Delhi High Court
The Trustees Of Safadar Hashmi Memorial ... vs Govt Of Nct Of Delhi on 16 July, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001CRILJ3689, 2001(60)DRJ208
Author: Arijit Pasayat
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, D.K. Jain, C.K. Mahajan
ORDER Arijit Pasayat, C.J.
1. By this petition under Section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (in short the Code), Notification No. F24/85/Misc.93-PO: dated 21-8-1993 passed by the Government of NCT of Delhi, purported to have been issued under Section 95 of the Code is under challenge. by the notification in question posters entitled: Ram Katha in buddhist tradition and Jain tradition displayed in the banner of the Safdar Hasmi Memorial Trust @ Sahmat were held to have been published, circulated and displayed with deliberate and malicious intention to insult or attempt to insult religious belief of a particular community and also that these posters promote or attempt to promote on the ground of religion, disharmony or feeling of enmity between different religions/communities which act is an offence punishable under Section 153-A and Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the IPC). In exercise of powers conferred under Section 9591) of the Code read with Notification No. U-11011/2/74/UTL (i) dated 20.3.74, the Government of NCT of Delhi has declared every copy of the aforesaid posters and material containing the above-said objectionable material forfeited to the Government.
The notification was issued in the background of the Ayodhya controversy. A national workshop was held on 11th July, 1993 and the programme intended fro 15th August, 1993 was given a concrete shape under the title of the "Mukti Naad" i.e. 'Free Expression'. The programme was to be held at Ram Ki Pairi on the banks of the Saryu River in Ayodhya. It was intended to include social workers, artiest, intellectuals and citizens at which musicians, performer sand artist were to come together to celebrate the social integrity of India and the togetherness of all persons regardless of their religious faith. The programme was also to include an exhibition, A tribute to Ayodhya, to demonstrate its diversity and social and cultural significance over the ages. The exhibition was to be held at 17 places all over the country and was to be organized by the local people from 9th to 14th August, 1993. These locations amongst others were delhi, bombay, Calcutta, Bangalore, Patna, Simla, Amritsar, Chandigarh, Jallandhar, Ranchi, Bhopal, Lucknow, Jaipur, Benaras, Faizabad, Baroda and Hyderabad. In the exhibition, 83 panels consisting of painting, photographs, reproduction of archaeological material, persons, buildings and various texts etc. were displayed. One of these panels was titled "Ram Katha". It consisted of four pages of text on A-4 size paper. it was divided into six sections. Included in these six sections were two posters to which the present petition relates, that is Ram Katha in Buddhist Tradition and Ram Katha in Jain Tradition However, some parts of the poster appears to have attracted notice of the authorities and impugned notification has been issued. The same is reproduced below:
"No F.24/85/Misc.93-PO:- Whereas it appears to the Lieutenant Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi that the posters entitled Ram Katha in Buddhist Tradition and Ram Katha in Jain Tradition have with deliberate and malicious intention been published, circulated and displayed by "Sahmat" to insult or attempt to insult the religious belief of a particular community and these posters also promote or attempt to promote on the ground of religious belief of a particular community and these posters also promote or attempt to promote on the ground of religion disharmony or feeling of enmity between different religious communities which act is an offence punishable under section 153A and 295A IPC.
Now, therefore in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (i) of Section 95 Cr.P.C. 1973 (act No. 2 of 1974) read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home, Affairs, Notification No. V=11011/2/74-UTD)1) dated the 20th March, 1974, the Lieutenant Government of National capital Territory of Delhi hereby declares every copy of the aforesaid- posters and materials containing the above stated objectionable materials forfeited to the Government."
2. Petitioner's main grievance is that background facts clearly show that there was a complete non-application of mind. It is vague to the extent that on even what was considered objectionable has been indicated therein. The community/communities referred to in the notification have not been specified and in a routine manner without application of mind the notification has been passed. It is not clear from the notification as to what was the basis for holding that the acts of petitioner were done deliberately and /or maliciously. Reference made in the posters were to various ancient materials. There is no doubt about the bonafide intention of the petitioner. It is apparent from the fact that the State have not objected to the holding of the exhibition and or display of 82 panels excluding the allegedly offending panel. It is highlighted that what is reflected in the notification does not meet the requirements of law and even if, as pleaded by the respondent, there was some material on the file, the same cannot be used to supplement or supplant the material on the file, the same cannot be used to supplement or supplant the material indicated in the notification. Even if the files are referred to they would clearly establish non-application of mind. The source and the view have been clearly indicated in the panel but is not the case of the respondent that even those materials were not sought to be confiscated.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that after fully considering the materials on record, impugned notification has been issued. it is not a case where there is lack of material and disclosure of the entire offending material would have perpetrated the mischief which was sought to be avoided by the impugned notification. Merely because the community/communities have not been definitely indicated that does not in any way effect the validity of the notification. The material on record clearly establishes that the impugned acts were not resorted to deliberately and maliciously.
4. Under Section 95 of the Code, corresponding to Section 99A and 99G of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (in short, the old Code), conditions necessary for a forfeiture are as follows. They are (i) publication has been seen, read by the state Government prior to its declaration of forfeiture, but it must first form an opinion and (ii) the Government has stated the ground of its opinion in the order. Stating of the grounds required under the Section implies that the opinion should be supported by facts and is not mere recital that it contains offensive matter. Requirements are mandatory. Where the order of the Government does not state the grounds for the opinion it has formed, the order does not stand the test of legality. Mere reproduction of ingredients of the relevant section of IPC would not suffice. If the grounds are not specifically stated, they cannot be treated as implies and absence thereof is fatal to the validity of the impugned notification. Court cannot supplement or supplant and also cannot made a roving enquiry. The extraordinary power conferred under Section 95 of the Code must be used care, caution and circumspection. It should be ensured that right guaranteed under section 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is not curbed except by rigid adherence to the provisions. It is to be noted that Section 95 of the Code is wider than Section 153A IPC, as intention to promote enmity or hatred between different classes of the community is a ground for action under Section 95 while under Section 153A, it is the actual promotion or attempt to promote enmity or hatred that constitutes the offence. It is not necessary that the offending passage should all be re-produced in the notification or the ground or the reason in support of the opinion formed by the Govt. should be stated in a particular form or in great detail. it will be sufficient if by reading the notification, a person is able to understand the grounds on which the Government formed opinion. An order under Section 95 can be made only when the Government forms certain opinion that document concerning which notification is purported to be made contains the matter the publication of which is punishable under Section 124A or 153A or 153B or Section 292 or Section 293 or Section 295-A. Further the government has to state the grounds of its opinion in the notification containing the order. The statement of grounds is mandatory. A mere citation of the words of the Section may be enough if facts along with it are clearly stated.
5. As noted by the Apex Court in State of U.P. vs Lalai Singh Yadav, , the triple facets of a valid order under Section 99A of the Old Code (Presently Section 95) are (i) that the book or document contains any material, (ii) such matter promotes or is intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of the country; and (iii) a statement of the grounds of Government's opinion. Thereupon the State Government may be notification declare every copy of such matter to be forfeited. The statement of the grounds of Government's opinion may be brief, but not blank. It is no answer that the grounds are implied.
6. A notification in order to be legal and effective must comply with the requirement. This compliance is a since qua non for the validity of the notification. To state the grounds of opinion without stating the fact does not amount to statement by the Government of the grounds of its opinion. Mere mention of article or a part thereof in the notification would not constitute grounds contemplated by Section 95 of the Code. There is distinction between facts which form the grounds for formation of opinion and opinion itself. In Narayan Das v. State of M.P., it was held by the Apex Court as follows:
"The formation of an opinion by government is undoubtedly the ground for the action taken by them, but the grounds for the opinion are obviously different. The opinion, after it has been formed, furnishes a ground to the Government for taking action contemplated but the grounds on which the opinion itself is formed are and must be other grounds. These grounds must necessarily be the import or the effect of the tendency of matter contained in the offending publication, either as a whole or in portions of it, as illustrated by the passages which the government may choose".
7. When an application is field under Section 96, the only thing the High Court is require to do is to find out whether requisite requirement are satisfied. it is not the function of the Court to consider any other matter whatsoever apart from the Government's reason for making the order which in the High Court's opinion would have justified the forfeiture. This position has been succinctly stated in Harnam Das v. State of U.P., 1961 SC 1662. It was noted in the said case as follows:-
"What then is to happen when the Government did not state the grounds of its opinion? In such a case if the High Court upheld the order, it may be that it would have done so for reasons which the government did not have in contemplation at all. if the High Court did that, it would really have made an order of forfeiture itself and not upheld such an order made by the Government. This, as already stated, the High Court has not power to do under Section ((D. (now Section 96(4) and (5)). It seems clear to us, therefore that in such a case the High Court must set aside the order under Section 99D, for it cannot then be satisfied that the grounds given by the government justified the order. You cannot be satisfied about a thing which you do not know....."
In Lalai Singh case (supra), the Apex Court held as under:
"..that the grounds or reasons linking the primary facts with the forfeiter's opinion must be stated at learned length. That depends, in some cases, a laconic statement may be enough, in others a longer ratiocination may be proper but never laches to the degree of taciturnity. An order may be brief but not a blank".
It is for effective exercise of statutory rights given to the aggrieved party to approach the High Court under Section 96 of the Code that such express mention is necessary in the impugned order or statement of grounds of government's opinion.
8. One the major grounds of challenge pressed into service by learned Counsel for the petitioner is the absence of description of the community/communities in the notification whose religious behalf is offended. In this context, one of the important decisions on the point, is Arun Rajan Ghosh vs State of West Bengal 1954 (59) CWN 495. Some portion of the judgment throw illuminating light. It was observed in the said case as follows:
"It will appear that the section falls into three clear parts. it first lays down a condition precedent to Government's taking action under the section . The condition is that government must form one or more of the opinions regarding the effect of the publication as are specified in the section itself. having laid down the condition precedent, the section states that where the condition has been satisfied, that is to say, where the Government has come to think hat the publication is of one or other of the characters mentioned in the section, they may declare every copy of the publication to be forfeited. This part of the section is, what I may call an enabling provision.l but the section does not stop there. While saying that the government may take action when it comes to form a certain kind of opinion and saying further that the action taken may be to declare every copy of the publication forfeited, the section also says in what form the order of forfeiture shall be made. It enjoins that the grounds of the opinion must be stated in the order itself. That part of the section is mandatory."
"I may now proceed to refer to the actual order passed in the present case. It reds as follows:
"In exercise of the power conferred by section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 18998. the Governor is pleased to declare to be forfeited to the Government every copy of the book in Bengali entitled 'A Saktisali-Samaj' (Powerful Society), Part III, by Swami Satyanandji Saraswati, printed and published by Shri Hari Charan Chakrawarty, from Soktibad Press 117, Dharamtala Street, Calcutta, on the ground that the said book contains matter which is deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of a class of citizens of India by insulting the religion and the religious beliefs of that class and which promotes feelings of hatred between different classes of the citizens of India, the publication of which matter is punishable under section 295A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code. (Act XIV of 1860)"
"The second defect which appears to me to vitiate the order is that even the opinion of Government upon which they purport to have made the order of forfeiture has not been properly stated. it is said, in the first instance that the book contains matter which is intended to outrage the religious feelings of "a class of the citizens of India." The question at once arises, which class? Unless the class is specified, it is impossible to see whether the opinion of Government that the book contains matters which is intended to outrage the feelings of a class of citizens is justified. Government may think that a particular passage is intended to outrage the religious beliefs of Hindus, whereas there may, in fact be, nothing in the passage itself directed against Hindus although there may be some thing in it directed against people of another religious belief. Looking at the matter from the point of view of the person, who might make an application under Section 99B, it becomes quite impossible for him to make out the negative, if the order of forfeiture merely states that the book is intended to outrage the feelings of a class of citizens and does not specify the class. Not knowing what class Government had in mind he would, I imagine, be required to prove by taking the various classes of citizens of India one by one, that the book did not contain anything which could outrage the religious feelings of any of them. An opinion expressed in that form is not, in my view expressed in true conformity with the requirements of section 99A. Even worse is the form in which the next and the second opinion of Government has been stated. The order says that the book contains matter which promotes feelings of hatred between different classes of the citizens of India. Once again the question arises, between which classes? I do not consider it impossible that Government may in a particular case come to be of opinion that there are matters in the book or the paper forfeited which will promote feelings of hatred between all the classes of the citizens of India but if such be their opinion, they ought, in fairness and also in order that the order may be valid, to say. If I may refer again to the position of the person seeking to have the order set aside under section 99B he would be consigned to an impossible position, if he were to disestablish an opinion expressed in such a form. He would have to take ach of the different classes of citizens of India in its turn and then establish that the book did not contain any matter which promoted feelings of hatred between that class and any of the other classes. He would have to take next another class and repeat the operation in the same manner. To put it in a concrete form, he would have to take first, say the Hindus, and then establish that there was nothing in the book or paper forfeited by Government which promoted feelings of hatred between then and Muslims or then and Christians or them and Parsees, or them and Jains and so on. Taking next another class, say Christians, he would have to establish that the book contained no matter which would promote feelings of hatred between Christians and Muslims or Buddhists or Parsees or Jains or any of the other classes of the citizens of which the teeming millions of India are composed. He would also not known what kinds of classes were contemplated by the order, whether classes according to religion or classes according to occupation or classes according to wealth or classes according to any other criterion. Bur the question does no really depend upon the difficulty of the hypothetical petitioner under Section 99B. It seems to me to be of the essence of section 99A that the opinion formed by Government must be stated in an exact and concrete form in order that it may be a proper and sufficient opinion for the purposes of the section. The language different classes of citizens of India or outrage the feelings of any such class is to be found in section 99A itself and it is language of a general character because the section is intended to cover all classes against or as respects whom a publication might offend. It, however, any Government have to make an order under the authority of section 99A, they cannot merely quote the general language of the section but must specify what class or classes they have in mind and hose religious feelings are intended to be outraged to between whom feelings of enmity or hatred are likely to intended to be promoted. It is clear that a Government making an order under Section 99A of the draftsman preparing the text of an order for their use, must take some trouble and must not only proceed on precise notions as to the class or classes which in their opinion are affected, but must also specify such classes in the order. The draftsman not having expresses himself in the present case in the precise form required and there being nothing to show that the Government themselves were nay the more precise in their notions and it being also impossible to see what exactly the government's opinion was, the order, in my opinion is plainly vitiated by the second defect as well."
(underlined for emphasis) These observation in Arun Ranjan Ghose were quoted with approval by the Apex Court in Harnam Das's case (supra) in paras 12 and 13, where, inter alia, it was observed as follows:
"(12) The acceptance of the interpretation put by the High Court would lead to a result which in our view would be wholly anomalous. the order of forfeiture with which S. 99D is concerned is indisputably an order under section 99A. Now, an order under that Section is essentially an order of the Government and of no one else. Take a case where the Government making the order states the grounds of its opinion on which the order is based. Suppose the Government says that the expression of view A in the book concerned offends the religious beliefs of community X, Now assume that in an application made to set it aside, the High Court was nt satisfied that view A Could offend community X but thought that another expression of view in the same book which we will call B offended the religious beliefs of a different community, say community Y. If in such case the High Court upheld the order which if the view of the Court below is right, it could do there would really be an order of forfeiture made by the High Court and not by the Government because the Government in stating the grounds of its opinion had not since it did not say so though that view B could offend the religious beliefs of community Y. We think it impossible that the section concerned contemplated such a result: the Code nowhere provides an order of forfeiture being made by the High Court. We are, therefore of opinion that under section 99D it is the duty of the High Court to set aside an order of forfeiture if it is not satisfied that the grounds on which the Government formed its opinion that the books contained matters the publication of which would be punishable under any one or more of Sections 124A, 153A or 295A of the Penal Code could justify that opinion. It is not its duty to do more and to find for itself whether the book contained any such matter whatsoever.
(13). What then is to happen when the Government did not state the grounds of its opinion? In such a case if the High Court upheld the order, it may be that it would have done so for reasons which the Government did not have in contemplation at all. If the High Court did that it would really have made an order of forfeiture itself and nt upheld such an order made by the government. This, as already state the High Court has no power to do so under Section 99D. It seems clear to us therefore that in such a case the High Court must set side the order under Section 99D for it cannot then be satisfied that the grounds given by the Government justified the order. You cannot be satisfied about a thing which you do not know. This is the view that was taken in Arun Ranjan Ghose v. State of West Bengal 59 Cal WN 485 and we are in complete agreement with it. The present is a case of this kind. We thing that it was the duty of the High Court under Section 99D to set aside the order of forfeiture made in this case."
9. Under Section 153A the intention of the writer is immaterial and the Section will apply if writing did in fact promote or attempted to promote enmity and hatred etc. In order to bring the case within Section 295A IPC it is not so much the matter of discourse as the manner of it. In other words, the words used should be such as are bound to be regarded by any reasonable man as grossly offensive an provocative and maliciously and deliberately intended to outrage the feeling of any class of citizens. The grounds of opinion are vital and essential part of the notification. It is those grounds which reveal the jurisdiction for issuance of the notification.
10. One of the basic requirements of Section 295A IPC is deliberate and malicious act. malice in one sense is negation of bonafides. As observed by the Ape Court in Ramji Lal v. State of U.P. , Section 295A does not penalise any and every act of insult to or attempt to insult the religions or religious belief of a class of citizens, which are perpetuated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insult to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class are not encompassed by the provision. It only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. It is obvious that one who alleges malicious and deliberate act on the part of another has to prove it. I would also be necessary to consider as to what act could be said to have been done maliciously. Malice in common acceptation means ill will against a person, but in this legal sense it means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. A man acts maliciously when he willfully and without lawful excuse does that which he knows will injure another in person or property. the term maliciously denotes wicked, perverse and incorrigible disposition. It means and implies an intention to do an act which is wrongful to the detriment of another. Where any person willfully does an act injurious to another without lawful excuse he does it maliciously. Whether a person has acted corruptly or maliciously is a question of fact and must be proved.
11. The word maliciously is used in section 219 IPC. In order to establish malice as contemplated by this Section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused bore ill-will or enmity against specific persons, if the injurious act was done voluntarily without a lawful excuse, malice may be presumed. Malice is often not cable of direct and tangible proof and in almost all case has to be inferred from surrounding circumstances having regard to the setting, background and connected facts in relation to the editing and publishing of the offending articles.
12. Section 298 IPC uses the word "wounding." Section 295-A uses the word 'outraging'. Outraging is a much stronger word than wounding. In Murray's Dictionary. 'outrage' is explained as to wrong grossly, treat with gross violence or indignity.
13. Section 153-A IPC punishes (a) the act of promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, community or any other ground, and (b) acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different groups or castes or communities if the acts disturb the public tranquillity. The object of Section 153-a is to prevent breaches of the public tranquillity which might result from excited feelings of enmity between classes of people. Absence of malicious intention is a relevant factor to judge whether the offence is committed. It can be said to be promoting enmity only where the written or spoken words have the tendency or intention of creating public disorders or disturbances of law and order or affect public tranquillity. means read has to be proved for proving commission of the offence. (See. Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab )
14. It is to be noted that in the reply affidavit also it has not been stated to which particular religion or community reference was made. The notification uses the word "deliberately and maliciously". The words used in the matter objected should be such as are bound to be regarded by any reasonable man as grossly offensive an provocative and maliciously and deliberately intended to outrage the feeling of any class of citizens. There must be some material to show that act was done with deliberateness and malicious intention. A bare reading of the notification shows that there was no description of the particular religion or community and going by what has been stated in Harnam Das's case (supra), order of forfeiture as contained in the notification is vulnerable and indefensible.
15. Learned counsel for the State wanted to show with reference to the record that the materials exist in the file of the Government which clearly established the case for issue of the impugned notification. In view of what has been stated in Harnam Das's case (supra) we would not have permitted learned counsel for the State to place reliance on the material not forming part of the order but forming part of the record if any. But in order to find out if in reality any material existed, we looked at the files. As noted above learned counsel for the petitioner had no objection to our perusing the files, as according to him, it would reinforce his stand relating to non-application of mind. To out surprise we found that instead of supporting the case of the Government it goes to further waken its stand. It appears that process was initiated by the Desk officer with respect to certain communications received from police officials and Ministry of Home Affairs. In fact, there was suggestion in one of the letters that banning orders would be appropriate. The file seems to have progressed from the Desk officer to the Lieutenant Governor and what the Lieutenant Governor has done is merely to say "approved". The entire note sheet reads as follows:
"Letter received from PHQ kept at page 1-2/C and another d.o. letter received from Additional Secretary, MHA kept at pages 7 to 11/C may please be seen in connection with the two posters displayed by SAHMAT at the Teen Murti Bhawan in New Delhi. These posters have ben forwarded to us by the Ministry of Home Affairs along with the d.o. letter under reference. PHQ has also furnished copies of the posters in question which are kept at pages 3 to 6/C. I has been mentioned in the police report as well as the letter of HMA that the subject matter of these two posters is highly objectionable and likely to incense a very large section of the community and create law and order situation in Delhi as was the casein Ayodhya a few days ago. The police headquarters in their report have requested the proscription of these two posters may be considered by the Competent Authority. MHA in the above mentioned d.o. letter have stated that this matter came up for discussion in Lok Sabha today. They stated that the State Govt./UT have the power to proscribe such posters which are in violation under Section 153A, 153-B and 295A of the IPC and that they are also empowered to seize objectionable material under section 95 of the Cr.P.C. by a notification.
(2) the MHA has requested fro urgent action for banning these posters under the relevant provisions of law.
(3) In view of the foregoing an keeping the contents of the two posters in question. L.P. may like to consider proscription of the above two posters and their seizure in terms of the provisions of law quoted above.
(4) A draft notification to be issued under section 95 of the Cr.P.C. (read with Govt of India Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. U.11.11/2/74UTL(1) dated 20th March, 1977 is put up for approval. The above note and notification may be sent and vetted by the Secretary (law) before it is put up to CS/LG.
Press Officer D.S.(HOME)\ Secretary (Law & Judl)may also kindly clarify whether the notification could be enforced without publication in the official gazette.
Sd/ 20.8.93 H.S. Sd/20.8.93 Secretary Law & Judl Notification has ben vetted and this has to be published in gazette before it is enforced.
S/d 20.8.93 C.S. May kindly approve as proposed. The gazette notification will be issued today.
Sd/CS 21.8.93 L.G. Approved Sd/LG 21.8.93 (Underlined for emphasis and the materials found objectionable have been excluded from the entire portion quoted.)"
16. A bare reading of the above quoted note sheets does not leave a shadow of doubt that there was not application of mind by the concerned authority. Even before he considered the matter, the notification was vetted and it was noted "the gazette notification will be issued to-day". The authority merely stated "approved". The word "approved" is an official terminology concerned between subordinate official and higher authority who sanctions or confirms something which was proposed by the subordinate. The dictionary meaning of the expression "approval" is an act of approving or a formal permission or sanction to an intended act to be carried out by a subordinate who seeks permission. The word "approve" is derived from Latin word 'approbare' which connotes to give one's sanction or confirmation. "Approved" in term of approval connotes authority therefore. An authority to which power has been given to "approve" or "modify" some proposal has certainly power to say that it will not approve at all the words may approve, on a reasonable interpretation include not approve. If a person can approve, he or the authority is not bound to approve. (See. Malikaram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1575). Therefore, when a thing is done with approval of any person means that and only that he has with full knowledge approved. (See. DAVIS V. LEICESTER 1894(2) Ch. D. 208). Terms "approval" also suggests that what has to be approved has already taken place, though sometimes approval may also be sought of proposed action. Meaning would be more clear by way of making a differentiation between "approval" and "permission". Approval holds goods until disapproved but permission does not become effective unless it is obtained. Permission subsequently obtained may validate the previous act. In the present context the word "approval" suggests that some action has been taken and it is that some action which the subordinate authority wants by the final authority, which was contemplated through proposal. It is nothing but a confirmation. According to Anderson Law Dictionary "approve" means to accept as good or sufficient for the purpose intended, to confirm authoritatively.
17. As indicated above, there is no material to show application of mind, and on the contrary the concerned authority has merely acted as a rubber stamp. Everything was pre-designed, pre-determined. It is to be noted that except saying that a large section of the community (without indicating which community) was likely to be incensed, there is no indication regarding existence of requisite ingredients of Section 153-A and Section 295A IPC.
18. Looked at from any angle the notification is indefensible and has to be nullified, which we direct. The petition is allowed.