Central Information Commission
Dr. Balasubramaniam Rathinavel vs Canara Bank on 6 June, 2025
के ीय सूचना आयोग
Central Information Commission
बाबा गंगनाथ माग,मुिनरका
Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka
नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067
ि तीय अपील सं या / Second Appeal No. CIC/CANBK/A/2024/615319
Dr. Balasubramaniam ... अपीलकता/Appellant
Rathinavel
VERSUS
बनाम
CPIO: Canara Bank,
Bengaluru ... ितवादीगण/Respondents
Relevant dates emerging from the appeal:
RTI : 04.02.2024 FA : 12.03.2024 SA : 04.04.2024
CPIO : 04.03.2024 FAO : 03.04.2024 Hearing : 02.04.2025
Date of Decision: 06.06.2025
CORAM:
Hon'ble Commissioner
_ANANDI RAMALINGAM
ORDER
1. The Appellant filed an RTI application dated 04.02.2024 seeking information on the following points:
I am a person with disability. Canara Bank is having complete details of my application, direct interview marks awarded to me, etc. in the matter of Recruitment of Specialist Officers (Project 2006)-MMGS-III (for short-MMGS-III) though my Writ Petition No. 14725/2007 before the Honourable High Court of Madras, which was subsequently disposed of. Citing the above court case, information sought by me through various means were rejected by Canara Bank, which is in violation of the RTI Act, 2005. Through enclosure to Lr. REF.Page 1 of 17
RW/RIA/1999-CIC/2016 dated 21.07.2016, Canara Bank informed that they did not recruit Persons with Disabilities to the extent of 3% as mandated under the relevant law/rules. Through Lr. No. COSLM/R&L/RTI/2014/KNB dated 27.11.2014, Canara Bank informed that it has not identified any branches as suitable for persons with disabilities, which is mandatory under relevant provisions of the Government of India. Vide Letter Ref. No. HRW:IRS:(LEG):SK:1324:2022 dated 28.06.2022, Canara Bank informed me that I have not come out successful in MMGS-III during 2006-07. Canara Bank is not furnishing the information sought by me on my various RTI petitions, solely with the ulterior motive of making me ineligible for legal recourse for my rights as a person with disability. In the absence of the below information, Canara Bank is continuously denying me my opportunities and rights as a person with disability for the last 17 years.
In this background please furnish me information relating to MMGS-III as below
1. the marks scored by me in the personal interview in MMGS-III
2. minimum marks prescribed for candidates belonging to candidates from General Category
3. minimum marks prescribed for candidates belonging to candidates from SC/STs category
4. minimum marks prescribed for candidates belonging to candidates from persons with disability category
5. Name, designation and address of the Nodal officer responsible for the selection process.
6. Copy of the final select list
7. Interview Panel members award of marks for MMGS-III for all candidates under their signature.Page 2 of 17
2. The CPIO replied vide letter dated 04.03.2024 and the same is reproduced as under :-
Point No. 1 - 22.
Point No. 2, 3, 4 - Selection done on the basis of marks secured by the candidate in interview.
Point No. 5 - There was no post of Nodal officer. However, Recruitment process was conducted by the Personal Wing which is now HR wing of the Bank headed by Chief General Manager/General Manager Point no. 6-The following candidates are selected- 1- Ms. R Vimala, 2- Mr. Venkatesh Tamlurkar,3- Mr. Maram Srikanth, 4- Ms. Remya P Nair, 5- Mr. Toms Varghese, 6-Mr. Santosh Thomas.
7- The information sought by you is third party information and relates to personal information of the concerned. Hence, it is exempted under section 8-1-j of the RTI Act 2005.
3. Dissatisfied with the response received from the CPIO, the Appellant filed a First Appeal dated 12.03.2024 alleging that the information provided was incomplete, false and misleading. The FAA vide order dated 03.04.2024 upheld the reply given by the CPIO.
4. Aggrieved with the FAA's order, the Appellant approached the Commission with the instant Second Appeal dated 04.04.2024.
5. The appellant and on behalf of the respondent Mridula G., CPIO, attended the hearing through video conference.
6. The appellant inter alia submitted that the respondent had wrongly denied the information sought in point nos 2,3,4 and 7 of the RTI application. He further argued that the denial of information not only vitiates the principles of transparency but he also relied upon the latest judicial pronouncement dated 07.02.2025 passed by Hon'ble Page 3 of 17 Supreme Court in Public Information Officer & Registrar & Anr. Vs. Onkar Dattaray Kalmankar & Anr. [Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 2783/2025], wherein the following has been observed:
"We see absolutely no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court of Bombay, which has correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 8(1) (j) of the Right to Information Act 2005 (for short 'the RTI Act, 2005'). The issue relates to disclosure of marks of other candidate in an examination. We are also of the view that the disclosure of the marks though may fall in the category of personal information, yet the disclosure of this personal information is presently necessary in public interest, and therefore, it is not an information which cannot be given by the Information Officer under the RTI Act, 2005. To the contrary, such an information must be disclosed in order to maintain transparency in the process."
He insisted upon the information sought in point no. 7 of the RTI application i.e. disclosure of marks obtained by other candidates in the selection process, while relying upon the directions passed in a recent judicial pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Public Information Officer & Registrar & Anr. Vs. Onkar Dattaray Kalmankar & Anr. [Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 2783/2025], extracted as under:
"51. Since we have found that the disclosure of the marks obtained by the candidates in the written test, typing test and interviewers did not constitute any exempted information or did not affect the confidentiality of the exam so conducted, we must say that the approach of the District authorities in Wardha contributed to the promotion of transparency which should typically be promoted in matters of public recruitment. Withholding such information unnecessarily allows doubts, however unreasonable, to linger, which is not very healthy in promoting transparency and accountability in the working of public authorities and public recruitment processes. Regarding RTI, it is repeatedly asserted that sunlight is the best disinfectant."Page 4 of 17
7. The respondent while defending their case inter alia submitted that they had disclosed the list of selected candidates against point no. 6 of the RTI application. However, the marks obtained by the other candidates (third-parties) in the interview process qualify as their personal information, hence, the same was not disclosed to the appellant, as per provisions under Section 8 (1) (j) of the RTI Act.
8. The Commission after adverting to the facts and circumstances of the case, hearing both parties and perusal of records, observes that the respondent replied on 04.03.2024 and provided a point-wise reply to the appellant. While the CPIO partly disclosed information with respect to certain points, the information sought in point no. 7 of the RTI application i.e. Interview Panel members award of marks for MMGS-III for all candidates under their signature, was denied under Section 8 (1) (j) of the RTI Act. The reliance placed by the Appellant on the judgement of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar vs. Public Information Officer & Others, 2024 Live Law (Bom) 581, which was said to be affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Public Information officer and Registrar & Anr v. Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar & Anr has been duly considered.
8.1. However, the bench is of the considered opinion that since the appellant has referred to interview marks obtained by all candidates, it is a matter of judicial discipline and propriety to rely on the Apex Court's Constitution bench judgment in the matter of Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India Vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal in Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 with Civil Appeal No. 10045 of 2010 and Civil Appeal No. 2683 of 2010 wherein the import of "personal information" envisaged under Section 8(1)(j) of RTI Act has been exemplified in the context of earlier ratios laid down by the same Court in the matter(s) of Canara Bank Vs. C.S. Shyam in Civil Appeal No.22 of 2009; Girish Ramchandra Deshpande vs. Central Information Commissioner & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 212 and R.K. Jain vs. Union of India & Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 794 in the following manner:
"59. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion, would indicate that personal records, including name, address, physical, mental and Page 5 of 17 psychological status, marks obtained, grades and answer sheets, are all treated as personal information. Similarly, professional records, including qualification, performance, evaluation reports, ACRs, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal information. Medical records, treatment, choice of medicine, list of hospitals and doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the family members, information relating to assets, liabilities, income tax returns, details of investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information. Such personal information is entitled to protection from unwarranted invasion of privacy and conditional access is available when stipulation of larger public interest is satisfied. This list is indicative and not exhaustive..."
8.2. It is noted that the extent of disclosure demanded by the appellant is not only limited to the finally selected list of candidates but to all other candidates participating in the selection process. Now, to allow such a prayer would adversely affect the right to privacy of all such unselected candidates who are entitled to the protection of their fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Now, to arrive at the aforesaid deduction, in the facts of the instant matter it is imperative to read the preface or the genesis/discussion, wherefrom the above deduction was arrived at by the Apex Court. The following contents are thus reproduced from the text of the Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) case for emphasis:
"40. The right to privacy though not expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of India is now recognized as a basic fundamental right vide decision of the Constitutional Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy and Another v. Union of India and Others26 holding that it is an intrinsic part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and recognised under several international treaties, chief among them being Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 which states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. The judgment recognizes that everyone has a right to the protection of laws against such interference or attack.Page 6 of 17
41. In K.S.Puttaswamy (supra) the main judgment (authored by D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) has referred to provisions of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act to highlight that the right to privacy is entrenched with constitutional status in Part III of the Constitution, thus providing a touchstone on which validity of executive decisions can be assessed and validity of laws can be determined vide judicial review exercised by the courts. This observation highlights the status and importance of the right to privacy as a constitutional right. The ratio as recorded in the two concurring judgments of 26 (2017) 10 SCC 1 the learned judges (R.F. Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.) are similar. It is observed that privacy involves a person's right to his physical body; right to informational privacy which deals with a person's mind; and the right to privacy of choice which protects an individual's autonomy over personal choices. While physical privacy enjoys constitutional recognition in Article 19(1)(d) and (e) read with Article 21, personal informational privacy is relatable to Article 21 and right to privacy of choice is enshrined in Articles 19(1)(a) to (c), 20(3), 21 and 25 of the Constitution. In the concurring opinion, there is a reference to 'The Right to Privacy' by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis on an individual's right to control the dissemination of personal information and that an individual has a right to limit access to such information/shield such information from unwarranted access. Knowledge about a person gives another power over that person, as personal data collected is capable of effecting representations in his decision making process and shaping behaviour which can have a stultifying effect on the expression of dissent which is the cornerstone of democracy. In the said concurring judgment, it has been further held that the right to protection of reputation from being unfairly harmed needs to be zealously guarded not only against falsehood but also against certain truths by observing: (Emphasis Supplied) '623. An individual has a right to protect his reputation from being unfairly harmed and such protection of reputation needs to exist not only against falsehood but also certain truths. It cannot be said that a more accurate judgment about Page 7 of 17 people can be facilitated by knowing private details about their lives - people judge us badly, they judge us in haste, they judge out of context, they judge without hearing the whole story and they judge with hypocrisy. Privacy lets people protect themselves from these troublesome judgments.' xxx
43. Privacy and confidentiality encompass a bundle of rights including the right to protect identity and anonymity. Anonymity is where an individual seeks freedom from identification, even when and despite being in a public space....
xxx
46........ In the context of the RTI Act, suffice would be to say that the right to protect identity and anonymity would be identically subjected to the public interest test.
47. Clause (j) to sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the RTI Act specifically refers to invasion of the right to privacy of an individual and excludes from disclosure information that would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of such individual, unless the disclosure would satisfy the larger public interest test. This clause also draws a distinction in its treatment of personal information, whereby disclosure of such information is exempted if such information has no relation to public activity or interest. We would like to, however, clarify that in their treatment of this exemption, this Court has treated the word 'information' which if disclosed would lead to invasion of privacy to mean personal information, as distinct from public information. This aspect has been dealt with in the succeeding paragraphs.
48. As per Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, the word 'personal' means 'of or affecting a person or of or constituting personal property'....
xxx
51. This test had been adopted in several English decisions including decision of the House of Lords in Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Limited33 wherein Page 8 of 17 Lord Hope of Craighead had further elucidated that the definition is taken from the definition of 'privacy' in the United States, where the right to privacy is invaded if the matter which is publicised is of a kind that - (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) not of legitimate concern to the public. Law of privacy in Campbell (supra), it was observed, was not intended for the protection of the unduly sensitive and would cover matters which are offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities who must expect some reporting of his daily activities. The mind that has to be examined is not that of a reader in general, but that of the person who is affected by the publicising/dissemination of his information. The question is what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if he/she is subjected to such publicity. Only when publicity is such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved that there would be an invasion in the right to privacy which gives rise to a cause of action.
52. In Douglas (supra), it was also held that there are different degrees of privacy which would be equally true for information given in confidentiality, and the potential for disclosure of the information to cause harm is an important factor to be taken into account in the assessment of the extent of the restriction to protect the right to privacy.
53. While clause (j) exempts disclosure of two kinds of information, as noted in paragraph 47 above, that is "personal information" with no relation to public activity or interest and "information" that is exempt from disclosure to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy, this Court has not underscored, as will be seen below, such distinctiveness and treated personal information to be exempt from disclosure if such disclosure invades on balance the privacy rights, thereby linking the former kind of information with the latter kind. This means that information, which if disclosed could lead to an unwarranted invasion of privacy rights, would mean personal information, that is, which is not having co-relation with public information.Page 9 of 17
54. In Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner and Others34, the applicant had sought copies of all memos, show-cause notices and censure/punishment awarded to a Government employee from his employer and also details of his movable/immovable properties, details of investment, loan and borrowings from financial institutions, details of gifts accepted by the employee from his family members and relatives at the time of the marriage of his son. In this context, it was observed:
'12. We are in agreement with the CIC and the courts below that the details called for by the petitioner i.e. copies of all memos issued to the third respondent, show-cause notices and orders of censure/punishment, etc. are qualified to be personal information as defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act. The performance of an employee/officer in an organisation is primarily a matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are governed by the service rules which fall under the expression "personal information", the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or public interest. On the other hand, the disclosure of which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of course, in a given case, if the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information, appropriate orders could be passed but the petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of right.
13. The details disclosed by a person in his income tax returns are "personal information" which stand 34 (2013) 1 SCC 212 exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless involves a larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.' (emphasis supplied) Page 10 of 17
55. In Canara Bank v. C.S. Shyam and Another35, the applicant had sought information on parameters with regard to transfer of clerical staff with details of individual employees, such as date of their joining, promotion earned, date of their joining the branch, the authorities who had posted the transfer letters, etc. The information sought was declared to be personal in nature, which was conditionally exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
56. In Subhash Chandra Agarwal v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and Others36, the applicant (who is also the respondent in the present appeals) had sought information relating to details of medical facilities availed by individual judges of the Supreme Court and their family members, including information relating to private treatment in India and abroad in last three years. This Court had held that the information sought by the applicant was 35 (2018) 11 SCC 426 36 (2018) 11 SCC 634 'personal' information and was protected under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, for disclosure would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy which prohibition would not apply where larger public interest justifies disclosure of such information.
57. In R.K. Jain v. Union of India and Another37, the applicant had sought inspection of documents relating to Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of a Member of Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) and follow up action taken by the authorities based on the ACRs. The information sought was treated as personal information, which, except in cases involving overriding public interest, could not be disclosed. It was observed that the procedure under Section 11 of the RTI Act in such cases has to be followed. The matter was remitted to examine the aspect of larger public interest and to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 11 of the RTI Act which, it was held, was mandatory.
58. Reference can also be made to Aditya Bandopadhyay (supra), as discussed earlier in paragraph 32, where this Court has held that while a fiduciary could not withhold information from the beneficiary in whose benefit he holds such Page 11 of 17 information, he/she 37 (2013) 14 SCC 794 owed a duty to the beneficiary to not disclose the same to anyone else. This exposition of the Court equally reconciles the right to know with the rights to privacy under clause (j) to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act."
8.3. The above emphasised contents take us to the question of deciding whether there is any public interest involved in the disclosure of the information sought for in the instant RTI Application(s) relating to third parties. Here, the Commission places reliance on a catena of judgments of the superior Courts on the import of "public interest" as under:
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bihar Public Service Commission vs. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi & Anr. [CIVIL APPEAL NO.9052 OF 2012] observed as under:
"23. The expression 'public interest' has to be understood in its true connotation so as to give complete meaning to the relevant provisions of the Act. The expression 'public interest' must be viewed in its strict sense with all its exceptions so as to justify denial of a statutory exemption in terms of the Act. In its common parlance, the expression 'public interest', like 'public purpose', is not capable of any precise definition. It does not have a rigid meaning, is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time and state of society and its needs. [State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (AIR1952 SC 252)]. It also means the general welfare of the public that warrants recommendation and protection; something in which the public as a whole has a stake [Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition)]. Emphasis Supplied "24. The satisfaction has to be arrived at by the authorities objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to be weighed with regard to circumstances of a given case. The decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded for ensuring that larger public interest outweighs unwarranted invasion of privacy or other factors stated in the provision. Certain matters, particularly in relation to appointment, are required to be dealt with great confidentiality."Page 12 of 17
".... Similarly, there may be cases where the disclosure has no relationship to any public activity or interest or it may even cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual. All these protections have to be given their due implementation as they spring from statutory exemptions. It is not a decision simpliciter between private interest and public interest. It is a matter where a constitutional protection is available to a person with regard to the right to privacy. Thus, the public interest has to be construed while keeping in mind the balance factor between right to privacy and right to information with the purpose sought to be achieved and the purpose that would be served in the larger public interest, particularly when both these rights emerge from the constitutional values under the Constitution of India." Emphasis Supplied Similarly, in another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of S. P. Gupta v President of India, [AIR 1982 SC 149], with reference to 'public interest' it has been maintained that:
"Redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, 'diffused' rights and interests vindicate public interest... [in the enforcement of which] the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected." Emphasis Supplied And, in the matter of State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kasab Jamat & others [Appeal (Civil) 4937-4940 of 1998], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:
"the interest of general public (public interest) is of a wide importance covering public order, public health, public security, morals, economic welfare of the community, and the objects mentioned in Part IV of the Constitution [i.e. Directive Principles of State Policy]". Emphasis Supplied Page 13 of 17 Further, in the Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) case, the Apex Court had touched upon this aspect at length and some of the notable contents relevant to the instant discussion is reproduced hereunder:
"75. Public interest in access to information refers to something that is in the interest of the public welfare to know. Public welfare is widely different from what is of interest to the public. "Something which is of interest to the public" and "something which is in the public interest" are two separate and different parameters. For example, the public may be interested in private matters with which the public may have no concern and pressing need to know. However, such interest of the public in private matters would repudiate and directly traverse the protection of privacy.
The object and purpose behind the specific exemption vide clause (j) to Section 8(1) is to protect and shield oneself from unwarranted access to personal information and to protect facets like reputation, honour, etc. associated with the right to privacy. Similarly, there is a public interest in the maintenance of confidentiality in the case of private individuals and even government, an aspect we have already discussed.
76. The public interest test in the context of the RTI Act would mean reflecting upon the object and purpose behind the right to information, the right to privacy and consequences of invasion, and breach of confidentiality and possible harm and injury that would be caused to the third party, with reference to a particular information and the person. In an article 'Freedom of Information and the Public Interest: the Commonwealth experience' published in the Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, the factors identified as favouring disclosure, those against disclosure and lastly those irrelevant for consideration of public interest have been elucidated as under:
"it is generally accepted that the public interest is not synonymous with what is of interest to the public, in the sense of satisfying public curiosity about some Page 14 of 17 matter. For example, the UK Information Tribunal has drawn a distinction between 'matters which were in the interests of the public to know and matters which were merely interesting to the public (i.e. which the public would like to know about, and which sell newspapers, but... are not relevant). Emphasis Supplied Factors identified as favouring disclosure include the public interest in: contributing to a debate on a matter of public importance; accountability of officials; openness in the expenditure of public funds, the performance by a public authority of its regulatory functions, the handling of complaints by public authorities; exposure of wrongdoing, inefficiency or unfairness; individuals being able to refute allegations made against them; enhancement of scrutiny of decision- making; and protecting against danger to public health or safety.
Factors that have been found to weigh against disclosure include: the likelihood of damage to security or international relations; the likelihood of damage to the integrity or viability of decision-making processes: the public interest in public bodies being able to perform their functions effectively; the public interest in preserving the privacy of individuals and the public interest in the preservation of confidences.
Factors irrelevant to the consideration of the public interest have also been identified. These include: that the information might be misunderstood; that the requested information in overly technical in nature; and that disclosure would result in embarrassment to the government or to officials."
In view of the above, it will be prudent to consider that the findings and observation of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court's judgment in the Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar matter relied upon by the Appellant has to be read on a case to case basis and the Apex Court order dated 07.02.2025 in SLP No. 2783/2025 upholding the said judgment is not a ruling that overrides the averred constitution bench judgment in the Subhash Chandra Agarwal matter. In other words, the Apex Court order of 07.02.2025 Page 15 of 17 specifically upholds the order of disclosure laid down in the Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar and does not overrule the Subhash Chandra Agarwal case law. And therefore, in the instant case, the Commission relies on the Subhash Chandra Agarwal case law to uphold the denial of the personal information of the third parties to the extent that marks obtained by all candidates.
9. However, the Commission further notes that the CPIO has confirmed the following with respect to minimum marks prescribed for selection of candidates under General, SC/ST and PWD categories, in their latest written submissions dated 27.01.2025: "With regard to query 2,3 and 4 we wish to add that on perusal of the available records once again, it is observed that no minimum marks prescribed for any category."
In light of the aforementioned reply, the Commission cannot turn a blind eye to the appellant's prayer demanding transparency in the selection process viz-a-viz non- disclosure of cut-off marks in each of the categories (Gen/SC/ST/PWD). Therefore, keeping in view the spirit of RTI Act, a limited relief is allowed with respect to point no. 7 of the RTI application and the CPIO is now directed to provide only the marks obtained by the lowest ranked candidate in the final list of selected candidates (read as cut-off marks for final selection) without disclosing name (s) of the candidate (s) or the Panel Interviewers, in line with the exemption of Section 8(1)(g) and (j) of the RTI Act. The said information shall be provided, free of cost, to the Appellant within 15 days of the receipt of this order under due intimation to the Commission. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of.
Copy of the decision be provided free of cost to the parties.
Sd/-
(Anandi Ramalingam) (आनंदी राम लंगम) Information Commissioner (सूचना आयु ) दनांक/Date: 06.06.2025 Page 16 of 17 Authenticated true copy O. P. Pokhriyal (ओ. पी. पोख रयाल) Dy. Registrar (उप पंजीयक) 011-26180514 Addresses of the parties:
1 The CPIO Canara Bank, RTI Section, Recovery, Legal and Fraud Prevention Wing, Head Office (Annex), LIC Building, 113, J C Road, Bengaluru - 560002 2 Dr. Balasubramaniam Rathinavel Page 17 of 17 Recomendation(s) to PA under section 25(5) of the RTI Act, 2005:-
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