Allahabad High Court
Rahees Alias Baura And 3 Others vs State Of U.P. on 16 June, 2014
Author: Sudhir Agarwal
Bench: Sudhir Agarwal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 34 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 21567 of 2014 Applicant :- Rahees Alias Baura And 3 Others Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Counsel for Applicant :- Md. Abrar Khan,Irfan U Huda Counsel for Opposite Party :- Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.
1. This application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") has been preferred with a sole prayer that Courts below be directed to consider bail application of applicants, on the same day, pursuant to first information report dated 28.4.2014 (Case Crime No.408 of 2014) under Section 147, 307, 120-B I.P.C.) registered at P.S. Chakeri, District Kanpur Nagar, in the light of decision of this Court in Smt.Amarawati and Anr. Vs. State of U.P., 2004 (57) ALR 390 as approved by Apex Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P., 2009 (3) ADJ 322.
2. I am required to consider whether such an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with the prayer, as aforesaid, is entertainable. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., as is evident from a bare reading of aforesaid provision, can be culled out from the provision itself, which reads as under:
"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." (emphasis added)
3. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be exercised in a routine manner, but it is for limited purposes, namely, to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Time and again, Supreme Court and various High Courts, including ours one, have reminded when exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be justified, which cannot be placed in straight jacket formula, but one thing is very clear that it should not preampt a trial and cannot be used in a routine manner so as to cut short the entire process of trial before the Courts below. If from a bare perusal of first information report or complaint, it is evident that it does not disclose any offence at all or it is frivolous, collusive or oppressive on the face of it, the Court may exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. but it should be exercised sparingly. This will not include as to whether prosecution is likely to establish its case or not, whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would not be sustained, or the other circumstances, which would not justify exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. I need not go into various aspects in detail but it would be suffice to refer a few recent authorities dealing all these matters in detail, namely, State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Popular Muthiah Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police (2006) 7 SCC 296, Hamida vs. Rashid @ Rasheed and Ors. (2008) 1 SCC 474, Dr. Monica Kumar and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2008) 8 SCC 781, M.N. Ojha and Ors. Vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav and Anr. (2009) 9 SCC 682, State of A.P. vs. Gourishetty Mahesh and Ors. JT 2010 (6) SC 588 and Iridium India Telecom Ltd. Vs. Motorola Incorporated and Ors. 2011 (1) SCC 74.
4. In Lee Kun Hee and others Vs. State of U.P. and others JT 2012 (2) SC 237, it was reiterated that Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate evidence, if any, available on record. Interference would be justified only when a clear case of such interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled interference even at the preliminary stage by High Court may result in causing obstruction in the progress of inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in public interest. It, however, may not be doubted, if on the face of it, either from the first information report or complaint, it is evident that allegation are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no fair-minded and informed observer can ever reach a just and proper conclusion as to the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding, in such cases refusal to exercise jurisdiction may equally result in injustice, more particularly, in cases, where the complainant sets the criminal law in motion with a view to exert pressure and harass the persons arrayed as accused in the complaint.
5. In the present case, fortunately and interestingly it is not the allegation of applicants that there is any non-compliance of order passed by Court under Cr.P.C. or that there is any abuse of process on the part of Court or that there is any failure or travesty of justice on the part of Court below. In fact, applicants though have stated in para 11 of application that they are ready to surrender and apply for bail but it is admitted by learned counsel for the applicants that till date no such application has seen the light of the day. This Court does not know whether such an application would actually be filed or not. But what applicants require from this Court, to do, is that an application, which has yet to see the light of the day, should be directed to be decided by Court below and that too, on the "same day" so as to command the Court below to dispose of an application on the day it is presented before it, without exercising its discretion, which has been permitted by law by conferring a discretion upon it, looking to the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
6. The seven Judges decision of this Court in Smt.Amarawati and Anr. (supra) while answering the question referred to it, in para 47 of the judgment itself has said:
"The High Court should ordinarily not direct any Subordinate Court to decide the bail application the same day, as that would be interfering with the judicial discretion of the Court hearing the bail application." (emphasis added)
7. Having answered this very question, as above, this Court has further explained the distinction in the matter of procedure while considering bail application under Section 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. and made certain observations in respect thereto, but the fact remains that a direction by this Court in routine manner for considering bail application on the same day has not been found to be consistent with the scheme of the statute. This decision having been rendered by seven Judges Bench of this Court is binding upon this Court and I find no reason not to follow the aforesaid dictum.
8. It is true that this Court has used the word "ordinarily" but then in order to exclude this dictum and to make a case exceptional, background facts have to be pleaded, in the application. Without being guilty of reading a judgment as statute, still this Court cannot read the dictum laid down by Larger Bench in Smt. Amarawati and Anr. (supra) in a manner so as to render the dictum laid down therein frustrated or become meaningless for all practical purposes. The expression "ordinarily" may mean "normally". The expression must be understood in the context in which it has been used. When in a common parlance, expression "ordinarily" is used, there may be an option. There may be cases where an exception can be made out. (see State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. V.Saram Rao & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 137)
9. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Ors., 1976 (1) SCC 671, the Court said :
"The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority..."
10. Having gone through the entire application, and, as also admitted by learned counsel for the applicants, there is not even a whisper in the entire application so as to claim that any extra or exceptional circumstances exist so as to take out the present application from the law "ordinarily" applicable in such matter, as held in Smt.Amarawati and Anr. (supra). In paras 2, 3 and 4, general description about relief, for which application is being filed and the factum about registration of FIR are mentioned. Then paras 5 to 10 contain reasons stated by applicants, on their own, for justifying grant of bail and those reasons are:
(i) The applicants are innocent and law abiding persons falsely implicated due to enmity;
(ii) No weapon used is mentioned in FIR;
(iii) Due to enmity, Section 307 has been included in FIR though no case thereunder is made out;
(iv) Medical examination has been got conducted in a private hospital and injury report is manipulated;
(v) There is no serious injury; and
(vi) The applicants are not previously convicted.
11. These are the averments, which normally have to be considered by concerned Court while deliberating upon application of an accused to consider whether he should be granted bail or not.
12. Besides above, there is no averment/pleading so as to attract Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the case in hand.
13. Then learned counsel for the applicants stated that everyday, hundreds of cases are being filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with the sole relief that bail application should be considered on the same day and orders are being passed by this Court, therefore, the same order should be passed in this Court also. Some of such orders have been placed before this Court. However, I do not find consideration of any principle of law so as to pass an order, which apparently does not come within the precinct of Section 482 Cr.P.C. and that too after a categorical declaration of law by seven Judge Bench of this Court in Smt.Amarawati and Anr. (supra), as approved by Apex Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh (supra).
14. Even otherwise, I find that this aspect has been considered by this Court in Application under Section 482 No.19926 of 2013 (Trilok Chand Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.) decided on 19.6.2013. I find it useful to reproduce substantial part of the judgment on this aspect from paras 5 to 23, which read as under:
"5. The learned counsel for applicant then submitted that applicant may be allowed some time to surrender and a direction be issued to court concerned to consider his bail application on the same day and also to follow the law laid down in Joginder Kumar Vs. State of U.P. 1994Cri.L.J. 1981=1994(4) SCC 260, Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 2009 (4) SCC 437 and Smt. Amarawati and another Vs. State of U.P., 2005(1) AWC 416. He also requested that till then arrest of applicant be stayed and placed certain orders of this Court wherein such directions have been issued. He pointed out that hundreds and thousands such orders have been passed by this Court and, therefore, following the principle of parity similar direction must be issued in this case also.
6. I propose to examine on this aspect of the matter with deeper scrutiny. It is not the case of applicant that he has already surrendered or that though he have attempted to surrender but there is any illegal, unauthorised obstruction created by respondents in such endeavour of applicant. It is also not the case that any authority of this Court or Apex Court though cited before court concerned but it has refused to consider the same or ignored. No allegations have been made that the court concerned is acting contrary to law or the Presiding Officer has any kind of bias etc. so as to pass an order without looking into the matter in accordance with law.
7. The law laid down by Apex Court by virtue of Article 145 of the Constitution of India, is binding on all courts and authorities across the nation and everybody is supposed to act in the aid and enforcement of such law laid down by Supreme Court. There is no presumption that courts below shall not follow the law laid down by Supreme Court. There is also no presumption that a decision of Supreme Court laying down certain law, if cited, in support of arguments by a party, before a court, they would not be looked into and appreciated by such court. To follow the law laid down by Supreme Court, no sanction or approval or direction of this Court is required. To ask for such direction, when there is no factual foundation in the application, is nothing but doubting the capability, approach and efficiency of subordinate courts, which is not in the larger interest of institution as such. Moreover, in absence of any factual foundation, it is well established that no futile or uncalled for directions are to be issued by this Court. Its hand are already full of work and rather extremely loaded therewith, hence entertaining cases just for futile direction, which ex facie deserved to be dismissed, would be nothing but encouraging avoidable unnecessary burden upon this Court.
8. Even otherwise a direction to follow a decision of Apex Court without appreciating, whether it applies on the facts and circumstances of the case and would be cited by parties concerned, is like anticipating something, which is not existing in presenti and on the facts of the case, may not be applicable.
9. I may illustrate on this aspect by looking into the aforesaid decisions in detail, which the learned counsel or applicant intended to be considered by courts below, under a direction of this Court, though I am not sure whether it would actually be cited by counsel of accused-applicant when he would be presenting his case before court below.
10. In Joginder Kumar (supra), a habeas corpus writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed before Supreme Court alleging about unlawful detention of petitioner (a practising lawyer) by police authorities and seeking his release. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad appeared before Court and admitted to have detained petitioner for five days, not in detention but for taking his help in inquiry/investigation of an offence of abduction. Since the petitioner was already released by police, the Court found that relief in habeas corpus now cannot be granted. Yet it enquired as to how and in what circumstances, without informing the court concerned, an individual could be detained by police for five days. The Court found it a case of massive violation of human rights, besides the statutory legal provisions relating to arrest etc. The Court held that law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights, liberties and privileges, on the one hand; and, individual duties, obligations and responsibilities on the other hand. The Court said that an arrest cannot be made merely for the reason that a police officer is empowered under law to do so. The existence of power is one thing and justification for exercise thereof is another. Genuine, justified and satisfactory reasons must exist before a police officer should go to arrest a person so as to curtail his fundamental right of life and liberty. A person is not liable to arrest merely on suspicion of complicity of offence. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided unless there exists reason therefor. That was not a case where after inquiry or investigation by police, a charge sheet was filed and thereupon an incumbent was to surrender himself to the Court, and the power of Court either to release him on bail if so requested, or to sent him in judicial custody was under consideration.
11. This decision then was considered in D.K. Basu Versus State of West Bengal 1997 (1) SCC 416 which was a public interest litigation entertained by Supreme Court taking cognizance of a letter received from Executive Chairman, Legal Aid Services, West Bengal complaining about certain custodial deaths.
12. Apparently the aforesaid decision also strictly has no application to the nature of dispute involved in this application as also the stage at which question, as to whether the petitioner should be detained in jail or not, has to be considered. Here it is not the case of exercise of power by police but the judicial discretion of Court and thereto nothing should be anticipated unless an appropriate order is passed by court concerned.
13. The decision in Joginder Kumar (supra) in similar circumstances has been referred and followed subsequently also in K.K. Jerath Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others, JT 1998(2) SC 658 which was a case of anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. apprehending arrest during a C.B.I. inquiry. It was attempted to argue that there is presumption of innocence in favour of each individual until charge against him is established and, therefore, it would not be consistent with philosophy of Constitution that such a person should be subjected to interrogation by application of psychological or ambient pressures much less physical torture. It was stressed that Apex Court has a duty to protect a citizen against such inroads of these fundamental rights. The Apex Court while dismissing petition observed that in considering a petition for grant of bail, necessarily, if public interest requires detention of citizen in custody for purposes of investigation, it would be allowed otherwise there could be hurdles in investigation even resulting in tampering of evidence. In other words the Apex Court did not find any attraction in the arguments for the reason that a bail application has to be considered in the light of already established principle through various judicial precedents and not on mere asking.
14. There are several subsequent cases also wherein the Apex Court has distinguished the cases where there was no allegation of misuse of power of arrest by police authorities and an incumbent was arrested having been found prima facie guilty of commission of a cognizable offence.
15. In respect to circumstances where a bail application has to be considered by courts, the relevant considerations have been laid down in catena of authorities which are well established and need not to be added hereat. They have to be followed.
16. In Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh (supra) the matter came to be considered before the Court for quashing of a first information report. Here also apprehending arrest due to mere registration of a first information report, the matter was brought before this Court seeking quashing of first information report. The High Court dismissed the application and thereagainst the matter was taken to Apex Court. A complaint was made that during investigation or inquiry, petitioners apprehend their arrest by police authorities in an arbitrary manner. It is in this context the Court reminded police authorities to follow the dictum and direction laid down in Joginder Kumar (supra). When the matter was pending before Supreme Court, the police completed investigation and submitted a charge sheet. The Court then declined to interfere since the charge sheet was submitted and permitted petitioner to approach the court concerned by filing a bail application. The Court approved and reminded a seven Judges decision of this Court in Smt. Amarawati and another (supra) wherein an observation was made that the absence of power of anticipatory bail in State of U.P. would not debar the concerned Court/Magistrate to grant an interim bail if there is any likelihood of delay in disposal of bail application finally.
17. I find that in an earlier case of Som Mittal Vs. Government of Karnataka, JT 2008(2) SC 41, which was a matter relating to anticipatory bail, one of the two Judges constituting Bench (Hon'ble M. Katju, J.) has referred to and approved seven Judges decision of this Court in Smt. Amarawati and another (supra) and observed that non availability of any provision relating to anticipatory bail in State of U.P. is causing extraordinary burden on the High Court and a recommendation was made for reviving such a provision.
18. However, in none of the cases above, it has been said by Supreme Court or this Court, at any point of time, that once a charge sheet is submitted, still an accused is entitled to be released on bail, on just asking, and the courts below/concerned Magistrate should not apply its mind to the relevant facts and circumstances which would justify whether the concerned person should be granted bail or should be detained in judicial custody. The decision in Smt. Amarawati and another (supra) says otherwise. That being so, expecting this Court to simply stay arrest while directing or permitting the person concerned to approach the court below by filing a bail application and without applying its mind to the relevant facts and circumstances in which bail can be granted, would clearly amount to travesty of justice. It would be an order not in accordance with law and without considering the relevant facts and circumstances. Such an order would clearly travel in the realm of non-application of mind. I am afraid, this Court cannot pass such an order particularly when it is declining to entertain an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. being satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of cognizable offence has been found against accused resulting in filing of a charge sheet and now the matter must be examined by concerned Magistrate/court regarding bail etc. after considering the relevant facts and circumstances.
19. I may refer here one more aspect. The manner in which the applicant-accused pray that his arrest should be stayed, at the best can be placed at par with anticipatory or interim bail. In fact while granting an order of stay of arrest the court surpasses even those considerations which it is bound to take into account, when pass an order granting anticipatory bail.
20. Now it is well settled that even an order of anticipatory bail cannot be passed on mere asking but has to satisfy consideration of various relevant aspects in this regard. Some of these aspects have been considered recently by Apex Court in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2011(1) SCC 694 and in paras 122 to 138 the relevant facts and circumstances which must be considered by the Court before passing an order of anticipatory bail have been noticed in detail. Though these observations are not exhaustive but the aforesaid decision clearly lays down a law that even in passing an order on anticipatory bail, a bald, unreasoned and non-speaking order staying arrest or granting bail should not be passed as that would amount to a material illegality and irregularity and failure to exercise jurisdiction validly if relevant circumstances before passing such orders are not taken into account, weighed and assessed, and thereafter a decision is taken whether such an order would be justified or not.
21. It is true, that, several orders placed before this court, show that directions as requested by accused applicant to be issued to the court below, have been issued and in some of the cases arrest has also been stayed but unfortunately I do not find that before such directions the relevant law has been considered, discussed and be cited. The ultimate direction or action of Court do not constitute a binding precedent. What is binding precedent is the ratio, i.e., the law laid down by Court. A law is laid down when an issue is raised, argued and decided. In none of the orders placed before this Court, I find that any issue, whether these directions, as sought for, should be or can be issued or are justified to be issued, considered and decided. These orders, therefore, do not constitute a precedent so as to have a binding effect under the law of precedent.
22. Lastly it is contended that atleast the court below be directed to consider the bail application of accused applicant on the same day when it is presented. It is pointed out that in many of the cases the concerned courts/Magistrates either grant interim bail or sent accused in jail by deferring any order on the bail application due to paucity of time and that is how the fundamental right of life and liberty of accused is jeopardised for no fault on his part.
23. What is said, if correct, is admittedly something serious and puts a blot on the system of administration of justice. If a person who otherwise does not deserve bail for one or the other reasons is allowed interim bail, only for the reason that concerned Magistrate/court finds no time to apply mind on his application, it would not only be travesty of justice but would be highly dangerous for the society at large. Similarly, if a person is sent to jail, curtailing his liberty, only for the reason that concerned Magistrate/court could not find time to apply mind on his bail application, again this would be a case of grave injustice, besides violation of fundamental rights of a citizen. Both the situations cannot be appreciated. In the circumstances, I would like to hold that if a bail application is moved in time, with due notice to other side, if so required in law, the Magistrate/court concerned must consider the relevant facts and circumstances before passing any order either way and in case the number of applications are such so as not to make it possible to be attended within the court timing, the District Judge concerned shall look into and distribute the work in such manner so that applications are attended by competent courts without any undue delay and no person is sent to jail or released, by way of interim bail, without application of mind by concerned court/Magistrate. If necessary the Court may attend such applications irrespective of the fact that court timing is over. Upholding Constitutional rights and people's freedom vis-a-vis the safety, protection and interest of society is of prime importance and it cannot be compromised in the name of court timings or something for which the parties are not responsible and accountable. If necessary, on this aspect the matter may also be examined on administrative side by this Court after having relevant information with detail facts and datas from concerned district judgeship(s).
15. Learned counsel for the applicants, despite repeated query, could not address this Court to substantiate upon any aspect of the matter so as to persuade this Court to take a different view or to distinguish the aforesaid judgment, for the purpose of present case. I, therefore, find no reason but to follow the aforesaid dictum in the case in hand also.
16. It is really surprising that an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is being filed though there is no infringement of any right or procedural protection available to the accused, in any manner, so as to justify exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., yet precious time of this Court is sought to be consumed for obtaining an order directing the Court below to consider bail application, which is yet to be filed, on the "same day", despite law otherwise declared by this Court in Smt.Amarawati and Anr. (supra) holding that High Court should not "ordinarily" direct any subordinate Court to decide bail application on the same day as that would be interfering with judicial discretion of this Court hearing bail application.
17. This law was laid down as back as in 2004 and since applicants themselves have required the Court below to consider the law laid down therein, it is evident that applicants are well aware of aforesaid decision, yet have not cared to avoid frivolous case before this Court seeking a relief, which has been held inapplicable in the aforesaid decision. There is no factual averment and foundation laid down in the entire application to attract any part of Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the case in hand. In my view, such an application should be treated a mere judicial adventure on the part of applicants to obtain an order, which according to applicants, is an innocuous order though not; or it should be taken as a gross abuse of process of law. I am inclined to follow the later view.
18. This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that it is already reeling under extreme pressure of extra ordinary pendency of cases, for one or the other reasons, causing huge delay in disposal of cases. Everyday, on various platforms, people cry of denial of justice. They are frequently reminding us that "justice delayed is justice denied" but on account of massive litigation exodus, Courts are under mounting pressure of huge number of cases, pending. Lack of infrastructure and other supporting establishment, is another hurdle in speedy disposal of cases. It is virtually a day dream to think of an early disposal of a case yet a few litigants, assisted by officers of this Court, do not hesitate in filing frivolous cases adding to mounting arrears. This is high time when such frivolous and uncalled for litigation must be endeavoured to be curtailed by taking hard steps. This Court should not show its misplaced sympathy to such persons, who indulge in filing frivolous cases before this Court so as to consume a sufficient time in those matters, depriving Court's precious time to be utilized in other substantial issues. It is not that the state of law was/is not clear, inasmuch as, Smt.Amarawati's judgment came in 2004, approved by Apex Court in 2009, is further reiterated in Trilok Chand (supra), still practice of filing cases with the only prayer that bail application, which is yet to be filed, should be directed to be decided by Courts below on the same day, is continuing. Here, it is a fit case, which warrants not only rejection of this application but with exemplary cost.
19. Stressing upon the ways to discourage filing of vexatious and frivolous cases against all kinds of orders or at every stage of proceedings, irrespective of the fact whether application like the present one would be permissible in law or not, Apex Court in the context of practice of filing SLPs against all kinds of orders of High Court or other authorities, came heavily in Mathai @ Joby vs. George and Anr, 2010 (4) SCC 358 and said that if all such sundry kinds of cases are allowed, the Court will soon be flooded with a huge amount of backlog and it will not be able to deal with important questions relating to the Constitution or the law or where grave injustice has been done. The Court has limited time at its disposal and the Judges are struggling with unbearable burden with zeal to dispense justice to whom it is highly needed yet being obstructed by such frivolous and vexatious matters, a trend is developing to bring all kinds of trivial and flimsy matters to Court causing wastage of not only public money, but also precious time of the Court, which can be used for other substantial matters.
20. The Apex Court in Crl. M.P. No.25683 of 2013 in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2448 of 2014 (Phool Chandra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.), decided on 10.3.2014, observed:
"..the time of the Court which is becoming acutely precious because of the piling arrears has to be wasted on hearing such matters. There is an urgent need to put a check on such frivolous litigation. Perhaps many such cases can be avoided if learned Counsel who are officers of the court and who are expected to assist the court tender proper advice to their clients. The Bar has to realise that the great burden upon the Bench of dispensing justice imposes a simultaneous duty upon them to share this burden and it is their duty to see that the burden should not needlessly be made unbearable. The Judges of this Nation are struggling bravely against the odds to tackle the problem of dispensing quick justice. But, without the cooperation of the gentlemen of the Bar, nothing can be done."
21. The Court in Phool Chandra & Anr. (supra) referring to earlier decisions in Varinderpal Singh Vs. Hon'ble Justice M.R. Sharma and Ors., 1986 Supp SCC 719; Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors. Vs. Nirmala Devi and Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 249; and Gurgaon Gramin Bank Vs. Khazani and Anr., AIR 2012 SC 2881 has said:
"It is high time that the Courts should come down heavily upon such frivolous litigation and unless we ensure that the wrongdoers are denied profit or undue benefit from the frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to control frivolous and uncalled for litigation. In order to curb such kind of litigation, the courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive which can be ensured by imposing exemplary costs upon the parties as well as on learned Counsel who act in an irresponsible manner."
22. I may also repeat hereat observation made by the Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India, JT 2005 (6) SC 486 stating that award of costs must be treated generally as mandatory. It is the liberal attitude of the Courts in not awarding costs which has led to frivolous points or litigation before the Courts. Costs should invariably follow the event and reasons must be assigned for not awarding costs.
23. In view of the above and considering the fact that despite the law laid down by a Larger Bench of this Court in Smt.Amarawati and Anr. (supra), which has been approved by Apex Court also in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh (supra) and has considered again in a recent decision in Trilok Chand (supra), still applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C., like present one, are continuously being filed with a sole request that bail application, which is yet to be filed, should be directed to be decided on the same day. In my view, it is nothing but a gross abuse of process of law and frivolous litigation, therefore, should attract exemplary cost.
24. Learned A.G.A. informs this Court that everyday, dozens of such applications with similar request are being filed consuming huge time of this Court in disposal of such applications, which orders in fact are nothing but create an undue pressure upon subordinate judiciary also so as to protect itself from a situation of likely disobedience of this Court's orders though, as a matter of fact, neither such direction in view of Larger Bench judgment is permissible nor there is any occasion for such issuance.
25. This Court cannot make any comment on such statement of learned AGA but only takes notice of the fact that a large number of cases with similar request are being filed everyday consuming enough time of this Court in disposal of such applications. This is high time now that legal aspect of the matter should be reiterated again with a hope that such applications in future would be discouraged to be filed unless and until a case on the basis of pleadings, facts and material is made out.
26. Looking to the discussion, made above, the application has to be dismissed with cost.
27. The application is accordingly dismissed with cost of Rs.25,000/-, which shall be paid by applicants in Government Treasury within a month from today, failing which, it would be open to the State to realize the same as arrears of land revenue.
Order Date :- 16.6.2014 KA