Punjab-Haryana High Court
Raghubansh vs State Of Haryana And Ors. on 3 February, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1998)119PLR168
Author: N.C. Khichi
Bench: N.C. Khichi
JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. Should the delay of more than 12 years be condoned? The learned Single Judge has exercised his discretion and declined the request made by the appellant. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge the appellant has filed the present appeal. A few facts may be noticed.
2. On July 9, 1973, the State of Haryana issued a notification Under Section 4 for acquisition of land measuring 137 acres. On November 5, 1973, the Collector gave his award. The aggrieved landowners including the present appellant sought reference Under Section 18. Ultimately on January 21, 1978, the Additional District Judge, enhanced the compensation. The present appellant did not file any appeal against the award of the Additional District Judge. However, some other landowners filed R.F.A. No. 581 of 1978. Vide judgment dated August 5, 1985, this Court enhanced the compensation of Rs. 317.50 per Maria. Thereafter on October 3, 1985, the appellant filed an application Under Section 28-A for the grant of similar compensation to him. Averring that the application was not being decided, the appellant claims to have filed C.W.P. No. 15822 of 1989 in this Court. This petition was dismissed by this Court on December 5, 1989. S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1924 of 1990 was also dismissed vide orders dated April 23, 1990. Thereafter on May 4, 1990 the appellant filed an appeal in this Court along with an application Under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Single Judge found that there was not sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Hence this appeal.
3. Mr. Harsh Aggarwal, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that it was only on account of the wrong advice that the appellant had not filed an appeal in the year 1978. Since the delay has occurred on account of the wrong advice given by the counsel, it should have been condoned by the learned Single Judge. He has referred to a decision of Division Bench of this court in Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana, 1997(2) P.L.J. 259. Reference has also been made by the learned counsel to the decision of the Apex Court in The State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors., J.T. 1996(3) S.C. 371. The claim made on behalf of the appellant has been controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents.
4. We have perused the application Under Section 5 filed by the appellant at the time of the presentation of the appeal to this Court. In this application it has been, inter alia, averred in paragraph 4 that "there is delay of about 12 years 10 days in preferring the appeal. This delay has been caused due to the financial constraints and lack of legal knowledge on the part of the applicant. The applicant in his own wisdom thought that he will be entitled to the higher compensation if so determined in the case of other claimants as the State is bound to grant the same treatment to its citizen even if he has not resorted to the remedy of appeal etc." There is not even a suggestion that there was wrong advice tendered by any counsel. After this application had been dismissed by the order under appeal, the appellant has averred in the grounds of appeal that he did not file an appeal "as he was advised that he can get the compensation redetermined according to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in the connected appeals by moving an application Under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act." This is a new story introduced by the appellant. There appears to be a conscious effort to improve upon the earlier pleadings. The attitude of the appellant is not straight forward.
5. Mr. Aggarwal has placed reliance on the decision in Rattan Lal's case. Herein the plea of the appellant was that delay has occurred on account of legal advice. This plea was accepted by the Bench. Such is not the position in the present case. It is undoubtedly true that in Chandra Mani's case it was expressed that the Court should be liberal and the expression "sufficient cause" should be pragmatically construed in a "justice oriented approach". However, even by most liberal construction it does not appear to be possible to say a complete good bye to the Limitation Act and to hold that whatever be the delay and howsoever unsatisfactory the explanation, the Court is bound to condone it. It is true that some time a litigant may be misled by advice. If he approaches the Court and gives full facts, the Court can condone the delay. However, the averments should be clear and categoric. These should not be vague. In the present case the appellant rested on his "own wisdom". This is his categoric case on his application Under Section 5. Later on, an attempt has been made to improve upon the matter and to say that he had waited on account of legal advice. This is clearly an attempt to improve upon the original pleadings. Which of the two is correct? Even the counsel for the appellant does not know.
6. Mr. Aggarwal submits that similar other appeals are pending. He refers to R.F.A. No. 1244 of 1984 (Des Raj v. State of Haryana).
7. We had sent for this File. It has been put up by the Registry. We find that the notification as well as the award are different. The notification had been issued on July 18, 1973 and the award had been given by the Additional District Judge, Faridabad on March 26, 1984. In the present case the notification Under Section 4 was issued on July 9, 1973 and the matter was decided by the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon and not Faridabad on January 21, 1978. Thus, it is clear that the two cases have nothing common with each other. There was no delay in Des Raj's case which may have required condonation. The subject matter of dispute was different. Consequently, the pendency of that case can be of no assistance to the appellant.
8. No other point has been urged.
9. In view of the above, we find that there is no ground to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge. The order passed by the learned Judge is neither contrary to law nor perverse. Consequently, it calls for no interference.
10. As a result the appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.