Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Putti Seetharavamma vs Bellamkonda Venkaiah on 7 November, 2025
APHC010345162019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3397]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY,THE SEVENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA
KRISHNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 651/2019
Between:
Putti Seetharavamma and Others ...APPELLANT(S)
AND
Bellamkonda Venkaiah and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. KIRAN KUMAR VADLAMUDI
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. SHAIK MOULALI .
2.
SECOND APPEAL NO: 652/2019
Between:
Putti Seetharavamma and Others ...APPELLANT(S)
AND
Bellamkonda Venakteswarlu and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. KIRAN KUMAR VADLAMUDI
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. SUBHANI S M
2.
3. .
4. E V V S RAVI KUMAR
CONTEMPT CASE NO: 1067/2021
Between:
Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and ...PETITIONER(S)
Others
AND
Putti Seetharavamma and ...CONTEMNOR(S)
Others
Counsel for the Petitioner(S):
1. SUBHANI S M
Counsel for the Contemnor(S):
1. SOURI BABU DUPPATI
The Court made the following:
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL Nos.651 and 652 of 2019
and
CONTEMPT CASE No.1067 of 2021 In I.A.No.1 of 2019 In S.A.No.652 of 2019
Common Judgment:
The second appeal in S.A.No.651 of 2019 is filed against the Judgment
and decreedated 06-09-2019 in A.S.No.30 of 2013 on the file of theIV
Additional District Judge, Guntur, reversing the Judgment and decree dated
21-02-2012 in O.S.No.21 of 2008 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge,
Mangalagiri.
2. The second appeal in S.A.No.652 of 2019 is filed against the Judgment
and decreedated 06-09-2019 in A.S.No.32 of 2013 on the file of the IV
Additional District Judge, Guntur, reversing the Judgment and decree dated
21-02-2012 in O.S.No.27 of 2008 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge,
Mangalagiri
3. The trial Court clubbed both the aforesaid suits videO.S.No.21 of
2008andO.S.No.27 of 2008, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri
and a common judgment is pronounced in both the suits.Against which the
appeal suits vide A.S.No.30 of 2013and A.S.No.32 of 2013, on the file of the
IV Additional District Judge, Guntur have been preferred by one
Mr. Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu, his brothers and others. The First Appellate
Judge also clubbed both the appeal suits and a common judgment is
pronounced in both the appeal suits. Against which the second appeals vide
S.A.Nos.651 and 652 of 2019 have been preferred. Therefore, both the
second appeals are clubbed and a common judgment is being pronounced in
both the second appeals.
4. Originally, the trial Court clubbed both the suits O.S.Nos.21 and 27 of
2008. O.S.No.21 of 2008 was filed by the plaintiffs, viz., Putti Seetharavamma
and her sons for seeking therelief of permanent injunction restraining the
defendants viz., Bellamkonda Venkaiah and others, their men and all the
persons claiming rights through the defendants from in any way interfering
with and/or causing obstruction to the plaintiffs‟ peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the plaint schedule property.
O.S.No.27 of 2008 was filed by one Mr. Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu,
his brothers and others for seeking the relief of possession of plaint „A‟ and „C‟
schedule properties and relief of declaration that the plaintiffs and the 5th
defendant got title to the plaint „B‟ schedule property and consequential
permanent injunction restraining the defendants
1 to 4 and their people from in any way interfering with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of plaintiffs‟ and 5th defendant, and for mesne
profits.
The learned trial Judgeclubbed both the suits and a common judgment
was pronounced in both thesesuits, dismissed the suit in O.S.No.27 of 2008
and decreed the suit in O.S.No.21 of 2008 with costs.
5. Felt aggrieved thereby,the unsuccessful plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008
filed the appeal suit vide A.S.No.32 of 2013 and the unsuccessful defendant
Nos.1 and 2 in O.S.No.21 of 2008 filed the appeal suit vide A.S.No.30 of
2013, before the learned IV Additional District Judge, Guntur. The learned first
appellate Judge also clubbed both the appeals and allowed thesame by
setting aside the common judgment and decree passed by the learned
trialJudge. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.21 of 2008 and the
defendants in O.S.No.27 of 2008approached this Court by way ofsecond
appeals.
6. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred
to as they are arrayed in the original suit.
7. The case of Mr. Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and other plaintiffs in
O.S.No.27 of 2008 and the defendants in O.S.No.21 of 2008, on the file of the
Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, is as follows:
One Bellamkonda Chimpaiah had two sons namely China Narasaiah
and Chinnaiah. The said China Narasaiah had a son by name Venkatappaiah
and Veeraiah is the son of Venkatappaiah relates to the branch of Chinna
Narasaiah. The said Veeraiah had a wife by name Hanumayamma and a son
by name Seetharamaiah, who died in the month of September, 1941, the
Veeraiah died intestate on 07.03.1941. The other son of Bellamkonda
Chimpaiah by name Chinnaiah had two sons namely Pullaiah and Veeraiah
and the plaintiff Nos.1 to 7 in O.S.No.27 of 2008 are the sons of Veeraiah,
who relates to the branch of Chinnaiah. Bellamkonda Veeraiah relates to the
branch of Chimpaiah, Chinna Narasaiah, died intestate on 07.03.1941, by
leaving his wife Hanumayamma and son Seetharamaiah. It is further
contended that the said Seetharamaiah also died in the month of September,
1941. Consequently, the said Hanumayamma became entitled to be the
estate of her deceased husband and her deceased son as well. The
Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and other plaintiffs relates to another branch of
Chinnaiah pleaded in O.S.No.27 of 2008 that the said Hanumayamma has
became entitled the estate of her deceased husband and her deceased son
as well, as per the existing law after the death of the said Hanumayamma, it is
only the branch of Chinnaiah that would be entitled to the said estate as
absolute owners. It is further contended that the said Hanumayamma died on
15.01.1993, possessing the plaint schedule properties i.e., the „A, B and C‟
schedule properties, without executing any Will. Consequently, the plaintiffs
being the nearest successors, succeeded to the said properties under law.
However, the defendant Nos.1 to 4 are claiming rights under the bogus
documents and under the colour of relationship with Smt. Hanumayamma as
her sister‟s daughters. The Putti Seetharavamma and her sons continued to
be in the possession of the plaint „A‟ and „C‟ schedule properties and the
Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and other plaintiffs possessed plaint „B‟ schedule
properties.
It is further contended by Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and others that,
in view of the aforesaid reasons, they are constrained to file the suit in
O.S.No.27 of 2008, seeking possession of plaint „A‟ and „C‟ schedule
properties and seeking relief of declaration of title and consequential relief of
permanent injunction against the defendant Nos.1 to 4, namely the
Putti Seetharavamma and her sons,in respect of plaint „B‟ schedule
properties.
8. The case of Smt. Putti Seetharavamma and her sons/defendants in
O.S.No.27 of 2008 and the plaintiffs in O.S.No.21 of 2008, on the file of the
Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, is as follows:
A simple suit for possession in respect of the plaint „A‟ and „C‟ schedule
properties, without the relief of declaration of title, is not maintainable, and the
suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the plaint „B‟
schedule property is not tenable. They further pleaded that Putti
Seetharavamma is a widow and Putti Sathya Sai Rambabu, Putti Sreenivasa
Rao andPutti Venkata Rao are her sons. Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and
other plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008 are inter-related and all of them are the
close associates and friends of each other and all of them are sailing together
and helping each other. Meanwhile, in the month of January, 1987, the
husband of Putti Seetharavamma died due to sudden cardiac arrest, while her
sons are small kids and Putti Seetharavamma was not a wordly wise women,
as such, after the death of her husband, she cannot maintain the family and
manage properties effectively. The said Hanumaiah is the younger brother of
the mother of Putti Seetharavamma and Bellamkonda Hanumayamma, the
husband of Bellamkonda Hanumayamma had passed away without any
issues and the said Hanumayamma inherited the properties from her husband
after his death. They further pleaded that as per the decree and judgment
passed in O.S.No.14 of 1942, on the file of the Sub-Court, Guntur, the said
Hanumayamma became the absolute owner of the schedule property and she
has got a right and settlement to alienate the said properties as per her will,
wish and according to her convenience.
It is further contended by Putti Seetharavamma and her sons that the
said Hanumayamma, out of love and affection, executed registered gift deeds
in favour of the defendant Nos.1 to 4 in respect of the plaint schedule
properties and delivered the possession and their names are mutated in
revenue records and they are having the possession and enjoyment of the suit
schedule properties. While the Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu, his brothers and
others have tried to trespass into the possession of the plaint „B‟ schedule
property, Puttiseetharavamma and her sons have filed a suit in O.S.No.21 of
2008, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, seeking relief of
permanent injunction in respect of the plaint „B‟ schedule properties.
9. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned Senior Civil Judge,
Mangalagiri, clubbed both the suitsvide O.S.No.21 of 2008 and O.S.No.27 of
2008 and framed the issues for trial.
Issues framed in O.S.No.21 of 2008:
(1) Whether the plaintiffsare entitled for permanent injunction
as prayed for?
(2) To what relief?
Issues framed in O.S.No.27 of 2008:
(1) Whether the plaintiffs and defendant No.5 are entitled for
declaration of title over suit schedule A and C as prayed
for?
(2) Whether they entitled for possession?
(3) Whether they are entitled for consequential permanent
injunction as prayed for?
(4) To what relief?
10. The trial Court by invoking Rule 5 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the aforesaid issues are re-casted as follows:-
1) Whether the plaintiffs have succeeded the estate or Bellamkonda
Hanumayamma by virtue of Law of Succession?
2) Whether defendants 1 to 4 became the absolute owners of plaint A, b
and C schedule properties by virtue of registered gift deeds dated
17-06-1983 and 23-9-1983?
3) Whether the suit claim of plaintiffs is barred by limitation?
4) Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder as well as non-joinder of proper
and necessary parties?
5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get possession of plaint A and C
schedule properties as prayed for?
6) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get declaration of title over plaint B
schedule property as prayed for?
7) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get consequential relief for
permanent injunction in respect of plaint B schedule property as prayed
for?
8) To what relief?
11. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs in
O.S.No.27 of 2008 and defendants in O.S.No.21 of 2008, P.W.1 to P.W.3
were examined and no documents were marked. On behalf ofthe defendant
Nos.1 to 4 in O.S.No.27 of 2008 and plaintiffs in O.S.No.21 of 2008, D.W.1and
D.W.2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-46 were marked.
12. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, afterconclusion of trial,on
hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral
anddocumentary evidence on record,dismissed the suit in O.S.No.27 of 2008
and decreed the suit in O.S.No.21 of 2008 with costs. Feltaggrieved
thereby,the unsuccessful plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008 filed the appeal suit
vide A.S.No.32 of 2013 and the unsuccessful defendant Nos.1 and 2 in
O.S.No.21 of 2008 filed the appeal suit vide A.S.No.30 of 2013, before the
learned IV Additional District Judge, Guntur, wherein,the learned First
Appellate Judge also clubbed both the appeal suits and the following points
came up for consideration.
Point for consideration in A.S.No.32 of 2013:
1. Whether the appellants/plaintiffs 1 to 13 are entitled to set aside the
Decree and Judgment passed against them in O.S.No.27 of 2008, on
the file of the Senior Civil Judge‟s Court, Mangalagiri, dated 21-12-2012?
Point for consideration in A.S.No.30 of 2013:
1. Whether the plaintiffs/respondents1 to 4entitled to set aside the decree
and judgment passed against them in O.S.No.21 of 2008, on the file of
the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, dated 21-12-2012?
13. The learned IV Additional District Judge, Guntur, i.e., the first
appellateJudge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, allowed
both the appeal suits. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful plaintiffs in
O.S.No.21 of 2008 and the unsuccessful defendants in O.S.No.27 of 2008filed
the present second appeals before this Court.
14. On hearing the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants
at the time of admission of S.A.No.652 of 2019 on 23.01.2020, a learned
Judge ofthis Court framed the following substantialquestions of law:
1) Whether the 1st appellate Court is justified in rejecting the claim of the
appellants herein that their predecessor in title was the absolute owner
and possessor of the scheduled properties by virtue of Section 14(1) of
Hindu Succession Act, 1956?
2) Whether the 1st appellate Court is justified in reversing the decree and
judgment of the trial Court though the trial Court held that the suit in
O.S.No.27 of 2008 is barred by Article 65 of Indian Limitation Act?
3) Whether the 1st appellate Court justified in reversing the decree and
judgment of the trial Court though the suit in O.S.No.27 of 2008 is bad
for the non-joinder of necessary and proper parties to the suit?
On 31.08.2020, when S.A.No.651 of 2019 has come up for admission
before a learned Judge of this Court, on hearing the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the appellants and in view of the admission of S.A.No.652
of 2019 on 23.01.2020, this Court had framed the similar substantial questions
of law as framed in S.A.No.652 of 2019.
When the matter came up for hearing on 27-06-2025, on hearing the
both side counsels‟, this Court had framed the following additional substantial
question of law in S.A.No.651 of 2019:
1) Whether the Judgment of the appellate Court is vitiated by perversity for
reversing the well considered judgment of the trial Court, by applying a
repealed statute [The Hindu Women‟s Rights to Property Act, 1973],
which further stands excluded in view of the overriding effect of Section
4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?
15. Heard Sri P.Veera Reddy, leaned Senior Counsel appearing for
appellant Nos.1 and 2, Sri J.Ugra Narasimha, learned counsel appearing for
appellant Nos.3 and 4 representing Sri Kiran Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellants, Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing
Sri S.M. Subhani learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 8 and 10 to 12
and Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.17 to 18.
16. In a second appeal under Section 100 of CPC the High Courtcannot
substantiate its own opinion for that of First Appellate Court unless theCourt
finds that the conclusions drawn by the First Appellate Court are
erroneousbeing, (i) contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law
or (ii)contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court or (iii) based
oninadmissible or no evidence.
17. The jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal under Section100 of
CPC is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of lawand
while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of CPC, it is
notpermissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence on record
andinterfere with the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court and if the
FirstAppellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its
decisioncannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of
procedurerequiring interference in a second appeal.
18. The undisputed facts of both the parties are that Bellamkonda
Venkateswarlu and other plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008, connected with
A.S.No.32 of 2013, relates to the branch of Bellamkonda Chinnaiah.
Bellamkonda Veeraiah, his wife Hanumayamma and their son Seetharamaiah
relates to another branch of Bellamkonda Chinna Narasaiah. Both Chinna
Narasaiah and Chinnaiah are brothers and the sons of Bellamkonda
Chimpaiah. Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and others in O.S.No.27 of 2008
contended that, being the nearest successors to Bellamkonda
Hanumayamma, they are having title in the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule
properties, since she died intestate and her husband and son predeceased
her without executing any Will.
19. The specific case of Putti Seetharavamma and her sons, who are the
defendant Nos.1 to 4 in O.S.No.27 of 2008, connected with A.S.No.32 of 2013
and the plaintiffs in O.S.No.21 of 2008 (old case No.103 of 2000), connected
with A.S.No.30 of 2013, is that Bellamkonda Hanumayamma had executed
registered gift deeds, under Ex.B-9in favour of the defendant No.1, in respect
of plaint „B‟ schedule property dated 17.06.1983 and Ex.B-16 to Ex.B-19,
dated 17.06.1983 and 23.09.1983, respectively in respect of plaint „A‟ and „C‟
schedule properties, they have accepted the said gift deeds, Hanumayamma
delivered the possession and they are enjoying the plaint schedule property
since the date of registered gift deeds and their possession was recognized by
the Revenue authorities and Bellamkonda Hanumayamma died on
05.01.1988, but not in the year 1993, as pleaded by Bellamkonda
Venkateswarlu and his brothers and the suit in O.S.No.27 of 2008(old suit in
O.S.No.330 of 2001), which is filed on 11.07.2001, therefore, the suit is barred
by the law of limitation.
20. Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants would contend that though the respondents/plaintiffs are having
knowledge about the execution of registered gift deeds in favour of the
appellants by Late Smt. Bellamkonda Hanumayamma, but they have failed to
challenge the said gift deeds, and O.S.No.27 of 2008 was filed after more than
twelve (12) years from the date of death of Hanumayamma, as such, the suit
is barred by the law of limitation in accordance with Article65 of the limitation
Act. According to the respondents, Hanumayamma died on 15.01.1993, the
date, month and year of the death of Hanumayamma is disputed by the
appellants. Admittedly, no documentary evidence is produced by the
respondents/plaintiffs to show that the said Hanumayamma died on
15.01.1993. According to the appellants, Bellamkonda Hanumayamma died
on 05.01.1988, the appellants also not filed any documentary proof to show
that Hanumayamma died on 05.01.1988. The respondent/plaintiff No.1 in
O.S.No.27 of 2008 admitted in his evidence in cross-examination that
Bellamkonda Hanumayamma died one year after the death of Putti
Hanumaiah. As per Ex.B-2, Putti Hanumaiah died on 05.01.1987. Another
admission made by P.W.1 in his evidence before the trial Court on 14.02.2011
is that "about twenty three (23) years back Hanumayamma died", P.W.2 also
admits that Putti Hanumaiah i.e., the husband of the defendant No.1
i.e., Hanumaiah predeceased Hanumayamma with a gap of one year.
Therefore, it is evident that Bellamkonda Hanumayamma died in the year
1988; the suit for possession is filed by the plaintiffs on 11.07.2001. Therefore,
it is evident that the suit is not filed within twelve (12) years from the date of
the death of Hanumayamma.
21. It is the specific case of the respondents/plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008
that the plaint „B‟ schedule property is in their possession.The
respondents/plaintiffs herein filed the suit for seeking relief of declaration of
title and consequential relief of permanent injunction in respect of plaint „B‟
schedule property. P.W.1/plaintiff No.1 admits in his evidence in cross-
examination that there is no documentary proof to show that the plaint „B‟
schedule properties are in their possession and they did not apply for
issuance of the pattadar passbooks and the title deed passbooks in their
favour. He further admits that they have not paid the land revenue for plaint „B‟
schedule property at any point of time. He further admits that they did not
raise any objection before the Revenue authorities in issuing title deeds and
pattadar passbooks to the defendant Nos.1 to 4. He further admits that the
defendant Nos.1 to 4 mortgaged the plaint „B‟ schedule property to the Andhra
Bank, Tadikonda Branch and obtained loan from the bank. He further admits
that for the last 27 or 28 years, the plaint „A‟ schedule property is in the
possession and enjoyment of the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and the husband of the
defendant No.1, so also the plaint „C‟ schedule property. The above
admissions of the P.W.1 clinchingly establishes that the appellants are in
possession of the plaint schedule properties from 1984 onwards, which is
within the knowledge of the respondents/plaintiffs. The suit for possession is
filed by the plaintiffs on 11.07.2001. P.W.1 also further admits that the
Revenue authorities issued passbooks for the plaint schedule properties in
favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 under Ex.B-1 to Ex.B-3 and the name of
the defendant Nos.2 to 4 are also mutated in the revenue records. The
appellants availed loan from Chaitanya Grameena Bank by mortgaging the
plaint schedule properties. Ex.B-4 to Ex.B-7 are the passbooks issued by the
Bank in favour of the defendant Nos.1 to 4 respectively.
22. P.W.2, who is the plaintiff No.7 in O.S.No.27 of 2008 admitted in his
evidence in cross-examination before the trial Court on 28.03.2011 that "for
the last 28 years, the plaint schedule properties are in possession and
enjoyment of the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and the defendant Nos.1 to 4 pleaded
that the deceased Bellamkonda Hanumayamma executed registered gift
deeds in favour of the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and the husband of the defendant
No.1 for the entire schedule properties". He further admits that they have not
raised any objection before the Revenue authorities in issuing the pattadar
passbooks and title deed passbooks and in collection of land revenue from the
defendant Nos.1 to 4. Bellamkonda Hanumayamma and the mother of the
defendant No.1 are sisters. He further admits that the defendant No.1 looked
after the welfare and necessities of Hanumayamma. The husband of the
defendant No.1 is the younger brother of Hanumayamma and the obsequies
of Hanumayamma were performed by the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and they have
spent the entire expenses in this regard. He further admits that Putti
Hanumaiah i.e., the husband of the defendant No.1 had predeceased
Hanumayamma with a gap of one year. The above admissions of P.W.1 and
P.W.2 clinchingly establishes that though the plaintiffs are having the
knowledge about the issuance of pattadar passbooks and title deed
passbooks in favour of the defendant Nos.1 to 4, they have not raised any
objection before the Revenue authorities. Furthermore, all the plaintiffs are
having the knowledge about the payment of land revenue by the defendant
Nos.1 to 4/ Putti Seetharavamma and her sons in respect of the plaint
schedule properties and the possession of the defendant Nos.1 to 4 from the
date of death of Hanumayamma in respect of the plaint schedule properties is
within the knowledge of the plaintiffs. P.W.3 admits in his evidence in cross-
examination shows that he does not know the contents of his chief affidavit
and he is an illiterate, without reading the contents of his affidavit, he cannot
say the contents of his affidavit. He further admits that there is a dispute
between his son and the defendant Nos.1 to 4, in connection with the house-
site. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.3 is no way helpful to the plaintiffs to
prove their right to title in the plaint schedule property.
23. Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and other plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008
pleaded in the plaint that the defendant Nos.1 to 4/appellants claiming rights
under bogus documents and colour of relationship with Hanumayamma as her
sister‟s daughter. The pleadings in the plaint in O.S.No.27 of 2008 and the
own admissions of P.W.1 to P.W.3 reveals that the respondents have got
knowledge about the execution of gift deeds by Bellamkonda Hanumayamma
in favour of the appellants. Furthermore, the own admissions of the
respondents/P.Ws.1 and 2 reveals that the appellants are in possession and
enjoyment over the plaint schedule property since 1988. The suit for
possession of plaint „A‟ and „C‟ schedule properties and declaration of title in
respect of plaint „B‟ schedule properties is filed on 11.07.2001. Viewed from
any angle, the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by the law of limitation. It is also
relevant to say that the registered gift deeds are executed in favour of the
appellants in respect of plaint „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ schedule properties in the year
1983. P.Ws.1 and 2 have admitted in their evidence that they have not raised
any objections before the Revenue authorities in issuing the pattadar
passbooks, title deed passbooks and also in collection of land revenue from
the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and Bellamkonda Hanumayamma and the mother of
the defendant No.1 are sisters. P.W.2 further admits that the defendant No.1
used to look after the welfare and necessities of Bellamkonda
Hanumayamma, the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and Hanumayamma used to reside
in the plaint „C‟ schedule properties and the defendant Nos.1 to 4 have availed
the bank loan on the basis of the documents and also mortgaged the plaint „A‟
and „B‟ schedule properties and the obsequies of Hanumayamma were
performed by the defendant Nos.1 to 4. As stated supra, the suit is filed in the
year 2001, after lapse of eighteen (18) years from the date of execution of
registered gift deeds. Admittedly, Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and his
brothers have not challenged ExB-9, Ex.B-16 to Ex-B-19, registered gift
settlement deeds. For the aforesaid reasons, the suit in O.S.No.27of 2008 is
hopelessly barred by the law of limitation.
24. Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants contended that Bellamkonda Hanumayamma was having absolute
rights over the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties by virtue of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 and she executed a registered gift settlement deeds
under Ex.B-9, Ex.B-16 to Ex.B-19 in the year 1983 and the possession was
already delivered to the donee and their possession was also recognized by
the Revenue authorities. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs contended that the husband of
Hanumayamma died in the year 1941 i.e., on 07.03.1941 and her son
Seetharamayya died in the month of September, 1941 and the succession
was opened in the year 1941 and as per the existing law in the year 1941, the
plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008, being the nearest successors of Bellamkonda
Veeraiah, will get rights in the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties.
25. Bellamkonda Venkateswarlu and other plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008
are seeking relief of possession of plaint „A‟ and „C‟ schedule properties, and
also seeking relief of declaration of title and consequential relief of permanent
injunction in respect of plaint „B‟ schedule properties.
26. In a case of Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Cooperative
Housing Society Limited and others 1 , wherein the Apex Court held as
follows:
"In a suit for declaration of title, burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out
and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if
any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to
the plaintiff. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for
declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own
title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the
onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their
case or not. We are of the view that even if the title set up by the defendants is
found against, in the absence of establishment of plaintiff‟s own title, plaintiff
must be non-suited."
In a case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Thukalan Paulo
Avira and others2, whereinthe Apex Court held as follows:
"It is perfectly clear that in a suit of this description if the plaintiffs are to succeed
they must do so on the strength of their own title."
1
(2014) 2 Supreme Court Cases 269
2
1958 SCC OnLine Supreme Court 136
In a case of SajanaGranites, Madras and another vs. Manduva
Srinivasa Rao and others3, wherein the Composite High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad, held asfollows:
"The Supreme Court in M.P. Athanastus case (supra), M.M. Catholices v. Polo
Avira case (supra) and this Court in C. Audilakshmamma case (supra) held that
plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title, and for recovery of possession, can
succeed only on the strength of his own title and that it is not obligatory on the
defendants to plead and prove the possible defects in the plaintiffs title and so if
the plaintiff fails to establish his title, even if the defendant fails to establish his
own title, plaintiff must be non suited. In this case since appellants are seeking
declaration of their title to the suit property they have to establish their title; and
cannot expect relief on the basis of the weakness of the case of respondents
1 and 2, or on the basis that the evidence adduced by respondents 1 and 2 does
not establish their title to the suit property."
In a case of K.Venkatasubba Reddy vs. Bairagi Ramaiah (died) by
L.Rs.,4wherein theComposite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad,
held as follows:
"A Division Bench of this Court also in Chakicherla Adilakshmamma v. Almakuru
Rama Rao and Ors,- (3) AIR 1973 AP 149. Relying on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 526 (cited supra) held that "in a suit for
ejectment, the plaintiff is liable to be nonsuited, if he fails to establish his own title
irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or
not.
The law laid down by the Supreme Court and also by the Division Bench of this
Court in the ejectment suits is also applicable to the suits for declaration of title.
Thus, the plaintiff must succeed by establishing his own title, by adducing
satisfactory evidence and he cannot succeed on the weakness of the
defendant's case."
3
2001 SCC OnLine AP 666
4
1999 (1) APLJ 416 (HC)
In a case of BrahmaNand Puri vs. Neki Puri Since deceased
represented by Mathra Puri and another5,whereinthe Apex Court held as
follows:
"The plaintiff‟s suit being one for ejectment he has to succeed or fail onthe title
that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength ofhis title his suit
must fail notwithstanding that the defendant inpossession has no title to the
property, assuming learned counsel isright in that submission."
In a case ofJagdish Narainvs. Nawab Sai Ahmed Khan6, wherein the
Privy Council held as follows:
"The plaintiff‟s suit being one for ejnectment he has to succeed or fail onthe title
that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength ofhis title his suit
must fail notwithstanding that the defendant inpossession has no title to the
property, assuming learned counsel isright in that submission."
In a case of A. Ramloo and others vs. G. Sreeramachandra Murthy
and others 7 , wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad held as follows:
In a ruling reported in Moran Mar Basselios Catheolicos and another v.Most Rev.
Mar Poulose Athanasius and others, AIR 1954 SC 526, it hasbeen held by their
Lordships as under:
"That the plaintiff in ejectment suit must succeed on the strength of hisown title.
This can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to dischargethe onus that is on
him irrespective of whether the defendant has provedhis case or not. A mere
destruction of the defendants title, in theabsence of establishment of his own title
carries the plaintiff nowhere."
5
AIR 1965 SC 1506
6
1945 SCC OnLine PC 56
7
1999 SCC OnLine AP 80
27. In the plaint itself, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008 pleaded as
follows:
"The 1st son of Chimpaiah by name China Narasaiah got a Son Venkatappaiah
who was succeeded by veeraiah who died on 7-3-1941 having got a son
Seetharamaiah through his wife Hanumayamma. It so happened the said
Seetharamaiah also died in September, 1941. Consequently, the said
Hanumayamma became entitled to be in possession of the estate of her
deceased husband and her deceased son as well."
Further, the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit pleaded as follows:
"The said Hanumayamma died on 15-1-1993 possessing the Plaint Schedule
Properties i.e., A.B.C. schedule mentioned properties without executing any will.
Consequently, the plaintiffs being the nearest successors succeeded to the said
properties under Law."
28. It is relevant to say that both the sons of Chinnaiah branch i.e., the
father of P.W.1 and Venkatappaiah filed a suit in O.S.No.14 of 1942 against
Bellamkonda Hanumayamma before the Sub Judge, Guntur, seeking for
appointment of receiver. In the plaint in the said suit also, they pleaded that
Veeraiah died on 07.03.1941, leaving behind him the property shown in plaint
„A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ schedule and on the death of Veeraiah, his minor son
Seetharamaiah became entitled the same by the survivorship, and the said
Seetharamaiah died in the month of September, 1941 and that Bellamkonda
Hanumayamma inherited the property shown in plaint „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ schedule
asa widow‟s estate. The said suit in O.S.No.14 of 1942 was dismissed on
19.02.1943. Therefore, it is evident that the possession of Hanumayamma
right from 1941 onwards, after the death of her husband and son was
admitted by the Bellamkonda people in the year 1942 itself in the earlier suit
proceedings viz., O.S.No.14 of 1942.
29. As stated supra, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008, sought for a
declaration of title in plaint „B‟ schedule property and recovery of possession in
plaint „A‟ and „C‟ properties. The legal position in this regard is no more
res integra. In a "suit for ejectment", the plaintiffs can succeed only on the
strength of their own title and there is no obligation upon the defendants to
prove the title of the plaintiffs. The "onus to prove the title of the plaintiff in a
suit for declaration is also applicable to the suit for possession". The plaintiffs
also supposed to prove their title, and the onus is upon the plaintiffs to prove
their right and title in the plaint schedule property, whether the defendants
have proved their case or not. The own admissions of P.W.1 and P.W.2
namely the 1st plaintiff and the 7th plaintiff in their evidence negative the case
of the plaintiffs.
30. P.W.1 and P.W.2 admit that there is no documentary proof to show that
the plaint „B‟ schedule property is in their possession. P.W.1 and P.W.2 also
admit that they have not raised any objection for issuance of pattadar
passbooks and title deeds, and also payment of land revenue by the
defendants and also issuance of land revenue receipts in the name of the
defendants. Though the plaintiffs relied on the evidence of P.W.3, he admits
he does not know the contents of his chief affidavit and he is illiterate. Without
reading the contents of his affidavit, he cannot say the contents of his affidavit.
He further admits that there is a dispute between his son and the defendant
Nos.1 to 4, in connection with the house-site. Therefore the evidence of P.W.3
is no way helpful to the plaintiffs to prove their right to title in the plaint
schedule property. Admittedly, no single document is filed by the plaintiffs to
prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property.
31. The legal position in this regard is no more
res integraand the same has been well settled by the Apex Court in
Ananthula Sudhakar Vs. P.Buchi Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. and Others 8 ,
wherein it held as follows:
"21(a) Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff's title and he does not have
possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a
consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute
or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a
consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff's
lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an
injunction simpliciter."
32. It is a trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always
lies on the plaintiffs to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a
declaration relief and weaknesses, if any, of the case set up by the defendants
would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiffs.
33. As stated supra, the respondents/plaintiffs failed to prove their title in
the plaint „A‟ and „C‟ schedule properties and also failed to prove their title and
possession in plaint „B‟ schedule property. On the other hand,
Putti Seetharavamma and her sons in O.S.No.27 of 2008 relied on
voluminousdocumentary evidence under Ex.B-1 to Ex.B-46 and they have
8
(2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 594
proved that they are having right and title in the plaint schedule properties and
they are in possession of plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties by virtue of
registered settlement deeds under Ex.B-9, Ex.B-16 to Ex.B-19, said to have
been executed by Bellamkonda Hanumayamma a way back in the year 1983
itself.
34. The material on record reveals that Bellamkonda Hanumayamma
executed registered gift settlement deeds under original of Ex.B-9, Ex.B-16 to
Ex.B-19, in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 4 in O.S.No.27 of 2008 i.e., Putti
Seetharavamma and her sons and the said gift deeds are accepted by donees
and the possession was also delivered by the donor to the donees on the date
of the gift deeds itself and Putti Seetharavamma and her sons came into
possession of the plaint schedule property and their possession was also
recognized by the Revenue authorities by issuing pattadar passbooks and title
deed passbooks. It is also admitted by P.W.1 and P.W.2 that the defendant
Nos.1 to 4 i.e., Putti Seetharavamma and her sons are in possession of the
plaint schedule property and they have been paying land revenue to the
Government within their knowledge.
35. Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would contend that
Bellamkonda Hanumayamma was not having any right in plaint „A‟ to „C‟
schedule properties to execute registered gift deeds in the year 1983 and the
defendant Nos.1 to 4 will not get any rights in respect of plaint „A‟ to „C‟
schedule properties.
36. Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would contend that
Bellamkonda Chimpaiah had two sons, namely Chinna Narasaiah and
Chinnaiah, and they are coparceners, and on the death of Veeraiah, who
belongs to the branch of Chinna Narasaiah, the property devolves on his son
Seetharamaiah, the said Seetharamaiah had no male issue; as such, the
property would revert back to the other branch of Chinnaiah. He would further
contend that "as on the date of death of Veeraiah i.e., on 07.03.1941, and on
the death of Seetharamaiah in the month of September, 1941,
Hanumayamma had no right in the property and she would not be entitled for
any share".
37. In the plaint itself, the plaintiffs i.e., Bellamkonda people in O.S.No.27 of
2008 have not pleaded that the plaint „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ schedule propertiesare
joint family properties. It is also not the case of the plaintiffs that the plaint
schedule property is in joint possession of two branches, i.e., Chinna
Narasaiah branch and Chinnaiah branch. In the plaint itself it was pleaded as
follows:
"The 1st son of Chimpaiah by name China Narasaiah got a Son Venkatappaiah
who was succeeded by veeraiah who died on 7-3-1941 having got a son
Seetharamaiah through his wife Hanumayamma. It so happened the said
Seetharamaiah also died in September, 1941. Consequently, the said
Hanumayamma became entitled to be in possession of the estate of her
deceased husband and her deceased son as well."
"The said Hanumayamma died on 15-1-1993 possessing the Plaint Schedule
Properties i.e., A.B.C. schedule mentioned properties without executing any will.
Consequently, the plaintiffs being the nearest successors succeeded to the said
properties under Law."
38. The plaintiffs themselves pleaded in the plaint itself that Bellamkonda
Hanumayamma was in the possession of the entire plaint schedule property
from the year 1941 onwards till her death in the year 1993. As per the own
case of the plaintiffs, Bellamkonda Hanumayamma was in exclusive
possession of the plaint „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ schedule properties from 1941
onwards till her death. The own pleadings of Bellamkonda people in the
present suit and in the earlier suit for appointment of receiver vide O.S.No.14
of 1942 itself show that after the death of her husband and unmarried son
Seetharamaiah, Bellamkonda Hanumayamma was in exclusive possession of
the plaint schedule property till her death i.e., more than 45 years above,
therefore, the question of jointness doesn‟t arise.
39. Learned First Appellate Judge held in its Judgment that the appellants
failed to prove the gift deeds. Here, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008 are
seeking the relief of declaration of title in the plaint „B‟ schedule property and
also for possession of the plaint „A‟ and „C‟ schedule properties, but not by the
appellants. As stated supra, "the onus of proof applicable in „Declaratory Suits‟
is also applicable to the recovery of possession suits". Moreover, the gift
deeds are not challenged by the respondents/plaintiffs. Another wrong
conclusion, which is arrivedby the learned First Appellate Judge, is that the
respondents/plaintiffs are able to prove that the Hindu Women's Rights to
Property Act, 1937, applies to the present case, but the trial Court, by applying
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, dismissed the suit filed by
the plaintiffs. The First Appellate Court came to another wrong conclusion
that after the death of Veeraiah in the year 1941, his widow had got only a
right of possession as per Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property
Act, 1937, and after the death of the widow, the property has to revert back to
the reversioners/plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008.
40. As seen from the plaint averments, it is not the case of the plaintiffs in
O.S.No.27 of 2008 that after the death of Veeraiah on 07.03.1941, his wife
Hanumayamma was having limited rights as per Section 3 of the Hindu
Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the plaintiffs are the reversioners.
In the plaint itself, it was pleaded that "Bellamkonda Veeraiah died on
07.03.1941, by leaving his minor son Seetharamaiah and wife Hanumayamma
as Class-I heirs, and the said minor son Seetharamaiah died in the month of
September, 1941, consequently, the said Hanumayamma became entitled to
be in possession of the estate of her deceased husband and deceased son as
well, and the said Hanumayamma died on 15.01.1993, possessing the plaint
„A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ schedule properties". Therefore, it is evident, as per the own
pleadings of Bellamkonda people i.e., the plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008, the
said Hanumayamma was in actual exclusive possession over the plaint „A‟ to
„C‟ schedule properties for more than 50 years. In the earlier suit proceedings
in O.S.No.14 of 1942, the father of the plaintiffs herein and one Bellamkonda
Pullaiah pleaded that on the death of Veeraiah, his minor son Seetharamaiah
became entitled to the same by survivorship, but, the said Seetharamaiah
died in the month of September, 1941, and therefore, Bellamkonda
Hanumayamma inherited his properties in the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule
properties as a widow‟s estate.
41. Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed a reliance on the
Federal Court Reports in between, In Re The Hindu Women's Rights to
Property Act, 1937, and The Hindu Women's Rights to Property
(Amendment) Act, 1938 and In Re A Special Reference under Section 213
of the Government of India Act, 19359,decided in the year 1941.
Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed a reliance on
L.Bappu Ayyar and another Vs. Ranganayaki alias Meenakshi Ammal
and others10, decided on 22.07.1954, which is prior to the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956, wherein it is held as follows:
"...The Act would apply to the case and the widow would therefore be
entitled to partition of the share of her husband in the properties.
It cannot be contended that S.3 must be restricted to the cases of the
separate property of a Hindu because of the expression "a Hindu dying
Intestate."
When the manager of the joint family places before the Court the
properties which according to him, are liable for division, the Court is not bound
to accept that as a final word on the subject and it is open to the plaintiff to let in
evidence to show that some properties belonging to the joint family have been
excluded from the list furnished by the manager and if the Court is satisfied that
it is so, they will be included. Likewise it is open to the plaintiff to show by
evidence that the manager has been acting fraudulently during the course of his
9
1941 SCC OnLine FC 3
10
AIR 1955 MAD 394
management and that acts of misappropriation, malversation or fraud have taken
place in which case the Court is at liberty to direct a general account of the
management. Without clear evidence regarding acts of fraud or misappropriation
there cannot be a general back accounting by the manager."
42. The repeal of Section 31 of the Act58 of 1960 does not mean that the
repealed acts are revived. The effect of the original repeal was to remove
those repealed acts from the statute book. The total Women‟s Right to
Property Act itself got repealed w.e.f., 26.12.1960, and the said Act is not in
existence w.e.f., 26.12.1960. Here, even as per the case of the appellants,
Hanumayamma died in the year 1988, by that date Hindu Succession Act,
1956 is in force, she executed a registered gift settlement deeds a way back in
the year 1983 in favour of the appellants in respect of the plaint schedule
properties under Ex.B-9, Ex.B-16 to Ex.B-19.
43. As stated supra, in view of Section 4 r/w repealed provision of Section
31 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Hindu Women‟s Right to Property Act,
1937, is prohibited to be applied to decide any woman‟s right to property.
Even as per the own case of the respondents/plaintiffs, as per the plaint
averments, Bellamkonda Veeraiah possessed plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule
properties and died on 07.03.1941, intestate, by leaving his minor son
Seetharamaiah and wife, later, the said Seetharamaiah also died in the month
of September, 1941, consequently, the said Hanumayamma became entitled
to be in possession of the estate of her deceased husband and her deceased
son as well. Even as per the case of the father of P.W.1 and P.W.2, in the
year 1942 itself, it was pleaded in O.S.No.14 of 1942 that Veeraiah died on
07.03.1941, leaving behind him the properties under plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule,
and on the death of Veeraiah, his minor son Seetharamaiah became entitled
to the same by way of survivorship, but, the said Seetharamaiah also died in
the month of September, 1941, and that Bellamkonda Hanumayamma
inherited the properties shown in the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule as a widow‟s
estate.
44. As noticed supra, this Court confirmed the findings of the learned trial
Judge that Hanumayamma died in the year 1988 but not in the year 1993 as
contended by the respondents/plaintiffs. Since the total Women‟s Right to
Property Act, 1937 is repealed, by virtue of subsection (1) ofSection 14 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, "any property possessed by a female Hindu,
whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held
by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner".
45. It is better to reiterate the averments in the plaint in O.S.No.27 of 2008
(suit for declaration of title in respect of plaint „B‟ schedule property and
recovery of possession in respect of plaint „A and „C‟ schedule properties)
pleaded by Bellamkonda people is as follows:
"The 1st son of Chimpaiah by name China Narasaiah got a Son Venkatappaiah
who was succeeded by veeraiah who died on 7-3-1941 having got a son
Seetharamaiah through his wife Hanumayamma. It so happened the said
Seetharamaiah also died in September, 1941. Consequently, the said
Hanumayamma became entitled to be in possession of the estate of her
deceased husband and her deceased son as well."
"The said Hanumayamma died on 15-1-1993 possessing the Plaint Schedule
Properties i.e., A.B.C. schedule mentioned properties without executing any will.
Consequently, the plaintiffs being the nearest successors succeeded to the said
properties under Law."
46. The averments in the plaint filed by the respondents/plaintiffs clearly go
to show that from the date of death of the husband of Bellamkonda
Hanumayamma in the month of March, 1941, and also from the date of death
of her minor son Seetharamaiah in the month of September, 1941, she
possessed the plaint schedule property till the date of her death and she was
entitled to the said estate as an absolute owner, and the said Hanumayamma
died by possessing the plaint schedule properties i.e., „A‟ to „C‟ schedule
properties without executing any Will. Furthermore, the 1st plaintiff/P.W.1 and
the 7th plaintiff/P.W.2 admitted in their evidence itself that there is no
documentary evidence to show that the plaint „B‟ schedule properties are in
their possession, and they did not apply for issuance of pattadar passbooks
and title deed passbooks for the said properties in their favour, they have not
been paid any land revenue for plaint „B‟ schedule properties at any point of
time. They also further admit that they did not raise any objections before the
Revenue authorities for issuing pattadar passbooks and title deed passbooks
in favour of the appellants and the P.W.1 admits that the
defendant Nos.1 to 4, mortgaged the plaint „B‟ schedule property to the
Andhra Bank, Tadikonda Branch and obtained a loan from the bank. P.W.1
further admits that for the last 27 or 28 years, the plaint „A‟ schedule property
is in the possession of the defendant Nos.1to 4 and the husband of the
defendant No.1, and so also the plaint „C‟ schedule property and the Revenue
authorities issued the pattadar passbooks and title deed passbooks in favour
of the appellants and the defendant Nos.1 to 4 also obtained a loan from the
Chaitanya Grameena Bank, by mortgaging the plaint schedule properties and
they also issued pattadar passbooks under Ex.B-4 to Ex.B-7. The 7th
plaintiff/P.W.2 admits that the defendant No.1 looked after the welfare and
necessities of Bellamkonda Hanumayamma and the obsequies of the said
Hanumayamma were performed by the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and Hanumaiah
and they spent the entire expenses. He further admits that the defendant
Nos.1 to 4 and Hanumayamma used to reside at plaint „C‟ schedule properties
and the defendant Nos.1 to 4 also obtained loan from the bank on the basis of
the documents by mortgaging the plaint schedule properties and they did not
raise any objection for issuance of pattadar passbooks and title deed
passbooks, and the defendant Nos.1 to 4 also paid the land revenue in
respect of plaint schedule properties.
47. The Hindu Women‟s Right to Property Act had conferred certain rights
upon the widow of the last male-holder, and such rights are saved by Clause 6
of the General Clauses Act. In the case of separate property of the last male
owner, under Section 3(1) of the Hindu Women‟s Right to Property Act,the
widow or all the widows of the last male-owner would be entitled to the same
share as a son. On the death of the last male-owner, the right to a share in his
property accrued to his widow, and that right is not lost by reason of not
asserting it before the Act was repealed. Prior to the Hindu Succession Act,
1956, a widow‟s right is of nature of a right of property; her possession is that
of owner; her powers in that character are however limited, sub-section 3 of
Section 3 of the Hindu Women‟s Right to Property Act, enacts that the interest
devolving on the Hindu widow shall be limited interest known as the Hindu
Women‟s Estate. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 repealed specifically two
Acts vide:
Section 31:
The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 (2 of 1929) and
the Hindu Women‟s Rights to Property Act, 1937 (18 of 1937) are hereby
repealed.
Vide the amending Act, 1960 (58 of 1960) the repeal provision i.e.,
Section 31 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was totally repealed.
The repeal of this section by Act 58 of 1960 does not mean that the
repealed Acts are revived. The effect of the original repeal was to remove
those repealed Acts from the statute book.
Therefore from 26-12-1960 onwards, the Hindu Women‟s Rights to
Property Act, 1937 and another Act were not at all available for application in
deciding a Hindu Women‟s Right to Property.
48. Sub-section (1) ofSection 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,
defines as follows:
"Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after
the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not
as a limited owner"
49. By virtue of the Hindu Women‟s Right to Property Act, 1937,
Bellamkonda Hanumayamma was in the possession of the plaint schedule
properties and she was enjoying absolute rights, and also she was in the
absolute possession of the entire plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule property right from
1941 itself till the date of execution of registered gift settlement deeds in the
year 1983, i.e., about 40 years, and the possession of plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule
properties by Bellamkonda Hanumayamma for about 40 years is also
admitted by the plaintiffs in the suit in O.S.No.27 of 2008. Therefore, by virtue
ofSection 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, "any property
possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after
commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, shall be held by her as a
full owner thereof and not as a limited owner". By virtue of Section 14(1) of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Hanumayamma was having total absolute
rights and possession in plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties, she executed
registered gift settlement deeds in the year 1983, under Ex.B-9, Ex.B-16 to
Ex.B-19, in respect of the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties in favour of the
appellants and the said possession was also delivered to the appellants in the
year 1983 and all the donees accepted the aforesaid gift deeds. Bellamkonda
Hanumayamma died subsequent to the commencement of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, she died in the year 1988, therefore, the question of
reversion as pleaded by the respondents herein doesn‟t arise.
50. Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed reliance on a
Judgment in between Ajit Kaur Alias Surjit Kaur Vs. Darshan Singh (Dead)
through Legal Representatives and Others11, wherein the Apex Court held
a follows:
"...Theproperty possessed by a female Hindu, ascontemplated in the
section, is clearly property towhich she has acquired some kind of title
whetherbefore or after the commencement of the Act. It may benoticed that the
Explanation to Section 14(1) sets outthe various modes of acquisition of the
property by afemale Hindu and indicates that the section appliesonly to
property to which the female Hindu hasacquired some kind of title,
however restricted thenature of her interest may be. The words "as full
ownerthereof and not as a limited owner" as given in the lastportion of
sub-section (1) of Section 14 clearly suggestthat the legislature intended that the
limited ownershipof a Hindu female should be changed into
fullownership. In other words, Section 14(1) of the Actcontemplates that a Hindu
female who, in the absenceof this provision, would have been limited owner of
theproperty, will now become full owner of the same byvirtue of this section. The
object of the section is toextinguish the state called limited estate or
"widow'sestate" in Hindu law and to make aHindu woman, whounder the old
law would have been only a limitedowner, a full owner of the property
with all powers ofdisposition and to make the estate heritable by herown heirs
and not revertible to the heirs of he lastmale holder. The Explanation to
subsection (1) ofSection 14 defines the word "property" as including"both
movable and immovableproperty acquired by afemale Hindu by inheritance or
devise..."
Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed reliance on a
Judgment in between Chhotey Lal and others Vs. Jhandey Lal and
another12. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law is not at all applicable
to the present case.
11
(2019) 13 SCC 70
12
1972 SCC OnLine All 66
Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed reliance on a
Judgment in betweenDaya Singh (Dead) through L.Rs. and Another Vs.
Dhan Kaur13, wherein the Apex Court as follows:
"...The appellants filed a suit as reversioners to the
estate of Wadhwa Singh questioning the gift. The suit was
decree and the decree was confirmed on appeal. After coming
into force of the Hindu Succession Act on June 17, 1956, the
widow again made a gift of the same lands to the respondent.
She died in 1963."
Whereas, in the present case even as per the own case of the plaintiffs
in O.S.No.27 of 2008, Bellamkonda Hanumayamma was in possession of total
plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule property, after the death of her husband and her
minor son, from the year 1940 itself, she was in exclusive possession of the
property of Veeraiah and his son and after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
came into force, in the year 1983, Hanumayamma having been the absolute
owner and having absolute rights had executed a registered gift deeds under
Ex.B-9, Ex.B-16 to Ex.B-19, in favour of the appellants, but for the reasons
best known to the respondents/plaintiffs, the validity of the gift deeds are not
questioned by the plaintiffs.
51. Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed a Judgment in
betweenManohar Lal Ganeriwal and Others Vs. Bhuri Bai and Others 14,
wherein the facts in the aforesaid case law are that "one Mr.Rameswar Lal
died in the year 1933 or 1934 and the Section 4 of the Act, makes it clear that
the Act is not to operate retrospectively, therefore, his widow cannot claim any
13
(1974) 1 SCC 700
14
(1973) 3 SCC 432
right to the suit property though her husband who had died long before Act,
1937 came into force". Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the said
case law are not applicable to the present case.
Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed a reliance in
between Shyam Prasad Mishra & Another Vs. Vijay Pratap Singh &
Another15, in view of the findings given by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ajit
Kaur Alias Surjit Kaur Vs. Darshan Singh (Dead) through Legal
Representatives and Others (2019) 13 SCC 70, the ratio laid down by the
High Court of Allahabad in Shyam Prasad Mishra & Another Vs. Vijay
Pratap Singh & Another, need not be taken into consideration of deciding
the present case.
Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed a reliance in
between Gopalakrishna (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Others Vs.
Narayanagowda (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Others 16, wherein
the Apex Court held that "the period of limitation started with the death of the
limited owner, namely, the widow and the time started ticking with the passing
away of the widow."
Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed a reliance in
between Arshnoor Singh Vs. Harpal Kaur and Others17.
It is not the case of the plaintiffs even as per the plaint averments that
the plaint schedule property is a coparcenery property and it is a joint family
property of estate of two brothers.
15
2005 SCC OnLine A11 945
16
(2019) 4 SCC 592
17
(2020) 14 SCC 436
Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed a Judgment in
between G.Rama Vs. T.G.Seshagiri Rao (Dead) by Lrs.18.
The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law is applicable to the sub-
section (2) of the Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, but not
applicable to Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
The Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is only applicable
to the facts of the present case.
52. Learned counsel for the appellants had placed a Judgment in between
Cherotte Sugathan (Dead) through Lrs. and Others Vs. Cherotte Bharathi
and Others19, wherein the Apex Court held as follows:
"10. Applicability of the said provision must be tested
having regard to the provisions contained in Hindu Succession
Act, 1956. Section 4 of the Act provides for the overriding
effect of the Act stating:.
4. Overriding effect of Act.--(1) Save as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act,--
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any
custom or usage as part of that law in force
immediately before the commencement of this Act,
shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for
which provision is made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before the
commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to
Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the
provisions contained in this Act.
12. Upon the death of Sukumaran, his share vested in the
first respondent absolutely. Such absolute vesting of property
18
(2008) 12 SCC 392
19
(2008) 2 SCC 610
in her could not be subjected to divestment, save and except
by reason of a statute.
13. Succession had not opened in this case when the 1956
Act came into force. Section 2 of the 1856 Act speaks about a
limited right but when succession opened on 2.8.1976, first
respondent became an absolute owner of the property by
reason of inheritance from her husband in terms of Sub-
section (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act. Section 4 of the 1956
Act has an overriding effect. The provisions of 1956 Act, thus,
shall prevail over the text of any Hindu Law or the provisions of
1856 Act. Section 2 of the 1856 Act would not prevail over the
provisions of the 1956 Act having regard to Section 4 and 24
thereof."
53. A full Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in R.B.S.S. Munnalal and
others Vs. S.S.Rajkumar and others20, held as follows:
"16. By Section 14(1) the legislature sought to convert
the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric Hindu
law would have been regarded as a limited interest into an
absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto gave to the
expression "property" the widest connotation. The expression
includes property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or
devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of
maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or
not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or
exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other
manner whatsoever. By Section 14(1) manifestly it is intended
to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property
however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric
Hindu law may be into absolute estate."
The Apex Court had further held in the aforesaid case law as follows:
"....The Act is a codifying enactment, and has made far
reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of
20
AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1493
inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu
females full rights of inheritance, and sweeps away the
traditional limitations on her powers of dispositions which were
regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She is
under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent in respect
of property possessed by her at the time of her death"
54. A full Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Sukh Ram and another Vs.
Gauri Shankar and another21, held as follows:
"2. ....On the death of Hukam Singh in 1952, it is
common ground Kishan Devi acquired by virtue of s. 3(2) of
the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act 18 of 1937, the same
interest in the property of the joint family which Hukam Singh
had. That interest was limited interest known as the 'Hindu,
Woman's estate': s. 3(3) of the Hindu Women's Right to
Property Act, 1937. The Parliament enacted The Hindu
Succession Act 30 of 1956, which by s. 14(1) provided that-
"Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether
acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall
be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited
owner."
The Apex Court had further held in the aforesaid case law as follows:
"6. On the death of her husband, Kishan Devi became entitled
to the same interest which Hukam Singh had in the joint family
property of that interest, she became full owner on June 17,
1956, and being full owner she was competent to sell that
interest for her own purposes, without the consent of the male
coparceners of her husband."
55. In view of the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law, even if a female
Hindu possessed the interest, which male Hindu had in the joint family interest
of that property, of that interest she becomes a full owner on 17.06.1956, and
21
AIR 1968 Supreme Court 365
being a full owner, she was competent to sell her interest for her own
purposes without the consent of the male coparceners of her husband. In the
case at hand, it is the specific case of the respondents/plaintiffs as per the
plaint averments that Bellamkonda Chimpaiah was having two sons namely
Chinna Narasaiah, and Chinnaiah. Bellamkonda Veeraiah was the grandson
of Chinna Narasaiah. The Respondents/plaintiffs Nos.1 to 7 are the grandsons
of Chinnaiah. Chinna Narasaiah, and Chinnaiah are brothers. In the plaint, it
was specifically pleaded that Bellamkonda Veeraiah belongs to the branch of
Chinna Narasaiah, who died intestate by possessing plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule
properties on 07.03.1941, by leaving his son Seetharamaiah, the said
Seetharamaiah also died in the month of September, 1941, and the entire
plaint schedule properties were possessed by the wife of Bellamkonda
Veeraiah by name Hanumayamma from 1941 onwards till her death in the
year 1993, consequently, the said Hanumayamma entitled to be in possession
of the estate of her deceased husband and deceased son as well. As stated
supra, this Court held that Hanumayamma was died in the year 1988. By
virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Hanumayamma
became the full owner, and she was competent to execute registered gift
settlement deeds in respect of plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties without the
consent of the nearest successors of her husband.
56. In a case of Vidyaben Vs. Jagadishchandra Nandshankar Bhatt and
Others22, the Apex Courtheld as follows:
"7. It is true that prior to the coming into force of the
Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, 1937, the wife did not
possess any interest in the joint coparcenary property during
the lifetime of her husband. However, in case of partition
between her husband and his sons, she would be entitled to a
share equal to that of her husband or son. But she would not
be entitled to claim partition in her own right and even after
partition, she would not be the absolute owner of the property
which came to her share but she would take a limited interest
therein. However, after the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property
Act, 1937 came into force, a widow was given a share in the
joint family property equal to that of the share of her husband
or the son and she had a right to claim that share by partition.
The other incidence viz. that whatever share she got in the
property would be a mere life interest in the estate was not
changed. For the first time, therefore, the right to claim partition
was given to a widow by this Act. This Act was repealed by
Section 31 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Apparently,
therefore, a Hindu widow would lose her right to claim her
share by partition in the joint family property even-though
under the general principles of Hindu Law, she was entitled to
a share therein. Section 31 of the Act is repealed by the Act 58
of 1960. But there is nothing in the said Act showing that the
Act which was specifically repealed by Section 31 was to be
revived. u/s 7 of the General Clauses Act, in the absence of
any specific words, stating that such an Act would be revived
the result would be that the Act which was repealed by Section
31 of the Act cannot revive even when Section 31 itself was
repealed. For the purpose of this Appeal, therefore, it is
assumed that the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act,
1937 was no longer in force."
22
AIR 1974 Gujarat 23
57. In the case on hand, the husband of Hanumayamma died after the
commencement of the Hindu Women‟s Right to Property Act, 1937, i.e., on
07.03.1941, by possessing the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule property and her son
also died in the month of September, 1941, and she was alive up to her death
in the year 1988, her limited ownership right had fructified into full ownership
by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
58. Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs had placed a Judgment
in between U.Sudheera and others Vs. C.Yashoda and others23, wherein
the Apex Court held as follows:
"19. Thus, the law is clear that a second appeal will be maintainable before
the High Court, only if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question
of law. If no substantial question of law arises, the second appeal could not have
been entertained and the same ought to have been dismissed, as the jurisdiction
of the High Court itself is not yet invoked."
In the case on hand, there is a perversity in the findings of the First
Appellate Court, which are not based on any material, appreciation of
evidence by the First Appellate Court also suffers from material irregularity.
Therefore, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law is not at all applicable
to the present case.
59. The material averments in the plaint in O.S.No.27 of 2008, which suit is
filed by the plaintiffs for seeking relief of possession of plaint „A‟ to „C‟
schedule properties and also seeking relief of declaration of title in respect of
plaint „B‟ schedule properties go to show that, Bellamkonda Veeraiah died on
07.03.1941, by possessing plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties by leaving his
23
(2025) 4 SCC 215
wife Hanumayamma and son Seetharamaiah. The plaint averments further
goes to show that the said Seetharamaiah died in the month of September,
1941, and Hanumayamma was alive for a period of 50 years by possessing
the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties, and she enjoyed the rights as widow
of Bellamkonda Veeraiah. As noticed supra, Bellamkonda Hanumayamma
died in the year 1988, i.e., after the commencement of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956. The Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, made an
important departure in that aspect. The said Section provides: "any property
possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the
commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, shall be held by her
a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner".By virtue of the said
provision, Bellamkonda Hanumayamma became the full owner of the property
on that date. From a plain reading of the Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, it is clear that the estate taken by a female Hindu,
under that provision is an absolute one and is not defeasible under any
circumstance. The ambit of that estate cannot be cut by any text, rule or
interpretation of Hindu Law. The presumption of continuity of law is only a rule
of interpretation.The presumption is inoperative, if the language of the
concerned statutory provision is plain and unambiguous. In the case on hand
even as per the own case of plaintiffs, the widow of the deceased
Bellamkonda Veeraiah, by name Hanumayamma was alive for a period of 50
years by possessing plaint "A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties, after the death of her
husband by name Bellamkonda Veeraiah and also her son Seetharamaiah
and Bellamkonda Hanumayamma enjoyed the properties for a period of 50
years as a widow of the deceased Bellamkonda Veeraiah. Shebeing afull
owner of the property, by virtue of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she had
executed the registered gift settlement deeds in favour of the appellant Nos.1
to 4, under Ex.B-9, Ex.B-16 to Ex.B-19, in the year 1983 and the said gift
settlement deeds are not yet challenged by the plaintiffs. Moreover, the
possession of the appellants in the plaint schedule properties for a long period
of more than 25 years prior to institution of the suit, mutation of their names in
the revenue records, issuance of pattadar passbooks and title deed
passbooks in favour of the appellants and the payment of land revenue in
respect of the plaint „A‟ to „C‟ schedule properties by the appellants, is
undisputed by the respondents/plaintiffs.Furthermore, the 7th plaintiff/P.W.2
admitted in his evidence incross-examination itself that the appellants and the
deceased Hanumayamma lived together in the plaint „C‟ schedule properties.
Another admission made by P.W.1 and P.W.2 in their evidence is that they
have not raised any objection before the Revenue authorities for issuance of
pattadar pass books and title deed passbooks in favour of the appellants.
60. The learned First Appellate Judge, without considering the entire
evidence on record in a proper manner and failed to re-appreciate the
evidence in a proper manner came to wrong conclusion and allowed the
appeals filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of 2008. The learned trial Judge on
considering the entire evidence on record had rightly dismissed the suit in
O.S.No.27 of 2008 and decreed the suit filed by Putti Seetharavamma and her
sons vide O.S.No.21 of 2008. The First Appellate Court by applying the
repealed enactment, had decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.27 of
2008 and thereby, the First Appellate Court committed a patent error.
Therefore, the decrees and common judgment passed by the First Appellate
Court in A.S.No.30 of 2013and A.S.No.32 of 2013, are liable to be set-aside
and the decrees and common judgment passed by the trial Court in
O.S.No.27 of 2008 and O.S.No.21 of 2008 are hereby confirmed.
CONTEMPT CASE No.1067 of 2021
In
I.A.No.1 of 2019
In
S.A.No.652 of 2019
61. The contempt petition arises out of an Order dated 31.08.2019, passed
by this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in S.A.No.652 of 2019, under the provisions
of the Contempt of Courts Act r/w Order 39 Rule 2(A) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, as prayed in the affidavit of the petitioner attached to the
Contempt Petition.
62. The brief averments in the affidavit of the 5th petitioner is as follows:
The petitioners herein have filed suit in O.S.No.27 of 2008, on the file of
the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, seeking possession of plaint „A‟ and „C‟
schedule properties andalso to declare the petitioners/plaintiffs and the
defendant No.5 have got the title to the plaint „B‟ schedule property. The trial
Court dismissed the aforesaid suit on 21.02.2012 and against the said
dismissal order, the petitioners herein preferred an appeal vide A.S.No.32 of
2013, on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Guntur. Thereafter, the
First Appellate Court, allowed the appeal on 06.09.2019 and set-aside the
Decree and Judgment dated 21.02.2012, passed by the trial Court in
O.S.No.27 of 2008.
After allowing the first appeal by the First Appellate Court, the
petitioners herein have filed an Execution Petitionvide E.P.No.82 of 2019.
While so, during the pendency of the said E.P., proceedings, the petitioner
herein and others, who are the defendants in the said suit, filed Second
Appeal videS.A.No.652 of 2019. This Court, after considering the judgment
passed by the First Appellate Court, which was decreed in favour of the
petitioners by reversal order, passed an interim order dated 28.01.2020,
initially for a limited period. The interim order dated 28.01.2020, passed by this
Court is extracted hereunder:
"Heard the arguments in-part.
For continuation, post on 05.02.2020.
Learned counsel for the respondents undertakes not to take any coercive steps
in E.P.No.82 of 2019, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, until
hearing of this Interlocutory Application."
The petitioners pleaded that by violating the interim orders
dated 28.01.2020, passed by this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in S.A.No.652 of
2019, the respondents/appellants demolished the existing „C‟ schedule
property (old existing house structure) on 24.11.2020 and started making new
construction and raising ground floor initially and 1st floor in the month of June,
2021, without obtaining permission from the authorities concerned.Therefore,
the petitioners herein have filed complaints before the CRDA.
63. The brief averments in the counter affidavit of the respondent Nos.1 to 4
is as follows:
The respondents herein have filed a suit in O.S.No.21 of 2008, on the
file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, seeking permanent injunction in
respect of the suit schedule property i.e. the plaint „B‟ schedule property and
the petitioners herein have filed O.S.No.27 of 2008, on the file of the Senior
Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, seeking recovery of possession of „A‟ to „C‟ schedule
properties and for permanent injunction in respect of plaint „B‟ schedule
property. The respondents further pleaded that the learned Senior Civil Judge,
Mangalagiri, clubbed both the suits videO.S.No.21 of 2008 and O.S.No.27 of
2008 and conducted a common trial. The learned trial Judge byitsdecree and
common judgment dated 21.02.2012, decreed the suit in O.S.No.21 of 2008 in
favour of the respondents and dismissed the suit in O.S.No.27 of 2008 against
the petitioners herein. The said decree and common judgment dated
21.02.2012, was challenged by some of the petitioners herein vide A.S.No.30
of 2013 and A.S.No.32 of 2013, on the file of the IV Additional District Judge,
Guntur. The First Appellate Court also clubbed both the appeal suits and
allowed them vide decree and common judgment dated 06.09.2019.
The respondents pleaded that they have been in possession and
enjoyment of the scheduled properties of both the suits and their possession
has been protected by the decree & judgment dated 21.02.2012, passed by
the trial Court. The respondents further pleaded that the First Appellate Court
even after allowing both the appeal suits vide A.S.No.30 of 2013 and
A.S.No.32 of 2013, on an application vide I.A.No.1212 of 2019 in A.S.No.32 of
2013, made by the respondents, by an order dated 26.09.2019, has stayed its
own decree and judgment dated 06.09.2019, till 25.10.2019. Thereafter,
challenging the decree and judgment dated 06.09.2019, passed by the First
Appellate Court, the respondents herein have filed S.A.No.652 of 2019 before
this Court. When the matter was taken up for hearing on 15.11.2019, learned
counsel for the petitioners has brought to the notice of this Court that an
Execution Petition was filed by them and the same was not numbered and
undertook that they would not press for any orders in the said Execution
Petition, even if it is numbered till 27.11.2019.
The respondents further pleaded that when the second appeal was
listed on 22.01.2020, this Court observed that there was an undertaking given
by the learned counsel for the respondents therein stating that they would not
press for execution proceedings. Thereafter, when these matters were listed
on 23.01.2020, this Court by framing substantial questions of law, admitted
S.A.No.652 of 2019, in which the decree and judgment dated 21.02.2012,
passed in O.S.No.27 of 2008 is challenged. Learned counsel for the
respondents would contend that in order to protect their properties i.e., a
house which is in dilapidated condition, the respondents herein have
demolished the said house partially and got repaired the existing structure. As
such, the said act of the respondents herein cannot be construed as violation
of the interim orders passed by this Court and the provision under which the
present contempt case is filed i.e., under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not applicable to the present case. Further the
petitioners herein have failed to produce the orders of this Court in restraining
the respondents herein from altering the nature of properties, as such,
requested to dismiss the contempt case.
64. The prayer sought by the petitioner in this contempt petition is to
summon and punish the respondents/contemnors for deliberately and
intentionally violating the interim orders dated 31.08.2019, passed by this
Court in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in S.A.No.652 of 2019, under the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act r/w Order 39, Rule 2(A) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. As seen from the material on record, no such order is
passed by this Court on 31.08.2019, as stated by the petitioners in their
affidavit, in fact the First Appellate Court had disposed of the appeal
proceedings on 06.09.2019.
65. As seen from the copy of the order dated 28.01.2020, filed by the
petitioners, it reads as follows:
"Heard the arguments in-part.
For continuation, post on 05.02.2020.
Learned counsel for the respondents undertakes not to take any coercive steps
in E.P.No.82 of 2019, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, until
hearing of this Interlocutory Application."
66. The aforesaid order dated 28.01.2020, passed by this Court in I.A.No.1
of 2019 in S.A.No.652 of 2019 (copy of the order enclosed along with the
contempt petition) clearly goes to show that the petition in I.A.No.1 of 2019, is
filed by the appellants i.e., the respondents herein to suspend the operation of
the decree and judgment dated 06.09.2019, passed in A.S.No.32 of 2013, on
the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Guntur, wherein the learned counsel
for the plaintiffs i.e., the learned counsel for the petitioners herein undertakes
not to take any coercive steps in E.P.No.82 of 2019, before the learned Senior
Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, filed by the petitioners herein before the executing
Court, therefore, the said I.A.No.1 of 2019 is posted to 05.02.2020 by this
Court. The copy of the order filed by the respondents/appellants dated
12.02.2020, enclosed to the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, wherein
interalia, it was ordered as follows:
"Heard Sri J.Ugra Narasimba, learned counsel representing Sri Kiran
Kumar Vadlamudi, learned counsel for the appellants.
Sri J.Ugra Narasimha, learned counsel represents that steps are being
taken in E.P.No.82 of 2019 now pending on the file of the Court of learned
Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, basing on a decree concerned to this appeal by
the respondents.
In the circumstances stated by the learned counsel and in as much as
learned counsel appearing for the respondents also undertook not to take any
coercive steps in the above E.P. as per the proceedings recorded on 28-01-2020
in this matter, Executing Court is directed not to proceed in E.P.No.82 of 2019 on
its file, till, 18.02.2020.
For hearing the respondents‟ counsel, list the matter on 18-02-2020
along with S.A.No.651 of 2019."
67. The aforesaid order goes to show that an undertaking was given by the
learned counsel for the plaintiffs in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in S.A.No.652 of 2019,
filed by the defendants/appellants. But, no such undertaking was given by the
learned counsel for the alleged contemnors/respondents herein. In fact, no
order has been passed by this Court on 28.01.2020 or on subsequent dates,
restraining the appellants i.e., the alleged contemnors from making any
construction. In fact, the learned counsel for the appellants or the learned
counsel respondents herein/alleged contemnors have not given any
undertaking before this Court that they will not make any further constructions.
An undertaking is given by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in I.A.No.1 of
2019 in S.A.No.652 of 2019, which was filed by the appellants. In fact, this
Court has not passed any injunction by restraining the respondents herein/
alleged contemnors from altering the nature of the properties which are in the
possession of the respondents/alleged contemnors.
68. Admittedly, the first appeal is continuation of the suit proceedings and
the second appeal is also the continuation of the first appeal proceedings. As
stated supra, the First Appellate Court came to a wrong conclusion and
committed an error and allowed the appeal suits. Since the second appeal in
S.A.No.652 of 2019 is allowed by this Court, the impugned judgment and
decree dated 06.09.2019, passed in A.S.No.32 of 2013, by the learned IV
Additional District Judge, Guntur, is liable to be set-aside. Therefore, in view of
the allowing of the second appeal videS.A.No.652 of 2019, there is no
executable decree, since the suit for possession which is filed by the plaintiffs
in O.S.No.27 of 2008 was dismissed by the trial Court which was confirmed by
this Court.In the second appeal proceedings, the decree and judgment of the
First Appellate Court is set-aside and confirmed the decree and judgment
passed by the learned trial Judge in O.S.No.27 of 2008. For the aforesaid
reasons, this Court is inclined to close the present contempt case in view of
the judgment passed by this Court in S.A.No.652 of 2019.
Accordingly, the Contempt Case is closed.
69. In the result, both the second appeals vide S.A.No.651 of 2019 and
S.A.No.652 of 2019 are allowed and the decree and common judgment dated
06.09.2019, passed in A.S.No.30 of 2013 and A.S.No.32 of 2013, by the
learned IV Additional District Judge, Guntur, is hereby set-aside and the
decree and common judgment dated 21.02.2012, passed in O.S.No.21 of
2008 and O.S.No.27 of 2008, by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri,
is hereby confirmed and the Contempt Case is closed. Each party do bear
their own costs in the second appeals.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.
__________________________
V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.
Date: 07.11.2025 SRT 10 HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO SECOND APPEAL Nos.651 and 652 of 2019 and CONTEMPT CASE No.1067 of 2021 In I.A.No.1 of 2019 In S.A.No.652 of 2019 Dt.07.11.2025 SRT