Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Bharat Mohan Rateshwar vs National Investigation Agency on 11 December, 2012
Author: Ajay Rastogi
Bench: Ajay Rastogi
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR. ** J U D G M E N T D.B.CR.APPEAL NO.1194/2011 (Bharat Mohan Rateshwar Vs. The National Investigation Agency) Date of Judgment : December 11th,2012 P R E S E N T REPORTABLE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE AJAY RASTOGI HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE SMT. MEENA V.GOMBER Mr.G.S.Gill , for the appellant-applicant. Ms.Padmalakshmi Nigam, Special Public Prosecutor for NIA along with Mr.S.S.Raghav, Asstt. Solicitor General of India. BY THE COURT: (per Hon'ble Dr.MeenaV.Gomber,J)
The appellant has preferred this D.B.Criminal Appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2008) against the order dated 24.10.2011 passed by Special Judge, CBI Cases No.1, Jaipur whereby his criminal bail application was rejected.
Briefly stated facts of the case are that on 11.10.2007 a massive bomb blast took place in the compound of Dargah Sharif, Ajmer as a result of which three precious lives were lost and fifteen persons were seriously injured, who had gathered there for Roza Aftaar. Accordingly, an FIR No.85/2007 dated 11.10.2007 was registered at Dargah Sharif police station, Ajmer-Rajasthan under Sections 302, 307, 323, 295, 201, 120B IPC and Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 on the complaint of Shri Sayed Sarwar Chisty resident of Khadim Mohalla, Ajmer.
The case was initially investigated by local police and later on conducted by the ATS Rajasthan w.e.f. 8.5.2009. ATS Rajasthan filed a charge-sheet against three accused persons namely (i) Devendra Gupta (A-1) presently in Judicial custody; (ii) Chandra Shekhar Leve (A-2) bailed out by Rajasthan High Court; (iii) Lokesh Sharma (A-3) presently in judicial custody, [and names of (i) Sandeep Dange (A-8), (absconding); (ii) Ram Chandra Kalsangra (A-9), (absconding) and (iii) Sunil Joshi (A-10) (deceased) were shown in Column No.2 against whom charge-sheet was not filed], on 20.10.2010 under Sections 302, 307, 323, 295, 201, 120B IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 13,16,17,18,19, 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter for short referred to as 'U.A.(P) Act, 1967') in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer. However, further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C continued to unearth the large conspiracy and involvement of the other accused persons.
On receipt of some further credible information about the commission of Scheduled offences under the NIA Act and involving the security of the State, the Central Government decided that the case be investigated by the NIA. Accordingly, vide order dated 1.4.2011, Ministry directed the NIA to take up the investigation of the said case and such other offences as may come to light during investigation. Accordingly, in compliance to the said order of Ministry, NIA re-registered the said case as crime No.04/2011 against seven named accused and some other unknown for further investigation and to unearth the larger conspiracy and to find out the alleged involvement of others involving the security of the State.
Supplementary charge-sheet No.92A was filed against Harshad (A-4) and Mukesh Vasani (A-5) on 28.4.2011.
The appellant was arrested on 4.2.2011 and was charge-sheeted along with other seven named accused persons by the NIA on 18.7.2011 in charge-sheet No.92B and since then he is in judicial custody as his application for regular bail filed under Section 439 Cr.P.C. had been dismissed by the Special Sessions Judge by a detailed order passed on 24.10.2011.
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant Shri G.S.Gill, as also the learned Special Public Prosecutor Ms.Padmalakshmi Nigam appearing for NIA and Sh.S.S.Raghav, Asstt. Solicitor General of India, and have gone through the material placed before us for consideration.
Assailing the order passed by learned Special Judge on 24.10.2011, Shri G.S.Gill, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned Special Judge has overlooked the basic principle of law that the confessional statement of co-accused cannot be used against the appellant and further that before filing the charge-sheet No.92 against three persons, the appellants statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. had been recorded by ATS on 6.6.2010 and thereafter under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 24.9.2010 and his name was cited as witness in the second charge-sheet No.92A filed on 28.4.2011 by NIA itself against two accused persons namely Harshad (A-4) and Mukesh Vasan (A-5). According to him, there is no material to prima facie establish appellant's involvement in the commission of offence.
During the course of arguments Shri G.S. Gill also placed before us an order passed by the Court of the IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Hyderabad on 26.11.2012 granting regular bail to Devendra Gupta and Lokesh Sharma, allegedly accused in Makka Masjid, Hyderabad bomb blast case (who are also co accused in the present case). In that case, the learned Sessions Judge has categorically discussed that more than 200 witnesses had already been examined and some of the witnesses had also got recorded their statements under Section 164 CrPC. Therefore, learned Special Judge was of the view that in the given circumstances, tampering the witnesses of that case may no more be a ground against the applicants. Therefore, any decision given by Hyderabad Sessions Court with regard to co accused Devendra Gupta and Lokesh Sharma in Makka Masjid, Hyderabad bomb blast case does in no manner affect the order to be passed in this case.
On the other hand Ms.Padma Lakhsmi Nigam, learned Special Public Prosecutor, opposing the appeal for bail submitted that it was not solely on the basis of confessional statement of co-accused Aseemanand recorded on 18.12.2010, that the appellant has been roped into in the case. According to her, the confessional statement made by co-accused Swami Aseemanand led to discovery of some information relating to the commission of an offence and is used as an aid for further investigation and for formulating prima facie case relating to the commission of offence either by the accused or the co-accused.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that as per investigation, appellants role surfaced as an accused not only in this case but also in different cases of bomb blast that have taken place in the country including case no.02/2010 with regard to bomb blast at Mecca Masjid, Hyderabad. He was found to have close links with late Sunil Joshi @ Manoj who was master mind behind Samjhauta Express, Mecca Masjid & Ajmer blasts in 2007. According to her, the CDR printout of mobile phone number 09825352827 used by the appellant and this CDR printout coupled with his interrogation disclosed his close links with late Sunil Joshi because soon after the bomb blast at Ajmer Dargah, appellant received the telephonic information about it from Sunil Joshis mobile No.09424060007 and had admitted about his telephonic conversation with Sunil Joshi soon after the blast at Ajmer Dargah Sharif in his confessional statement recorded on 29.4.2010.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor Ms.Padmalakshmi Nigam further submitted that even Swami Aseemanand, in his confessional statement, recorded on 18.12.2010, admitted that he had given Rs.40,000/- to Sunil Joshi at appellants residence for causing bomb explosions at Mecca Masjid, Hyderabad which is clear to suggest that the appellant not only conspired for causing such blast but also offered his personal residence as the venue for such conspiracy and meetings and had full prior knowledge of such blasts executed by the master mind Sunil Joshi.
Further, besides the confessional statements of Aseemanand, there is evidence that the appellant & Sunil Joshi had been directed to procure the blast material and SIM cards from Jharkhand at a meeting hosted by co-accused. Subsequently another meeting of several co-accused was held at appellants house in Valsad to discuss the issues relating to bomb blasts at the places of religious importance for muslims. The appellant also participated in this meeting and, as such, he is a co-conspirator to the offence of financing of terrorist activity as well as accused in the larger conspiracy of the blasting of bombs.
The appellant had admitted in his statements recorded on 6.6.2010 under Section 161 Cr.P.C and on 24.9.2010 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. his going to Mihijam Jamtara & Shabridham in 2006, and beginning of 2007 although the purpose of his visit to these places was not disclosed. There is evidence on record that the appellant also visited several places to procure SIM cards, pistols, detonators and other arms and ammunitions along with Sunil Joshi and as per his own admission and as revealed by other witnesses appellant participated in meetings alongwith several other accused in Shabri Kumbh in 2006. The appellant disclosed under Section 27 of the Evidence Act during investigation said Aashram/residence of Sunil Joshi at Chuna Khadam in Distt. Dewas where a meeting was held in 2007 and attended by the appellant, Sunil Joshi @ Manoj, Suresh Nair etc and this is corroborated by other witnesses in this case.
Thus according to the prosecution, there is a prima facie case against the appellant for offences punishable under UA (P) Act, 1967/2008 and as per the investigation, his role emerges not only as an important conspirator in causing bomb blast but also as the facilitator, fund raiser and financier for perpetrating the offences under the Schedule of NIA Act.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor Ms.Padmalakshmi Nigam submitted that if the appellant is enlarged on bail, he may tamper with the oral evidence collected till now by influencing the witnesses in retracting their stand and also may hinder the collection of some more material by the Investigating Agency to arrive at a just and fair conclusion of the case. Moreover, other accused persons namely Sandeep Dange, Ramji Kalsangra, Bhavesh Patel, Suresh Nayar & Mehul are yet to be apprehended and his release may adversely affect their arrest.
Considered the rival contentions & perused the material placed before us in the form of charge-sheets No.92 dated 20.10.2010, 92A dated 28.4.2011 and 92B dated 18.7.2011.
In the light of the facts as brought forth by the parties leading to the present appeal, the materials on record and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties concerned, we now proceed to determine the question as to whether the impugned order refusing to grant bail to the accused appellant Bharat Mohan Rateshwar can be sustained.
Before we discuss the sustainability of the impugned order, it is worth recalling that when the Terrorist & Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 was repealed, the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, 2002 came to be enacted to combat, amongst others the menace of terrorism. However, even the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, 2002 came to be repealed in 2004 and when the terror attack took place in Mumbai on 26.11.2008, there was no specific legislation in force to help India fight against terrorism at the national level in as much as investigations into the acts of terrorism were to be ordinarily, carried by the various agencies at the State level. In the aftermath of Mumbai terror attacks National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (which herein-after for short will be referred as 'the NIA Act, 2008'), therefore, came into force on 31.12.2008. The NIA Act, 2008 created Special Courts for trial of Scheduled Offences.
In order to make law more stringent than what it was, the UA(P) Act, 1967, was introduced which too witnessed significant amendments on 31.12.2008, whereby Sections 43A, 43B, 43C, 43D, 43E and 43F were inserted under Chapter VII.
In the light of the scheme of investigation as perceived by the NIA Act, 2008, for the trial of Scheduled Offences, the relevant penal provisions as also the provisions with regard to bail, as have now been incorporated in the UA(P) Act, 1967, the present appeal needs consideration.
As terrorism has become a threat to the very existence of human society and terrorist activities have not remained a localized crime, a National Investigation Agency, which can coordinate and oversee investigation into the offences having national and cross-border repercussion was dreamt. It is to meet this requirement that the NIA has been given birth. Bearing in mind the threat of terrorism and its national and international ramifications, which India has to fight vis-a-vis the limitations on the powers of the Special Court to grant bail and the High Court's jurisdiction and powers in such matters, the present appeal seeking to get set aside the impugned order of the learned Special Court refusing to grant bail to the accused appellant Bharat Mohan Rateshwar, needs to be examined.
The question that arises is that when such an accused person arrested applies for bail, whether the application for bail so made would be treated to be an application under Section 439 of the Code on the ground that the Special Court has the power of the Court of Session so far as the trial of the accused is concerned or the Special Court, when such Court is constituted, can entertain such an application only in terms of Section 437 of the Code.
Since the appeal has been filed under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, 2008, it is necessary to examine the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under the said Section vis-a-vis High Court's power under Section 439 of the Code.
The question which is necessary to consider the provisions embodied in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008 conferring appellate jurisdiction on the High Court against the orders granting or refusing bail by a Special Court, is how does this appellate power contained in Section 21(4) of the NIA Act differ from the power which the High Court ordinarily enjoys to grant or cancel bail under Section 439 of the Code. It is relevant to quote Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, which reads as under :-
21. Appeals.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) Every appeal under sub-sec.(1) shall be heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal.
(3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec.(3) of Sec.378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail.
(5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days:
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days.
Thus, it is clear that under the NIA Act, 2008, appeal against even the order of a Special Court, not being an interlocutory order, lies to the High Court, both on facts and on law, and it has to be heard by a Division Bench of High Court. Further, the provision of sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code has been ignored in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008, which says that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing a bail. Thus it excludes sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
A Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh & anr. v. State of Assam & ors, (2010) 4 GLT 1, has interpreted the provision of Section 21(4) under the NIA Act, 2008 as also Sections 437 and 439 of the Code and held as under :-
When such an arrested accused applies for bail to the Special Court, the source of power to consider such an application for bail lies in Section 437 and not Section 439 of the Code. Even a High Court cannot invoke its powers, under Section 439 to grant bail if it has been refused by the Special Court nor can the High Court, by resorting to its power under Section 439, cancel bail if bail has been granted to such an accused by the Special Court. If the bail has been refused or granted by the Special Court, the aggrieved party may, however, prefer an appeal, in terms of Section 21(4) to the High Court. Such an appeal has to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and in such an appeal, the merit of the order, granting or refusing bail, can be questioned.
The appellant, besides the offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Explosive Substances Act, has also been booked for the offences under Sections 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the UA(P) Act, 1967. By way of amendment of the Act, Sections 43A, 43B, 43C, 43D, 43E and 43F had been inserted under Chapter VII. Sub-section (1) of Section 43D, makes every offence, punishable under the UA(P) Act, 1967, a 'cognizable offence'.
Sub-section (2) of Section 43D clarifies that the references to fifteen days, ninety days, and sixty days, whenever they occur, shall be construed as references to thirty days, sixty days and ninety days respectively. Sub-section (5) of Section 43D, is of utmost importance, which reads as under :-
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.
A bare reading of sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact that sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail by laying down that if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, 1967 is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.
Thus, if the Special Court, on perusal of the case diary, forms an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against an accused person, of the commission of offences or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI is prima facie true, it will not remain within the powers of the Court to grant bail in such a case. This position is further made clear by sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
The logical conclusion would, therefore, be that in a case, investigated by the agency, if the Special Court forms an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Special Court would have no jurisdiction to grant bail to such an accused except as may be provided by law.
In the backdrop of Clause (i) and (ii) of Section 437(1) CrPC, when one reverts to Section 43D(5), what surfaces is that the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D, (which lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no person accused of an offence, punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the NIA Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 CrPC is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true), can be treated to be, and can be read, by legal fiction, as Clause (iii) of Section 437(1).
The concept of proviso to Section 43D(5), has been dealt by the Division Bench of Guwahati High Court in the matter of Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra). The expression used in proviso to Section 43D(5) 'prima facie true', is an expression which does not ordinarily appear in penal statutes. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the matter of Marlin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79 at page 85 observed that a prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case, which can be said to be established if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out, the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion, in question, and not whether that was the only conclusion, which could be arrived at on that evidence.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in a later decision in the matter of The Management of the Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. B. Dasappa, M.T. Represented by the Binny Mills Labour Association, AIR 1960 SC 1352, followed the meaning of the word 'prima facie' given in Marlin Burn Ltd. (supra).
In the face of the observations made by the Apex Court in both the above mentioned decisions, it can be construed that prima facie case would mean, whether inference drawn is a possible inference or not. So the expression 'prima facie true' would mean that the court shall undertake an exercise to determine as to whether the accusations, made against the accused, are inherently improbable and/or wholly unbelievable. If the court finds, on such analysis, that the accusations made are inherently improbable, or wholly unbelievable, it may be difficult to say that a case, which is prima facie true, has been made out.
The term 'true' would mean a proposition that the accusation brought against the accused person, on the face of the materials collected during investigation, is not false. While arriving at a finding whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or false, the Court can only look into the materials collected during investigation, and on its bare perusal should come to a finding that the accusation is inherently improbable, however, while so arriving at a finding, the Court does not have the liberty to come to a conclusion which may virtually amount to an acquittal of the accused.
Thus, if a Special Court finds that the materials so collected during the investigation are sufficient to form, when assumed to be true, an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations, made against the accused, are prima facie true, the Special Court will be dis-empowered from releasing the accused on bail.
It is true that at the stage of bail, no minute scrutiny or microscopic dissection of the materials, collected during investigation, shall be undertaken by the Special Court. Credibility or otherwise of the materials collected would not be the subject-matter of scrutiny. What, at best, the Special Court can do, and shall do, is to examine if the accusations made, on the basis of the materials collected, are wholly improbable. When the materials are, on examination by the Special Court, found to be not wholly improbable and the Special Court finds, on assuming such materials to be true, that the accusations, made against an accused, as regards commission of an offence under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act, 1967, are prima facie true, such materials would be enough to attract the bar imposed by the proviso to Section 43D(5).
Thus, Section 437(1) of the Code imposes restrictions on the power of the Special Court and, consequently, on the powers of the High Court too, to release an accused on bail if there are reasonable ground for believing that he has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
However, determination of question as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing or not would obviously invite the court to assign reasons so as to make it clear as to why this court has taken the view that no reasonable grounds to believe exist or as to why reasonable grounds to believe exist. In either way, therefore, the reasons are necessary to be assigned and that is what invites and compels the Court to discuss, albeit as briefly as possible, the materials on record, which, to our mind, are relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal and some of these materials even the learned counsel for the appellants has freely referred to.
The material produced before us rests substantially on the theory of criminal conspiracy. It deserves to be pointed out that there may not be direct evidence of criminal conspiracy inasmuch as existence of criminal conspiracy can be inferred from circumstantial evidence if such evidence, direct or indirect, is based on acts or omissions indicating existence of such criminal conspiracy. When the prosecution case is to a large extent, based on the theory of criminal conspiracy, the case of the appellant cannot be considered independent of co accused and has to be considered in the light of the entire materials, which have been collected by the Investigating Agency. Such materials would, obviously, include not only the acts of commission of the appellant herein Bharat Mohan Rateshwar, but also other co accused persons including those who are absconding.
During investigation, statements of Vasudev Parmar, Govind, Col. S.Purohit, Anand Raj Kataria and Rohit Jha have been recorded by the Investigating Agency which reveal that the criminal conspiracy to cause bomb blasts had started sometime in the year 2004 and the appellant had a close association with late Sunil Joshi (died), Aseemanand (judicial custody), Devendra Gupta (judicial custody), Mehul Raj, Amit and Ramji Kalsangra (absconders) and was a co-conspirator. The meeting of minds of late Sunil Joshi, Aseemanand and the appellant , and their propounding the theory of Bomb Ka badla Bomb against muslims, and assembling of bombs by Sunil Joshi, Ramji Kalsangra, Amit Mehul and Shivam in Devas is revealed from the statements of Vasudev Parmar and Swami Aseemanand.
The record further showed that mother conspiracy meeting was held in June 2006 at the appellant's residence Thakurghar Mograwadi, Valsad (Gujarat) which was attended by Nab Kumar Sarkar @ Swami Aseemanand, Pragya Singh (whose sangathan was known as Vandematram), late Sunil Joshi, Sandeep Dange, Ramji Kalsangra, Lokesh Sharma, Amit @ Hakla and the appellant. In this meeting targets which were selected were Malegaon, Samjhouta Express, Mecca Masjid Hyderabad, Aligarh Muslim University and Ajmer Dargah Sharif.
It has also come on record that after selecting the targets, three groups were formed to execute the plan. Out of the three groups the first group comprising of appellant and Aseemanand was assigned the role of providing financial help and to give other help and shelter etc. As planned both the accused persons made financial help available to Sunil Joshi and also gave them shelter at his Valsad house and Shabridham.
Second group was assigned with the responsibility of collecting/arranging/ procuring the necessary material for bomb making and this group consisted of Sandeep Dange, Ramji Kalsangra and late Sunil Joshi.
Third group had been assigned with the responsibility of planting the bombs and late Sunil Joshi took the responsibility stating that the members of the three groups should remain away from each other and he will be doing the co-ordination work.
It has also come on record that during the period from April/May 2006 to November 2007, 11 SIM cards were purchased on fake names and identities from Jamatara & Mihijam, out of which two were used in Ajmer blast case and the appellant admitted in his statements, his going to Mihijam & Shabridham during that time but had not disclosed the purpose. Statements of Rohit Jha as also of Aseemanand reveal movement of appellant and Sunil Joshi for procurement of SIM cards and pistol from Jamatara and Mihijam in April/May 2006.
The appellant who was arrested on 4.2.2011, admitted that all the facts were in his knowledge. He has been a part of conspiracy and financier. He made a disclosure under Section 27 of Evidence Act that he along with other co-conspirators planned bomb blasts as retaliatory step to bomb's reply by bomb and that he wanted it to be videographed. On this information, Videography was got conducted. The facts disclosed the role of appellant in criminal conspiracy and its execution led to bomb blast in Ajmer Dargah on 11.10.2007. His interrogation and videography showed that they had connection with other cases of bomb blasts in other states of the country.
As per the information given by Mukesh Vasani, co-accused Sunny and Mehul had implanted bombs in Ahaetenoor & Ibadat Khana respectively at about 6.00 pm on 11.10.2007 at Dargah Sharif. Out of two bombs one exploded and the other unexploded was found in a bag with other material which was defused and the mobile phone used as device and timer had inscription of Vandematram, a group run by Pragya Singh.
From above, it is apparent that the appellant as also Aseemanand played an important role of facilitator financier and planner for bomb blast at Ajmer Dargah and the financial help was extended by Swami Aseemanand to the appellant and late Sunil Joshi since one year prior to the incident; whereafter the appellant and Sunil Joshi visited Mihijam Jamtara Jharkhand and other places and played an important role in procuring the mobile phone, SIM cards, detonator and other explosive substances to be used for bomb blast and same were procured on the basis of false identity cards. As a part of conspiracy, other members of this terrorist group namely Sandeep Dange, Ramji Kalsangra, Suresh Nayar, Bhavesh Patel & Mehul played an important role in getting the training for making bombs and making them by using mobile phones, SIM cards and in transporting the bombs to Dargah Sharif and placing them at the places assigned, consequent whereof three precious lives were lost and 15 persons were injured.
The charge-sheet No.92B was filed against accused namely Swami Aseemanand, Bharat Bhai Rateshwar, Ramchandra Kalsangra, Sandeep Dange, Sunil Joshi (died), Suresh Nayar, Bhavesh Patel and Mehul for offences under Secs. 302, 307, 295A, 120B IPC and Secs.3,4,6 of Explosive Substances Act, 1908, and Secs. 13,16,17,18,20 and 23 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967/2008 and the investigation against other suspects namely Ramesh Gohil @ Ghanshyam, Sunny @ Amit Hakla, Pragya Singh, Samandar Jayanti Bhai, Indresh Kumar is still pending under Sec.173(8) Cr.P.C.
Thus the oral and documentary evidence as also other material collected by the Investigating Agency show that the terrorist group conspired and made a plan and in order to implement said plan different roles were played by the three groups and the role of appellant in criminal conspiracy and its execution led to bomb blast in Ajmer Dargah on 11.10.2007.
In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the appellant is not entitled to bail at this stage. Hence this appeal for bail is dismissed.
Before parting with this appeal, we make it clear that whatever views and opinions we have expressed with regard to the facts discernible from the relevant case diary and the records, are tentative in nature and these are meant for the purpose of considering the appellant's prayer for bail. Our views and opinions shall not be taken as final views and opinions of this Court as regards the guilt or otherwise of the accused appellant.
With these above observations and directions, this appeal stands disposed of.
(Dr.MEENA V.GOMBER), J. (AJAY RASTOGI), J. Sandeep/-db
[All corrections made in the judgment/order have been incorporated in the judgment/order being emailed.] Deepankar Bhattacharya PS