Allahabad High Court
Laxmi Palace (Cinema) Through Its ... vs Presiding Officer, Labour Court, ... on 24 February, 2005
Author: S.N. Srivastava
Bench: S.N. Srivastava
JUDGMENT S.N. Srivastava, J.
1. Subject matter of impugnment in the instant petition is the Award dated 3.6.1995 rendered by the Labour Court Varanasi pursuant to Reference No. 105 of 1992 made under Section 4 K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in which Industrial Dispute referred was "Whether the employers have wrongfully terminated the services of Employee Sri Lalji Pandey son of Sri Dev Nath Pandey, Booking Clerk with effect from 8.12.1990 and if so, what relief/compensation he is entitled to get?"
2. It would appear from the record that the petitioner-employer entered appearance through his representative on 7.7.1992. on which date time was sought to file written statement on behalf of the petitioner employer. On 21.10.1994, time was again granted to the representative of the petitioner fixing 15.12.1994 and again upto 3.2.1995. Again, time was granted on 2.3.1995 fixing 28.4.1995. It would further appear that in the meantime representative of the petitioner reclused himself and as a consequence notice was issued to the petitioner employer on 1.5.1995, which it is alleged was served to the petitioner on 10.5.1995. In this conspectus, the Labour Court proceeded exparte and rendered the award dated 3.6.1995.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned award stating that it is unsustainable on grounds that there is no decision or adjudication even of claims of the workman in the award on merit inasmuch as there is no discussion at all of the materials on record. He further canvassed that even if the Labour Court was inclined to proceed exparte, it was under a duty to analytically examine the materials on record and record reasons for his conclusions. The learned counsel further argued that the award is telescoped into very few paragraphs and contains no discussion on merit and hence, it being not in conformity with the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Rules made there-under , renders itself liable to be quashed. Per contra, Smt. Sarita Jhingan strove hard to prop up the award urging that the Labour Court had repeatedly afforded opportunity from 1992 onwards and being satisfied that the petitioner was evading appearance, was constrained to proceed exparte. She also tried to convince that it was not necessary for the Labour Court to delve into details and ultimately contended that the award was rightly passed.
4. The short and substantial question that crops up for consideration is whether it was incumbent upon the Labour Court to decide the question on merit on the basis of materials on record notwithstanding the fact that the employer had not filed any written statement within the time fixed and there was order of the Labour Court to proceed exparte.
5. In connection with the aforestated question, Rule 16 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 may be referred to. Clause (1) of Rule 16 clearly envisages that if on the date fixed or on any other date to which the hearing maybe adjourned, any party to the proceedings before the Labour Court or Tribunal or an Arbitrator is absent, though duly served with summons or having the notice of date of hearing, the Labour Court or Tribunal or the Arbitrator, as the case may be, may proceed with the case in his absence and pass such order as it may deem fit and property. Rule 10 (9) of the Rules framed under Central Industrial Disputes, bears close similarity with the provisions of Rule 16 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 and mandates on similar lines. There is no gain-saying that the Labour Court is invested with power to proceed exparte in the circumstances embodied therein but the question remains whether the award which is not supported with reasons or discussion could have the complexion of an award on merit. In connection with this question, I would first delve into the cases cited across the bar.
6. The first case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25. In this case, the Apex Court held that the onus was on claimant to prove by leading evidence that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination and filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to, the conclusion that a workman had in fact worked for 240 days in a year. The next case relied Upon is C & M.D. Tamin Ltd v. P.O., Indl. Tribunal, 2001-1-LLJ. In the case the crux of what has been held is that the adjudicatory forum should take into consideration the statements filed by the party, which remained exparte, and only on the comparative merits of the claims and counter claims an exparte award has to be passed. It was further observed that it is clear that the exparte award passed without considering the contentions raised in the counter statement filed before the conciliation Officer or before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal would not be valid.
7. In Anil Sood v. Presiding officer, Labour Court II, 2001 (89) FLR 229 the Apex Court held that the power to proceed exparte is available under Rule 22 of the Central Rules which also includes the power to inquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing and if there is sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then if the party is visited with an award without a notice which his a nullity and therefore, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside the exparte award.
8. The last decision is Agra Electric Supply Company v. Labour Court, Meerut, AIR 1970 SC 806 the quintessence of what has been held by the Apex Court is that the provisions clearly indicate that the Tribunal or Labour Court should take up the case and decide it on merits and not dismiss it for default.
9. It has been postulated both by the Apex Court and various High Courts in a catena of decisions that failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. In Rural Regional Bank and Anr. v. Munna Lal Jain (2005) AIR SCW 95, the Apex Court elaborated that reasons are live links between the mind of the decisions taker to the controversy and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the inscrutable face of the sphinx, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The inscrutable face of a sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.
10. Reverting to the case in hand, it is luculent from a bare perusal that the award consists of four paragraphs. The first paragraph contains details of parties and dispute referred to it. The second and third paragraphs deal with the dates fixed in the case in labour court. The fourth and last paragraph contains conclusion. The decisions discussed above, do point to the requirements of taking into consideration the statements filed by the party and it is only on comparative merits of claims and counter claims that an exparte award has to be passed and any exparte award filed without discussing the claim and counter claims of the parties would not be valid. In the instant case, the Labour Court merely laid out factual aspects and jumped to the conclusion that the workman was illegally terminated and was liable to be reinstated in service. The requirement of law envisaged for quasi judicial authority such as tribunal is that the approach should be one simulating the judicial standard and it must receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts germane and relevant to the facts in issue and inference to form conclusion has to be drawn in conformity with the judicial norms. In substance, the approach of the Labour Court should be judicious. It transpires from a perusal of the award that the Labour Court has not discussed the materials on record nor it tried to discuss the question for inference how the termination order was illegal on the basis of materials on record. The least that was expected of labour court was to discuss the claims of the workman simulating the judicial standard in case it was constrained to proceed exparte in the facts and circumstances of the case i.e. to have analytically examined the merit of the claims and recorded his satisfaction with reference to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well enunciated by catena of decisions that the decision on merit must have its genesis on material facts on record and the authority is not permitted to traverse beyond the facts on record to draw inference and make out a case of subjective satisfaction for his conclusions. What operated in the mind of the authority remained entombed and there is no discussion to articulate the view that the workman was illegally fired away and was entitled to reinstatement. It is therefore explicit from the award that the award was rendered without application of mind and it cannot be given the complexion of an award on merit. The award being bereft of any discussion on merit even of claims of the workman thus, non-application of mind is conspicuously discernible in the order.
11. As a result of foregoing discussion, the award under challenge cannot be sustained in law. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed and in consequence, the award dated 3.6.95 is quashed. In view of above discussion, the matter is relegated to the Labour court for decision afresh after affording opportunity to the petitioner-employer for filing written statement within a period of one month which period would commence to run from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. It is expected that the Labour Court shall complete evidence within two months thereafter and pass appropriate orders expeditiously in accordance with law.