Delhi High Court
Chander Pal vs N.C.T. Of Delhi And Ors. on 27 August, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(66)DRJ804
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha, Madan B. Lokur
JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, c.J.
1. This reference has been made to a Larger Bench by a Division Bench of this Court doubting the correctness of a judgment dated 18.10.2001 in C.W.P. No. 6672 of 2000 and other connected matters whereby and whereunder an order of the appellate authority had been set aside only on the ground that purportedly on similar charges, the appellate authority itself had set aside orders of punishment.
Having regard to the point involved in these matters, it is not necessary to notice the fact of the matter in great detail.
1.1 The basic fact of the matter, however, is not in dispute. The petitioners were appointed as 'Constables'. Indisputably the terms and conditions of service of the Constables are governed by the provisions of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (in short, 'the said Act'). In terms of the provisions of the said Act, rules were framed known as Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980 (in short, 'the Appointment Rules') and Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeals) Rules, 1980 (in short, 'the Punishment Rules').
1.2 In exercise of it powers conferred upon him under Section 5 of the said Act, the Administrator vide notification dated 17.12.1980 declared that the rules and orders as amended or revised from time to time as specified therein shall apply to subordinate civilian and class IV employees of the Delhi Police in addition to the rules and regulations made under the said Act including Central Civil Services (Conduct Rules, 1964 (in short, CCS Rules').
2. Rule 3 of the Appointment Rules defines 'Appointing Authority' in relation to the subordinate police officers below the rank of Inspector to mean the Deputy Commissioner of Police including the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police or any other officer of equal rank.
2.2 Rule 5 of the Appointment Rules deals with 'Recruitment'. Rule 5(d), which is relevant for the purpose of this matter, reads thus:-
"Notwithstanding the above rules, the Commissioner of Police shall be the competent authority to appoint in relaxation of the procedure of recruitment through the Employment Exchange and without subjecting to competitive test, the sons/daughters of Delhi Police personnel who die in harness leaving their families in immediate need of assistance, in terms of the instructions issued by the Govt. of India, MHA regarding such compassionate appointments."
2.3 Rules 9 of the Appointment Rules is as under:-
"(9) Recruitment of Constables. -- Delhi being a cosmopolitan city, it is imperative to attract candidates from all parts of the country.
(ii) The recruitment of constables shall be done twice a year in the months of January and July by the Board to be nominated by Commissioner of Police as per Rule 8.
(iii) The Commissioner of Police may also order special recruitment at any time if there are sufficient number of vacancies and the panels prepared earlier have exhausted.
(iv) A panel shall be drawn up of selected candidates on the basis of existing and anticipated vacancies. This panel shall be valid till the next recruitment is held.
.....
(vii) "Relaxation. Addl. Commissioner of Police (Armed Police & Training) can grant relaxation to the sons/daughters of either serving, retired or deceased police personnel and category 'D' employees of Delhi Police who do not fulfill the general conditions of physical standard, age and educational qualifications--Relaxation of maximum of 5 centimetres in height and chest measurement, one standard in educational qualification and maximum age limit up to 25 years. Any candidate of this category can take the test with prior approval of the Dy. Commissioner of Police concerned. Proper sanction for relaxation shall be obtained from Addl. C.P. (AP & T), Delhi in case of these candidates who qualify in the test and come within the selection range. Their names will be included in the panel of qualifying candidates subject to requisite relaxation being granted by Addl. C.P. (AP & T), Delhi."
2.4 The Parliament enacted the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 (in short, 'the Employment Exchange Act').
It is not in dispute that the provisions of the said Act would apply to recruitment in Delhi Police having regard to the provisions contained in Section 3 thereof.
Section 4 of the Employment Exchange Act is in the following terms:-
"4. Notification of vacancies to employment exchanges. -- (1) After the commencement of this Act in any State or area thereof, the employer in every establishment in public sector in that State or area shall, before filling up any vacancy in any employment in that establishment, notify that vacancy to such employment exchanges as may be prescribed.
(2) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, require that from such date as may be specified in the notification, the employer in every establishment in private sector or every establishment pertaining to any class or category of establishments in private sector shall, before filling up any vacancy in any employment in that establishment, notify that vacancy to such employment exchanges as may be prescribed, and the employer shall thereupon comply with such requisition.
(3) The manner in which the vacancies referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall be notified to the employment exchanges and the particulars of employments in which such vacancies have occurred or are about to occur shall be such as may be prescribed.
(4) Nothing in Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be deemed to impose any obligation upon any employer to recruit any person through the employment exchange to fill any vacancy merely because that vacancy has been notified under any of those sub-sections."
2.5 A bare perusal of the provisions of the said Act and the Appointment Rules would clearly go to show that by necessary implication, it was obligatory on the part of the competent authority to call for names of the eligible candidates from Employment Exchanges.
BACKGROUND FACTS AS NOTICED FROM C.W.P. NO. 6620 OF 2001:-
3. The petitioners allegedly obtained their employment by producing bogus employment registration card. The services of the petitioners were terminated on the aforementioned ground. Original applications were filed questioning the said order and pursuant to the directions issued by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (in short, 'the Tribunal'), disciplinary proceedings were initiated. The Enquiry Officer and consequently the Disciplinary Authority found the petitioners guilty of the charges levelled against them. Appeals preferred thereagainst before the appellate authority were also dismissed. Original applications filed by the petitioners before the Central Administrative Tribunal questioning the said orders were allowed and the matters were remitted back to the appellate authority. However, by reason of an order dated 27.12.1999, the appellate authority again rejected the appeal. Fresh original applications were filed, which have been dismissed by reason of the impugned order.
3.1 According to the petitioners, the persons similarly situated have approached this Court and by reason of a judgment dated 18.10.2001 several writ petitions were allowed. Notice were issued in these matters on the ground of alleged discrimination.
4.0 Mr. Goburdhan and Mr. Verghees, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, would contend that it is not a case where the petitioners were not registered in the Employment Exchange at all as upon verification of the records, it was only found that they were not registered in a particular month.
The learned counsel would urge that having regard to the fact that the persons similarly situated have been exonerated by the appellate authority in other cases, there is absolutely no reason as to why the petitioners should not be treated alike. In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed on Sengara Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. and T.V. Choudhary v. Chief Secretary, Government of A.P. and Anr. (1987) 3 SCC 258.
5.0 The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend that the petitioners cannot claim equity only because some wrong orders have been passed by the appellate authority in other cases.
6.0 Before proceeding to consider the matter, we may notice that the learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 1851 of 1996, which was dismissed on 07.03.2000 (order impugned in C.W.P. 7568 of 2001), noticed the charges levelled against the petitioner in CWP No. 6672/00, which were in the following terms:-
" CHARGE I, Insp. Tilak Ram, Enquiry Officer, charge you Const. Raj Kumar No. 10696/10497/3427/DAP that while selected as temporary constable in Delhi Police, during a special recruitment held at Rampur (U.P.) in the month of May, 1987, adopted deceitful means. You produced of May, 1987. The same was sent to Distt. Employment Officer, Rampur (U.P.) verification and report. The Employment Officer, after verification reported that "the applicant has charged the date of registration from 19.5.87 to 5.1.87 by erasing and his signature also seems to be false as on the card he signed in Hindi whereas on their office record he signed in Hindi whereas on their office record he signed in English."
The above act on your fact amount to grass misconduct, remissness and negligence which renders you liable for departmental action under Section 21 of Delhi Police Act, 1987.
Sd/-
(TILAK RAM) Insp. Enquiry Officer IV. BN.DAP 8.11.93"
ANNEXURE Subject:- D.E. against Ct. Raj Kumar No. 3427/DAP.
The finding of the Enquiry Officer is enclosed herewith. The Undersigned will take a suitable decision after considering the report. If you do so in writing to the undersigned or submission, you do so in writing to the undersigned within 15 days from the date of receipt of this letter along with its enclosures be sent to this office immediately."
Sd/-
(A.S. TOOR) DY. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE IV. BN. DAP. DELHI."
The disciplinary authority thereafter found the petitioner guilty of the said charges.
6.1 In C.W.P. No. 7568 of 2001, an appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on the ground that the same was barred by limitation, whereas in C.W.P. N. 6620 of 2001, the appellate authority determined the matter on merits.
The order of the appellate authority in the matter involved in C.W.P. No. 6620 of 2001 is in the following terms:-
"The Hon'ble Tribunal however, find that there is one point on which the applicant is right. In some similar other case where there was a finding of charge having been proved the same Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate namely Shri. A.S. Toor and Shri R.C. Khli, Deputy Commissioner ad Sr. Addl. Commissioner of Police respectively took the view that it would be unjust to remove similarly situated person only on the ground of defective employment card when the charged person had already undergone the pages of arduous training and had already reached a stage of overage for Government service. On the face of it, it seems to an extraordinary manner of dealing with similar cases wherein in one case it is held that the applicant should be removed from service and on similar facts and circumstances in another similar case a compassionate view is taken or it is held that there was no real requirement of such an employment registration card.
I do not agree with the above views of the then Sr. Add. C.P./AP&T, Delhi. Undergoing the pangs of arduous training and reaching the stage of overage for Government service is not a reason that the appellant is taken in the Police Deptt. who had not fulfillled one of the conditions ie to have name registered in the Employment Exchange as well as who has produced fake document. Rather this is a grave misconduct committed by the appellant. It will be a great injustice to the Deptt. If the persons who had secured the service on the basis of forged documents are to be accepted by the Department. If he is accepted, then the Deptt. will be forced to accept the others who secured their job in the Deptt. by producing fake/forged documents. The Hon'ble Court has also observed that a person who starts service with a false certificate cannot be considered a fit person for the police force.
6.2 Our attention, however, has been drawn to an order of the appellate authority in the case of Ex. Const. Virender Kumar; No. 9910/DAR wherein per contra it was recorded:-
"I have also heard the appellant in orderly on 19-8-1994 and during the course of personal hearing before the undersigned the appellant has intimated that his name was registered in Employment Exchange office against registration bearing No. 3294/87 dated 4-5-1987. The same has been verified from the concerned Employment exchange and District Employment Officer, Muzaffar Nagar (UP) vide his letter No. 0202/94/541 dated 6-10-1994 has intimated that the name of Shri Virender Kumar, No. 9910/DAP was registered against the aforesaid registration number. He was duly registered with the Employment Exchange before he was enrolled with the department.
Registration with the Employment Exchange provides date to the Govt. to make jobs available to the suitable number of the unemployed persons. It also helps the job seeken to know the options available. Mere registration with the Employment Exchange does not render a candidate eligible for a job. In order to get selected the candidates has to compete with the other candidates in all spheres and to make the required grade. The candidates were not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Such an open selection provides better scope to the selection board. it will, therefore, be uninstified to dispense with the services of a cancel date merely on ground of late of defective registration with the Employment Exchange, especially when he has already undergone the pauge of arduous training and become over aged for government service. I therefore, accept the appeal submitted by Ex. Const., Virender Kumar, No. 9910/DA-P. He is hereby re-instated in service with immediate effect. The period intervening the date of his removal i.e. 4-5-1994 and the date on which he rejoins his duty will be treated as leave of kind due."
6.3 The learned Tribunal by reason of its impugned order dated 07.09.1999 passed in O.A. No. 290/95 with O.A. No. 2406/97 (C.W.P. No. 6620 of 2001) arrived at the following findings of fact:-
"6. The other point raised by the applicant is that there was no legal requirement to the production of the employment card. The question is not whether there should have been requirement for registration with the employment exchange by a certain date but the applicant filled a false and fabricated employment registration on certificate. It may be that in order to ensure that only genuine residents of UP were recruited during the special recruitment drive that such a condition was imposed. The applicant has not been able to establish as to how this condition is in contradiction of Rule 9 of the Delhi Police (Recruitment and Appointment) Rules 1980. Be that as it may, the applicant did submit a certificate for recruitment. In that certificate the date given was faced. Obviously, a person who starts service with a false certificate cannot be considered a fit person for the police force."
It was further held by order dt. 7/3/00 passed in O.A. No. 1851/96:-
"... The same revealed that various candidates had submitted false and fabricated cards in order to obtain employment. As far as the applicant is concerned, the employment exchange card, which he produced, showed that he had been registered as on 11.3.1987. The card bore the number 2924/87 dated 11.3.1987. When enquiry in respect of the same was made with the District Employment Officer, Sharanpur, the said Employment officer, after verification, vide his letter dated 21.11.1987 reported that the date of registration of the appellant was 11.5.1987 and not 11.3.1987. Since it was found that applicant had secured employment by adopting unlawful and deceitful means as a constable in Delhi Police, his services were, by an order issued on 19.4.1988, terminated."
6.4 The Tribunal, thus, held that production of false document(s) would itself amount to misconduct. Even before the learned Tribunal, the order passed by the disciplinary authority had not been questioned on merit.
The only argument, which was advanced by the petitioner, was the said order is discriminatory in nature.
6.5 The decision in Sengara Singh's case (Supra) whereupon strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Goburdhan was rendered in an absolutely different fact situation. Therein the services of 1100 members of the police force were terminated on the ground that they had taken recourse to agitation, as regard their conditions of service, despite the fact that the High Court refused to interfere with the orders of the transfer. The competent authority re-instated 1000 members of the force whereas it refused to do so in the case of about 100 constables although all were absolutely similarly situated. In that view of the matter, Apex Court directed.
"12. Logically the appellants must receive the same benefit which those reinstated received in the absence of any distinguishing feature in their cases. Accordingly, the appellants would be entitled to reinstatement in service."
In that case, the legality of the orders passed by the Government was no in question and only in that view of the matter it was held that all the 1100 employees being identically situated should be treated alike. Such is not the position here.
In T.V. Choudhary's case (Supra), the question, which arose for consideration, does not arise in these writ petitions. In that case, the Government singled out an officer for adverse action letting off his co-delinquents. However, during pendency of the Special Leave Petition, as other persons similarly situated had also been placed under suspension, no specific direction was issued.
6.6 In the aforementioned cases,thus, no law has been laid down to the effect that even if a wrong order is passed in favor of other persons allegedly similarly situated, a delinquent officer can take benefit thereof.
A wrong order does not create any right in favor of a third party.
In Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee and Anr. v. Chintamani Khuntia and Ors., it was held:-
"30. The Sevaks cannot also invoke Article 300-A in the fats of this case. The offerings that are made to the deities are not the properties of the Sevaks. The Sevaks are given a share in these offerings as remuneration for guarding and collecting the offerings. They do not have to discharge these duties in regard to the monies deposited in the Hundis. They are not entitled to any share in these monies as of right. There cannot be any question of deprivation of any right to property of the Sevaks in the fats of this case. Merely because by mistake some monies were paid to "Dwaitatapatis" as compensation will not confer any right on the Sevaks to get any such compensation. No right can be founded on a mistake committed by the Temple Committee."
6.7 In State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Anr. , the law operating in the filed is stated in the following terms:-
"30. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favor of any individual or group of individuals other cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly wrong judgment passed in favor of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. In this regard this Court in Gursharan Singh and Ors. v. NDMC and Ors. held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed:-
"Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on enquiry clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination."
Again in Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and Ors. this Court considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality holding:
"Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalized. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents."
In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann , this Court observed:-
"The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had been given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal or resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing mis-appropriation of money, is dismissed from service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a similarly circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14 for reinstatement? The answer is obviously "NO". In a converse case, in the first instance one may be wrong but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right."
6.8 In any event, it cannot be disputed by the learned counsel for the parties that irrespective of the fact that whether the Employment Exchange was required to be notified or not in terms of the provisions of the Employment Exchange Act, obtaining of an employment relying on or on the basis of the forged document would itself be a misconduct.
6.9 Once it is found that the writ petitioners have indulged in such fraudulent activities rendering them unbecoming of the members of the Police Force, their services were bound/liable to be terminated and no illegality can be said to have been committed by the respondents. If in some other cases, the appellate authority had taken a different view without adverting to the real issue, the same would not itself confer any legal right upon the writ petitioners herein to pray for a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate in service following illegal order.
6.10 A writ of mandamus can be sought for by a person when there exists a legal right in himself and a corresponding legal obligation on the respondents.
Equality clauses enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would apply only when the petitioner has been deprived of a legal right. A delinquent officer in no circumstances can based his claim invoking equality clause where its foundation is based on illegality.
He cannot be permitted to urge that although he is guilty of commission of a misconduct he should not be punished only because others have been let off either by mistake or otherwise.
No case, thus, has been made out to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Tribunal.
So far as question of quantum of punishment is concerned recently in Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386, it was held:-
"69. The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph in respect of Article 14 are now to be applied here where the question of "arbitrariness" of the order of punishment is questioned under Article 14.
70. In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India this Court referred to "proportionality" in the quantum of punishment but the Court observed that the punishment was "shockingly" disproportionate to the misconduct proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , this Court stated that the court will not interfere unless the punishment awarded was one which shocked the conscience of the court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back to the authority and would not normally substitute one punishment for the other. However, in rare situations, the court could award an alternative penalty. It was also so stated in Union of India v. Ganayutham .
71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as "arbitrary" under Article 14, the court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment."
The aforesaid decision has been followed in Commandant, IV Battalion, APSP Mamnoor Lines, Warangal and Anr. v. Jabbar Hussain and Anr. 2001 (3) ALT 552.
6.11 The court in exercise of its power of judicial review has a limited role to play in this behalf. In A. Ratnam and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Education Department, Hyderabad 2001 (6) ALT 661, (of which one of us was a Member), it has been held thus:-
"51. It is also equally settled that a Court of judicial review would not ordinarily interfere with the finding of facts however grave they may be. This Court is only concerned with grave error of law, which is apparent on the face of record. The error of law for instance may arise when a Tribunal wrongfully rejects admissible evidence or considers inadmissible evidence and records a finding. However, as observed by Constitution Bench of the supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, "it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record and the same must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provisions which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened." The principles of judicial review of decisions of the Tribunals noticed hereinabove were accepted by the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob's case (30 supra). It is opposite to excerpt the following passage which is educative:
The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
52. The decision is Syed Yakoob's case was also followed in Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi, .
In view of the binding authorities, the law is well settled that-
(i) The High Court is not appellate authority over the decision of the Administrative Tribunals;
(ii) While exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot be oblivious to the conceptual difference between appeal and review;
(iii) The petition for a judicial review would lie only on grounds of grave errors of law apparent on the face of the record and not on the ground of error of fact, however, grave it may appear;
(iv) When the Tribunal renders a decision after determining the facts, no application for judicial review could be maintainable only on the ground that the Tribunal committed an error of fact, however grave it may appear, unless it is shown that such a finding of the Tribunal is based on no evidence and the error of fat itself can be regarded as error of law in the sense that admissible evidence was rejected and inadmissible evidence was relied on;
(v) The orders passed by the Tribunal by exercising discretion which judicially vests in it cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal in the sense the Tribunal did not follow an earlier decision of the Tribunal or binding authority of the High Court or the Supreme Court with reference to finding of facts and law;
(vi) When the Tribunal disposes of the original application by applying the binding precedents of the High Court as well as the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has committed any error of law apparent on the face of the record; in such cases the limited review before the High court would be whether the binding principle has been appropriately applied or not; the Tribunal's decision which is rendered in ignorance of the statutory law including subordinate legislation as well as the law laid by the Supreme Court must be held to suffer an error apparent on the face of the record and requires judicial review;
(vii) Whether or not an error is error of law apparent on the face of the record must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened;
(viii) The three parameters of judicial review of administrative action-illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety with necessary changes are equally applicable to cases of judicial review of the Tribunal's decision; and
(ix) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on High Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice."
7.0 In this writ petition, we are concerned with the question as to whether the order of the learned Tribunal can be said to be perverse. It is not. The findings of fact arrived at by the learned Tribunal are binding on us. In fact the findings of fact are not in question.
As noticed hereinbefore, the only contention raised in these writ petitions is as regard correctness of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in C.W.P. No. 6672 of 2000.
Having given our anxious consideration and for the forgoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the directions of the Division Bench in the said writ petition cannot be sustained inasmuch as it is trite that no equality can be claimed on the basis of illegality.
Article 14 speaks of equality before law and equal protection of law. The claim of equality and the claim of equal protection thus must be claimed within the four corners of law. Furthermore, it is well settled that two wrongs do not make one right.
7.1 In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that once it is held that the writ petitioners committed serious misconduct by producing a document for the purpose of obtaining employment, which was a forged and fabricated one, he is not a fit person to be retained in service, particularly in a disciplined force. It may not be a case where a question would arise as to whether vacancy should compulsorily be notified to the Employment Exchange or not, but the question is that the writ petitioners proceeded on the basis that they can obtain employment only when they produce the requisite certificate of the Employment Exchange. Keeping in view the provisions of Rule 9 of the Appointment Rules, production of such certificate is of great significance.
8.0 For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgments of the Tribunal cannot be said to be vitiated in law for any reason whatsoever.
These writ petitions are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the cases, there shall be no orders as to costs.