Madhya Pradesh High Court
Yogesh Kumar Tamrakar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 15 March, 2024
Author: Amar Nath Kesharwani
Bench: Amar Nath Kesharwani
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AMAR NATH (KESHARWANI)
SECOND APPEAL No.1114 OF 2009
BETWEEN:-
YOGESH KUMAR TAMRAKAR S/O SHANKAR
PRASAD TAMRAKAR AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
OCCUPATION BUSINESS, R/O SATNA,
DISTRICT SATNA (M.P.)
.....APPELLANT
(BY SHRI ABHIJEET AWASTHI - ADVOCATE)
AND
THE STATE OF M.P. THROUGH COLLECTOR,
DISTRICT SATNA (M.P.)
.....RESPONDENT
(BY SHRI RAMJI PANDEY - GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on : 28/02/2024
Passed on : 15/03/2024
.....................................................................................
This Second Appeal having been heard and reserved for judgment,
coming on for pronouncement on this day, Justice Amar Nath
(Kesharwani) pronounced the following:
JUDGMENT
This Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant/plaintiff under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 16/02/2009 passed by Ist Additional Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 2 District Judge, Satna, District Satna (M.P.) in Civil Appeal No.59-A/2003, whereby learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 18/02/2003 passed by IVth Civil Judge, Class-II, Satna, District Satna (M.P.) in Civil Suit No.228-A/1999, whereby the suit filed by appellant/plaintiff for declaration of title and permanent injunction was dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant/plaintiff has filed a suit for declaration of title, possession holder and to declare that the order dated 15/07/1994 passed by Collector, Satna in Revenue Case No.5A- 19/93-94 and order dated 18/07/1994 passed by Tehsildar Raghurajnagar in Revenue Case No.246A/6A/93-94 are illegal and void against the interest of the appellant/plaintiff and permanent injunction against respondent that neither he do any kind of interference in possession of the appellant/plaintiff himself, nor do it through any of his employee, in respect of land bearing Khasra No.91/6/2 area 2.00 acre, situated at Mauja Sonora Chek Utaili, Tehsil Raghurajnagar, District Satna (M.P.), here-in- after referred to as "suit property" alleging that he purchased the suit property from Bhadaiya Charmkar by registered sale deed (Ex.P-1) dated 15/12/1980 for a consideration of Rs.4,000/- (Four thousand) and since then he is in possession of the suit property and the suit land has also been mutated in his name vide order dated 03/01/1981 passed by Tehsildar Raghurajnagar, District Satna (M.P.) and the same has been demarcated in the year 1993 and report was submitted to the Court of Tehsildar, Raghurajnagar, District Satna, who after finding the same to be valid and as per law, ordered to confirm the demarcation report. The boundaries of the suit property is mentioned in the plaint map. It was further averred in the plaint that on 28/10/1998 when appellant/plaintiff approached the concerned Patwari for obtaining the copy of khasra report, he came to know that his name has been deleted and instead of his name, the name of Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 3 respondent/defendant was recorded. Upon enquiring the same from Patwari, he came to know that the concerned Collector vide order dated 18/07/1994 has removed the name of appellant/plaintiff from the revenue record and recorded the name of respondent/defendant (State of M.P.) without giving any notice to the appellant/plaintiff. Hence, order dated 15/07/1994 passed by the Collector in Revenue Case No.5A/19/93-94 is illegal and is liable to be set aside. Appellant/plaintiff has further pleaded that he has sent a notice under Section 80 of the CPC to the respondent, but the respondent have neither replied to the same, nor corrected the khasra entries in favour of appellant/plaintiff. Hence, he filed the Civil Suit before the trial Court for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondent/State.
3. Respondent/defendant opposed the case of the appellant/plaintiff by filing written statement alleging that the suit property was allotted to Bhadaiya Charmkar for agricultural purpose and said land was sold to the appellant/plaintiff in contravention of Section 165(7-b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, therefore, after giving full opportunity of hearing to the appellant/plaintiff, Collector, Satna passed the order dated 15/07/1994 and removed the name of appellant/plaintiff in the revenue record and recorded it in the name of State, hence prayed that the suit of the appellant/plaintiff be dismissed.
4. Learned trial Court framed the issues and after considering the material available on record, dismissed the Civil Suit vide judgment dated 18/02/2003 holding that the appellant/plaintiff has failed to prove his case. Being aggrieved by the judgment of trial Court, appellant preferred an appeal, which was also dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide impugned judgment dated 16/02/2009, hence Second Appeal filed before this Court.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 45. This Second Appeal has been admitted for final hearing vide order dated 30/01/2014 on the following substantial questions of law :-
"1. Whether both the Courts below are justified in holding that order dated 15/07/1994 passed in Revenue Case No.5A/19/93-94, in suo-motu revision after about 12 years of execution of sale deed by the original owner to the purchaser, is legal?
2. Whether the learned Courts below are justified in rejecting the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff in holding that provisions of Section 165(7-b) of the MP Land Revenue Code has been violated inspite of the fact that vendor has not filed any suit for declaring the sale void before the Competent Court?"
6. Before considering this appeal on merit on the abovementioned substantial questions of law, it reveals from the record that an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC (I.A.No.9251/2011) is pending in the case for taking additional document i.e. certified copy of order dated 15/07/1994 passed in Revenue Case No.5A/19/93-94 by the Collector, Satna.
7. It reveals from the pleadings of the parties that order dated 15/07/1994 passed in Revenue Case No.5A/19/93-94 has been challenged by the appellant in Civil Suit and in this Appeal on the ground that the order was illegal and passed without extending the opportunity of hearing to the appellant/plaintiff. But that order was not produced before the trial Court. Respondent also relied on that order, hence it is not in dispute that the Collector, Satna has passed the order dated 15/07/1994 and that order is important and necessary for proper adjudication of appeal and since the order dated 15/07/1994 is a public document, hence I.A.No.9251/2011 is allowed and document is taken on record. Accordingly, I.A.No.9251/2011 is disposed of.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that order dated 15/07/1994 in suo-motu revision is time barred, since the same has been Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 5 instituted after an inordinate delay of more than 10 years in the light of the fact that the suit property was purchased by the appellant in the year 1980 vide registered sale deed dated 15/12/1980 and thereafter his name was recorded in the revenue record in the year 1981 as well as demarcation was also carried out on the basis of said sale deed in the year 1993. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment passed by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ranveer Singh since dead through LRs Kishori Singh and others vs. State of M.P., 2010 (4) MPLJ 178 in which it was held that a period of 180 days from the date of detection of illegality or irregularity communicated by revenue authority subordinate to the revisionary authority would be a reasonable period for exercise of suo- motu powers and drew the attention of this Court towards Para-52 of the Ranveer Singh (supra).
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent/State has not followed the provisions of Section 50(iii) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, which shall be referred hereinafter as "MPLRC, 1959", which provides that no order shall be varied or reversed in revision unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them of being heard. Learned counsel further submitted that no prior notice or communication to the appellant regarding initiation of proceedings against him was given by the Collector, Satna and submitted that it is not only a statutory violation, but also the violation of principle of natural justice. In support of his contention learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Suresh Chandra Nanhorya Vs. Rajendra Rajak, (2006) 7 SCC 800 and drew the attention of this Court towards Para-8, 10 & 11 of the above citation.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the appellant is a bonafide purchaser and by no stretch of imagination he could not have Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 6 fathomed that the suit property would be embroiled in litigation at a later stage. At the time of purchasing of the suit property the appellant took reasonable care and diligence that is expected from an ordinary person and in support of his arguments learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah and others vs. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (Dead) by LRs. and others, (2000) 6 SCC 402.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the learned Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court has not considered the material evidence placed on record and submitted that it is clear from the record that the respondent was privy to the fact that the appellant purchased the suit property and despite such knowledge, appellant has taken no action, which was ignored by the trial Court as well as First Appellate Court, hence non-consideration of material fact which is on record is a substantial question, which should be considered by this Court. In this regard learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment passed by Ho'ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmiram (Dead) by legal representatives & Others Vs. Bietshwar Singh, (2008) 10 SCC 697.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the appellant has been in possession of the suit property throughout from the date of purchase of suit property. There is not even an iota of evidence showing that appellant had ever been dispossessed and merely because revenue proceedings were initiated against the appellant, does not mean his possession can be treated as invalid. In this regard learned counsel placed reliance in the case of Balkrishan vs. Satyaprakash & Ors., 2001 (2) SCC 498.
13. Learned counsel also submitted that the revenue authorities have manipulated their report by contending that the appellant has no right over the suit property since mandate of Section 165(7-b) of the MPLRC, 1959 Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 7 was not complied with, but such removal of the name of appellant from the revenue record would not confer any right upon the respondent because revenue entries are only for fiscal purpose and does not create any title. The only adjudicatory forum competent to resolve the legal issue relating to title is Civil Court and no other. In this regard learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commr. reported in (2007) 6 SCC 186.
14. Per contra, learned Government Advocate for the respondent/State submits that the order dated 15/07/1994 was passed well within the rights under Section 50 of the MPLRC, 1959 and that no title could have been conferred upon the appellant by sale deed (Ex.P-1). Since the land was given to Bhadaiya Charmkar on lease by the Government for agricultural purpose and no title has been conferred upon Bhadaiya Charmkar over the suit property, therefore, the same could not have been sold to the appellant. He further submitted that Bhadaiya Charmkar has also violated the provisions of Section 165(7-b) of the MPLRC, 1959, hence the impugned judgment passed by Appellate Court as well as trial Court are according to law and as per material placed on record and suit of the plaintiff has rightly been dismissed, hence prays for dismissal of the instant appeal. In support of his arguments learned counsel placed reliance on judgments passed by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Saroj Chand Vs. Smt. Premwati & Another, decided on 11/05/2020 in WA.No.345/2020 and in the case of Ummed Singh Vs. M/s Viranchi Realtors & Others, decided on 17/07/2015 in MA.No.314/2015.
15. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and gone through the citations upon which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the parties. Appellant/plaintiff has recorded his evidence before the trial Court as PW-1 and examined witness Badriprasad Yadav (PW-2) and exhibited documentary evidence Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 8 i.e. sale deed (Ex.P-1), certified copy of mutation register as Ex.P-2 and Ex.P-14, certified copy of khasra panchshala of the year 1985-86 to 89-90 (Ex.P-3), certified copies of mutation orders and map (Ex.P-4 to Ex.P-8), certified copy of order dated 27/04/1993 passed in Civil Suit No.1-A/1993 (Ex.P-9), certified copy of decree (Ex.P-10), certified copy of statement of Gopal Prasad Shrivastava (Ex.P-11), copy of application under Order 60 of the CPC (Ex.P-12), certified copy of khasra panchshala of the year 1980- 81 (Ex.P-15), certified copy of khasra panchshala of the year 1982-83 (Ex.P-16), certified copy of khasra panchshala of the year 1993-94 (Ex.P-
17), certified copy of khasra panchshala of the year 1999-2000 (Ex.P-18).
16. Respondent/defendant has not adduced any documentary or oral evidence in support of his pleading.
17. It is not in dispute that the appellant/plaintiff has purchased the suit property from Bhadaiya Charmkar vide registered sale deed (Ex.P-1) dated 15/12/1980. It reveals from the certified copy of mutation register (Ex.P-2) that the suit property was mutated in the name of appellant as per order dated 31/01/1981 passed by Tehsildar Raghurajnagar. As per Khasra Panchshala (Ex.P-3) which are for the year 1985-86 to 89-90, the name of appellant was registered as landlord. It reveals from documents Ex.P-4 to Ex.P-8 that demarcation proceeding was also carried out in the year 1993. Collector, Satna has passed the order dated 15/07/1994 in Revenue Case No.5A/19/93-94 on the report of SDO, Raghurajnagar. In the order dated 15/07/1994 it is not mentioned that in which provision the Collector has passed the order dated 15/07/1994. But it seems that Collector, Satna has used his power of suo-motu revision as conferred to him under Section 50 of the MPLRC, 1959.
18. Section 50 of the MPLRC, 1959 as was in force prior to the amendment in 2011, is reproduced as below :-
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 950. Revision. - (1) The Board or the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may at any time on its/his motion or on the application made by any party for the purpose of satisfying itself/himself as to legality or propriety of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of any Revenue Officer subordinate to it/him call for, and examine the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by such officer, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit:
Provided that -
(i) no application for revision shall be entertained -
(a) against an order appealable under this Code;
(b) against an order of the Settlement Commissioner under Section 210;
(c) against an order passed in revision by the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner in respect of cases under S.170-B, nor shall any such order be revised by the Board on its own motion;
(ii) no such application shall be entertained unless presented within sixty days to the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or within ninety days to the Board of Revenue from the date of the order and in computing the period aforesaid, time requisite for obtaining a copy of the said order shall be excluded;
(iii) no order shall be varied or reversed in revision unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them of being heard.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) -
(i) where proceedings in respect of any case have been commenced by the Board under sub-section (1) no action shall be taken by the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer in respect thereof;
(ii) where proceedings in respect of any case have been commenced by the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner under sub-section (1), no action shall be taken by the Collector or the Settlement Officer in respect thereof;
(iii) where proceedings in respect of any such case have been commenced by the Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer under Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 10 sub-section (1), the Board may either refrain from taking any action under this section in respect of such case until the final disposal of such proceedings by the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or may withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem fit;
(iv) where proceedings in respect of any such case have been commenced by the Commissioner or the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1), the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner may either refrain from taking any action under this section in respect of such case until the final disposal of such proceedings by the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or may withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem fit.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section all Revenue Officers shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Board.
[EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
19. In the case of Ranveer Singh (supra) Hon'ble Full Bench has clarified the position of law regarding limitation period in exercising the suo-motu revisional power by the authority under Section 50 of the MPLRC, 1959 and held that such power can be exercised within reasonable period of time by the concerned authority, which the Court held to be within a period of 180 days from the date of detection of illegality or irregularity committed by the revenue authority subordinate to the revisionary authority. In the present case the Collector, Satna did not use the revisional power within a reasonable period, but has slept over its revisional power for more than 12 years as mutation order was passed on 03/01/1981 and Collector, Satna has passed the order under revisional power on 15/07/1997. Para-11, 33, 36 & 52 are reproduced as below :-
11. We do not have any scintilla of doubt that the Revisional Authority mentioned in Section 50 of the Code may exercise suo motu power of revision at any time in order to satisfy itself about the legality or propriety of any order passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to it or as to the regularity of the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 11 proceedings of any such officer and while exercising such powers the Revisional Authority may pass such order as it thinks fit. True, the Legislature has not fixed any upper limit of the period when this power should be exercised and section is totally silent in this regard, although period of limitation has been fixed by the Legislature when a revision application is filed by a party concerned. According to Clause (ii) of Sub-
section (1) of Section 50 of the Code, an aggrieved party can file revision application within 60 days before the Commissioner or/the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or Settlement Officer or within 90 days to the Board of Revenue excluding the requisite time for obtaining copy of the order against which revision is filed. But merely because the Legislature has not fixed an upper limit for exercising suo motu powers by the Revisional Authority, according to us, it will not confer unfettered right to the Revisional Authority to exercise this power at any moment of time according to his whims because it would amount to give a sword having no scabbard. Indeed, after having an order in favor of a litigant he must be permitted to live in peace with an understanding that since the order passed in his favor has not been challenged for a considerable long period, now it cannot be challenged. His right, whatever he enjoys, may be on account of some illegal order in his favor should attain some finality so that his faith in the judicial system may not be ruined that although an order is in my favor, but it can be set aside at any moment of time even after passing of several years.
33. Coming to the point in question "what should be the reasonable period". We have at a glance demonstrated different type of periods of limitation in order to achieve the aim and object of a particular chapter and the provisions enacted in that chapter. Hence, according to us, in respect to Section 50 of the Code which comes under Chapter v. of the Code what should be the reasonable period for exercising suo motu powers, one should be guided with the aims and object of this chapter only and should not borrow the different type of periods of limitation which have been prescribed in other chapters to achieve the aim and object of the provisions prevailing in those chapters. Hence, the prescribed periods of limitation of 30 years, 10 years, 5 years, 3 years, 2 years or even 1 year prescribed in different chapters and the provisions enacted in that chapter cannot be made applicable for the purpose of achieving the aim and object of this Chapter v. in which Section 50 has been enacted which speaks about the exercise of suo motu powers of revision also. The Chapter v. of the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 12 Code contains Sections 44 to 56 and the maximum period of limitation in this chapter is 90 days. Hence, according to us, the maximum period which has been envisaged in any of the provision of any other chapter of the Code cannot be made applicable for the purpose of this chapter because that particular period of limitation has been enacted by the Legislature to achieve the aim and object of that particular chapter and its provisions only. The maximum period of limitation of 90 days has been enacted for filing the revision, but since this restriction is not for exercising suo motu powers and to serve the purpose, the aim and object for which this provision has been enacted, according to us, within a period of 180 days the Revisional Authority should exercise suo motu powers from the date of the coming into the knowledge to it that any particular illegality, impropriety or irregularity of the proceeding has been exercised by any officer subordinate to it.
36. Ex consequenti we hereby hold that in order to exercise suo motu power of revision envisaged under Section 50 of the Code and looking to the scheme of Chapter V, it should be exercised by the Revisional Authority within 180 days from the date of the knowledge of the illegality or impropriety of any order passed or as to the irregularity of the proceedings of any Revenue Officer subordinate to it and it will not be justifiable to stretch it for any length of period even for protection of the Government land or public interest.
52. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I concur with Brother Shrivastava, J., that what should be an irreparable loss is to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case because as no definite yardstick in that regard can be applied. I further concur with him in the manner that in such cases a period of 180 days from the date of detection of illegality, impropriety and/or irregularity of the order/proceedings committed by Revenue Authority subordinate to Revisional Authority would be a reasonable period for exercise of suo motu powers despite involvement of Government land or pubic interest. I may further hasten to add that this would be upper-ceiling of limitation for exercise of such powers and the person suffering an irreparable loss would be within his rights to show that such power ought to have been exercised in lesser period in view of the attending facts and circumstances of the case, causing irreparable loss prior to such exercise.
[EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 13
20. It is mentioned in the order dated 15/07/1994 that SDO, Raghurajnagar has submitted the report on 01/08/1992, but the Collector, Satna has not used its power within a reasonable period or upper limit of 180 days as clarified in the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ranveer Singh (supra). Since the revenue authority has mutated the name of appellant in revenue record and demarcation was also carried out in the year 1981 and 1993 respectively, hence it can be presumed that it was in the knowledge of revenue authority that property was sold by Bhadaiya Charmkar to the appellant and no action was taken under Section 50 of the MPLRC, 1959 within reasonable time or under the limitation provided in the judgment of Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ranveer Singh (supra).
21. The maxim vigilantibus noa dormientibus jura subveniunt fits perfectly in this case which translates to as "the law will only come to the assistance of those who are vigilant and not to those who sleep over their rights." The principle is sound and would equally apply to State and its instrumentalities, therefore, in the light of the Full Bench judgment, the order dated 15/07/1994 passed by Collector, Satna was passed beyond the limitation period of 180 days and is therefore, in the light of the foregoing discussion is bad in law and is liable to be set aside.
22. The appellant has pleaded that no opportunity of hearing was given to him prior to the order dated 15/07/1994 passed by Collector Satna. Appellant/plaintiff has also stated the same before the trial Court in his examination-in-chief. Respondent/defendant has pleaded that opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant, but respondent has not filed any document in support of his pleading and not adduced any evidence to prove that the opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant before passing of the order dated 15/07/1994. In the case of Suresh Chandra Nanhorya (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court has held that natural justice is the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 14 essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. Para-8, 10 & 11 of the case of Suresh Chandra Nanhorya (supra) are reproduced as below :-
8. Natural justice is an inseparable ingredient of fairness and reasonableness. It is even said that the principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary.
10. Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. In Mullooh v. Aberdeen Corpn. It was stated :
"the right of a man to be heard in his defence is the most elementary protection....."
11. Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice.
23. It is pertinent to mention here that respondent has not filed any document to show that the suit property was given to Bhadaiya Charmkar (executor of sale deed Ex.P.-1) on lease.
24. In view of the above discussion, the order dated 15/07/1994 passed by Collector, Satna in Revenue Case No.5A-19/93-94 and order dated 18/07/1994 passed by Tehsildar Raghurajnagar in Revenue Case No.246A/6A/93-94 are hereby set-aside.
25. Now I will consider the second substantial question of law framed by this Court, learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court has given the finding to the effect that since Bhadaiya Charmkar has sold the suit property to the appellant without permission of the Collector, Satna, which is required under Section 165(7-b) of the MPLRC, 1959 hence appellant/plaintiff is not title holder of the suit property.
26. Section 165(7-b) of the MPLRC, 1959 provides that :
165. Rights of transfer.- (7-b) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a person who holds land from the State Government or a person who holds land in Bhoomiswami rights under sub-section (3) of Section 158 or whom right to occupy land is granted by the State Government or the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 15 Collector as a Government lessee and who subsequently becomes Bhoomiswami of such land, shall not transfer such land without the permission of a revenue officer, not below the rank of a Collector, given for reasons to be recorded in writing.
[EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)
27. It reveals from sale deed (Ex.P-1) that the compliance regarding provision of Section 165(7-b) of the MPLRC, 1959 has not been mentioned in the sale deed (Ex.P-1) executed by Bhadaiya Charmkar in favour of appellant regarding suit property. But, since it is not proved by cogent evidence that the suit land was given to Bhadaiya Charmkar on lease, hence compliance of Section 165(7-b) of the MPLRC, 1959 is not required. It is pertinent to mention here that Bhadaiya Charmkar or his legal representatives have never challenged the validity of sale deed (Ex.P-
1) and it is not the case of the respondent/State that appellant has even been evicted from the suit property. Hence, it is clear that appellant is in possession of the suit property since 15/12/1980 i.e. from the date of execution of sale deed, therefore, appellant/plaintiff is in possession of the suit property for more than 40 years. Hence, it is clear that the appellant is a bonafide purchaser of the suit property and only on the ground that vendor of the suit property has not taken permission from Collector, Satna under Section 165(7-b) of the MPLRC, 1959 sale deed executed in favour of appellant cannot be said to be void ab initio. Hence, trial Court as well as First Appellate Court have erred in dismissing the suit filed by the appellant.
28. As discussed above, the appeal filed by the appellant is hereby allowed and impugned judgment and decree dated 16/02/2009 passed by I Additional District Judge, Satna, District Satna (M.P.) in Civil Appeal No.59-A/2003 and judgment and decree dated 18/02/2003 passed by IVth Civil Judge, Class-II, Satna, District Satna in Civil Suit No.228-A/1999 are Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52 16 hereby set aside and order dated 15/07/1994 passed by Collector, Satna in Revenue Case No.5A-19/93-94 and order dated 18/07/1994 passed by Tehsildar Raghurajnagar in Revenue Case No.246A/6A/93-94 are also hereby set aside and appellant is declared as title holder of the suit property and respondent/State is restrained from causing interference in possession of the appellant/plaintiff itself, nor do it through any of its employees or instrumentalities.
29. Appeal stands disposed of in above terms.
30. Decree be drawn accordingly.
No order as to costs.
(AMAR NATH (KESHARWANI)) JUDGE as Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANURAG SONI Signing time: 15-03-2024 17:57:52