Punjab-Haryana High Court
Punjab Agro Foodgrains Corporation ... vs Harshit Rice And General Mills And ... on 27 February, 2026
Author: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
Bench: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
CR-1423-2026 -1-
113
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CR-1423-2026
Date of decision: 27.02.2026
PUNJAB AGRO FOODGRAINS CORPORATION LIMITED
...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S HARSHIT RICE AND GENERAL MILLS AND ANOTHER
...Respondent(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI
Present:- Mr. Somesh Gupta, Advocate
for the petitioner.
****
JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J. (Oral)
1. The present Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the order dated 31.01.2026 (Annexure P-8) passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator, vide which the application of the petitioner seeking permission to lead additional evidence has been dismissed being not maintainable.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the dispute between the parties is pending before the learned Sole Arbitrator and the petitioner, who is the claimant in the arbitral proceedings had filed an application seeking permission to lead additional evidence by taking various grounds but the same has been dismissed by the learned Sole Arbitrator vide impugned order dated 31.01.2026 (Annexure P-8). He further submitted that there was a necessity to lead additional evidence because the grounds which 1 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:36 ::: CR-1423-2026 -2- were taken relate to the core controversy involved in the dispute pending before the learned Sole Arbitrator. He further submitted that the relevant record is with the third Agency i.e. the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and since the said record is directly connected with the controversy involved, the application seeking permission to lead additional evidence was required to have been allowed by the learned Sole Arbitrator and therefore, the aforesaid impugned order passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator is erroneous. He also submitted that since the impugned order has been passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator before whom the arbitral proceedings are pending, the petitioner has preferred the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking setting aside of the said order.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. The petitioner seeks to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by filing the present Civil Revision Petition. The dispute between the parties is already pending adjudication before the learned Sole Arbitrator, wherein an application filed by the petitioner/claimant seeking permission to lead additional evidence was dismissed. A perusal of the aforesaid impugned order shows that the same is a detailed order passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator.
5. During the course of arguments, a query was raised to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to how the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable or entertainable before this Court, to which he could not offer any answer. Therefore, this Court would proceed on the basis of the settled law in this regard.
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6. A Seven Judge Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s SBP & Co. versus Patel Engineering Ltd. & Another, (2005) 8 SCC 618 while dealing with the nature of the orders passed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act discussed the scope of judicial intervention in paras No.45, 46 & 47(vi) of the judgment. It was so observed that Arbitral Tribunal is a creation of an Agreement between the parties even though it is constituted on the basis of order passed by the Chief Justice/High Court if any occasion arises but the parties submit themselves to the Arbitrator on the basis of Agreement between the parties which is therefore contractual in nature. Rationale and objective of minimising the judicial intervention was also discussed. In the concluding part, it was so observed that once the matter reaches Arbitral Tribunal or Sole Arbitrator then the High Court would not interfere with the order passed by Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the Court only in terms of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Paras No.45, 46 & 47(vi) are reproduced as under:-
"45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the Arbitral Tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating its grievances against the award including any in- between orders that might have been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed 3 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -4- by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal is, after all, a creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though, if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the Arbitral Tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible.
46. The object of minimising judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 or under Article 226 of the Constitution against every order made by the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the Arbitral Tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage.
47. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions as follows:
(i) to (v) xx xx xx xx
(vi) Once the matter reaches the Arbitral Tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with the orders passed by the arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the Court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. (vii) to (xii) xx xx xx xx"
7. In M/s Deep Industries Limited versus Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and another, 2020 (15) SCC 706 order passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act for staying the 4 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -5- black-listing order was challenged before the learned City Civil Court which dismissed the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. This order under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act was challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and it was allowed by the High Court and the order of the City Civil Court was set aside. Thereafter, the Contractor assailed the same before Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. Argument was raised regarding the maintainability of filing the said petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by referring to Section 5 of the Arbitration Act as well as the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s SBP & Company versus Patel Engineering Ltd. & Another's case (Supra). Another argument was also raised by the appellant that it was not a case of lack of jurisdiction. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that against the order of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, no petition under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India can be filed. It was further held that although Article 227 of the Constitution of India remained untouched by the provisions of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act but it is only when the orders that lack patent inherent jurisdiction that the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. It was also discussed that the legislative policy pertaining to general revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure that revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies only against the final order and not against the interlocutory orders, is also relevant. In the present petition as well, the impugned orders are not the final orders and are only interlocutory or procedural orders. Para Nos.16, 17 & 24 are reproduced as under:-
"16. Most significant of all is the non-obstante clause contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything
5 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -6- contained in any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal against certain judgments and orders and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed (See Section 37(2) of the Act)
17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non-obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us herein above so that interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.
xx xx xx xx
24. Mr Rohatgi is also correct in pointing out that the legislative policy qua the general revisional jurisdiction that is contained by the amendments made to Section 115 CPC should also be kept in mind when the High Courts dispose of petitions filed under Article 227. The legislative policy is that no revision lies if an alternative remedy of appeal is available. Further, even when a revision does lie, it lies only against a final disposal of the entire matter and not against interlocutory orders. These amendments were considered in Tek Singh v. Shashi Verma 18 in 6 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -7- which this Court adverted to these amendments and then stated:
(SCC p. 681, paras 5-6) "5. ......A reading of this proviso will show that, after 1999, revision petitions filed under Section 115 CPC are not maintainable against interlocutory orders.
6. .....Even otherwise, it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is to be exercised to correct jurisdictional errors only. This is well settled. In DLF Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh 19 this Court held: (SCC pp. 811-12, para 5) "5. ...The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision. and not to errors
7 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -8- either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power under Section 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on revision under Section 115 of the Code when there was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal."
8. In Bhaven Construction through Authorized Signatory Premji Bhai K. Shah versus Executive Engineers, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and another, (2022) 1 SCC 75 an application was filed before learned Arbitrator under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act disputing the appointment of Sole Arbitrator. Against the aforesaid order in the application of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India was filed in the High Court and the learned Single Judge dismissed the same. However, on assailing the same by filing a Letter Patent Appeal, it was allowed and thereafter, an SLP was filed, wherein it was observed that in exceptional rarity when a party is left remediless under a statute or there is a clear bad faith then the provisions of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India can be resorted. Para Nos.11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19 & 20 are reproduced as under:-
11. Having heard both the parties and perusing the material available on record, the question which needs to be 8 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -9- answered is whether the arbitral process could be interfered under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, and under what circumstance?
12. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in itself. This phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has definite legal consequences. One such consequence is spelled out under section 5 of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under
"5. Extent of judicial intervention.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part."
(emphasis supplied) The non-obstante clause is provided to uphold the intention of the legislature as provided in the Preamble to adopt UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, to reduce excessive judicial interference which is not contemplated under the Arbitration Act.
13. The Arbitration Act itself gives various procedures and forums to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator. The framework clearly portrays an intention to address most of the issues within the ambit of the Act itself, without there being scope for any extra statutory mechanism to provide just and fair solutions.
14. Any party can enter into an arbitration agreement for resolving any disputes capable of being arbitrable. Parties, while entering into such agreements, need to fulfil the basic ingredients provided under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. Arbitration being a creature of contract, gives a flexible framework for the parties to agree for their own procedure with minimalistic stipulations under the Arbitration Act.
xx xx xx xx
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18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework, mandates that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a Constitutional right. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Association of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court referred to several judgments and held:
"11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation - L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261. However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation."
(emphasis supplied) It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion to allow judicial interference beyond the 10 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -11- procedure established under the enactment. This power needs to be exercised in exceptional rarity, wherein one party is left remediless under the statute or a clear 'bad faith' shown by one of the parties. This high standard set by this Court is in terms of the legislative intention to make the arbitration fair and efficient.
19. In this context we may observe Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC wherein interplay of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act and Article 227 of the Constitution was analysed as under: (SCC p. 714, paras 16-17) "16. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal against certain judgments and orders and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed [see Section 37(2) of the Act].
17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions can be filed under Article 11 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -12- 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us hereinabove so that interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction."
(emphasis supplied)
20. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to show exceptional circumstance or "bad faith" on the part of the appellant, to invoke the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution. No doubt the ambit of Article 227 is broad and pervasive, however, the High Court should not have used its inherent power to interject the arbitral process at this stage. It is brought to our notice that subsequent to the impugned order of the sole arbitrator, a final award was rendered by him on merits, which is challenged by Respondent 1 in a separate Section 34 application, which is pending."
9. Another Seven Judges Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, in Re:, (2024) 6 SCC 1 again while largely dealing with provisions of Section 11 of the Arbitration Act also discussed the provision of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act.
It was observed that one of the objectives of the Arbitration Act was to minimize the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitration proceedings. The principle of minimum judicial interference was also discussed and it was so observed that the principle of judicial non-interference in arbitration proceedings respects the autonomy of the parties to determine the arbitral 12 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -13- procedures and this principle has also been incorporated in international instruments, including the New York Convention and the Model Law. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that one of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act is to minimize the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process and party autonomy and settlement of disputes by an arbitral tribunal are the hallmarks of arbitration law. Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to have their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick, efficient, and effective manner by minimizing judicial interference in the arbitral proceedings and the Parliament has enacted Section 5 to minimize the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process to the bare minimum and only to the extent "so provided"
under the Part-I of Arbitration Act. Para Nos.76, 81, 82 and 186 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
"76. The principle of judicial non-interference in arbitral proceedings is fundamental to both domestic as well as international commercial arbitration. The principle entails that the arbitral proceedings are carried out pursuant to the agreement of the parties or under the direction of the tribunal without unnecessary interference by the national courts.61 This principle serves to proscribe judicial interference in arbitral proceedings, which would undermine the objective of the parties in agreeing to arbitrate their disputes, their desire for less formal and more flexible procedures, and their desire for neutral and expert arbitral procedures.62 The principle of judicial non- interference in arbitral proceedings respects the autonomy of the parties to determine the arbitral procedures. This principle has also been incorporated in international instruments, including the New York Convention and the Model Law.
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81. One of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act is to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process. Party autonomy and settlement of disputes by an arbitral tribunal are the hallmarks of arbitration law. Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to have their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick, efficient, and effective manner by minimizing judicial interference in the arbitral proceedings. Parliament enacted Section 5 to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process to the bare minimum, and only to the extent so provided" under the Part I of Arbitration. In doing so, the legislature did not altogether exclude the role of courts or judicial authorities in arbitral proceedings, but limited it to circumstances where the support of judicial authorities is required for the successful implementation and enforcement of the arbitral process. The Arbitration Act envisages the role of courts to "support arbitration process" by providing necessary aid and assistance when required by law in certain situations.
82. Section 5 begins with the expression "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force." The non-obstante clause is Parliament's addition to the Article 5 of the Model Law. It is of a wide amplitude and sets forth the legislative intent of limiting judicial intervention during the arbitral process. In the context of Section 5, this means that the provisions contained in Part I of the Arbitration Act ought to be given full effect and operation irrespective of any other law for the time being in force. It is now an established proposition of law that the legislature uses non-obstante clauses to remove all obstructions which might arise out of the provisions of any 14 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -15- other law, which stand in the way of the operation of the legislation which incorporates the non-obstante clause.
xx xx xx xx
186. Section 5 is effectively rendered otiose by the interpretation given to it in N.N. Global (2). The Court failed to provide a reason for holding that Section 5 of the Arbitration Act does not have the effect of excluding the operation of Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act in proceedings under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. The non obstante clause in Section 5 does precisely this. In addition to the effect of the non obstante clause, the Arbitration Act is a special law. We must also be cognizant of the fact that one of objectives of the Arbitration Act was to minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process."
10. The doctrine of minimal judicial intervention is not only a well-
accepted principle but is also a statutory provision under Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The said principle of minimal judicial intervention has been acknowledged and well-accepted by Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above.
11. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is reproduced as under:-
"5. Extent of judicial intervention.--Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part."
12. This Court also had an occasion to deal with the aforesaid proposition of law in Jalandhar Improvement Trust and others versus Shourya Towers Private Limited, CR-6014-2025, decided on 06.11.2025. The 15 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -16- relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment passed by this Court is also reproduced as under:-
"42. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments has given large impetus to the provision of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act which provides for a non obstante clause. This is so clear from both the judgments passed by Seven-Judges Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s SBP & Company Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Another's case (Supra) and Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, in Re:
(Supra). On the proposition of law with regard to the judicial interference, both the learned Senior Counsels for the parties have not disputed that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be taken away even if there is a contrary provision in any statute. However, it was the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that it was not a case of maintainability of the present revision but it is a case of entertainability of the present petition in the facts and circumstances of the present case because with the operation of the provisions of Section 23(4) of the Arbitration Act, the aforesaid right had to be forfeited by the operation of law and this was precisely what was done by learned Arbitral Tribunal.
43. In M/s Deep Industries Limited's case (Supra) which was referred to by both the learned Senior Counsels for the parties, it was a case of an order being passed under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act by the learned Arbitral Tribunal against which an appeal was filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act and that order under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act was challenged under Article 227 of the 16 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -17- Constitution of India which was allowed by the High Court and the order of the City Civil Court was set aside. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that Article 227 of the Constitution of India remained untouched by Section 5 of the Arbitration Act but the provision of Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked only when there is patent lack of inherent jurisdiction. Similarly, in Bhaven Construction's case (Supra), again it was so held that it is only in exceptional rarity that the party is left remediless or there is clear bad faith only then intervention can be done under Article 227 of the Constitution of India."
13. The facts and circumstances of the present case would show that the petitioner/claimant had filed an application seeking permission to lead additional evidence, which was dismissed by the learned Sole Arbitrator and thereafter, the petitioner has straightaway filed the present petition before this Court. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that none of the aforementioned parameters are fulfilled as neither has any jurisdictional error been committed by the learned Sole Arbitrator nor does the matter fall within the category of exceptional rarity and therefore, entertaining such a petition would be contrary to the basic spirit of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 relating to minimal judicial intervention and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as aforesaid.
14. Consequently, the present Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand). The petitioner is hereby directed to deposit the aforesaid costs with the High Court Legal Services Committee, within a period of three months from today and thereafter, furnish the receipt of such deposit to the Registry of the Court. In case the aforesaid costs are not 17 of 18 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 01:16:37 ::: CR-1423-2026 -18- deposited by the petitioner within the stipulated period, then this Court will further proceed in accordance with law, including recovery of the same as arrears of land revenue and if the receipt of the aforesaid costs is not furnished by the petitioner to the Registry of the Court within three months, then the Registry shall list this case for compliance purposes after three months.
(JASGURPREET SINGH PURI)
27.02.2026 JUDGE
Chetan Thakur
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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