Madras High Court
Thanthai Periyar Pokkuvarathu ... vs Management Of Tamil Nadu State ... on 11 April, 2005
Author: Prabha Sridevan
Bench: Prabha Sridevan
JUDGMENT Prabha Sridevan, J.
1. This petition coming on for orders upon Perusing the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof and upon hearing the arguments of D. Hariparandhaman advocate for the petitioner and of Sri L. G. Saha Devan, advocate for the respondent, the Court made the following order:
The question raised by the petitioner association in this writ petition is whether the notice issued by the respondent- Corporation, inviting tenders for awarding the contract of reconditioning work, etc., to outside contractors, can be interfered with.
2. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent- Corporation raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition by relying upon the decision of this. Court in Indian Additives Ltd. v. Indian Additives Employees Union 2005-I-LLJ-900 (Mad). On facts, the learned Counsel submitted that all along, the respondent had been engaging outside contractors for various works,. but by limited tenders, against which the workers have never had any complaints. However, since the volume of the work sought to be allotted on this occasion is huge, the respondent is calling for an open tender. According to the learned Counsel, the petitioner cannot be aggrieved by this action of the respondent, since the respondent has, categorically stated that no workman will lose his employment because of their decision to award the work to outside contractors. According to him, if the petitioner-association was really aggrieved, their remedy lies under the Industrial Disputes Act.
3. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner association submitted that the impugned notice was contrary to the settlement arrived at between the workers and the management and submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Staff and Workers' Federation , is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. According to the learned Counsel, there is already a settlement under which the parties had agreed that such work will not be given to contractors. Learned Counsel submitted that though the period of the said settlement has come to an end, yet the terms of the settlement will govern the parties until a new settlement comes into existence.
4. The settlement referred to above contained the following clause:
Vernacular matter omitted It is not in dispute that the above clause indicates that the Corporation will not employ contract labour in all departments. It is also not in dispute that the settlement has come to an end.
5. As regards the life of the settlement, it cannot be denied that until a new settlement comes into effect, the "expired" settlement will govern the parties. It has been so held by the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur . In that case, the Supreme Court has observed as follows, at pp. 15 and 21 of LLJ:
"32. The core question that first falls for consideration is as to whether the Settlements of 1974 are still in force. There are three stages or phases with different legal effects in the life of an award or settlement. There is a specific period contractually or statutorily fixed as the period of operation. Thereafter, the award or settlement does not become non est but continues to be binding. This is the second chapter of legal efficacy but qualitatively different as we will presently show. Then comes the last phase. If notice of intention to terminate is given under Section 19(2) or Section 19(6), then the third stage opens where the award or the settlement does survive and is in force between the parties as a contract which has superseded the earlier contract and subsists until a new award or negotiated settlement takes its place. Like Nature Law abhors a vacuum and even on the notice of termination under Section 19(2) or Section 19(6) the sequence and consequence cannot be just void but a continuance of the earlier terms, but with liberty to both sides to raise disputes, negotiate settlement or seek a reference and award. Until such a new contract or award replaces, the previous one, the former settlement or award will regulate the relations between the parties. Such is the understanding of industrial law at least for 30 years as precedents of the High Courts and of this Court bear testimony. To hold to the contrary is to invite industrial chaos by an interpretation of the Industrial Disputes Act whose primary purpose is to obviate such a situation and to provide for industrial peace. To distil from the provisions of Section 19, a conclusion diametrically opposite of the objection, intendment and effect of the Section is an interpretative stultification of the statutory ethos and purpose. Industrial law frowns upon a lawless void and under general law the contract of service created by an award or settlement lives so long as a new lawful contract is brought into being. To argue otherwise is to frustrate the rule of law. If law is a means to an end order in society can it commit functional harakiri by leaving a conflict situation to lawless void?
44. At this stage, I may record my firm conclusion that for the reasons already given the settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act does not suffer death merely because of the notice issued under Section 19(2). All that is done is a notice 'intimating its intention to terminate the award.' The award even if cease to be operative qua award, continues qua contract. Therefore, if the Industrial Disputes Act regulates the jural relations between the Life Insurance Corporation and its employees and 'if' we will presently scan then the rights under the settlements of 1974 remain until replaced by a later award or settlement"
It is not the case of the respondent that this legal position has changed. It does not change even if the union has given a notice of termination of the settlement to the management. So as on date, the above referred clause governs the parties.
6. The following paragraphs in the additional counter- affidavit filed by the respondent are extracted:
"The contention raised in grounds 'b' and 'c' are legally incorrect and the settlement has already come to an end and the reliance based on the Item (2) in the said settlement is misconceived.
I further submit that the contention raised in ground 'd' is denied. It is submitted that there is no settlement in force, but it is only contract between the parties, which is not enforceable. Therefore, the reliance based on 1999 (2) L.L.N. 1 (supra), is not! applicable to the facts of the case."
7. In Indian Additives Ltd., Chennai v. Indian Additives Employees' Union (supra) this Court has observed as follows:
"Constitution of India, Article 226 -Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 9-A Employees' Union challenged actions of management as such action of management was in violation of Section 9-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it related to conditions of service. Such claim relates to enforcement of right or obligation created under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and has to be adjudicated by machinery constituted under such Act- Existence of alternative remedy is not absolute bar to writ petition but ordinarily party should be relegated to alternative remedy - Legal position would remain same even if there is violation of fundamental right or of natural justice, or when proceedings are without jurisdiction, and High Court still, depending on facts of case dismiss writ petition and direct party to invoke alternate remedy - Decision rendered in Voltas Volkart Employees' Union v. Voltas Ltd. 2000-I-LLJ-969, not correctly decided as relevant Supreme Court judgments were not brought to notice of Court; Decision of Full Bench in P. Pitchumani v. Management of Sri Chakra Tyres, Ltd. (represented by its Managing Director), Madurai and Ors. 2004-II-LLJ-994, followed - Writ petition dismissed."
In the light of the above, it must be seen whether the writ petition can be entertained.
8. The judgment in 1999-I-LLJ-849 (SC) (supra), is identical in all respects to the facts of the present case.
In both the cases, the workers of the State Transport Corporation were involved.
In both the cases, the impugned action was in violation of the settlement arrived at between the workers and the management.
In both the cases, the writ jurisdiction was invoked.
Even if the settlement between the management and the workers of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation was still in force, unlike in this case, that will not make a difference, in view of the legal principle laid down by the Supreme Court 1981- I-LLJ-1 (SC) (supra). The only other difference in these two cases is that in the case referred to above, the check-off facility was withdrawn, which is not the case here.
9. The question of maintainability of a writ petition when the controversy related to the breach of a settlement was raised before the learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court, as seen from Para. 10 of the judgment in 1999-I-LLJ-849 (supra). The said question was held in favour of the workmen by the Karnataka High Court and the appeal filed by the management before the Supreme Court also failed.
10. The judgment in 1999-1-LLJ-849 (Kant) (supra), is relevant and is extracted hereunder at p. 859:
"16. It has also to be kept in view that even assuming that settlement of 1988 had thereby come to an end, its binding effect as contractual obligation continued till it was replaced by other settlement as ruled by this Court in the Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur and Ors. (supra). It is also difficult to appreciate how the case of check-off facility is not termed as condition of service as by the said facility the management has agreed to deduct from the wages of the employees the requisite amount to be paid to the Union by way of subscription of the employees. Such permissible deduction from the wages cannot but be treated as condition of service. The contention that from September 21, 1993 check-off facility has been given up by the Corporation cannot be of any assistance to the Corporation for the simple reason that it would amount to violation of a binding settlement by the Corporation which as per Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act would be penal. No advantage in law, therefore, can be taken by the Corporation from its unilateral withdrawal of binding check-off facility as per settlements of 1988. It is also not possible to countenance the submission that though the check-off facility may scease to exist de facto. Such unilateral withdrawal of check-off facility by one of the parties cannot be treated to be an act which is legal and valid. Minutes of the meeting held between the representatives of the Corporation and respondent No. 1 union held on October 18, 1995 also cannot amount to substitution of a fresh settlement on the pay roll check-off facility. To reiterate, the federation's only agreement was to discuss demands relating to check-off and trade union facilities at the Government level. So long as the said discussion had not culminated into any other binding settlement on the topic, the earlier settlement cannot be said to have been replaced or substituted by any other validly binding settlement. Consequently, the aforesaid written submissions do not advance the case of the appellant."
11. The relevant portion of the above judgment reads thus at p. 862:
"20. ... In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, therefore, if any unilateral notice to terminate the binding settlement of July 28, 1988 was issued by the Corporation which, on the facts of the present case, is found not to have been issued, even then till any new settlement on the question of grant of pay-roll check-off facility was substituted by parties, the legally binding effects of the earlier settlement of 1988 would continue to operate and the Corporation will then be contractually bound to confer pay-roll check-off facility to the union. Consequently, there was no occasion for the Corporation to issue the impugned notification, dated September 21, 1993, even on this ground as it was clearly violative of the mandatory requirement of Section 19 Sub-section (2) and was contrary to the settled legal position as aforesaid. It was, therefore, a still- born notification and was rightly set aside by the learned single Judge on that ground and also by the Division Bench of the High Court."
Thus, when the rights of the workmen under the settlement have been violated, the statement made by the respondent that no workman will lose his employment has no relevance.
12. Even in the judgment reported in 2005-I-LLJ-900 (supra) the Division Bench of this Court had held as follows at p. 902:
"5. ... No doubt, it is well settled that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition ...."
The Division Bench placed reliance on the Full Bench judgment in P. Pitchumani v. Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd. 2004-II-LLJ-994, wherein the Full Bench laid down the following parameters for deciding the question of jurisdiction in labour matters at p. 999:
"(i) only such violations under Industrial Disputes Act, which involve public duties, are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;
(ii) dismissals, transfers and other matters concerning the service conditions of employees governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, have to be adjudicated only by the for a created under the said statute and not otherwise;
(iii) it is needless to mention that the disputes relating to matters not governed by Industrial Disputes Act have to be resolved only by common law Courts;
(iv) the transfers effected in these cases do not involve any public duties and involve the disputed questions of fact and they should be resolved only before the for a under the I.D. Act
(v) the appellants/petitioners-employees shall be entitled to seek for reference by filing application under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order;
(vi) if any industrial disputes are raised, then the concerned fora, be it Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, shall dispose of the same within four months from the date of receipt of the reference, after affording opportunity to either party;
(vii) without prejudice to the contentions of the appellants/petitioners-employees, one week time from the date of receipt of a copy of this order is given to the employees to join at the transferred places and in respect to such of those dismissed employees, for non-joining at the transferred places, the delay is condoned if they join as stipulated above and in that event, dismissal orders passed against them disappear automatically; and
(viii) the respondents-managements shall sympathetically consider the payments of wages/salaries to the appellants/petitioners employees so as to maintain the industrial peace and harmony."
In that case, the matter was referred to the Full Bench because of the differing views taken by two co-ordinate Benches regarding maintainability of a writ petition when the forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, is there. On view was that for violation of a statutory provision, writ petition is maintainable even against a private company, as held by a Bench of this Court in Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. v. Mettur Chemicals Podhu Thozhilalar Sangam 2000-I-LLJ-1335. The other view was that a writ petition cannot be maintained for the said violation. The Full Bench concluded as above.
13. In Pitchumani P. and Ors. v. Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd, rep. by its M. D., Madurai case (supra) the Full Bench has dealt with the Chemplast Sanmar case as follows 2004-II-LLJ-994 at p. 999:
"11. In Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. v. Mettur Chemicals Podhu Thozhilalar Sangam and Anr. [2000-I-LLJ-1335 (supra) the facts are quite different. There the factual position is admitted. There was a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for payment of fixed monthly amount at the rate of 56.5 per cent of wages for the circumstances stated therein. The time of the settlement expired. The question for consideration was whether after the expiry of the term of settlement the benefits under the settlement ensure to the benefit of the workmen till a new settlement is arrived at substituting the old settlement. Basing upon the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases referred thereto, it was held by the Division Bench that the benefit in the old settlement continues even after the expiry of its term till a new settlement is arrived at substituting the old one. It was also held that in not honouring the commitment to pay the amounts under the old settlement, there was alteration of service condition without notice to the employees, thus violating Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In that case there was no dispute with regard to questions of fact and the entire matter lay on the interpretation of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the light of the legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court. In the instant case, the dispute is entirely different as there are serious disputed questions of fact which need to be probed, for which fact finding is necessary, which can be made only after elaborate enquiry and that is only possible either before the Labour Court or by referring industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this regard the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court for exercising the jurisdiction and the remedy under the Special Act, i.e., Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, needs consideration. That was also a case where the workmen claimed that the benefit as per the earlier settlement continued in their favour till a new settlement was signed. The Full Bench merely said that, that case was different because there -was no dispute regarding the facts and hence, it could be decided on legal principles. Before the latter Bench, there were serious disputed questions of fact. In fact, the Full Bench did not specifically hold that the decision in Chemplast Sanmar case (supra), was wrong. It is in this light that Clause (1) of Para. 14 of the judgment in Pitchumani case (supra), as extracted above, should be read. Here also, factually there is no dispute. The relevant term in the settlement is not denied. Therefore, if in identical circumstances a writ could be filed for violation of the terms of a settlement against a private company, as was done in Chemplast Sanmar case (supra), the case is stronger when the respondent is a State Corporation."
14. Ultimately, the decision will depend not just on precedents, but on facts too. In Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills , it was held as follows:
"Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation 3 of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments 3 of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Company, Ltd. v. Norton (1951 A.C. 737), LORD MACDERMOT observed:
'The matter cannot of course, be settled merely by treating the ipissima verba of WILLES, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge.' The following words of LORD DENNING in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
'Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by CARDOZO) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.' Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."
15. The facts in, 1999-I-LLJ-849 (SC) (supra) referred to above is almost identical, to the facts here and therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court must be applied to the case on hand. The respondent cannot proceed to violate the terms of the settlement. The order of interim stay granted on March 8, 2005 is hereby made absolute.