Gujarat High Court
Bhikhabhai Mavjibhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat on 29 September, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1994)1GLR151
JUDGMENT A.N. Divecha, J.
1. The decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 30th July, 1984 in Revision Application No. TEN. B.A. 590 of 1984 is under challenge in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thereby the Tribunal rejected the petitioner's revisional application against the order passed by the Assistant Collector at Dholka on 5th October, 1977 in Ceiling Appeal No. 199 of 1977 as hopelessly time-barred.
2. The facts giving rise to this petition are not many and not much in dispute. The petitioner was found holding certain parcels of land in all admeasuring 45 acres 7 gunthas in village Moti Boru, Taluka Dholka, District Ahmedabad (Rural) on 1st April, 1976. The Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal (No. 4) at Dholka (the first authority for convenience) undertook the necessary inquiry under Section 20 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 ('the Act' for brief) to find out whether or not the petitioner's holding was in excess of the ceiling area fixed thereunder. It came to be registered as Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1976 (Moti Boru). After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his order passed on 21st February, 1977 in Ceiling Case No. 17 of 1976, the first authority declared the petitioner's holding to be in excess of the ceiling area by 6 acres 7 gunthas. Its copy is at Annexure 'A' to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner carried the matter in appeal before the Assistant Collector at Dholka. His appeal came to be registered as Ceiling Appeal No. 199 of 1977. By his order passed on 5th October, 1977 in the aforesaid appeal, the Assistant Collector at Dholka dismissed it. Its copy is at Annexure 'B' to this petition. It appears that, in the meantime, the compensation proceedings with respect to the surplus land declared under the order at Annexure 'A' to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition came to be initiated by the first authority some time in 1980. It appears that some compensation was fixed for the surplus land. The aggrieved petitioner carried the matter in appeal before the appellate authority. It appears that appeal came to be withdrawn. The petitioner thereafter invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad by means of his Revision Application No. TEN. B.A. 590 of 1984 questioning the correctness of the order passed by the first authority at Annexure 'A' to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition. By its decision rendered on 30th July, 1984 in the aforesaid revisional application, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad rejected it as hopelessly time-barred. Its copy is at Annexure 'C to this petition. The petitioner has thereupon invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the approach of the Tribunal and its decision pursuant thereto at Annexure 'C' to this petition.
3. Shri Shah for the petitioner has urged that the petitioner approached the Tribunal with a specific case that he was given no intimation of the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition, and as such the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the petitioner's revisional application without recording a finding to the effect that the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition was in face served to him. Shri Shah for the petitioner has also criticised the approach of the Tribunal in dealing with the matter more particularly when it permitted the respondent herein to press into service the bar of limitation for frustrating the petitioner's just case. As against this, Shri Mehta for the respondent has urged that the Tribunal has recorded a finding to the effect that the petitioner in fact knew of the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition as admitted by him during the compensation proceedings initiated some time in 1980 with respect to the surplus land declared by the order at Annexure A to this petition as affirmed by the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition. In that view of the matter, runs the submission of Shri Mehta for the respondent, it did not lay in the mouth of the petitioner to approach the Tribunal with the case that the intimation of the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition was not given to him. Shri Mehta for the respondent has urged that the impugned decision at Annexure 'C to this petition is quite just and proper and calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of its limited powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
4. At this stage a note also deserves to be taken of the criticism levelled by the Apex Court with respect to the approach made by the Government and the Governmental agencies and authorities in defending just claims of citizens by pressing into service technical pleas like limitation. In this connection a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of the Madras Port Trust v. Hyrnanshu International . In the context of the bar of limitation contained in Section 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act, 1905, it has been observed:
The plea of limitation based on this Section is one which the Court always looks upon with disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public authority like the Port Trust should, in all morality and justice, take up such a plea to defeat a just claim of the citizen. It is high time that Governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens.
It is unfortunate that the State Government while resisting the petitioner's revisional application before the Tribunal pressed into service the bar of limitation ignoring and overlooking the aforesaid observations made by the Apex Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of the Madras Port Trust (supra). I am unable to agree with Shri Shah for the petitioner in his submission to the effect that the Tribunal ought not to have permitted the respondent herein to raise such a plea for defeating the just case of the present petitioner. In the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of the" Madras Port Trust (supra) it has been clearly held that, if a Government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and, if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by the Court. The Apex Court has however, reiterated that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a Government or a public authority.
5. It is unfortunate for the present petitioner that the plea of bar of limitation was pressed into service by no other litigant than the State Government while opposing his revisional application culminating into die decision at Annexure 'C' to this petition. In all fairness, the State Government and the agency representing it before Courts and Tribunals ought to have kept in mind the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court made in its binding ruling in the case of the Madras Port Trust (supra).
6. That brings me to the question as to what approach Courts and Tribunals should show towards litigants while dealing with their applications for condonation of delay.
7. This Court has time and again emphasised that Courts dealing with delay condonation application should adopt a liberal approach and not a hypertechnical one. The landmark ruling on the point is in the case of Karim Abdualla v. Bai Hoorbai reported in (1975) XVI GLR 835. The sum and substance of that ruling is that unless die applicant making die application for condonation of delay is guilty of gross unexplained delay or is charged witii deliberate delay with some ulterior motive, me application for condonation of delay should normally and ordinarily be accepted. This Court has in terms held that substantial justice lies in deciding die matter on merits rather than disposing if of on technicalities. The principles stated in the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Karim Abdualla (supra) has come to be reiterated by die Supreme Court in its ruling in me case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji .
8. At this stage a reference also deserves to be made to die binding ruling of the Supreme Court in die case of Ram Sumiran v. D.D.C. reported in AIR 1985 SC 606 relied on by Shri Shah for the petitioner in support of his petition. In mat case, me writ petition in question came to be dismissed by the High Court of Allahabad on the ground that it had abated as the heirs of the deceased were not brought on record despite knowledge of his deadi. In mat case the application for bringing heirs of deceased was made six years after the deam of me concerned party despite the fact that die occurrence of die deam of me deceased was known to me concerned party. In that context me Supreme Court has held:
But merely because no application was made by the appellants for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record we do not think that in the circumstances of the present case that would be a valid ground for refusing to grant the application of the appellants for setting aside the abatement and bring die legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record because the appellants are admittedly from the rural area and in a country like ours where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, it would not be fair to presume that everyone knows that on death of a respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record within a certain time. The ends of justice require that the application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 should have been granted.
9. The aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sumiran (supra) is on all fours applicable in the present case. The present petitioner know in 1980 of the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition. It is an admitted position on record that he is residing in a village and it does not appear that he is quite literate. He does not appear to be well off. Villagers are often found quite gulliable and poverty-stricken. They are often taken in by what is dished out to them. For them at times the order passed by the competent authority is not worth more than a piece of paper in absence of any proper advice. It is too much to expect from them knowledge of intricacies of law. The record does not show that the petitioner was represented before the first authority or the appellate authority by a proper person trained in law. The appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition might have come to his knowledge, and yet in absence of proper advice he might not have challenged it there and then. He appears to have clearly disclosed to the first authority in the compensation proceedings pursuant to the order at Annexure 'B' to this petition to the effect that he knew of the appellate order in question. That fact by itself shows that he was neither crafty nor shrewd. At the appellate stage of the compensation proceedings, he appears to have received some advice that he ought to have challenged the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition. At that stage also it appears that he might have been advised that he could approach the Tribunal only after he received intimation of the appellate order. That perhaps explains why he belatedly invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal for questioning the correctness of the impugned order at Annexure 'A' to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition. It appears that the Tribunal has overlooked this aspect of the case.
10. It was not the case of the respondent herein before the Tribunal to the effect that the delay on the part of the present petitioner in invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal was deliberate and with some ulterior motive. The delay appears to be gross but no opportunity appears to have been given to the petitioner to explain it. If an opportunity was given, I am sure the petitioner would have given convincing and cogent reasons for occurrence of the delay in invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal and it was certainly not deliberate.
10.1. Ordinarily, I should have directed the petitioner to move the Tribunal with an application for condonation of delay in his belated invocation of its revisional jurisdiction. That would unnecessarily result into loss of time, money and energy. In view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sumiran (supra), I think the petitioner should be spared from making any such application for condonation of delay. The circumstances of the case justify that the delay on the part of the petitioner in invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal was certainly not deliberate and it occurred on account of the petitioner's inability to realise the consequences of not challenging the appellate order at Annexure 'B' to this petition in absence of any competent legal advice or guidence. In that view of the matter, I think the ends of justice would be fully met if the Tribunal is directed to restore the petitioner's revisional application culminating into the decision at Annexure 'C' to file and dispose it of on its own merits according to law without considering the bar of limitation.
11. In the result, this petition is accepted. The decision of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad in Revision Application No. TEN. B.A. 590 of 1984 at Annexure 'C' to this petition is quashed and set aside. The Tribunal is directed to restore the revisional application culminating into its decision at Annexure 'C' to this petition to file and dispose it of on its own merits according to law treating the delay in preferring it to have been condoned. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent however with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.