Madras High Court
The State Of Tamil Nadu vs A. Karikalan on 24 March, 2008
Author: K. Chandru
Bench: P.K. Misra, K.Chandru
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated : 24..3..2008 Coram: The Honourable Mr.Justice P.K. MISRA and The Honourable Mr.Justice K.CHANDRU W. P. No. 26217 of 2001 and W.P.M.P. No. 38792 of 2001 1. The State of Tamil Nadu Rep. by Joint Secretary to Government Environment & Forests Department Fort St. George Chennai 9 2. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests Panagal Building Saidapet, Chennai ... Petitioners -vs- 1. A. Karikalan 2. The Registrar Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal Chennai 104 ... Respondents Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a writ of Certiorari to quash the impugned order passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No. 4197 of 2000 dated 21.3.2001. For Petitioners : Mr. K. Rajasekar, Spl. GP (Forests) For Respondent 1 : Mr. M. Ravi ORDER
K. CHANDRU, J.
Heard the arguments of Mr. K. Rajasekar, learned Special Government Pleader representing the petitioners and Mr. M. Ravi, learned counsel for the first respondent and have perused the records.
2. In this writ petition, the petitioner State of Tamil Nadu challenges the order passed by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 4197 of 2000 dated 21.3.2001. The first respondent was working as a Forest Extension Officer. By an order dated 30.3.1995, the second petitioner informed the first respondent that there was no leave application received from him and that he was directed to join in the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore in the light of G.O. Rt. 436, Environmental and Forests Department dated 17.5.1993. By the said order, the first respondent, who was on compulsory wait, was transferred and deputed to work as Lecturer in the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatotre, with immediate effect.
3. The petitioner filed O.A. No. 2258 of 1995 challenging the Government Order as well as the consequential direction. The Tribunal granted an order of status quo on 31.5.1995. It was argued by the first respondent that despite the interim order, he was not given any posting order. He filed another Original Application being O.A. No. 10082 of 1995 to consider his representation for posting. The Tribunal in that O.A. On 03.12.1998 directed the Government to consider his representation. Pursuant to that direction, he was posted as Forest Extension Officer, Tirunelveli on 03.02.1999. After joining at Tirunelveli on 24.3.1999, he made a representation to regularise his services from 01.7.1992 to 03.02.1999 during which time, he had stayed away from work. The first petitioner refused his request on the ground that the disciplinary proceedings are pending against him and his case of regularisation will be considered only after disposal of the same. It is against this order, the first respondent filed O.A. No. 4197 of 2000.
4. For curious reasons, the O.A. No. 2258 of 1995 was dismissed as it had become allegedly infructuous. The Tribunal was concerned only with O.A. No. 4197 of 2000 with regard to regularisation of his leave period from 01.7.1992 to 03.02.1999. It was contended by the first respondent that since the charge memo given to the petitioner was confined only with regard to the unauthorised absence for the period from 01.3.1992 to 30.3.1995 and the period thereafter, was covered by the order of status quo dated 31.5.1995 in O.A. No. 2258 of 1995, there was no impediment for regulating the period between 30.3.1995 to 03.02.1999, i.e, the date on which the petitioner was given a further posting order to join at Tirunelveli.
5. It was seriously objected to by the petitioners by contending that the first respondent had applied leave only up to 15.11.1992 and there was no leave application from the first respondent thereafter. However, the Tribunal took a very liberal view with a view to help the applicant / first respondent and held that the period from 01.7.1992 to 15.11.1992 was covered by the leave letter and the same cannot be taken as an unauthorised absence. Thereafter, the Tribunal held that though the period from 15.11.1992 to 30.01.1995 was not covered by the order of the Tribunal but the period from 30.01.1995 to 03.02.1999 was covered by a status quo order of the Tribunal in O.A. No.2258 of 1995. The Tribunal held that since the petitioners have initiated disciplinary action against the first respondent for his unauthorised absence only after he had moved the Tribunal, the petitioners are bound to regularise the period covered by the status quo order of the Tribunal as per Rules. The Tribunal did not specify as to what was the rule that it was referring to. When the Tribunal declined to grant relief for the period from 15.11.1992 to 30.01.1995 for which charges have been framed, it is axiomatic that any regularisation can be done only after completion of the disciplinary proceedings. But it, however, gave a positive direction to regularise the period from 31.5.1995 to 03.02.1999 with all attendant benefits. It is against this order, the State has come up with the present writ petition.
6. The learned Additional Government Pleader contended that the Tribunal had committed a grave error in vivisecting the period of unauthorised absence.
7. We are also of the opinion that the Tribunal had adopted an hypertechnical approach without looking into the ground realities. In fact, the first respondent, who was on a compulsory wait, was sent on deputation to the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University by the order of the first petitioner in G.O. Rt. 436 Forest Department dated 17.5.1993. The first respondent did not obey the order and also made a representation. Even when the final notice was given in 1995, he had approached the Tribunal and got an interim order on 30.5.1995, i.e., a full two years after the order was passed by the first petitioner and two months since the reminder letter sent by the second petitioner. No one can understand as to why the Tribunal should have passed an order of status quo on 30.5.1995. Further, the first respondent did not enforce the said order by filing any execution proceedings in terms of the power vested on the Tribunal.
8. On the contrary, he chose to send a representation to the petitioner State and when there was no action, he moved the Tribunal once again to consider his representation. It was thereafter, the petitioner State considered his representation and granted a further posting at Tirunelveli probably as a stop gap arrangement. It was not to be understood as the petitioner was being successful in attacking the Government Order sending him on deputation nor the consequential direction by the second petitioner to join duty immediately. He withdrew the O.A. challenging the deputation / transfer thereby making it clear that there was no judicial verdict on the said order. This was a making of the first respondent himself to avoid an adjudication on merits of the order of the Government.
9. Once the Original Application stood dismissed as either having become infructuous or withdrawn by the action of the parties, it goes without saying that the interim order also disappears along with the final order. In fact, it has been repeatedly held that the Court cannot be influenced by the interim order while deciding the main dispute.
10. Recently, the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others v. Dev Raj and others [2007 AIR SCW 6047] once again reiterated the same view. The opinion of Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J. as found in paragraph 6 of the said judgment may be reproduced usefully:
Para 6: ".... It is a settled position in law that while deciding the dispute finally the Court ought not to be influenced by the fact that some interim arrangements had been made. Such interim arrangements are always subject to the outcome of the main dispute...."
11. However, Mr. M. Ravi, learned counsel for the first respondent referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. and others v. Sateesh S. Rao Sonawalkar [2004 (11) SCC 550] and contended that in the present case, when the first respondent had obtained a status quo order, no steps were taken to vacate the said order. But, on the contrary, basing upon his representation, he was granted relief by giving a posting at Tirunelveli and since the petitioners had given a posting order consequent upon which the first respondent had joined service, no exception can be taken about the conduct of the first respondent. Further, since the said period is covered by a Court order, the Tribunal was right in holding that period to be regularised and prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition.
12. This argument is only stated to be rejected. The Supreme Court in the judgment in the ECIL's case (cited supra) and relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, did not intend to lay down any proposition of law which will have a bearing on the issue before this Court. In fact, the Supreme Court dealt with the peculiar facts projected before it and it will have no universal application.
13. Further, it must be stated that the interim order given by any Court does not mean that it is an order binding even after the disposal of the main case. It is the first respondent who had chosen to get his original application dismissed so as to avoid any adjudication on merits of the transfer / deputation issue. The fate of an interim order depends upon the outcome of the main case and the Tribunal was wrong in relying upon the interim order in granting the main relief and that too, without going into the merits of the case. Further, it is not as if that the State had complied with any execution proceedings initiated by the first respondent to exercise the so-called order of status quo.
14. In the present case, the status quo order obtained by the first respondent has no legal value as the order of deputation was made in the year 1993 and the status quo order came to be passed only in 1995. Therefore, the first respondent can take no advantage over that order. Further, the issue of unauthorised absence cannot be dealt with on a compartmental basis. It is only on completion of the disciplinary proceedings and depending on the outcome of the same, any regularisation order can be made in terms of the relevant Leave Rules. The Tribunal, without specifying the rule under which such regularisation can be made, simply allowed the Original Application thereby granting a largesse on the first respondent. Till the first respondent justifies his absence in the regularly instituted departmental enquiry, he cannot be granted any relief by the Tribunal and therefore, the approach of the Tribunal is wholly erroneous. The order of the Tribunal impugned in this writ petition deserves to be set aside.
15. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. The first respondent's request, if any, for regularising the leave whether authorised or unauthorised will depend upon the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings pending against the first respondent.
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