners to face trial in C.C.No.916 of 2023 before the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate (Mobile Court), Anantapuram. Only through trial can the truth be unearthed and justice be effectuated and urged to dismiss the Criminal Petitions.
11. This Court, exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' finds it expedient to intervene to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of law. The guiding principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1, permit quashing where the allegations in the charge sheet, even assumed true, fail to disclose a cognizable offence or where the dispute is manifestly civil. Here, the prosecution materials reveal no independent incriminating evidence against the Petitioners, reducing the criminal proceedings to a tool of harassment amid an ongoing title dispute.
12. At its core, the prosecution case hinges on a contest over title to agricultural land deriving from a decree in O.S.No.7 of 1985 by the learned Subordinate Judge, Gooty, with Accused Nos.2 and 3 claiming thereunder while executing the sale deed dated 15.02.2020 in favour of LW2. The de- facto complainant has concurrently invoked civil jurisdiction via O.S.No.420 of 2023 before the learned Junior Civil Judge, Anantapur, for cancellation of that very sale deed. Such duality confirms the lis as purely civil, where invoking 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 8 Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.,' serves merely to browbeat the accused, warranting quashment.
13. Of course, the ingredients of cheating under Section 415 of 'the I.P.C.,' requiring inducement by deception with dishonest intent from inception, and its aggravated form under Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.,' are wholly absent. Accused Nos.2 and 3 proceeded on a bona fide assertion of title under a competent decree, with counter-claims by LW3 to LW5 raising pure questions of civil validity. Accused No.1's involvement was limited to a professional legal opinion on presented documents, sans any inducement, misrepresentation, or benefit, which cannot penalize a lawyer's dutiful scrutiny.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand2, at paragraph No.12 held as under:
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court."
15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala3, at paragraph Nos.12 & 13 held as under:
"12. From the decisions cited by the appellant, the settled proposition of law is that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If 2 (2013) 11 SCC 673 3 (2015) 8 SCC 293 9 the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In other words for the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860 can be said to have been made out.
13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC. In our view the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings."
16. Indeed, Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for brevity 'the Act'), mandates the seller to disclose known latent defects in title, yet reliance on a subsisting civil decree evinces good faith, not fraud. Upon transfer, Section 55(5)(c) of 'the Act' vests risk of loss in the buyer, channelling post- sale third-party assertions and the complainant's investments in development works (leveling, fencing, borewell, electrification) toward civil redress. The legal notice of 06.02.2023 and rebuttal underscore this civil path, negating any primordial dishonest intent for Section 420 of 'the I.P.C.'
17. Section 34 of 'the I.P.C.,' invoking joint liability, demands prior commonality of intention, not mere proximity. No evidence links Accused No.1's detached opinion to any shared fraudulent design with Accused Nos.2 and 3, such inference from association alone is impermissible. Lacking these 10 thresholds, no prima facie offence endures, and perpetuating proceedings would travesty justice.
18. Accordingly, the Criminal Petitions filed by Accused Nos.1 to 3 under Section 482 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' are allowed, and the proceedings in C.C.No.916 of 2023 on the file of the learned Special Judicial First Class Magistrate (Mobile Court), Anantapur, are hereby quashed insofar as they relate to the petitioners.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dated: 27.02.2026 VTS