Punjab-Haryana High Court
Basakha Singh vs Mani Ram Bhatia on 1 November, 2006
Equivalent citations: (2007)147PLR1
Author: Nirmal Yadav
Bench: Nirmal Yadav
JUDGMENT Nirmal Yadav, J.
1. This is defendant's second appeal challenging the concurrent finding recorded by both the courts below holding that defendant-tenant is liable to be ejected from the demised premises as the respondent-landlord has proved termination of tenancy by issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The plea taken by the appellant before the 1st Appellate Court that no decree of ejectment against him could be passed as the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short the 'Rent Act') has been invoked before expiry of 10 years' period of exemption granted vide notification dated 9.2.1984 issued by the Punjab Government has been rejected.
2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent-plaintiff Mani Ram filed a civil suit seeking ejectment of the appellant-defendant from demised premises i.e. House No. HL-206, Phase-II, S.A.S. Nagar, Mohali. Defendant was inducted as tenant by the plaintiff through Mohinder Singh, husband of his wife's sister, on a monthly rent of Rs. 320/-. The appellant-tenant did not bother to make the payment of rent regularly. He also did not prove to be a good tenant and, therefore, the plaintiff asked him to vacate the house and also to make the payment of rent due towards him. Accordingly, statutory notice was served upon the defendant terminating his tenancy, as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The suit was contested by the defendant, mainly, on the ground that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. He further challenged the locus standi of the plaintiff to file the suit asserting that plaintiff is not the owner of the demised premises. According to him, the property belongs to the Punjab Housing Board. He also denied the service of notice issued by the plaintiff. Service of notice sent by Mohinder Singh through his counsel Shivdev Singh was, however, admitted by the defendant. The defendant further pleaded that he had been paying rent to Mohinder Singh. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed:
1. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties? OPA
2. Whether valid notice terminating the tenancy has been served upon the defendant? OPA
3. Whether the provision of Section 106 T.P.A. does not apply to the suit property? OPR
4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit? OPR
5. Relief.
The trial Court after taking into consideration the facts and evidence on record, decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant and decreed the suit for ejectment with costs.
3. The defendant challenged the aforesaid judgment and decree before the District Judge, Rupnagar, inter alia, pleading that notification dated 9.2.1984 has expired on 31.3.1995 and provisions of Rent Act have become applicable, therefore, the suit stands abated. The 1 st Appellate Court rejected the aforesaid plea-of the defendant with regard to applicability of Rent Act with the following findings:
9. In my view the exemption granted from the provisions of the Rent Act vide notification dated 9th February, 1984 will not become ineffective and unoperative (sic), simply because the exemption granted has expired On 31.3.95. In my view all the actions taken during the period from 9.2.84 to 31.3.95 are out of.the purview of. the Rent Act. To this view I find support from the Authority Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia where it was held as under:
Bearing in mind the well settled principles that the rights of the parties crystalize to the date of the institution of the suit the meaningful construction of the provision granting exemption to a building from operation of the Act must be that the exemption would apply for a period of 10 years and will continue to be available until suit for eviction is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding must be instituted within the stipulated period of 10 years; Once rights crystallize for the adjudication the 10 years exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date of letting it would never be disposed of within 10 years and even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That will make the 10 years holidays from the Rent Act illustory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problems of shortage of houses. The purpose of legislation would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else.
4. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and going through the evidence on record, 1 am of the view there is no merit in this appeal. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the relationship of landlord and tenant has been proved between the parties. It has further been found that the suit was filed during the period of exemption and, therefore, the provisions of the Rent Act were not applicable. The issue with regard to payment of rent does not survive. The main argument raised by learned Counsel for the appellant is that the period of 10 years has expired during the pendency of appeal and the provisions of the Rent Act have become applicable. In support, the learned Counsel referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of K. Balakrishna Rao and Ors. v. Haji Abdulla Sait and Ors. 1980 (1) Rent Control Reporter 374 and Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (1990-1)97 The Punjab Law Reporter 182.
5. On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondent argued that a suit instituted during the period of exemption could be continued and a decree passed therein could be executed even though the period of exemption came to an end during the pendency of the suit. Learned Counsel argued that from a bare reading of the provisions of the Rent Act, it is evident that it has not prevented a civil Court from adjudicating the rights accrued and liability incurred prior to the date on which the Act became applicable to the buildings in question. In support, the learned Counsel referred to the judgments of the Apex Court in Shri Kishan alias Krishan Kumar and Ors. v. Manoj Kumar and Ors. ; Atma Ram v. Ishwar Singh . The Apex Court in Atma Ram's case (supra) while rejecting the argument that a decree of ejectment passed after expiry of 10 years in a suit instituted within an exempted period was not executable, has observed as under:
8. It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the court of delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim "Actus curia neminem gravibit" an act of Court shall prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the time normally consumed for adjudication, the 10 years exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date of letting it would never be disposed of within 10 years and even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That will make the 10 years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem of shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation would thus be defeated. The purposive interpretation in a social ameliorative legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else." In Shri Kishan's case supra, the Apex Court considered several judgments and observed that various High Courts have taken the view that a suit instituted during the period of exemption could be continued and decree passed therein could also be executed even though the period of exemption came to an end during the pendency of the suit. The only discordant note was struck in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera . However, in a later decision rendered subsequent thereto Nand Kishore Marwah and Ors. v. Smt. Samundri Devi , the Apex Court discussed and explained Vaneet Kumar's case. It was further held that nothing in the Act prevents the civil Court from continuing the suit and passing a decree which would be executed. Keeping in view the well-settled principle that rights of the parties crystallized on the date of institution of the suit, the only construction that can be founded is that exemption would apply for a period of 10 years and continue to be available until the suit is disposed or adjudicated. Once the rights have crystallized, the adjudication must be in accordance with law. In case immunity from operation of the Rent Act is depended upon the ultimate disposal of the case within the period of exemption, the very purpose of exemption would not be achieved, as ultimate disposal within the exempted period of 10 years would almost be impossible in reality. Unless a suit is instituted soon after the day of letting out a house, it would never be disposed of within a period of 10 years and sometimes, it may not be disposed of even thereafter. The exemption of 10 years from the date of Rent Act would, therefore, prove to be illusory. The logical consequence of argument advanced by learned Counsel for the appellant, if considered and accepted, would mean that even if a decree is obtained by the landlord within 10 years from its completion it cannot be executed after the expiry of the said period of 10 years. The ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments cited by learned Counsel of the respondent are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The appeal is continuation of the suit and, therefore, similar would be the position if the Rent Act becomes applicable during the pendency of the appeal.
6. The authorities cited by learned Counsel for the appellant are quite distinguishable as in those case, there was no notification for exemption from applicability of the Rent Act as in the present case. In Sushil Mehta's case (supra), the notification was issued by the State Government exempting the land belonging to Gurgaon Municipality from the provisions of the Rent Act. The finding of the Court was that the shop in question stands mainly on the land of the landlord and only a small portion was located on the municipal land. In those circumstances, it was held that the building was governed by the provisions of the Rent Act and exemption granted by the Government was not attracted to the demised premises. Earlier, there was no Rent Act applicable, rather the Rent Act came into existence for the first time during the pendency of the suit and, therefore, the civil suit was filed for ejectment from the demised premises.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellant further argued that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant as the building belongs to Punjab Housing Board and eviction order could only be passed under the Punjab Housing Board Development Act, 1972. Learned Counsel pointed out that allotment to the Mani Ram, respondent was cancelled. However, this argument has been discussed in detail by the Courts below. A reference to the statement of PW3-Sunil Kumar, Senior Assistant, Punjab Housing Board, Mohali has been made, who admitted that house in question was allotted to Mani Ram Bhatia on 31.12.1976 on installment basis. The letters were issued to him at the address given in his application. Since no response was received from the allottee, the allotment was cancelled. However, later on, he paid the entire outstanding amount and a recommendation was made by the Housing Board, for revocation of cancellation vide letter-Exhibit PW3/A. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the respondent produced the order dated 28.8.2003 vide which the appeal filed by the respondent was accepted and allotment was restored in favour of the respondent.
8. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the house was let out by Mohinder Singh and notice was also issued by Mohinder Singh through his counsel Shivdev Singh and, therefore, the relationship of landlord and tenant is not proved, is also without any force. Mohinder Singh never claimed himself to be the landlord of the demised premises. According to him, he was merely collecting the rent on behalf of plaintiff-Mani Ram. The questions put to Mani Ram Bhatia in the cross-examination also show that defendant-appellant himself admitted him to be the landlord. The suggestions put to plaintiff that he had received the rent upto date and the suit was filed in order to enhance the rate of rent and that the entire rent was paid to him through Mohinder Singh, sufficiently prove that appellant has admitted that respondent to be the owner/landlord of the demised premises.
9. In view of the above discussion and the settled proposition of law as noticed above, do not find any ground to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below.