Gujarat High Court
Naranbhai Nathubhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat & on 12 April, 2013
Author: G.R.Udhwani
Bench: G.R.Udhwani
NARANBHAI NATHUBHAI PATEL....Petitioner(s)V/SSTATE OF GUJARAT C/SCA/14432/2003 CAV JUDGEMNT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14432 of 2003 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.UDHWANI ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?2
To be referred to the Reporter or not ?3
Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?4
Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ?5
Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
================================================================ NARANBHAI NATHUBHAI PATEL....Petitioner Versus STATE OF GUJARAT &
3....Respondents ================================================================ Appearance:
MR BS PATEL, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner.
MR NIRAJ ASHAR ASST GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Respondents No. 1 - 2 , 4 RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 3 ================================================================ CORAM:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.UDHWANI Date : 12/04/2013 CAV JUDGEMNT In this petition, the petitioner challenges the order dated 20/10/1995 passed by 2nd respondent in Revenue Case No.5 of 1995 under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (for short BLRC), whereby a grant of the possessory rights conferred by a certificate dated 22/04/1991 produced at Annexure C issued by Mamlatdar, Siddhpur came to be withdrawn. The petitioner also challenges the order dated 15/07/2003 passed by 1st respondent dismissing the revision application filed by the petitioner, which is produced at Annexure B.
2. The predecessor of the petitioner resided at Village Kahoda of Siddhpur as agriculturist since more than 80 years and his forefathers were in possession of a piece of land ad-measuring 153.06 square meters, in Revenue Survey No.667 paiki which was being used as wada land . The State Government had been passing resolutions at least right from 1930 under the BLRC to confer possessory rights to the agriculturist holding wada land. One of such resolution was passed on 22/06/1968 and then on 25/04/1980 (Annexure I Colly of reply affidavit). In both the above resolutions, a policy was set up by the State Government to grant possessory rights on defined payment to the agriculturist possessing wada land. As per the said resolutions, wada land is the one which is used by agriculturist as an additional piece of land in the Gam Tal either immediately attached to their agricultural land or at some other place in Gam Tal depending upon the convenience and availability of the lands for the purpose of cattle and other incidental agricultural purposes etc.
3. The petitioner applied for and the Mamlatdar granted to him the possessory rights for said piece of land, after he paid a consideration of Rs.122.50 Paise as required by Mamlatdar. Accordingly, certificate at Annexure C was issued to the petitioner.
4. The petitioner was Sarpanch of the village and during the course of his duty as such he took a stringent action under the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961 against 3rd respondent for removal of encroachment made by him on the road and it is his case that because of political rivalry, 3rd respondent moved an application to get the order Annexure C cancelled. Therefore, in purported exercise of power under Section 211 of BLRC, a notice dated 16/09/1995 was issued by 2nd respondent, which was replied to by the petitioner, but without considering the settled legal position as to limitation of one year for exercise of powers under Section 211 of the BLRC, 2nd respondent while relying upon statement made by Talati-cum-Secretary, passed impugned order at Annexure A after a period of more than four years of Annexure C without verifying the previous report of Talati-cum-Mantri and Circle Inspector. It is the petitioner s say that order at Annexure A was passed upon approval of the Collector and 2nd respondent being the Deputy Collector was not an official superior to the Collector and, therefore had no authority to pass the impugned order. The petitioner preferred a revision application against the said order, which came to be dismissed, copy of which is produced at Annexure B.
5. The petitioner approached this Court by preferring SCA No.7399 of 1997, which set aside the order at Annexure D while remanding the matter, particularly, on the point of rendering the decision on limitation. Accordingly, the petitioner appeared before the 1st respondent and made written submissions produced at Annexure F. The petitioner pointed out that the land in question was not Gauchar land and by order dated 07/06/1980, the character of the lands in question as Gauchar was deleted from the record as such and was categorized as Gam Tal land. A reliance for the purposes is placed upon the entry made in the record of rights produced at Annexure G. Reliance is placed upon at Annexure H to show that the land in question is being used for various other purposes. While reiterating character of the land as Gaurchar land in impugned order at Annexure B, the Mamlatdar was held to had no authority to certify the possession of said land as wada land. Mamlatdar s order was held to be nullity and against the record. Hence, this petition.
6. It was submitted that the orders passed by the 1st and 2nd respondent were arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as they have been passed without considering the earlier report of Talati-cum-Mantri, which makes it clear that the land in question was the wada land.
7. It was also contended that powers under Section 211 of the BLRC could not have been exercised after a period of more than 04 years in view of the settled legal position in Patel Chhotabhai Madhavbhai & Ors. Vs. Stae of Gujarat & Anr., [1995 (1) GLR 407].
8. It was contended that the settled legal position on limitation under Section 211 of the BLRC was ignored by the 1st respondent under the guise that order at Annexure C passed by Mamlatdar was a nullity.
9. It was also contended that both the authorities failed to appreciate that it was on account of political rivalry that the proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and, therefore, the said respondents ought not to have been parties to such rivalry.
10. It was submitted that similarly situated persons were given similar benefit and, therefore, such a benefit could not have been denied to the petitioner.
11. It was contended that impugned orders are passed upon mis-conception of fact that, the land in question was Gauchar land, but in fact record in the nature of Annexure G and H, showed different state of affairs. Orders having been passed in ignorance of the said documents are, in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
12. Lastly, it was submitted that at the time of passing of the order by Mamlatdar (Annexure C), Wada Patrak was available and was referred to by Mamlatdar and therefore, merely because record could not be located, an incorrect conclusion that land in question was not wada land was reached at. Learned Counsel therefore submitted that impugned orders are required to be quashed and set aside.
13. The petitioner in the rejoinder after reiterating the fact mentioned in the petition has come out with the case that as such it was mandatory to keep Wada Patrak and the production of it was avoided during the course of proceedings under the pretext that it was not traceable. It is also pointed out that few similarly situated persons have been allotted the lands and therefore the petitioner was entitled to same treatment.
14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order was passed at the instance of and under the influence of the superior authority i.e. Collector and therefore it being biased, may not be sustained.
15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner while drawing the attention of the Court to resolution dated 25/04/1980, submitted that in fact the said resolution does not prescribe the limitation for lodging a claim for wada land, but it merely prescribes a time schedule of decision of the applications and payment of the cost that may be determined and in fact under the said resolution it is permissible to re-apply in case of non-payment of price of land within the time schedule which fact, according to the learned Counsel clearly indicates that there is no outer time limit for the operation of the resolution. It was submitted that therefore the findings to the contrary in the impugned order Annexure A were not sustainable.
16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that only finding rendered by the Deputy Collector, in order at Annexure A was that the time limit for the application under Resolution dated 25/04/1980 was three months and that having expired, the land could be used only as open land without possessory right, but in the impugned order, the 1st respondent expanded the scope of revision as if sitting in appeal by adding the facts and findings which were not the part of impugned order at Annexure A.
17. Affidavit-in-reply has been filed by 1st and 2nd respondents.
Learned Counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 submitted that land in question was Gauchar land and not wada land and there being concurrent findings of fact on this issue and this Court under Article 226 may not interfere.
18. It was contended that a policy was evolved by the State Government to give possessory rights of wada land situated in Gam Tal and Sim Tal to persons concerned all over the State and the benefit of the said policy was made available in the year 1980. Thereafter, in the year 1997, the State Government, in pursuance to representations from those who could not take advantage of the resolution of 1980, passed another resolution dated 13/02/1997 once again giving powers to the concerned authorities to give possessory rights to such persons. Such policies are produced with affidavit-in-reply at Annexure I Colly. It was submitted that however, the Mamlatdar exercised powers in the year 1991 and issued order / certificate Annexure C when no such policy was in vogue and thus he lacked authority in law to pass order at Annexure C.
19. It was also contended that since as per the report of the Circle Inspector dated 30/03/1991, the land in question was not the wada land, possession of it could not have been given to the petitioner as wada land. It was submitted that the petitioner being ex-Sarpanch had sought and succeeded in getting illegal favours from the Mamlatdar and therefore impugned orders have been rightly passed to withdraw such illegal favour.
20. Relying upon the village Form No.8-A at Annexure III Colly to reply affidavit, it was submitted that, even otherwise the land in question being Gauchar land was not grantable as wada land and therefore impugned orders may not be disturbed.
21. The impugned order at Annexure A is passed by the Deputy Collector, Patan which records following findings.
That by endorsement dated 16/09/1995, the Collector, Mehsana had asked me to revise the order at Annexure C passed by the Mamlatdar.
21.1 Apparently, the Deputy Collector had not taken a decision of its own to revise the certificate / order produced at Annexure C. The powers under Section 211 of the BLRC are exercisable by a Revenue Officer, not inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy Collector or a Superintendent of Survey, in their respective departments.
21.2 It cannot be disputed that Deputy Collector and the Collector are the Revenue Officers as defined under Sections 8 and 9 of the BLRC respectively. Section 211 of the BLRC may be quoted hereunder for reference:
211. Power of State Government and of certain revenue officers to call for and examine records and proceedings of subordinate officers; and to pass orders thereupon.- The State Government and any revenue officer, not inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy Collector or a Superintendent of Survey, in their respective departments, may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer.
The following officer may in the same manner call for and examine the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them in any matter in which neither a formal nor a summary inquiry has been held, namely, a Mamlatdar, a Mahalkari, an Assistant Superintendent of Survey and Assistant Settlement Officer.
21.3 It can be noticed that Section 211 is divided in three parts; (01) Assistant or Deputy Collector or a Superintendent of Survey, in the respective department, are authorized to call for and examine the record of any inquiry and to satisfy itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed thereunder, and as to regularity of proceedings of such officer; (02) the Revenue Officers like Mamlatdar, Mahalkari, and and Assistant Settlement Officer, have been authorized to call for and examine the proceedings of any Officer, subordinate to them in any matter in which neither a formal nor a summary inquiry has been held and (03) all the Officers named in one and two above, are authorized to modify, annul or reverse or pass necessary orders as deemed fit. However, the proviso prevents Assistant or Deputy Collector from passing an order in any matter where a formal inquiry has been held. The named Officers are obliged to submit the record instead, with his opinion to the Collector, who shall pass such order thereon as deemed fit. Thus, the Revenue Officer named in Section 211 are authorized to call for and satisfy itself as to legality or propriety of decision or order etc., as aforesaid. It can be seen that in the matter of calling for the record and proceedings, the Revenue Officers are invested with concurrent powers. The powers having been statutorily invested in the specific Revenue Officer are contemplated to be exercised by such Officer on recording his own satisfaction and not the satisfaction of his superior officer. As indicated above, the impugned order mentions the satisfaction of Collector, being the superior officer to the Deputy Collector who exercised the said power at the instance of the former. It therefore clearly appears that the Deputy Collector was under the influence of the Collector and he did not take a decision for revising the decision or the order of the Mamlatdar on his own satisfaction. It is no doubt true that after calling for the record of the inquiry or the proceedings of subordinate Revenue Officer, on its own, the Deputy Collector could have, under proviso to Section 211, submitted the record with his opinion to the Collector and it is the Collector who is obliged under the proviso to pass necessary order. This procedure was not followed in this case and thus it appears that the Deputy Collector has not exercised the authority as invested in him under Section 211 of the BLRC. The possibility of the decision of the Deputy Collector being biased therefore cannot be ruled out. It is settled law [see Rattan Lal Sharma Vs. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School and others [AIR 1993 SC 2155] and State of Rajasthan Vs. R A Mehta [2013 AIR SCW 671]) that for a proof of bias what is required to be shown is likelihood of bias and not actual bias. The test is whether, in the given set of circumstances, the justice seeker perceived and apprehended the decision to be biased, such perception and apprehension would be obvious in a case where apparently the superior officer directs his subordinate to exercise the statutory authority vested in such subordinate authority without allowing him to take his own decision for exercise of such authority. This Court therefore is convinced that the decision rendered by the Deputy Collector was a biased decision and it cannot be sustained even for a minute.
22. Further, it is not in dispute that the impugned order at Annexure A came to be taken in revision under Section 211 of the BLRC after a period of more than 04 years. In Patel Chhotabhai Madhabhai (Supra) a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, held as under:
8.
As indicated earlier, the Supreme Court was precisely concerned with the case falling under Secs. 65 and 211 of the Code. The permission for the non-agricultural use was granted on a remand by the Collector of Rajkot and the lands were put to the non-agricultural use. The Commissioner who at that time would be the revisional authority under Sec. 211 of the Code had issued the necessary notices and ultimately the orders granting the N.A. permissions came to be set aside vide the orders dated 12th October 1961. The principle adopted by the Supreme Court is that this revisional powers must be exercised within a reasonable time. It is also pointed out by the Supreme Court that the question of reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. Ultimately, the Supreme Court has taken into consideration the provisions contained under Sec. 65 of the Code and has opined that, "a reasonable time limit" one gets in the provisions contained under Sec. 65 of the Code itself. When that reference is made to the text of the said provision, it appears very clearly that an occupant of a land which is being assessed and held for the purpose of agriculture, is entitled to put the land on the non-agricultural use. Under the procedure provided by this section itself, the occupant has to obtain the permission of the Collector and that the Collector has to process the application on the receipt of it. Sec. 65(1)(b) makes it abundantly clear that if the Collector fails to inform the applicant, of his decision on the application, within a period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. Therefore, reading these provisions along with the provisions contained under Sec. 211 of the Code, a view has been taken by the Supreme Court that in such a case when the orders under Sec. 65 of the Code are involved, the revisional authority acting under Sec. 211 of the Code must exercise the revisional powers within a few months. Undoubtedly, in the instant petitions such powers have not been exercised within a few months of the order granting permission for putting the land to the N.A. permission.
Thus, on a compactus of decisions which have been cited at the Bar, the unequivocal principle laid down by the Supreme Court appears to have been followed by saying that, if the order granting the permission for non-agricultural use under Sec. 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code are to be revised under Sec. 211 of the Code, it must be done within a reasonable time and that looking to the special provisions embodied in Sec. 65 of the Code a few months can be said to be a reasonable time during which the powers shall have to be exercised.
19. The learned Government Counsel Ms. Mandavia wanted to urge with great emphasis that, even if the principle is to be accepted that the revisional powers must be exercised under Sec. 211 of the Code within a reasonable time, the reasonableness of the time should be decided qua the date of the commencement of the proceedings. Ms. Mandavia, placing reliance upon the observations of the revisional authority wanted to urge further that, this all was brought to the notice of the Government, some officer was appointed to make necessary inquiries and ultimately the notices were issued and the powers were exercised. The learned Counsel Mr. Patel for the petitioners while replying this contention wanted to urge that, there is absolutely no mention in the show cause notice saying that the Government would like to treat the orders as orders in nullity. The learned Counsel further urges that, what the Government had done as a spade work, preparatory to the exercise of the powers under Sec. 211, was never brought to the notice of the petitioners and that this becomes evident for the first time, when one reads the orders of the revisional authority. The question appears to have been decided in case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra). The Supreme Court does not speak of the initiation of the proceedings under Sec. 211 of the Code. This decision of the Supreme Court and the decisions referred to above, would speak not of initiation of the proceedings but the exercise of the revisional powers under Sec.
211. The whole exercise of revision must be done within the time frame as provided by the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha (supra). If the Supreme Court wanted to rule that even an initiation of the proceedings by way of notice within a reasonable time would salvage the situation, it would have so befallen from the Supreme Court, which has not happened. Moreover, no decision says that some preliminary exercise to be done by the Government popularly known as 'Spade Work' would amount to the exercise of the powers within the meaning of Sec. 211 of the Code. Moreover, if initiation is to be taken into consideration, then also, as seen from the Table, it is definitely not within the time frame. The spade work or the inquiry by some Government officer would not tantamount to exercise of the powers under Sec. 211 of the Code. In view of this position even if it is accepted, disregarding the contention of the learned Counsel Mr. Patel that nothing was brought to the petitioners even during the course of the hearing, then also, all what is done by the revisional authority cannot be said to be the exercise within the time frame provided by the Supreme Court in case of Raghav Natha (supra).
23. Thus, exercise of powers after a period of more than four years and that too under influence of the superior officer by Deputy Collector was unwarranted. However, it was contended that the order or certificate issued at Annexure C by the Mamlatdar was nullity since non-existent powers were exercised by Mamlatdar; resolution of 1980 not being a vogue in the year 1991 and therefore no limitation would apply. A perusal of the resolution annexed at Annexure I Colly with reply affidavit clearly indicates that no outer time limit for operation of the Resolution of 1980 was ever prescribed. Therefore, it is not accurate for the respondents to contend that during the interregnum i.e., during the resolution of 1980 and 1997, the Mamlatdar lacked the authority to consider the grant of possessory rights in wada land. It therefore cannot be said that he lacked such authority.
24. The impugned order (Annexure A) also records the fact that as per Resolution dated 25/04/1980, the possessor right in respect of wada land was to be claimed within three months and thereafter in case of old wada, the use of the land, only as an open land was permissible and therefore the order at Annexure C passed by the Mamlatdar was against the purpose of Resolution dated 25/04/1980.
24.1 It is evident from the Resolution dated 25/04/1980 annexed with affidavit in reply, that those whose land was registered as wada land were entitled to apply for possessory right on payment of defined cost. As per resolution dated 25/04/1980, a wada land can be in the Gam Tal adjoining to the house or away from the house and a Wada Patrak as per rules shall have to be maintained village-wise with relevant details. It has to be signed by Sarpanch and Talati-cum-Mantri is duty bound to maintain it. In the resolution, it is also provided that Wada Sahita Code will be applicable not to the lands already possessed as Wada land, but those which are left out. It is also provided that the person holding a wada land would otherwise be entitled to use the same as open land and in order to get a complete title, the cost as defined in the resolution shall have to be paid. For the purpose, an application with full detailed relevant facts is contemplated and such applications are required to be decided within time schedule prescribed in clause 4 of the resolution, and if, for any reason the applicant pays the price after the outer limit for such payment, a fresh application is permissible. In certain circumstances, the cost for possessory right is waived as contemplated in clause 6. As per clause-7, no detailed inquiry for grant of possessory right is required, but after the necessary formalities contemplated in the resolution, the certificate annexed to the schedule will be sufficient evidence of its possession.
24.2 What is significant from the Resolution dated 25/04/1980 is that it lays down the policy of administration of wada lands under Wada Code and grant or non-grant of absolute or possessory rights for those lands which have been registered as wada land. The resolution does not contemplate its date of expiry and thus there appears to be a substance in the argument by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was no question of a bar of limitation for making an application under the said policy.
25. The findings recorded in the impugned order at Annexure B are that:-
Land bearing Survey No.667/2 of Siddhpur Taluka of Kohra Village having 27 Acres and 32 Gunthas as per entry No.826/1 is a Gaurchar land.
A map of the land indicates that it is situated near Gam Tal.
It was not being used as Gauchar and therefore at the relevant point of time, the Panchayat had passed a resolution re-vesting the land in the State Government.
As per record of rights i.e. Village Form No.7&12, the land in question has been allotted as Gam Tal also to Societies, Post and Telegram Department, etc. Therefore, considering the above aspects, the land being a Gauchar land, the existence of wada therein is out of question.
If at all the land was a wada land and was grantable under Resolution dated 25/04/1980, the period of limitation for such grant was three months and in absence of extension of such period, the grant could not have been made by Mamlatdar by his order dated 30/03/1991.
The order passed by the Mamlatdar on 30/03/1991 was without verifying the Wada Patrak and his action was illegal.
That no basis for categorizing the lands in question as wada land could be produced by applicant or Talati-cum-Mantri before the competent authority.
That even before the Deputy Collector Patan, no evidence to show its character as wada land was produced. Therefore, the land in question was not wada land but was being used unauthorizedly.
Even, if the land in question was wada land, it could have been used only as an open piece of land and possessory rights could not have been granted.
26. In the impugned order at Annexure B, a reference to the reservation of land ad-measuring 27 Acres and 32 Gunthas of Survey No.667/2 Paiki as Gaurchar land has been made and the petitioner s claim came to be rejected on the ground that the lands in question were Gaurchar land and therefore it was not permissible to hold it as wada land. However, in the impugned order at Annexure B itself a further reference to village Form No.7 & 12 is made with the finding that the land in question is permitted to be used as Gam Tal land for various purposes like co-operative societies, post and telegram department, milk producing co-operative society, etc. Thus the respondents contention that the land in question was not grantable being a Gaurchar land, belies its own record.
27. The respondent State has produced with Annexure II, the application made by the petitioner for regularization of wada. On the said application, the Mamlatdar had called for report. It was inter-alia reported to Mamlatdar on 21/12/1989 that land was not entered in the Wada Register. A further detailed report was also submitted on 30/03/1991 stating that on inquiry it was learnt that the land in question was a Gam Tal land as reported by Talati. The said report was accompanied at page No.19. Talati had recommended to regularize the said land. That on verification of the record, it was not mentioned in the Wada Patrak as wada land, but during inquiry from neighbours, it was learnt that it was in possession of the petitioner since long. This report would go to show that the petitioner might have been using the land since long and the land in question was situated in Gam Tal but was not entered in Wada Register as wada land and as per the say of the neighbours, the land was in his possession since long but the wada land was not within the Gam Tal. However, opinion of the Talati was that it was in Gam Tal and the scheme in the resolution dated 25/04/1980 contemplated the existence of wada in Gam Tal., and Gam Tal has been defined as such area which is populated by inhabitants irrespective of the fact as to whether such area is treated as Gam Tal for administrative reasons. Under the Wada Code, Sarpanch is required to sign the register and it is the duty of the Talati-cum-Mantri to maintain it. It appears that though the wada was in possession of the petitioner since long, no entry was made in the Wada Register for no fault of the petitioner.
28. It is pertinent to note that impugned order at Annexure A refers to the report of the Talati of Kohla stating that a wada has been approved in Survey No.667 and against the lands ad-measuring 5 Acres and 7 Gunthas, 1/3rd is reserved as Gam Tal land and Kohda Juth Kelavni Mandal, Post Office and Telegram Department, Milk Producers Society etc., have also been allotted the land in the said Gam Tal but Wada Patrak is not available. Thus, the government record itself indicated that land in question was the wada land but no record to support its character as such was available. Thus, government record itself was unable to deny the character of land as wada land. It was therefore not permissible for the 1st and 2nd respondent to reject the petitioner s claim without determining the character of the land.
29. Considering the object of the policy under Resolution dated 25/04/1980, it is clear that the petitioner substantially complied with the eligibility for possessory rights. In fact, his possession cannot be said to be unauthorized, inasmuch as, the definition of wada itself is an indicator that when the people settled in the villages, they occupied certain amount of land in addition to the agricultural land, for being used as wada land and perhaps that is what forefather of the petitioner had done. Therefore, merely because the lands were formally not entered into Wada Register as wada land, it was not permissible for the State to deny the petitioner the benefit of the scheme when it was extended to other similarly situated persons whose names were entered into Wada Register.
30. The submission that because the concurrent findings of fact were rendered by both the authorities below this Court may not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, must fail for the simple reason that powers under Article 226 invest a discretion in High Court to issue necessary writs even cases where concurrent findings are recorded by a statutory authorities, if apparently such findings are shown to be arbitrary, biased, perverse or actuated by malice, etc. In view of the detailed discussion as above, the findings rendered by the authorities are totally baseless, biased, arbitrary and unwarranted and this Court can exercise the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
31. In the result, petition is required to be allowed; accordingly the petition is allowed. Impugned orders at Annexure A and B are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.
(G.R.UDHWANI, J.) sompura Page 24 of 24