Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Shrwan Kumar vs Rajasthan State Road Transport ... on 23 May, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1995ACJ337
JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, J.
1. All these three appeals (Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. 158 and 159 of 1986 filed by Shrwan Kumar and 4 of 1987 filed by Manni Devi) are directed against a common award dated 22.5.1986, passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jaipur, in claim case Nos. 101 and 118 of 1982. Since these appeals arise out of common award and self-same accident, they have been heard together by common consent and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Briefly stated, the case of Shrwan Kumar is that on 7.1.1982 at 4 p.m. he was driving a motor cycle bearing No. RRL 2649 and was proceeding from Jaipur to Sushilpura on Jaipur-Ajmer Road; one, Jagdish was riding pillion of the motor cycle. It is pleaded that when the motor cycle crossed Amaani Shaw Nalah it was collided by bus RRB 6022 belonging to Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'RSRTC'). This bus was being driven by Poonam Chand. The case of Shrwan Kumar is that the bus was being driven by Poonam Chand in a reckless and negligent manner, with the result, it dashed against the motor cycle throwing Jagdish from pillion. Shrwan Kumar and Jagdish sustained grievous injuries in this accident, which resulted in death of Jagdish.
3. Shrwan Kumar filed motor accident Claim Case No. 118 of 1982 claiming compensation for the injuries received by him, while Manni Devi and other legal representatives of Jagdish instituted claim case No. 101 of 1982.
4. In claim petition of Manni Devi and other legal representatives of Jagdish, compensation was claimed against the RSRTC and its driver, Poonam Chand, as also against Shrwan Kumar and registered owner of the motor cycle, Bhuramal.
5. Both the claim petitions were contested on behalf of the RSRTC and Poonam Chand. Factum of the accident was admitted but it was denied that Poonam Chand was driving the bus rashly and negligently. It was pleaded that Shrwan Kumar was driving the motor cycle at the excessive speed and he could not control the motor cycle which dashed against the bus, which had already been stopped by Poonam Chand because Poonam Chand had seen the motor cycle approaching at the excessive speed. The RSRTC and Poonam Chand disclaimed any liability to pay compensation, though it was not disputed that Shrwan Kumar sustained injuries in the accident and Jagdish met his death as a result of the accident.
6. Both the claim petitions were consolidated before the learned Tribunal and were heard together. In support of the claim, the claimants examined Manni Devi, AW 1; Dalpat Singh, AW 2; Dr. R.C. Joshi, AW 3; Dr. Chandra Shekhar Danga, AW 4; Shrwan Kumar, AW 5 and Seduram, AW 6. Certain documentary evidence was also produced on record. On behalf of the RSRTC and Poonam Chand, Poonam Chand, NAW 1; Baluram, NAW 2 and Hanuman Chand, NAW 3 were examined. The contesting respondents did not produce any documentary evidence.
7. After hearing learned Counsel for all the sides, the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that Poonam Chand was driving the bus rashly and negligently. However, he has further held that Shrwan Kumar was also liable because he was also driving the motor cycle rashly and negligently. Upon such findings, he held that Shrwan Kumar was guilty of contributory negligence.
8. As regards compensation as against Rs. 2,13,000/- claimed by Manni Devi and other legal representatives of Jagdish, the learned Judge of the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 58.000/-, details thereof shall be given later on in this judgment.
9. Shrwan Kumar had claimed a sum of Rs. 2,11,000/-. The learned Judge of the Tribunal, however, found Shrwan Kumar entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs. 60,000/-, but on account of contributory negligence, held him entitled to award of compensation to the tune of Rs. 30,000/-only. The amount of compensation awarded was to carry interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum also. Certain ancillary directions were also given. Aggrieved, Manni Devi and other legal representatives of Jagdish have filed Civil Misc. Appeal No. 4 of 1987 while Shrwan Kumar has filed Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. 158 and 159 of 1986.
10. Learned counsel for Shrwan Kumar has assailed correctness of the findings rendered by the learned Tribunal on a number of counts. It is contended that the learned Judge fell in error in holding that Shrwan Kumar was driving the motor cycle rashly and negligently and hence contributed towards the accident. It is submitted that it was not a case of contributory negligence at all. The award was also challenged on the ground that the compensation awarded was grossly on the lower side and a higher compensation ought to have been awarded as pleaded in the claim petition. Mr. S.C. Srivastava appearing on behalf of Manni Devi and legal representatives of Jagdish challenged the award on the ground that the compensation awarded was grossly on lower side and the amount of compensation should be enhanced. He supported Mr. G.C. Mathur, the learned Counsel for Shrwan Kumar, in his contention that there was no contributory negligence on the part of Shrwan Kumar. He, however, alternatively submitted that in case Shrwan Kumar was also held guilty of contributory negligence, it would be a case of composite negligence by two drivers, namely, driver of the bus and the driver of the motor cycle qua legal representatives of Jagdish and hence legal representatives of Jagdish should have been held entitled to recover amount of compensation from either the RSRTC and its driver or from Shrwan Kumar. His submission is that the liability was joint and several and the legal representatives of Jagdish could have recovered the amount of compensation from any of the tortfeasors. He prayed for enhancement of compensation.
11. Learned counsel for the RSRTC supports the award of compensation and submits that the case of contributory negligence against the driver of the motor cycle has been made out. It is submitted that the evidence produced by the RSRTC shows that Shrwan Kumar was equally guilty. It was submitted that the amount of compensation awarded was just and proper and calls for no interference.
12. I have given my earnest consideration to the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties. I have also perused the record of the Tribunal. I have given my earnest consideration to all the facts and circumstances of the case.
13. At the outset, I may state that there is no gainsaying that the accident took place on 7.1.1982 at 4 p.m. on Jaipur-Ajmer Road between bus RRB 6022 which was coming from Jalore to Jaipur and the motor cycle RRL 2649 which was proceeding from Jaipur towards Sushilpura.
14. This fact has also been proved beyond any manner of doubt that in this accident pillion rider, Jagdish, received fatal injuries and died on the spot, while Shrwan Kumar also sustained numerous grievous injuries.
15. I may also state that the RSRTC or Poonam Chand both have not filed appeals or cross-objections regarding findings mat it was due to rash and negligent driving of the RSRTC bus by Poonam Chand that the accident took place. Hence this question has become final and I am, therefore, required to examine if there was contributory negligence on the part of Shrwan Kumar or not. Poonam Chand, driver of the RSRTC bus, has appeared in the witness-box to say that he saw motor cycle coming towards his bus at which he stopped his bus on the proper side. The motor-cyclist was approaching in a zigzag manner (laharata aayd) and he dashed against the bumper of the bus. He further stated that he got down and found that the motor-cyclist was smelling of liquor. He claims to have gone to Sodala police station. Curiously, it is not claimed that he lodged a report of the accident with the police station. The story that the motor- cyclist was coming in a zig-zag manner was not spelt out in written statement filed on behalf of the RSRTC or Poonam Chand. Baluram, conductor of the bus, has come forward to support this story of Poonam Chand. He has also, in a parrot-like manner, stated that the motor-cyclist was coming in a zigzag manner and found that the motorcyclist was smelling of liquor. Hanuman Chand Bhandari, NAW 3, has also been examined to speak of this story. As already stated, no F.I.R. was filed in the police station, even after he (Poonam Chand) claimed to have reached police station after the accident. This fact detracts from the worth of the testimony of Poonam Chand, Baluram, and Hanuman Chand Bhandari, NAWs 1,2 and 3.
16. As against this, there is evidence of Dalpat Singh, AW 2, according to whom the bus was being driven by Poonam Chand at an excessive speed and this had caused the accident. To the same effect is the story of Shrwan Kumar, AW 5 and Seduram, AW 6.
17. Learned counsel for Shrwan Kumar points out that there were important pieces of evidence which were overlooked by the learned Judge of the Tribunal which have vitiated the judgment of the learned Tribunal. He submits that a strict proof was not required and provisions of Evidence Act are not strictly applicable and that certified copy of the F.I.R. pertaining to this accident had been placed on record without any objection on the part of the RSRTC or Poonam Chand which goes to show that it was the driver of the bus who had caused this accident. Likewise, there is certified copy of the mechanical report of the bus that the root-brake of the bus was not working at all. Likewise, there was photograph taken soon after the accident (page 98) which goes to show that the motor cycle was crushed underneath the bus. He submits that had this material been taken into consideration a finding of the contributory negligence could not have been arrived at by the learned Judge of the Tribunal. In support of the proposition that the provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply strictly to the proceedings, he has relied upon decision of the Delhi High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Saloni Dargan 1990 ACJ 127 (Delhi). In this decision, the Delhi High Court has taken the view that the strict provisions of Evidence Act are not applicable in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act and the procedure is a summary procedure and any document having some probative value and the genuineness of which is not in doubt can be looked into by the Tribunal for getting preponderance of probable versions. This view commends itself to me. To my mind, provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply strictly to cases tried by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, for the reason that the proceedings before the learned Tribunal are summary in nature.
18. Public documents like the first information report and the report of the mechanical inspection of the bus can be taken into consideration and this point is no longer res Integra so far as this Court is concerned. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Devilal 1991 ACJ 230 (Rajasthan), it was observed that strictly speaking, provisions of Evidence Act are not applicable before the Tribunal; if a document is a certified copy of a public document it need not be proved by calling a witness or the person who prepared it.
19. I, therefore, find that in the present case, certified copy of the first information report, mechanical inspection report and photographs clearly went to lend preponderance of probabilities to the version set up by Shrwan Kumar and his witnesses and these documents go to discredit the testimony of Poonam Chand and the witnesses who supported Poonam Chand.
20. When oral evidence of two sides is equally balanced, documentary evidence- the genuineness of which is not under challenge-will indubitably tilt the balance in favour of the party whose version is supported by such documentary evidence. I, therefore, find that in the present case, contributory negligence on the part of Shrwan Kumar has not been established at all and the story set up by Shrwan Kumar and his witnesses is more reliable than one set up by the driver of the bus, Poonam Chand and his witnesses.
21. I may here state that it is quality of evidence which has to weigh with the court and merely not the number of witnesses who depose about a particular fact. Judged in this light, I find that the learned Judge of the Tribunal fell in error in holding that Shrwan Kumar also contributed to the accident due to his negligence.
22. The learned Judge of the Tribunal has in a very cryptic manner stated that since the bus was to descend in the 'nalah', therefore, the motor-cyclist had to be careful and had he been careful, this accident could have been averted. This is only a surmise, not based upon any evidence and hence the finding of the learned Judge of the Tribunal that the motor-cyclist contributed to the accident due to his negligence cannot be said to be proper and is set aside.
23. This takes me to consider the quantum of compensation computed by the learned Judge of the Tribunal. First, I will take up case of Shrwan Kumar. Learned Judge of the Tribunal has reduced amount of compensation by fifty per cent attributable to the alleged negligence on the part of the motor-cyclist. Since I have found that the finding regarding contributory negligence is not proper, this reduction automatically goes away and Shrwan Kumar is entitled to the entire amount of compensation.
24. Now the question is whether the compensation awarded was grossly inadequate. This is an admitted position that Shrwan Kumar has received a large number of injuries in the accident. To be more precise, he suffered as many as 13 injuries and out of them, eight injuries were of grievous nature, as would be evident from the evidence of Dr. R.C. Joshi and Dr. Chandra Shekhar Danga. Exh. 11 is the injury report in this regard. There is no reason to doubt the testimony of the two witnesses. Dr. R.C. Joshi has deposed that Shrwan Kumar was permanently disabled because of the accident. However, he was unable to state the extent of this disability. In his testimony, Shrwan Kumar has slightly exaggerated number of injuries. He has stated that he cannot sit on his right leg and needs support. However, this part of his statement is not supported by medical evidence. He deposed about 21 fractures on his person and that is also not supported by the medical evidence.
25. Learned Judge of the Tribunal has discussed amount of compensation under various heads. Under the head of 'physical pain, mental agony and disfiguration of body', a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was claimed and the entire amount was granted and so, no exception can be taken to this part of the judgment.
26. Shrwan Kumar claimed a sum of Rs. 24,000/- on account of the fact that he remained in plaster and confined to bed for quite some time and would have pain during rains and winters. Learned Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- on this count. In his statement, he does not claim that he is likely to suffer from pain during winter and rainy seasons. Two doctors who appeared to support his claim were also not asked a single question on this aspect of the case. Award of Rs. 5,000/- under this head cannot be said to be grossly inadequate.
27. Shrwan Kumar in his statement claimed that he used to feel giddiness and his memory had been impaired because of the accident. This statement has been corroborated by the statement of Dr. R.C. Joshi who has stated that the head injury could affect memory of Shrwan Kumar. There is no reason to disbelieve this part of the case of Shrwan Kumar. Learned counsel for Shrwan Kumar has very fairly and frankly conceded that no claim was advanced in the claim petition on this ground, but he submits that the aforesaid fact which has been proved would necessitate his continuous treatment in future and on that ground, some amount ought to have been awarded. This appears to be correct. In my opinion, a lump sum compensation to the tune of Rs. 10,000/-would meet the ends of justice on this count.
28. A sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- was claimed on the ground that Shrwan Kumar was having income of Rs. 1,500/- to Rs. 2,000/-per month from the business of his hotel and now he will have to employ a servant to assist him and this has affected his business. Learned Judge of the Tribunal considered the evidence on this aspect and found that no reliable evidence has been adduced to show the income of Shrwan Kumar from hotel business and the loss which has been sustained by him. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, he awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 10.000/- in this regard.
29. It has been admitted before me that Shrwan Kumar was not paying income tax and, therefore, it can be assumed that his income was non-taxable and must be on much lower side than his claim. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this fact can be assumed in favour of Shrwan Kumar that his business must have remained closed during the period in which he was under medical treatment. This business could have been done only with the assistance of the servant which must have reduced his income. As stated already, the learned Judge of the Tribunal has assessed this loss at Rs. 10,000/-. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this amount deserves to be enhanced by another Rs. 10,000/-.
30. Shrwan Kumar claimed Rs. 1,000/-on the ground that his friends and relations had been visiting him in the hospital, but the learned Judge of the Tribunal has disallowed this amount, and rightly so.
31. Hence, in my opinion, Rs. 80,000/-(Rupees eighty thousand) is payable to Shrwan Kumar as just compensation on account of the accident. His appeal Nos. 158 and 159 of 1986 stand allowed to the aforesaid extent only with further proportionate costs on the enhanced amount but with no change in the interest rate fixed by the learned Judge of the Tribunal. However, the amount, if any, paid by the respondents shall stand adjusted against the amount of compensation modified above.
32. This takes me to the consideration of appeal No. 4 of 1987 filed by the legal representatives of Jagdish, namely, Manni Devi and others. Jagdish, a young boy aged about 25 years, met his untimely death due to the aforesaid accident. A sum of Rs. 2,12,000/- was claimed on behalf of the legal heirs of Jagdish under the following heads:
(i) Loss of dependency of income computed at Rs. 3,600/- per annum till Jagdish would have attained 70 years of age. - Rs. 1,62,000/-
(ii) Mental agony caused to the widow, parents and children of Jagdish.
- Rs. 50,000/-
33. Learned Judge of the Tribunal arrived at a finding that Jagdish must have been earning Rs. 300/- per month and he would have spent upon his family a sum of Rs. 200 per month only. He applied multiplier of twenty (20) and assessed damages on the first count, namely, for loss of dependency, at Rs. 48,000/-. Learned counsel for the legal representatives of Jagdish contends that the learned Judge of the Tribunal has not appreciated the evidence led on behalf of the legal representatives of Jagdish, correctly. Manni Devi in her statement stated that her husband was earning Rs. 400/- per month. This statement was not subjected to any cross-examination at all. This is true that no certificate of income was exhibited, though a certificate was definitely placed on record showing that Jagdish was serving under Sushil Kumar & Party and was getting salary of Rs. 400/- per month as salesman. Though certificate has not been proved but the fact that Manni Devi has deposed on oath about her husband's earning in a sum of Rs. 400/-per month and the fact that her statement has not been subjected to any cross-examination leads me to hold that Jagdish was earning Rs. 400/- per month. Learned Judge of the Tribunal has not adverted to this fact that the statement of Manni Devi was not subjected to cross-examination on this count and there was no rebuttal of the statement of Manni Devi that her husband was earning Rs. 400 per month as an employee of a liquor contractor. Thus, in disagreement with the learned Judge of the Tribunal, I hold that Jagdish was earning Rs. 400/- per month and not Rs. 300/- per month as held by him.
34. Manni Devi has categorically stated that her husband used to pay Rs. 300/- per month to her father-in-law, i.e., father of Jagdish for household expenses. There was no cross-examination on this statement as well. Learned Judge of the Tribunal thought it proper to hold that Jagdish was spending only Rs. 200/- per month on his family. It should be remembered that Jagdish was having a big family consisting of his old aged parents, widow and two children. The statement of Manni Devi cannot be said to be unreasonable when she claims that a sum of Rs. 300/- per month was being paid by her husband to her father-in-law towards household expenses. Learned Judge of the Tribunal has not given cogent reasons, why the testimony of Manni Devi was unreliable on the aforesaid aspect of the case. Hence, I hold that the deceased (Jagdish) was contributing a sum of Rs. 300/- per month towards maintenance of his dependants out of his monthly salary of Rs. 400/-. This appears to be reasonable, because certificate of income placed on record goes to establish that Jagdish was drawing monthly salary at Rs. 400/- and that his lodging and boarding were free from the side of the employer. This probabilises the fact that Jagdish must have been contributing Rs. 300/- per month towards household expenses. This brings dependency of the legal representatives of Jagdish to Rs. 300/- per month.
35. In General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas 1994 ACJ 1 (SC), it has been held that in fatal accident action the measure of damage is the pecuniary loss suffered and is likely to be suffered by each dependant as a result of the death. The assessment of damages to compensate the dependants is beset with difficulties because from the nature of things, it has to take into account many imponderables. The Apex Court has given following guidelines for arriving at the damages:
The manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself and his dependants and to deduct therefrom such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself, as regards both self-maintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependants. Then that should be capitalised by multiplying it by a figure representing the proper number of years' purchase.
Their Lordships further observed:
Much of the calculation necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis 'and in that region arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master' since there are so often many imponderables. In every case 'it is the overall picture that matters' and the court must try to assess as best as it can the loss suffered.
After reviewing the case-law on the subject, their Lordships observed:
It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally well-established. There are some cases which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage therefrom towards uncertainties of future life and awarded the resulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, if the deceased was, say, 25 years of age at the time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years- virtually adopting a multiplier of 45-and even if one-third or one-fourth is deducted therefrom towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly impermissible. We are aware that some decisions of the High Courts and of this Court as well have arrived at compensation on some such basis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle. They are merely instances of particular awards in individual cases. The proper method of computation is the multiplier method. Any departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability for the assessment of compensation.
Their Lordships then went on to say:
It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a 'just' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. We disapprove these decisions of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view. We indicate that the multiplier method is the appropriate method, a departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases.
Their Lordships further observed:
The multiplier represents the number of years' purchase on which the loss of dependency is capitalised. Take, for instance, a case where annual loss of dependency is Rs. 10,000/-. If a sum of Rs. l,00000/- is invested at 10 per cent annual interest, the interest will take care of the dependency perpetually. The multiplier in this case works out to 10. If the rate of interest is 5 per cent per annum and not 10 per cent, men the multiplier needed to capitalise the loss of the annual dependency at Rs. 10.000/- would be 20. Then the multiplier, i.e., the number of years' purchase of 20 will yield the annual dependency perpetually. Then allowance to scale down the multiplier would have to be made taking into account the uncertainties of the future, the allowances for immediate lump sum payment, the period over which the dependency is to last being shorter and the capital feed also to be spent away over the period of dependency is to last, etc. Usually in English courts the operative multiplier rarely exceeds 16 as maximum. This will come down accordingly as the age of the deceased person (or that of the dependants, whichever is higher) goes up.
Their Lordships then went on to observe:
Indeed, many factors have to be put into the scales to evaluate the contingencies of the future. All contingencies of the future need not necessarily be baneful. The deceased person in this case had a more or less stable job. It will not be inappropriate to take a reasonably liberal view of the prospects of the future and in estimating the gross income it will be unreasonable to estimate the loss of dependency on the present actual income of Rs. 1,032/- per month. We think, having regard to the prospects of advancement in the future career, respecting which there is evidence on record, we will not be in error in making a higher estimate of monthly income at Rs. 2.000/- as the gross income. From this has to be deducted his personal living expenses, the quantum of which again depends on various factors such as whether the style of living was Spartan or Bohemian. In the absence of evidence it is not unusual to deduct one-third of the gross income towards the personal living expenses and treat the balance as the amount likely to have been spent on the members of the family and the dependants. This loss of dependency should capitalise with the appropriate multiplier. In the present case we can take about Rs. 1,400/- per month or Rs. 17,000/- per year as the loss of dependency and if capitalised on a multiplier of 12, which is appropriate to the age of the deceased, the compensation would work out to (Rs. 17,000/- x 12 = Rs. 2,04,000/-) to which is added the usual award for loss of consortium and loss of the estate each in the conventional sum of Rs. 15,000/-.
36. The aforesaid are the basic principles in the light of which I shall have to assess the quantum of compensation to be awarded to the legal representatives of Jagdish. I have already held that Jagdish was having income of Rs. 400/- per month; he was getting his boarding and lodging free from his employer. It is in evidence that he was paying Rs. 300/- per month to the family; he was under a private employer but it can be assumed that his job was more or less stable and he would have gone up higher with further experience in the job that he was holding. Hence, his gross income can be taken at Rs. 800/- per month and out of this, it can reasonably be assumed that he would be spending Rs. 600/- per month on the family, his own boarding and lodging being free. Looking to his age, multiplier of 15 would meet ends of justice.
37. The learned Counsel for the legal representatives of Jagdish relied upon the decision in Prerna v. Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation 1993 ACJ 254 (SC), in support of the proposition that the multiplier of 24 should have been applied. In that case, there was evidence with regard to longevity in the family and on that basis, the multiplier was raised to 24. In the present case, there is no evidence of longevity in the family at all and, therefore, in my opinion, the multiplier of 15 should be proper. Thus computed, the compensation for loss of dependency would be assessed at Rs. 1,08,000/-.
38. Under the heading 'mental agony and pain', a sum of Rs. 15,000/- was claimed but only Rs. 5,000/- was allowed. Learned counsel for the legal representatives of Jagdish submitted that the learned Judge of the Tribunal did not consider the fact that there was loss of consortium and there were two daughters who had to be married. The children lost protection of their father when they needed it most and, therefore, loss on account of consortium should have been assessed at Rs. 15,000/- as claimed in the petition. Learned counsel for the RSRTC submits that the claim of Rs. 15,000/- is on the higher side, and the learned Judge of the Tribunal was right in arriving at the conclusion on this count. In General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas 1994 ACJ 1 (SC), the Apex Court added the usual award for loss of consortium and loss of the estate, each in the conventional sum of Rs. 15,000/-. I think, the same yardstick should be applicable to the present case. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts brought on record, hence a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for loss of consortium and Rs. 15,000/- for loss of protection to children and for pain and grief to all the members of the family of Jagdish (deceased) is also awarded. So, total amount of compensation awardable to the deceased is worked out at Rs. 1,38,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty-eight thousand). Since the accident took place long back, no deduction need be made on any account as held in this very ruling. The amount of compensation payable to the legal representatives stands enhanced, as stated above, along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from 9.7.1982. Such sums which have been paid already shall be adjusted towards the amount of compensation awarded above. Since two girls have become major and since parents of Jagdish have died, the entire amount may be paid to Manni Devi but, out of the aforesaid awarded compensation amount, Rs. 40,000/- for marriage of each of the daughters shall be kept in fixed deposits and shall be paid only when the marriage of daughters shall be settled and shall be used only for the marriage of such daughters.
39. No other point was urged.
40. In the result, all these appeals are allowed to the extent as indicated above and to that extent the impugned award shall stand modified. Parties are left to bear their own costs of these appeals.