Delhi District Court
Petitioners No. 2 vs Mrs. Praveen Bhalla on 31 March, 2015
IN THE COURT OF NAVEEN K. KASHYAP, COMMERCIAL CIVIL
JUDGE-CUM-ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER (WEST), TIS
HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
E. No-55/2014
1. Mr. Rakesh Ahuja
S/o Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja
A-2/45, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027.
2. Dr. (Mrs.) Ashima Darshana Mehta
W/o Dr. Yash Bir Mehta
D/o Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja
A-2/45, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027.
3. Mrs. Rani Ahluwalia
W/o Major (Retd.) Y.K. Ahluwalia,
D/o Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja
A-2/45, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027.
4. Dr. (Mrs.) Shanta Chawla
W/o Dr. Harish Chander Chawla
D/o Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja
A-2/45, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027.
5. Mrs. Usha Dunn
W/o Dr. Charles Dunn
D/o Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja
A-2/45, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027.
6. Mrs. Satish Dolly Phadke
W/o Late Mr. Mukund Phadke
D/o Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja
A-2/45, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027.
7. Ms. Parnita Ahuja
W/o Late Sh. Ravinder Kr. Ahuja
A-2/45, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027.
E-55/2014 Page 1 of 18
Petitioners No. 2,3,4,5,6 and 7 represented through
their Duly Constituted Attorney Mr. Rakesh Ahuja,
Petitioner No. 1.
..... Petitioners.
Versus
Mrs. Praveen Bhalla
W/o Late Shri Roop Lal Bhalla
A-2/45, Ground Floor,
Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027.
..... Respondent
Date of institution : 22.05.2014
Date of order : 31.03.2015
ORDER
1. The present petition is filed under section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act for eviction of the respondent from the premises/one shop measuring about 110 sqr. ft. on ground floor of property bearing no. A-2/45, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi-27 as shown in red in the site plan filed on record later on (hereinafter referred as tenanted suit premises), is filed on the ground of bonafide residential requirement of petitioners.
2. Vide this order, the Leave to Defend Application filed by respondent is decided.
3. The facts in brief, as stated in the petition, are that at present tenanted suit premises is lying locked and is not in use since 2010 and the same has been sublet illegally to M/s Bhalla Estates Pvt. Ltd. It is further stated that premises in question can be used for residential/ mix land use/ non residential purpose. It is further stated that current rate of rent is Rs. 400/- per month. That property was constructed after allotment in 1953. It is further stated that tenanted suit premises was originally let out to Late Mr. Tara Chand Bhalla in the year 1970 for commercial E-55/2014 Page 2 of 18 purpose at monthly rent of Rs. 155/- per month. After the death of Sh. Tara Chand Bhalla, his son Sh. Roop Lal Bhalla also expired in the year 2009. As such tenancy rights have been assumed by his wife/ respondent Mrs. Parveen Bhalla.
It is further stated that petitioners' father late Sh. D.C. Ajuha was the original owner of the building admeasuring about 297 sqr. yards in which tenanted suit premises is located. Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja purchased the same in the year 1953. Thereafter, he constructed a drawing room, three bed rooms, kitchen, store, two toilets, one bathroom and an attached garrage in the same. Later, in the year 1970 the building was expanded by adding drawing room, kitchen, two toilets, one bathroom and three bed rooms on the ground floor. One of the bed room was opened to create a separate entrance from outside and a partition wall was built from inside. Further, two bedrooms, one kitchen and one toilet/ bathroom were also constructed on the first floor.
That thereafter Mr. D.C. Ahuja passed away in the year 1972 and the whole building in question was transferred in favour of his wife Smt. Parkash Rani Ahuja by virtue of a Will executed by Sh. D.C. Ahuja. And further the whole building also stand mutated in the record of the MCD in the year 1987.
Thereafter vide a Registered gift deed dated 18/11/2011 executed by Smt. Parkash Rani Ahuja, she gifted the entire building to her seven children. That out of such seven children, one Sh. Ravinder Kumar Ahuja passed away on 28/10/2013 leaving behind his legal heirs Smt. Parnita Ahuja (wife), Ms. Amy Abha Ahuja (daughter) and Ms. Natasha Richa (daughter). Later, Ms. Amy Abha Ahuja (daughter) and Ms. Natasha Richa (daughter), relingquised their shares in favour of their mother Smt. Parnita Ahuja who is petitioner no. 7. As such the present seven petitioners are the children/LRs of one child of Smt. Parkash Rani Ahuja, who are also the children/LRs of original owner Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja.
E-55/2014 Page 3 of 18It is further submitted that petitioner no. 1 to 6 are aged between 58 years to 72 years. It is further stated that in the years 2011 their monther Smt. Parkash Rani Ahuja expressed her wish and desire. Her wish is to reside with all her chidlren in the suit property in her twilight years and advance ages of children, as she was emotionally attached to the suit premises. It is further stated that present construction of the suit premises is not enough to house to seven families of the petitioner, therefore, they require the entire suit premises to make sufficient special amenities to house the seven families. As such it is stated that petitioners required the entire building including the tenanted suit premises for their bonafide personal joint occupation by seven families and self use.
It is further diclosed that petitioners have also filed simultaneously an another similar petition against another shop in the same building.
It is further disclosed that petitioners do not have any other suitable alternative accommodation in Delhi.
4. Notice of the eviction petition was sent to the respondent. In response to which she filed leave to defend application along with affidavit dated 07/06/2014 filed on 07/06/2014 itself.
5. In nutshell, in his leave to defend application, as also argued by his learned counsel, it is claimed that respondent has raised many triable issues which are discussed in detail at appropriate stage later on.
6. In their reply coupled with counter affidavit dated 18/09/2014, the petitioner denied as well as explained the allegations made by the respondent and reaffirmed their stand taken in the main petition.
7. Further, thereafter respondent even filed her rejoinder affidavit dated 23/01/2015 to her leave to defend application.
E-55/2014 Page 4 of 188. I have heard Ld. Counsels for the parties at length on the leave to defend application. Further, I have gone through the records carefully.
THE LAW:
9. Before proceeding further it would be worthwhile to state that Chapter IIIA of Delhi Rent Control Act deals with summary trial of certain applications expressly stating that every application by a landlord for recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, or under Section 14A or 14B or 14C or 14D shall be dealt with in accordance with the special provisions prescribed in Section 25B of the Act. The provisions in Chap. IIIA confer a real, effective and immediate right to obtain possession by confining the trial only to such cases where the tenant has such a defence as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction under s.l4(1)(e) or under s. 14A. Chap. IIIA seeks to strike a balance between the competing needs of a landlord and a tenant and has therefore provided that the tenant shall have a right to apply for leave to contest. As per the broad scheme of this Chapter a tenant is precluded from contesting an application filed for eviction on the grounds mentioned in the aforementioned provisions unless he obtains leave from the Controller to contest the eviction petition. In default of obtaining leave to defend or leave is refused to him an order of eviction follows. It appears recourse to summary trial is adopted having due regard to nature of the grounds on which the eviction is sought with a view to avoid delay so that the landlord should not be deprived or denied of his right to immediate possession of premises for his bona fide use. The defence must also be bonafide and if true, must result in the dismissal of landlord's application. Defences of negative character which are intended to put the landlord to proof or are vague, or are raised mala fide only to gain time and protract the proceedings, are not of the kind which will entitle the tenant to the grant of leave. The Controller cannot set down the application for hearing E-55/2014 Page 5 of 18 without making an order in terms of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B. The trial must be confined only to such grounds as would disentitle the landlord to any relief.
10. A landlord, who bona fidely requires a premises for his residence and occupation should not suffer for long waiting for eviction of a tenant. At the same time, a tenant cannot be thrown out from a premises summarily even though prima -facie he is able to say that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide or untenable and as such not entitled to obtain an order of eviction. Hence, the approach has to be cautious and judicious in granting or refusing leave to defend to a tenant to contest an eviction petition within the broad scheme of Chapter IIIA and in particular having regard to the clear terms and language of Section 25B(5) of DRC Act.
11. Further, it is pertinent to note that the scope of the Section 14(1)(e) D.R.C. Act has been enlarged in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as "Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India" [AIR 2008 SC 3148]; so as to include premises let out for commercial purposes also within the scope and ambit of a petition under section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act.
THE FINDINGS:
12. With this background, this court turns to the facts of the case in hand. The respondent has raised many issues in the leave to defend application which have been stated to be triable issues. Same are dealt one by one. At this stage, it would be appropriate to note that each individual petition decision depends on the peculiar facts, circumstances and material placed on record in that particular petition. Alongwith present petition the same petitioners have also filed another petitioner bearing E. no. 56/2014 on the same ground against another tenant. But many of the factual defences raised by respondent in that petition no-56/2014 are not raised by the respondent of present petition. As such E-55/2014 Page 6 of 18 the present petition is dealt accordingly based on the factual defences raised in this petition.
13. The respondent has contended that no material is brought on record to show that petitioners are owners of tenanted suit premises.
14. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. In "M.M.Quasim Vs Manohar Lal Sharma" [(1981) 3 SCC 36]; it was observed by the Apex Court that an "owner-landlord" can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own. It was observed in "Shanti Sharma Vs. Smt Ved Prabha" [AIR 1987 SC 2028]; that the term "owner" has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. The Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But, at the same time, it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds. Ordinarily, the concept of the ownership may be absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereon. But in the modern context, where all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Government or the authorities constituted by the State. The legislature, when it used the term "owner" in s. 14(1)(e), did not think of ownership as absolute ownership. The meaning of the term "owner" is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. In "Smt. Narender Kaur vs. Mahesh Chand & Sons (HUF)" [R.C.REV.29/2012 decided on 17.08.2012, decided by Hob'ble Delhi High Court]; it has been held that it E-55/2014 Page 7 of 18 does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner-tenant to question the ownership of the respondent over the suit property, when rent is being paid. The object of the requirement contained in Clause (e), that the petitioner should be owner of the premises, is not to provide an additional ground to the tenant to delay the proceedings by simply denying ownership of the landlord of the premises and thereby putting him to proof by way of full fledged trial. The object is to ensure that the provision is not misused by people having no legal right or interest in the premises. The proceedings under the Act cannot be converted and utilized by a tenant to prevent eviction merely on the ground that he seeks to cast doubt on the title of the property, which has been acquired, when there is really no one else claiming right to the property.
15. In any case, the present contention of the respondent is also factual incorrect, as in the present petition the petitioners have placed on record a duly registered gift deed in their favor.
In this regard it is pertinent to note that it was held in "Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & Ors." [155(2008) DLT 383] that only those averments in the affidavit are to be considered by the Rent Controller which have same substance in it and are supported by some material. Mere assertions made by a tenant in respect of landlord are not to be considered sufficient for grant of leave to defend. Thus, the assertion being totally bland and unsubstantiated is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.
Furthermore, in the present case not only the co-owners to whose share the property has fallen, but all the co-owners have been joined as petitioners and hence it does not lie in the mouth of the tenant to raise any objection to the same.
Therefore, in view of above mentioned position of law, the present contention of the respondent does not raise any triable issue of such a E-55/2014 Page 8 of 18 nature that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises.
16. It is further argued by the respondent side that petitioners have not filed the reconstruction plan of building in question
17. On the other hand, learned counsel for petitioner has vehemently denied the same. It is submitted that case of petitioners is of bonafide requirement and petition is filed due to insufficiency of accommodation for joint occupation by all the petitioners. It is further argued that the basis of present petition is not reconstruction or modification, but bonafide requirement of petitioners.
18. On a bare reading of present main petition it is clear that petitioners are saying that after getting the physical possession of the tenanted suit premises they want to make sufficient special amenities in the building in which the tenanted suit premises is situated so as to house seven families and to earmark specific separate accommodation for such seven petitioners. Thus, there is no question of submission of re- construction plans.
19. Further, on the lines of arguments of Ld. Counsel for respondent in connected petitioner no-56/2014, it is further argued by learned counsel for respondent that present petition is barred under section 14 (6) of DRC Act. In this regard it is submitted by respondent that as per the admitted case of petitioners, earlier petitioners' mother was the owner. That as per petitioners themselves by virtue of a gift deed dated 18/11/2011, she transferred the building in question to the present petitioners. It is further claimed that such gift deed is neither in furtherence of any family settlement, partition or relinquishment, as such it is a clear cut case of transfer of property by existing owner to new co-owners. Further, such new co-owners were not having any kind of right, title and interest in the property in question prior to such gift deed.
E-55/2014 Page 9 of 1820. On the other hand, it is argued by learned counsel for petitioner that such contentions of respondent is vehemently denied by petitioner side. It is specifically denied that gift deed in question in favour of petitioners by their mother is a sham document or the same is hit by the provision of section 14 (6) of DRC Act. It is further denied that such gift deed amounts to transfer of property by an existing owner in favour of new owner falling under section 14 (6) of DRC Act. And in this regard it is submitted that all the petitioner are the successor in interest of original owner Late Sh. D.C. Ahuja as well as Smt. Prakash Rani Ahuja being their sole succeeding legal heirs.
21. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "V. N. Sarin vs. Major Ajit Kumar Poplai" (1966 SCR (1) 349), the question of receiving share by coparceners as a result of partition in the context of the bar under section 14 (6) of DRC Act was involved. It was held that same does not amount to "transfer" for the purpose of section 14 (6) DRC Act.
22. Further, having regard to the object of section 14 (6) of DRC Act and mischief which it wants to address, in the considered view of this court, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this petition getting the ownership of suit property by way of gift deed from their mother by the present petitioners within the period of five years from the date of filing the present petition, is not hit by the bar of section 14 (6) of DRC Act. The petitioners are the natural class one legal heirs of Smt. Prakash Rani Ahuja. Therefore, even otherwise such petitioners are entitled to such property after demise of Smt. Prakash Rani Ahuja. Further, in view of this court, the mischief which sought to be addressed by section 14 (6) is that the property should not be transferred by a previous owner, who does not have a case/requirement in terms of section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act to an unknown new owner, who may have such requirement in terms of section 14 (1)(e) of DRC Act. Therefore, a "cooling off" period of five years is given. But such are not the fact in present case. In fact, the facts of the E-55/2014 Page 10 of 18 present case are more akin to the situation as dealt in V.N. Sarin (Supra).
Further, while referring to a previous judgment of the Hon'ble High Court, in Hindustan Liver Ltd. vs. Smt. Rajeshwari Pandey [75(1998) DLT238]; it was observed that in earlier judgment of "Dr. R.C. Sakhuja vs. R.P. Kohli" (1970(2)RCR 226), it was held that devolution of property in the normal way of succession, whether testamentary or non testamentary, was not intended to be covered by the expression "aquired by transfer" as used in section 14 (6) of DRC Act. Therefore, the present contention of respondent does not raise any triable issue of such a nature that would disentitle the petitioners from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises.
23. It is further argued by learned counsel for respondent that all the petitioners are well settled and are not dependent on Smt. Parkash Rani Ahuja. It is further stated that Smt. Parkash Rani Ahuja is old and a permanent resident of USA. It is further argued that all the petitioner except the petitioner no. 3 are permanent resident of USA. It is further stated that as such their family members would also be the citizen of USA. It is further argued that the petitioners have not placed on record any document or application in furtherence of their desire to shift to India. Further, no attempts made by petitioners to shift to the portion already in their possession.
24. On the other hand, all such contentions are vehemently denied by the petitioners' side in detail. The petitioners have given details of their plan for shifting to India in affdavit to reply to leave to defend application. It is further argued by learned counsel for petitioners that all the petitioners are either already retired or approching retirement age. Therefore, question of work permit is not relevant for the purpose of present petition.
E-55/2014 Page 11 of 1825. In fact as also observed by the Hon'ble Higher Courts, there is nothing unnatural if in their old age the petitioner, who are in their mid 50-60s, as well as their mother wants to shift back to their country of origin and spend their rest of life in India in the feg and of their lives. In fact it is quite natural.
26. In fact, in the judgment tiled as "Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd." [AIR 1999 S.C. 100] it was held:
"...The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide."
27. It is further argued by the respondent side that petition is vague with respect to requirement of petitioners. It is further submitted that petitioners failed to give the details of families of petitioners. It is further stated that whole of the building is constructed in 300 sqr. yards having two complete floor construction. It is further claimed that petitioners have got sufficient reasonable alternative accommodation as the plot, in which tenanted suit property situated, is of 300 sqr. yards and there is sufficient rooms in the same.
28. On the other hand, the petitioners' side has strongly denied such contentions in detail. It is argued by ld. Counsel for petitioner that bonafide requirement of petitioners is amply stated in the main petition itself. It is further submitted that basis of requirement is the need for seven families as well as their mother to reside in the building in question in which tenanted suit premises is situated in consonance with their accustomed stature and life style.
E-55/2014 Page 12 of 1829. This court finds, such argument is made without any basis by respondent side. On a bare reading of main petition read with the reply to leave to defend application, it is clear that details of the residential requirement of petitioners is given in detail. Further, in any case, it is not disputed by respondent side that petitioners are seven separate families.
30. In fact in the judgment titled as "Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinary" [AIR 2000 S.C.534]; the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Similar observations have been made by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in "Shri Gurucharan Lal Kumar vs. Srimati Satya Wati" [2013(2) RCR (Rent) 120]; "Surinder Singh vs. Jasbir Singh"
[172 (2010) DLT 611].
Further, in "Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal and Others" [(2005) 8 SCC 252]; it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that it does not lie with the respondent to determine the requirement of the petitioners who are the owners/landlords.
31. Therefore, having regard to the accommodation mentioned in the main petition itself it is very much clear that tenanted suit premises are also required to accommodate such families. Therefore, the present contention of respondent does not raise any triable issue of such a nature that would disentitle the petitioners from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises.
32. It is further argued by respondent side that need expressed by petitioners and the background thereof is totally false and frivolous and contrary to documents. In this regard it is claimed that although in the petition, the petitioner stated that Smt. Parkash Rani Ahuja expressed her desire to shift to suit property in the year 2011 along with all petitioners but in the gift deed executed by her, there is no mention of E-55/2014 Page 13 of 18 such desire. It is further claimed that on the contrary right to sale etc. is given to the petitioners.
33. On the other hand, it is petitioners side who vehemently opposed such allegations.
34. There is no legal requirement for stating such desire to shift to suit property in the gift deed in question by Smt. Prakash Rani Ahuja. Further, in fact in case in such gift deed would have barred the petitioners from further transfer of the suit premises, then the same would have been contrary to the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and bad in law to that extent.
35. Further, respondent side contended that the petitioners with malafide intention want to get vacated the tenanted shop from the respondent and then to re-let the same to the new tenant for earning handsome amount.
36. On the other hand, the same has been vehemently denied by the petitioners.
37. It is held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi way back in "Vinod Kumar Bhalla Vs. Sh. Nanak Singh" [1982 (2) RCR (Rent) 715] that in all applications for leave to defend, the common defence raised by almost all the tenants is that the landlord wanted to enhance the rent or to sell the property after getting it vacated. It was observed by the Hon'ble High Court that such types of allegations are without any foundation and that after an order of eviction is passed Under Section 14 (1)(e) of D.R.C. Act, the tenant is granted six months time to vacate the premises and the landlord is required to occupy the same within two months and the landlord is further dis-entitle for re-letting or alienating the whole or any part of the premises within three years from the date of obtaining possession from the tenant. Thus, the landlord is not in a position either to sell or re-let the tenanted premises for a period of three E-55/2014 Page 14 of 18 years. A similar observation was made in the judgment titled as "Krishna Chopra & Anr. Vs. Smt. Raksha" [2000 Rajdhani Law Reporter 83].
38. Thus, on the basis of the above said case-law, the contention of the respondent is rejected as the same is a mere assertion without any substance. Moreover, the contention of the respondent is not tenable because in such kind of cases protection/remedy is available/provided for such tenants under the D.R.C. Act itself as they can file petition for repossession if the premises are re-let or transferred by the landlord after evicting the tenant, but certainly the leave cannot be granted solely on this ground.
39. Thus, the present contention of the respondent also does not raise any triable issue of such a nature that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises.
40. Further, the respondent has taken the defence that he is a very old tenant in the tenanted shop and it is the only means of livelihood for the tenant and this court must keep in mind the comparative hardship between the parties.
41. But it is not the livelihood of the tenant which is to be looked into by the court in these proceedings, rather, the court is to look into whether the tenant has disclosed some facts which may disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession.
42. The fact that the suit shop is the only source of livelihood of respondent does not render the landlord/petitioner disentitled to eviction of respondent from the tenanted premises. There is no provision in the DRC Act to evaluate the comparative hardships and comparative need between the landlord and tenant for deciding eviction petition "Harbhajan Dass Vs Tilak Raj Mehta" (1980 RCJ 780 Delhi)].
E-55/2014 Page 15 of 18The Conclusion:-
43. It is well settled that leave to defend is granted to the tenant in case any triable issue is raised by him, which can be adjudicated by consideration of additional evidence. The mere existence of any triable issue is not sufficient. The nature of the triable issue raised by the tenant must be such that it will disentitle the landlord from obtaining the eviction order.
44. In the judgment titled as "Sarwan Dass Bange Vs. Ram Prakash"
[167 (2010) DLT 80]; the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi referring to the judgment of "Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini" [(2005) 12 SCC 778] observed in para 17 as under:
"....It was held that the legislative intent is of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation; a special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created; if there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession; the landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own residence only. It was held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine; the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant unless his need is bona fide - no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under this Section, would approach the Court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. It was further held that this inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona fide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine.."
45. The whole purpose and import of summary procedure under Section 25-B of the Act would otherwise be defeated. The prayer for E-55/2014 Page 16 of 18 leave to contest should be granted to the tenant only where a prima facie case has been disclosed by him. In the absence of the tenant having disclosed a prima facie case i.e. such facts which disentitles the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction, the Court cannot mechanically and in routine manner grant leave to defend. In the light of the aforesaid legal proposition, all the pleas taken by the respondent have failed to raise any triable issues. The contents of the application for leave to defend have failed to rebut the presumption of bonafide qua the requirement of the petitioner. The application for leave to defend filed by the respondent is thus, rejected.
46. As a consequence thereof, an eviction order is passed U/Sec. 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act against the respondent in respect of premises/ one shop measuring about 110 sqr. ft. on the ground floor of property bearing no. A-2/45, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi-110027 as shown in red in the site plan filed (Ex. "P-1" as put by the court today itself).
47. However, in light of Section 14(7) DRCA, the aforesaid eviction order shall not be executable for a period of six months from the date of this order. The parties are left to bear their own costs. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Announced in the open court on 31/03/2015.
(This order contains 18 pages) (Naveen K. Kashyap) Commercial Civil Judge-cum-
Additional Rent Controller, West District, THC/Delhi.
E-55/2014 Page 17 of 18 E. No. 55/2014Rakesh Ahuja & Ors. vs. Mrs. Praveen Bhalla 31.03.2015 Present: Proxy counsel for the parties.
Vide separate order pronounced in the open court, the application for leave to defend filed by the respondent is thus rejected.
As a consequence thereof, an eviction order is passed U/Sec. 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act against the respondent in respect of premises/ one shop measuring about 110 sqr. ft. on the ground floor of property bearing no. A-2/45, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi-110027 as shown in red in the site plan filed (Ex. "P-1" as put by the court today itself).
However, in light of Section 14 (7) DRCA, the aforesaid eviction order shall not be executable for a period of six months from the date of this order. The parties are left to bear their own costs. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
(Naveen K. Kashyap) CCJ-Cum-ARC-(W) THC/Delhi- 31.03.2015.
E-55/2014 Page 18 of 18