Allahabad High Court
Shekhar And 3 Others vs State Of Up And 6 Others on 26 November, 2024
Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:184673 Judgment Reserved on 22.11.2024 Delivered on 26.11.2024 Court No. - 49 Case :- WRIT - B No. - 2412 of 2024 Petitioner :- Shekhar And 3 Others Respondent :- State Of Up And 6 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Pratik Chandra,Sr. Advocate Counsel for Respondent :- Chaudhary Subhash Kumar,Deepak Gaur Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
1. Heard Sri Anil Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Pratik Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Chaudhary Subhash Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent no.5 and Sri P.S. Chauhan, learned Standing Counsel for State respondents.
2. This case is arising out of proceedings initiated by the respondent no.5 by way of filing a suit under Section 116 of Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 (hereinafter called the 'Code 2006') for division of holding of plot in question claiming to be joint owners along with contesting defendants/respondents.
3. Present petitioners opposed it and filed a written statement.
4. Learned Trial Court prepared a preliminary decree on basis of a report submitted by the Lekhpal on 12.6.2023 and accordingly Kurras were prepared on 16.8.2023. Objections were invited, however, present petitioners submitted an application on 20.9.2023 that they have no objection to the proposed Kurras. Said consent is being reproduced hereinafter:
"निवेदन है कि उपरोक्त वाद की पत्रावली में मौजा के लेखपाल द्वारा जो कुरा प्रस्तुत किए गए है, उसमें हम प्रतिवादीगण सं०-1 लगायत 5 को कोई आपत्ति नहीं है, पब्लिक पूर्णतयाः सहमत है तथा लेखपाल महोदय द्वारा प्रस्तुत कुरा को अंतिम कुरा मानकर आदेश पारित कर दिया जाये तो हम प्रतिवादीगण सं०-1 लगायत 5 को कोई आपत्ति नहीं होगी।
अतः श्रीमानजी से प्रार्थना है कि उक्त वाद में लेखपाल महो. द्वारा प्रस्तुत कुरा को अन्तिम कुरा मानकर वाद को निर्णित कर दिया जाए, जिसमें हम प्रतिवादीगण सं०-1 लगायत 5 की पूर्ण सहमति है। तथा हम प्रतिवादीगण सं०-1 लगायत 5 रजामंदी प्रस्तुत कर रहे है।"
5. On the basis of above consent, learned Trial Court passed order dated 20.9.2023 and accordingly a final decree was passed on the basis of Kurras earlier proposed on 27.9.2023. For reference, same is reproduced hereinafter:
"आज यह पत्रावली प्रस्तुत हुई। मैंने वादी के विद्वान अधिवक्ता की बहस को सुना तथा पत्रावली का भली प्रकार अवलोकन किया। वादी विनोद यादव की ओर से दिनाक 23.12.2022 को बावत बटवारा प्रस्तुत कर कथन किया गया है कि उपरोक्त वाद में दिनांक 12.06. 2023 को प्रारम्भिक डिक्री का आदेश पारित किया जा चुका है जिसमें क्षेत्रीय लेखपाल को तलब करके कुर्रा दाखिल कराया जाना आवश्यक है। अन्त में लेखपाल को तलब करके कुर्रा दाखिल कराये जाने की प्रार्थना की गई है। नियमानुसार नोटिस जारी कर क्षेत्रीय लेखपाल को तलब किया गया। क्षेत्रीय लेखपाल के द्वारा दिनांक 18.08.2023 को मौजा चौरसी परगना उरई स्थित खाता सं०-333 में स्थित गाटा सं०-530 रकवा 0.3840 हे० के सम्बन्ध में न्यायालय में उपस्थित आकर प्रारम्भिक आदेश के अनुसार कुर्रा फांट एवं नक्शा फांट दाखिल कर अपना बयान अंकित कराया, जो पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध है। प्रतिवादीगण की ओर से कुर्रा पर सहमति प्रस्तुत की गयी है। ऐसी स्थिति में लेखपाल द्वारा प्रस्तुत किये गये कुर्रों फांट एवं नक्शा फांट दिनांक 16.08.2023 स्वीकार किये जाने योग्य है।
आदेश उपर्युक्त विवेचना के आधार पर मौजा चौरसी परगना उरई स्थित खाता सं०-338 मे स्थित गाटा सं०-530 रकबा 0.3840 हे० के सम्बन्ध में क्षेत्रीय लेखपाल द्वारा प्रस्तुत किये गये कुर्रा फांट एवं नक्शा फांट दिनांक 16.08.2023 में कुर्रा नं0-1 विनोद यादव को रंग लाल, कुर्रा नं0-2 जीवन को रंग पीला, कुर्रा नं0-3 शेखर को रंग नीला, कुर्रा नं0-4 श्रीमती पुष्पलता को रंग काला, कुर्रा नं०-5 ऐश्वर्य को रंग आसमानी, कुर्रा नं0-6 अरूण कुमार को रंग गुलाबी से आवंटित किये गये है, जो स्वीकार किये जाते है। तद्नुसार अन्तिम डिक्री निर्गत हो। पत्रावली आवश्यक कार्यवाही के उपरान्त दाखिल दफ्तर की जाये।"
6. Petitioners before this Court filed an Appeal under Section 208 of Code, 2006 on 1.2.2024, along with an application for condonation delay. In the said appeal, a ground was taken that consent was procured on misrepresentation though the Kurras prepared were contrary to established procedure.
7. Above referred appeal was dismissed on ground being not-maintainable in view of Section 209 (g) of Code, 2006 which bars that a consent decree cannot be challenged by way of filing a first appeal. Relevant part thereof is mentioned hereinafter:
"मेरे द्वारा उभयपक्ष के विद्धान अधिवक्तागण की बहस को सुना गया तथा अपील पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध अभिलेखों का अवलोकन किया गया। विद्धान अधिवक्तागण द्वारा प्रस्तुत तर्को एवं अभिलेखों के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट होता है कि विपक्षी, संख्या-01 के द्वारा मौजा चौरसी स्थित गाटा संख्या-530 रकवा 0.3840 है० के बटवारा का वाद अवर न्यायालय में योजित किया गया था, जिसमें अवर न्यायालय द्वारा पारित आदेश दिनांक 20.09.2023 में स्पष्ट उल्लेख किया गया है कि "क्षेत्रीय लेखपाल द्वारा दिनांक 16.08.2023 को मौजा चौरसी परागना उरई स्थित खाता संख्या-338 में स्थित गाटा संख्या-530 रकवा 0.3840है० के सम्बन्ध में न्यायालय में उपस्थित होकर प्रारम्भिक आदेश के अनुसार कुर्रा फांट एवं नक्शा फांट दाखिल कर अपना ब्यान अंकित कराया गया, जो पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध है। प्रतिवादीगण की ओर से कुर्रा पर सहमति प्रस्तुत की गयी है।" अभिलेखों के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट है कि प्रश्नगत भूमि के बटवारे वाद में लेखपाल द्वारा प्रस्तुत कुरों पर अपीलकर्तागण / प्रतिवादीगण द्वारा अवर न्यायालय में अपने-अपने हस्ताक्षरों सहित पूर्ण सहमति सहित रजामंदी दिनांक 20.09.2023 प्रस्तुत की गयी, जिसके आधार पर ही अवर न्यायालय द्वारा आदेश दिनांक 20.09.2023 के अन्तर्गत कुरों को स्वीकार किये जाने में कोई विधिक त्रुटि नहीं की है, जिसमें किसी हस्तक्षेप औचित्य नहीं है। चूंकि उ०प्र०राजस्व संहिता की धारा-209 (छ) में दी गयी विधि व्यवस्था " पक्षकारों की सहमति से न्यायालय या अधिकारी द्वारा पारित आदेश या डिक्री के विरुद्ध अपील नहीं होगी।" के आलोक में भी अपील धारणीय नहीं है और निरस्त होने योग्य है। यह भी उल्लेखनीय है कि अपीलकर्तागण / प्रतिवादीगण द्वारा धारा-5 म्याद अधिनियम के प्रार्थना पत्र में उल्लेख किया गया है कि अवर न्यायालय के आदेश दिनांक 20.09.2023 की उन्हे कोई जानकारी नहीं रही, जबकि अपीलकर्तागण/प्रतिवादीगण द्वारा अवर न्यायालय में प्रश्नगत वाद में प्रस्तुत कुरो पर दिये गये सहमति पत्र दिनांक 20.09.2023 के आधार पर ही उसी दिनांक को आदेश पारित किया, जिससे स्पष्ट होता है कि अपीलकर्तागण/प्रतिवादीगण को अवर न्यायालय के आदेश दिनांक 20.09.2023 की जानकारी भली-भांति रही है। इस प्रकार आक्षेपित आदेश दिनांक 20.09.2023 में विधि की दृष्टि से कोई त्रुटि नहीं है और अपीलकर्तागण की अपील ग्राह्यता स्तर मय धारा - 5 म्याद अधिनियम प्रार्थना पत्र बलहीन होने के कारण निरस्त किये जाने एवं अवर न्यायालय का आक्षेपित आदेश दिनांक 20.09.2023 यथावत रखे जाने योग्य है।
आदेश उपरोक्त विवेचना के आधार पर अपील ग्राह्यता स्तर पर निरस्त की जाती है। अवर न्यायालय का आदेश दिनांक 20.09.2023 यथावत रखा जाता है। बाद आवश्यक कार्यवाही पत्रावली दाखिल दफ्तर की जाये।"
8. In the aforesaid circumstances, present petitioners filed a Second Appeal before the Board of Revenue, but same was also dismissed at the stage of admission on same ground that first appeal was not maintainable in view of Section 209 (g) of Code, 2006 . Relevant part thereof is mentioned hereinafter:
"7. अपीलकर्तागण द्वारा यह कहने का प्रयास किया गया कि लेखपाल द्वारा प्रस्तुत कुर्रे विक्रय पत्र में वर्णित चौहद्दी के विपरीत होने के फलस्वरूप खण्डित किये जाने योग्य है। इस सम्बन्ध में उल्लेखनीय है कि परीक्षण न्यायालय के समक्ष प्रकरण लम्बित रहते हुये लेखपाल द्वारा प्रस्तुत कुरों पर अपीलकर्तागण द्वारा किसी प्रकार की आपत्ति प्रस्तुत नहीं की गई थी, अपितु लेखपाल द्वारा प्रस्तुत कुर्रों के सम्बन्ध में अपीलकर्तागण द्वारा सहमति दिया जाना परीक्षण न्यायालय के आदेश में उल्लिखित है। परीक्षण न्यायालय द्वारा निर्गत उक्त तथ्यात्मक निष्कर्ष को अवर अपीलीय न्यायालय द्वारा पुष्ट किया जा चुका है। वर्तमान द्वितीय अपील में लिये गये आधारों में यद्यपि अर्पीलकर्तागण द्वारा कुरों को तथ्यात्मक एवं विधिक दृष्टि से गलत होने का कथन प्रस्तुत किया गया है परन्तु उनके द्वारा परीक्षण न्यायालय द्वारा अंकित उपरोक्त सहमति को विशिष्ट रूप से नकारा नहीं गया है और न ही उक्त के सम्बन्ध में अंकित तथ्यात्मक निष्कर्ष को कोई चुनौती दी गई है। वास्तव में वर्तमान द्वितीय अपील में लिये गये आधार केवल प्रश्नगत सम्पत्ति पर निर्माण अवस्थित होने तथा भ्रमवश सहमति प्रस्तुत कर दिये गये होने पर आधारित है, जो कि द्वितीय अपील के स्तर पर संज्ञानित किये जाने योग्य नहीं है। विधि का यह सुस्थापित सिद्धान्त है कि द्वितीय अपीलीय न्यायालय द्वारा किसी प्रकरण में केवल उसी अवस्था में हस्तक्षेप किया जाना अनुमन्य है जबकि प्रकरण में कोई सारभूत विधिक प्रश्न निहित हो। वर्तमान द्वितीय अपील के मेमों के माध्यम से प्रस्तावित प्रश्न सारभूत विधिक प्रश्न के सम्बन्ध में मा० उच्चतम न्यायालय् एवं मा० उच्च न्यायालय द्वारा निर्धारित किये गये मानदण्डों को पूर्ण नहीं करते हैं अतः सारभूत विधिक प्रश्न की श्रेणी में नहीं आते हैं। वर्तमान द्वितीय अपील में अन्यथा भी कोई सारभूत विधिक प्रश्न निहित होना परिलक्षित नहीं होता है। स्वीकृत रूप से वर्तमान द्वितीय अपील समवर्ती तथ्यात्मक निष्कर्ष के विरूद्ध प्रस्तुत की गई है जिसमें इस न्यायालय द्वारा किसी प्रकार का हस्तक्षेप किये जाने की आवश्यकता परिलक्षित नहीं होती है। वर्तमान द्वितीय अपील सारहीन, बलहीन व तथ्यहीन है, जो कि किसी सारभूत विधिक प्रश्न के निहित होने के अभाव में ग्राह्यता के स्तर पर ही निरस्त किये जाने योग्य है।"
9. In aforesaid circumstances present writ petition has been filed.
10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioners has submitted that consent was obtained by misrepresentation since petitioners were assured that Kurras will be prepared on basis of possession without any prejudice. However, on spot Kurras were prepared contrary to it. Though it has not been specifically denied that application for consent was signed by the petitioners.
11. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Rule 109 of U.P. Revenue Code Rules, 2016 provides a mandatory procedure that on Kurras prepared by Lekhpal/Tehsildar, learned Trial Court shall invite objections, therefore, even if consent was given, mandatory requirement could not be skipped. He further submitted that bar as mentioned in Section 209 (g) of Code, 2006 does not bar a challenge to the consent decree if the consent was obtained on fraud as it is well established that fraud vitiates every solemn act.
12. Learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on judgments passed by Supreme Court in the case of Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and Ors, (1993) 1 SCC 581; A.V.Papayya Sastry & Ors. Vs. Government of A.P. & Ors, (2007) 4 SCC 221; Ved Pal (D) through, L.Rs & Ors. Vs. Prem Devi (D) through L.Rs & Ors, (2018) 9 SCC 496; Vipan Agarwal & Ors. Vs. Raman Gandotra & Ors (2023) 10 SCC 529 and Prasanta Kumar Sahoo & Ors. Vs. Charulata Sahu & Ors. (2023) 9 SCC 641.
13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that petitioners have given their consent without any misconception on basis of Kurras prepared according to the procedure prescribed and there was no ambiguity or prejudice caused to the petitioners.
14. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that even today petitioners have not come forward to oppose without any proposal for alternative Kurras and this writ petition is nothing but to dislodge the subsequent events took place since some portion of land has been sold by contesting respondents and possession was handed over.
15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
16. In the present case on basis of records it could not disputed at this stage that a written consent was given by the petitioners which was the basis of preliminary decree as well as the final decree.
17. It is also not much under dispute that Section 209 (g) of Code, 2006 bars institution of first appeal against orders passed on consent, therefore, first Appellate Court and the Second Appellate Court has not committed any legal error.
18. Court has also considered arguments on fraud. It is well settled that if consent is obtained on fraud, interference could be made. However, for that petitioners have to make out a very good case.
19. In the case where decree is based on a consent, in normal circumstances affected parties have a remedy either to challenge it by filing a separate suit or to approach the same Court which has passed the consent decree that consent was obtained by fraud and in this regard a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Sree Surya Developers And Promoters Vs. N. Sailesh Prasad & O(2022) 5 SCC 736 would be relevant and it relevant paragraph 9 is reproduced hereinafter:
"9. The earlier decisions of this Court have also been dealt with by this Court in paras 53 to 57 as under : (R. Janakiammal case [R. Janakiammal v. S.K. Kumarasamy, (2021) 9 SCC 114] , SCC pp. 132-36) "53. Order 23 Rule 3 as well as Rule 3-A came for consideration before this Court in large number of cases and we need to refer to a few of them to find out the ratio of judgments of this Court in context of Rule 3 and Rule 3-A. In Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi [Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581] , this Court considered Rule 3 as well as Rule 3-A of the Order 23. This Court held that the object of the Amendment Act, 1976 is to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the court which has recorded the compromise. In paras 6 and 7, the following was laid down : (SCC pp. 584-85) '6. The experience of the courts has been that on many occasions parties having filed petitions of compromise on basis of which decrees are prepared, later for one reason or other challenge the validity of such compromise. For setting aside such decrees suits used to be filed which dragged on for years including appeals to different courts. Keeping in view the predicament of the courts and the public, several amendments have been introduced in Order 23 of the Code which contain provisions relating to withdrawal and adjustment of suit by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule 1 Order 23 of the Code prescribes that at any time after the institution of the suit, the plaintiff may abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim. Rule 1(3) provides that where the Court is satisfied : (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw such suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit. In view of Rule 1(4) if the plaintiff abandons his suit or withdraws such suit without permission referred to above, he shall be precluded from instituting any such suit in respect of such subject-matter. Rule 3 Order 23 which contained the procedure regarding compromise of the suit was also amended to curtail vexatious and tiring litigation while challenging a compromise decree. Not only in Rule 3 some special requirements were introduced before a compromise is recorded by the court including that the lawful agreement or a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties, a proviso with an Explanation was also added which is as follows:
"Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Explanation.--An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this Rule."
7. By adding the proviso along with an Explanation the purpose and the object of the amending Act appears to be to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the same before the court which had recorded the compromise in question. That court was enjoined to decide the controversy whether the parties have arrived at an adjustment in a lawful manner. The Explanation made it clear that an agreement or a compromise which is void or voidable under the Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. Having introduced the proviso along with the Explanation in Rule 3 in order to avoid multiplicity of suit and prolonged litigation, a specific bar was prescribed by Rule 3-A in respect of institution of a separate suit for setting aside a decree on the basis of a compromise saying:
"3-A. Bar to suit.--No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful." '
54. The next judgment to be noted is Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh [Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566] , R.V. Raveendran, J. speaking for the Court noted the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A and recorded his conclusions in para 17 in the following words : (SCC p. 576) '17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3)CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.'
55. The next judgment is R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy [R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy, (2014) 15 SCC 471 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 238] in which the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A were again considered. After extracting the aforesaid provisions, the following was held by this Court in para 11 : (SCC p. 474) '11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges and the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide the same. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make the same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-ACPC. That is precisely what has happened in the case at hand. When the appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity of the compromise decree, the court before whom the suit came up rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11CPC on the application made by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-ACPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the defendants (the respondents herein) could hardly be heard to argue that the plaintiff (the appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance of OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been rejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a higher court.'
56. The judgments of Pushpa Devi [Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566] as well as Banwari Lal [Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581] were referred to and relied on by this Court. This Court held that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone which can examine and determine that question.
57. In subsequent judgment, Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh [Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 629 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 732] , this Court again referring to earlier judgments reiterated the same proposition i.e. the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and separate suit is not maintainable. In paras 17 and 18, the following has been laid down : (SCC p. 638) '17. By introducing the amendment to the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 w.e.f. 1-2-1977, the legislature has brought into force Order 23 Rule 3-A, which creates bar to institute the suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which decree is based was not lawful. The purpose of effecting a compromise between the parties is to put an end to the various disputes pending before the court of competent jurisdiction once and for all.
18. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all adjudicating forums. Thus, creation of further litigation should never be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule 3-A of the Order 23CPC put a specific bar that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23 Rule 3CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The court can be instrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and finality attached to the same. The court should never be party to imposition of a compromise upon an unwilling party, still open to be questioned on an application under the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3CPC before the court.' "
That thereafter it is specifically observed and held that a party to a consent decree based on a compromise to challenge the compromise decree on the ground that the decree was not lawful i.e. it was void or voidable has to approach the same court, which recorded the compromise and a separate suit challenging the consent decree has been held to be not maintainable".
(Emphasis Supplied)
20. As specifically observed above, that a compromise decree based on consent could be challenged on a ground that decree was not lawful i.e. it was void or voidable, but for that party aggrieved has to approach the same Court, which has recorded the compromise and a separate suit challenging the consent decree is liable to be held not maintainable as well as in the present case, first appeal was also not maintainable due to a specific bar.
21. On the basis of records, it appears that instead of approaching the same Court, petitioners have adopted an incorrect remedy to challenge it by way of filing a First Appeal which was barred by Section 209 (g) of Code, 2006, therefore, I don't find that there is any illegality in the impugned orders whereby first appeal was rejected being not maintainable and said order was rightly upheld by Board of Revenue.
22. In aforesaid circumstances a remedy is still available to the petitioners to approach the same Court which has passed the consent decree and it appears that said remedy has still not been adopted nor taken recourse of it, therefore without interfering with the impugned orders, this writ petition is disposed of with an observation that in case petitioners approach the same Court which has passed the consent decree and are able to show that consent decree was obtained on fraud or misrepresentation or the petitioners have been prejudiced, concerned Court will take appropriate decision after hearing both the parties.
Order Date :- 26.11.2024 SB (Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J)