Allahabad High Court
Uttar Padesh Rajya Sadak Parivahan ... vs Smt. Shalini Pratap And Ors. on 4 December, 2017
Author: Shabihul Hasnain
Bench: Shabihul Hasnain, Sheo Kumar Singh-I
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Court No. - 3 A.F.R. Reserved Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 430 of 2011 Appellant :- Uttar Padesh Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam Lko.Through Its Respondent :- Smt. Shalini Pratap And Ors. Counsel for Appellant :- Akhter Abbas Counsel for Respondent :- J.N.Misra,Mohd. Ali,Prem Shankar,Rajesh Chadha AND Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 296 of 2011 Appellant :- Smt. Shalini Pratap W/O Late Praveen Pratap & Ors. Respondent :- The M.D., U.P.State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow & Or Counsel for Appellant :- Mohd. Ali Counsel for Respondent :- Akhter Abbas,J.N.Mishra Hon'ble Shabihul Hasnain,J.
Hon'ble Sheo Kumar Singh-I,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sheo Kumar Singh-I, J.)
1. Aggrieved by the judgement and award dated 28.01.2011 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.16, Lucknow in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.55/2008, the first appeal from order under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been filed by the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation on the ground that the learned Tribunal has not considered the matter of rash and negligent driving of the another vehicle and fixed the responsibility to pay the amount to the appellant without considering the contribution of negligence of another vehicle. By filing the second appeal, the claimants have agitated that while computing compensation for loss of life of the deceased, relevant documents and settled principles for computing the amount of compensation has not been considered by the learned Tribunal. The contribution of vehicle through which the deceased was travelling or driving was wrongly calculated against the settled norms and annual income has not been properly evaluated by the learned Tribunal. Aggrieved by the amount of award, the claimants have filed this appeal for enhancement of amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.55/2008.
2. Both the appeals arise out of the same judgement and awad passed in the same claim petition in the similar facts. Thus, both the appeals are being decided by a common order.
3. The contents of the claim petition reveals that on 21.11.2007, the deceased Praveen Pratap was going to attend marriage ceremony of his friend's sister with Tata Indica car No.UP32CB/1399 and when they reached near town area of Kunda in district Pratapgarh, the offending roadways vehicle coming from Lucknow to Allahabad side driving rashly and negligently collided with the car causing injuries to the deceased and later on death on the spot. The deceased Praveen Pratap was a mechanical engineer and doing business of auto parts and service center of maruti car. The deceased was also having two auto mobile firms namely M/s Prabhu Motors and M/s Pratap Car Care Service Centre, took two loans from the Bank to the tune of Rs.30,00,000/- and Rs.7,50,000/- for doing business. He was an income tax payee for the financial year 2006-07 and gross income as shown in ITR is Rs.4,03,347/-. It has further been submitted that in the loan account, he had regularly deposited EMI of Rs.26,000/- per month.
4. After providing opportunity of hearing, recording statement of witnesses and perusal of the record, the learned Tribunal had framed four issues to the effect that as to whether on the date and time as narrated in the petition, the offending vehicle bus no.UP32CN/1120 driven by the driver rashly and negligently collided with the vehicle UP32CB/1399 causing injuries and death of Praveen Pratap, the deceased, as to whether there is any contributory negligence on part of the driver of the Indica car, and as to whether the petition was bad for non joinder of necessary parties. In the petition M/s Tata Motors and New India Insurance Company have been made party. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of both the vehicles and after applying the principles of contributory negligence, 75% fault was found on part of the driver of the UPSRTC and 25% fault was found to the driver of Indica car.
5. Learned counsel for the UPSRTC has submitted that the percentage should be 50% because both the vehicles were driven rashly and negligently and the learned Tribunal has wrongly fixed the responsibility of UPSRTC as 75%.
6. In reply thereof, learned counsel for the claimants has submitted that fixing the responsibility of 25% to the Indica car through which the deceased was travelling, was wrongly assessed by the learned Tribunal and deduction of 25% amount was not proper. It has further been submitted that since the Indica car was also insured even if it is found that there was any contributory negligence of the indica car Insurance Company should be held responsible for payment of amount.
7. We have heard Shri Akhter Abbas, learned counsel for the UPSRTC, learned counsel for the claimants Shri Mohd. Ali along with Shri J.N. Mishra, learned Advocate and Shri Rajesh Chadha, learned Advocate.
8. Let us first deal as to whether the case comes within the category of the contributory negligence.
9. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not be always possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly and negligently. Both these acts presuppose an abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to 'rash and negligent driving' within the meaning of the language of Section 279 Indian Penal Code. That is why the legislature in its wisdom has used the words 'manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life'. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated Under Section 279 Indian Penal Code is attracted.
10. 'Negligence' means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the Court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence.
11. The Court has to adopt another parameter, i.e., 'reasonable care' in determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrian happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, may be either vehicular users or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others.
12. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes - one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision which concerns with the consequences of driving dangerously alike the provision in the Indian Penal Code that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person does such an offence he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The courts have also taken the concept of 'culpable rashness' and 'culpable negligence' into consideration in cases of road accidents. 'Culpable rashness' is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent such happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria). 'Culpable negligence' is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that on the circumstances of a given case the res speaks and is eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person's negligent conduct.
13. In the case of Nageshwar Shri Krishna Ghobe v. State of Maharasthra MANU/SC/0182/1972 : (1973) 4 SCC 23, the Court observed that the statements of the witnesses who met with an accident while travelling in a vehicle or those of the people who were travelling in the vehicle driven nearby should be taken and understood in their correct perspective as it is not necessary that the occupants of the vehicle should be looking in the same direction. They might have been attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. The Court held as under:
"6. In cases of road accidents by fast moving vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find witnesses who would be in a position to affirm positively the sequence of vital events during the few moments immediately preceding the actual accident, from which its true cause can be ascertained. When accidents take place on the road, people using the road or who may happen to be in close vicinity would normally be busy in their own pre-occupations and in the normal course their attention would be attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. It is only then that they would look towards the direction of the noise and see what had happened. It is seldom - and it is only a matter of coincidence - that a person may already be looking in the direction of the accident and may for that reason be in a position to see and later describe the sequence of events in which the accident occurred. At times it may also happen that after casually witnessing the occurrence those persons may feel disinclined to take any further interest in the matter, whatever be the reason for this disinclination. If, however, they do feel interested in going to the spot in their curiosity to know some thing more, then what they may happen to see there, would lead them to form some opinion or impression as to what in all likelihood must have led to the accident. Evidence of such persons, therefore, requires close scrutiny for finding out what they actually saw and what may be the result of their imaginative inference. Apart from the eye-witnesses, the only person who can be considered to be truly capable of satisfactorily explaining as to the circumstances leading to accidents like the present is the driver himself or in certain circumstances to some extent the person who is injured."
14. On the above principles, if we examine the statement of witnesses, we find that it was the wide road and accident took place at about 03.00pm. near village Barai, Police Station Kunda, District Pratapgar. Both the vehicles are coming from the opposite direction. Map of the place of accident has been filed by the parties. It is not a case of overtaking. On the side of the claimants, PW-2 G.P. Singh and the side of the opposite parties, DW-1 Sunil Kumar Singh Upadhyaya and DW-2 Ravindra Kumar have been examined and the statement of witnesses have been properly assessed by the learned Tribunal. It was found that it is not a case whether any other vehicle was running before the vehicle under accident and it is also not a case for overtaking. Both the vehicles are coming from opposite direction. It was the duty of both the vehicles to avoid the accident and to keep their vehicles within control. It is also on record that it is error of judgement of the drivers for the reasons that vehicle collided from the right side of their part meaning thereby causing damage to the part of the vehicles where the drivers were sitting and driving. In these situation, it is very difficult to decide that who was at fault at the last moment and learned Tribunal has properly assessed and calculated the evidence and found that if the precautions have been taken by any of the drivers, the accident would have avoided. In this way driver of both the vehicles were found responsible for avoiding accident and also found that they were driving vehicle rashly and negligently. The second question as raised by the learned counsel for the UPSRTC is that ratio of contribution on negligence has not been properly assessed by the learned Tribunal. This has been assessed as 75% and 25%. Shri Akhter Abbas has contended that the ratio of the negligence should be fixed as 50%. Since there is no parameter to fix the responsibility in specific ratio but keeping in view of the fact that the collusion towards the side of the drivers' seat, we are of the view that it should be proper to fix the responsibility as 50%.
15. Learned counsel for the UPSRTC has submitted that the driver of Indica car was not authorized to drive the vehicle. The evidence on record reveals that Tata Motors Limited was owner of the vehicle. Shri Gorakh Prasad Singh was authorized person on behalf of the Tata Motors Limited and the person driving the vehicle was authorized on his behalf because he was sitting in the vehicle and the driver had valid and effective licence at the time of the incident. Since the authorized person was sitting in the car, the driver had authority to drive the vehicle and in this way, the Insurance Company M/s Tata Motors Limited is responsible for payment of 50% of the award of compensation.
16. Learned counsel for the UPSRTC has submitted that the deceased had no fixed income and the amount as calculated by the learned Tribunal as Rs.1,50,000/- annual income was wrongly calculated.
17. In reply thereof, learned counsel for the claimants has submitted that the deceased was a mechanical engineer and previously he was employed as Assistant Manager but later on resigned from the service and started his own business by taking two heavy loans one amounting to Rs.30,00,000/-, and second Rs.7,50,000/-. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the claimants that he after resigning from the post of Assistant Manager of the TELCO, Lucknow, started auto mobile business and was dealing auto parts and accessories, machinery business. He was having two auto mobile firms and service centre of maruti car.
18. The record reveals that the income of the deceased as follows:
i. Gross annual income in financial year 2006-07 = Rs.4,03,347/-
ii.(a) Gross income for 8 months w.e.f. 01.04.2007 to 21.11.2007, before his death in financial year 2007-08 = Rs.3,37,331/-, (b) Calculating for 12 months = Rs.505996/-
iii. Income as shown in the balance sheet prepared by Chartered Accountant = Rs.7,61,523/-.
iv. Repayment of loan shown in the account statement of Allahabad Bank = Rs.26,000/-
If we analyze all these source of income then minimum monthly income should not be calculated less than Rs.26,000/- per month as EMI paid to the Bank against the loan and other expenditure, which were required to do the business and family expenditure. If we assess the minimum expenditure with the EMI and the assessment filed in the ITR in the financial year 2006-07, it is nearly Rs.4,03,347/-. Though the learned counsel for the claimant has submitted that the amount for financial year 2007-08 should be taken into consideration.
19. In reply thereof, learned counsel for the UPSRTC has submitted that this should not be taken into account because the deceased died on 21.11.2007 and his ITR was filed by another person father/chartered accountant and from 4 lakh plus, it has been enhanced upto Rs.7,61,523/-.
20. This Court is of the view that gross income as shown in the financial year 2006-07 i.e. Rs.4,03,347/- is a reasonable amount which was filed during life tenure of the deceased. Thus calculation for award of compensation should be on the basis of ITR for the financial year 2006-07, which comes about Rs.4,03,347/-.
21. Age of the deceased was about 38 years at the time of incident and the M-15 multiplier will be applicable. Parties are in agreement on the multiplier.
22. Learned counsel for the claimants has submitted that 40% of enhancement has not been calculated by the learned Tribunal and this Court has inherent power to calculate and award just compensation.
23. The expression 'just compensation' has been explained in Sarla Verma's case - AIR 2009 SC 3104, holding that the compensation awarded by a Tribunal does not become just compensation merely because the Tribunal considered it to be just. 'Just Compensation' is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well-settled principles relating to award of compensation. After surveying almost all the previous decisions, the Court almost standardized the norms for the assessment of damages in Motor Accident Claims.
24. In a recent decision, in Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Limited and Ors. MANU/SC/0322/2012 : (2012) 6 SCC 421, Sarla Verma's case has further been explained with regard to the settled norms. It has been held in Paragraph 11 as follows:
"11. We have considered the respective arguments. Although, the legal jurisprudence developed in the country in last five decades is somewhat precedent-centric, the judgments which have bearing on socioeconomic conditions of the citizens and issues relating to compensation payable to the victims of motor accidents, those who are deprived of their land and similar matters needs to be frequently revisited keeping in view the fast-changing societal values, the effect of globalisation on the economy of the nation and their impact on the life of the people."
25. Consequently, it has been held at Paragraphs 14 to 18, as follows:
"14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for the observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla Verma's case that where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death and a departure from this rule should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. In our view, it will be nave to say that the wages or total emoluments/income of a person who is self-employed or who is employed on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., would remain the same throughout his life.
15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone across the board. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor. As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those who are self-employed or who get fixed income/emoluments. They are the worst affected people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to generate additional income necessary for sustaining their families.
16. The salaries of those employed under the Central and State Governments and their agencies/ instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries of those employed in private sectors have also increased manifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could have imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the Government would be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higher echelons of service will cross the figure of rupees one lakh.
17. Although, the wages/income of those employed in unorganized sectors has not registered a corresponding increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the salaries of the Government employees and those employed in private sectors but it cannot be denied that there has been incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self-employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc.
18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the observations in the last three lines of paragraph 24 of Sarla Verma's judgment, the Court had intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will be no addition in the income of a person who is self-employed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that a person who is self-employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also get 30 per cent increase in his total income over a period of time and if he/she becomes victim of accident then the same formula deserves to be applied for calculating the amount of compensation."
26. Since, the Court actually intended to follow the principle in the case of salaried persons as laid in Sarla Verma's case and to make it applicable also to the self-employed and persons on fixed wages, it is clarified that the increase in the case of those groups is not 30% always; it will also have a reference to the age. In other words, in the case of self-employed or persons with fixed wages, in case, the deceased victim was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. Needless to say that the actual income should be income after paying the tax, if any. Addition should be 30% in case the deceased was in the age group of 40 to 50 years.
27. In Sarla Verma's case (supra), it has been stated that in the case of those above 50 years, there shall be no addition. Having regard to the fact that in the case of those self-employed or on fixed wages, where there is normally no age of superannuation, it will only be just and equitable to provide an addition of 15% in the case where the victim is between the age group of 50 to 60 years so as to make the compensation just, equitable, fair and reasonable. There shall normally be no addition thereafter.
28. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the Application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case.
"Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to "make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just". Therefore, only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation."
29. The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Limited v. Mohd. Nasir and Anr. MANU/SC/0899/2009 : AIR 2009 SC 1219 and in Ningamma and Anr. v. United Indian Insurance Co. Limited MANU/SC/0802/2009 : (2009) 13 SCC 710.
30. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard to the duty of the Court to fix a just compensation and it has now become settled law that the Court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the Court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim.
31. There is another reason why the Court should award proper compensation irrespective of the claim and, if required, even in excess of the claim. After the amendment of the Act by Act No. 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994, the Report on motor vehicle accident prepared by the police officer and forwarded to the Claims Tribunal under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 has to be treated as an Application for Compensation.
32. Section 158 (6) of the Act reads as follows:
"158. Production of certain certificates, licence and permit in certain cases.-
(1) to (5) xxx (6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and, where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer."
32A. Section 166(4) of the Act reads as follows:
"166(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act."
33. Prior to the amendment in 1994, it was left to the discretion of the Tribunal as to whether the report be treated as an application or not. The pre-amended position under Sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act, read as under:
"(4) Where a police officer has filed a copy of the report regarding an accident to a Claims Tribunal under this Act, the Claims Tribunal may, if it thinks it necessary so to do, treat the report as if it were an application for compensation under this Act."
34. When an Appeal is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the High Court, the normal Rules which apply to Appeals before the High Court are applicable to such an Appeal also. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that when an Appeal is provided for, the whole case is open before the Appellate Court and by necessary implication, it can exercise all powers incidental thereto in order to exercise that power effectively. A bare reading of Section 173 of the Act also reflects that there is no curtailment or limitations on the powers of the Appellate Court to consider the entire case on facts and law.
35. It is well settled that the right of Appeal is a substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and are open to Review by the Appellate Court. Thus, such powers and duties are necessarily to be exercised so as to make the provision of law effective.
36. Generally, finding of fact recorded by Tribunal should not be interfered with in an Appeal until and unless it is proved that glaring discrepancy or mistake has taken place. If the assessment of compensation by the Tribunal was fair and reasonable and the award of the Tribunal was neither contrary nor inconsistent with the relevant facts as per the evidence available on record then as mentioned hereinabove, the High Court would not interfere in the Appeal. In the case in hand, nothing could be pointed out to us as to what were the glaring discrepancies or mistakes in the impugned Award of the Tribunal, which necessitated the Appellate Court to take a different view in the matter.
37. While deciding the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi; MANU/SC/1366/2017, the Supreme Court in Para-61 has held as follows:
"61. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions:-
(i).... (ii)....
(iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.
(iv). ... (v)... (vi)..
(vii) The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier.
(viii) Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years."
38. On the principles as mentioned above, both the appeals deserve to be partly allowed and the claimants are entitled for the following compensation:
i. Annual income of the deceased = 4,03,347 ii. 1/3rd standard deduction = -1,34,449 iii. Annual income for calculation ( i - ii x 15) = 2,68,898x15 = 40,33,470 iv. Enhancement @ 40% (below 40 years) = +16,13,388 v. Total (iii + iv ) = 56,46,858 vi. Loss of estate (in light of Pranay Sethi's case) = 15,000 vii. Loss of consortium = 40,000 viii. Funeral expenses = Rs.15,000/-
Total award payable to the claimants = Rs.57,16,858/-
39. On applying the principles of contributory negligence of 50% i.e. Rs.28,58,429/- is payable by the New India Insurance Company Limited being insurance company of the Tata Motors and 50% of the award shall be payable by the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. Rest of the terms and conditions with regard to the distribution of amount and rate of interest will be the same as directed by the learned Tribunal.
40. Accordingly, both the appeals are partly allowed and disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
41. Statutory amount deposited before this Court shall be remitted to the tribunal concerned within three weeks from today for adjustment and disbursement to the claimants in accordance with the award.
Order Date :-4.12.2017 Anupam S/-