Delhi District Court
State vs Ravinder Singh on 16 November, 2023
IN THE COURT OF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE-08(CENTRAL), TIS
HAZARI COURTS : DELHI
Presiding Officer: Ms. Meena Chauhan, DJS
FIR No. 276/2014
PS: Kotwali
U/s 304A/34 Indian Penal Code
State v. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
CIS No. 291280/2016
Date of Institution of case : 07.07.2015
Date when Judgment reserved : 14.10.2023
Date on which Judgment pronounced : 16.11.2023
JUDGMENT
a. Serial no. of the case : FIR No. 276/2014 PS: Kotwali Date of the commission b. : 24.03.2014 of the offence c. Name of the Complainant : SI Rajeev Kumar, No.D-1172
1. Ravinder Singh S/o Sh. Charan Singh R/o Village-Sherpur, PS-
Name of Accused
Kotwali, Disttt- Bulandsahar, UP.
d. persons, their parentages :
2. R.N. Singh S/o K.N. Singh R/o
and residences
H.No. 3/71, Sector-5, Rajender
Nagar Ghaziabad, UP.
e. Offences complained of : U/s 304A/34 Indian Penal Code
Plea of the Accused
f. persons and their : Both pleaded not guilty.
examinations (if any)
g. Final Order : Acquitted under all charges
h. Date of Order : 16.11.2023
FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 1
State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali
BRIEF REASONS FOR DECISION:
1. In brief, both the accused persons have been sent to face trial upon the allegations that on 24.03.2014 at about 09.45 am, at Footpath near Bankhandi Mandir, in front of Old Delhi Railway Station, Delhi, both the accused persons were so rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others by handing the street light pole in a negligent manner and thereby death of one person namely Ganga Ram due to electrocution not amounting to culpable homicide was caused by their rash and negligent act which led to the registration of a present FIR against both the accused persons under section 304A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as IPC).
2. After completion of an investigation, a charge sheet was filed against both the accused persons on 07.07.2015. Cognizance of the offence was taken on 12.02.2016. Copy of charge sheet and annexed documents were supplied to the accused persons under section 207 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as Cr.P.C) and thereafter, a charge under section 304A/34 IPC was framed against them on 03.05.2019 to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
3. Thereafter, the prosecution was given the opportunity to substantiate the FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 2 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali allegations against the accused persons. The prosecution examined seven (07) witnesses to substantiate allegations against the accused persons.
Serial Name of Documents Exhibited Dates of Dates of
No. Prosecutio in Evidence examinatio Cross-
n n-in-chief examinati
Witnesses on
PW-1 Inspector (i) Inquest Paper Ex. 10.07.2019 10.07.2019
Rajeev PW1/A
Kumar (ii) Identification
Statements Ex.
PW1/B(colly)
(iii) Tehrir Ex. PW1/C
PW-2 Bhanwar Nil 22.10.2019 Nil
Lal
PW-3 Dabar Lal (i) Identification Memo 22.10.2019 Nil
Ex. PW3/A
PW-4 Suresh (i) Letter for inspection 25.02.2020 25.02.2020
Kumar Ex. PW4/A(OSR)
Bukka (ii) Inspection Report
Ex. PW4/B
PW-5 SI Omakar (i) Site Plan Ex. 25.05.2022 25.05.2022
Nath PW5/A
(ii) Notices U/s 41A
Cr.P.C. Ex. PW5/B &
Ex. PW5/C
PW-6 Raj Nil. 25.05.2022 25.05.2022
Narayan
Pandey
PW-7 HC Nil 13.10.2022 13.10.2022
FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 3
State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali
Ranveer
Joshi
4. Vide separate statements of both the accused persons dated 10.07.2019 and 14.10.2023 recorded u/s 294 Cr.P.C, both the accused persons admitted the factum of FIR (Ex.A-1), certificate u/s 65-B (Ex.A-2) and postmortem report of decease Ganga Ram @ Dhagla Ram (Ex.A-3) without admitting the contents of the same.
5. The prosecution evidence was closed on 13.10.2022 and the statements of both the accused were recorded under Section 313 read with section 281 of Cr.P.C on 12.12.2022, wherein they pleaded their innocence and stated to have been falsely implicated. Accused Ravinder Singh stated that he was working as Senior Manager in O&M Department of BSES Yamuna Power Limited and he was assigned the work of fault locating cell and was not assigned any work of maintenance of street light pole including the pole in question. He further stated that the street light belong to MCD and BSES charges MCD for consumption of electricity. Accused R. N. Singh stated that he is not an employee of BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. And he is working with contractor Vikas Electric Traders. He further stated that the said contractor is having contract with BSES for maintenance of LT and HT lines of BSES which does not include any street light. He further stated that he never had any duty of maintenance of street light including the area where the accident occured.
FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 4
State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali
6. The accused persons have opted to lead defence evidence. Accused Ravinder Singh had examined himself U/s 315 Cr.P.C in his defence after seeking permission from the court. Defence Evidence was closed vide order dated 15.03.2023. Final arguments were heard. I have cogitated over the submissions made by Ld. APP for the state and Ld. Counsel for the accused persons.
DISCUSSION, DECISION AND REASONS THEREON:
7. At the time of final arguments, it is argued by Ld. APP for the State that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubts and all the ingredients of the relevant section are completed. Learned counsel for the accused persons argued that both the accused have been falsely implicated in the present case. He submitted that there is no iota of evidence on record to prove that both the accused persons were responsible for the maintenance of the street light pole in the question and death of Ganga Ram occurred due to their negligence and rashness. It was further submitted that the responsibility of maintenance of street light pole lies with the Municipal corporation, however, IO had not conducted any investigation to this effect and therefore, it is prayed that both the accused persons may be acquitted.
8. I have cogitated over the submissions made by ld. APP for the state and Ld. Counsel for the accused persons. At this juncture, it is prudent to discuss the penal provisions involved in the case for arriving at just a decision. The penal provisions are reproduced in verbatim:-.
FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 5
State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali
Section 304A Causing death by negligence.--Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
9. In a case involving death by electrocution punishable u/s 304A of IPC the prosecution is required to prove the following essential ingredients:
(i) Death due to electrocution,
(ii) Identity of the accused person,
(iii) Rash or negligent act of the accused persons in not properly maintaining the electric devices.
10.To understand the concept of rash or negligent act under Section 304A of IPC, it would be proper to refer to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 269 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 873 at page 271, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court proceeds to hold that only culpable negligent act and rashness amounts to an offence. The relevant paragraph is culled out as follows:
"7. Section 304A applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. The provision applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A. Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 6 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali but with the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are determining factors. A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be sufficient considering all the circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury but done without any intention to cause injury or knowledge that it would probably be caused." (Emphasis supplied)
11.Further it would be apt to quote another decision Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla v. State of Maharashtra, (1965) 2 SCR 622 : AIR 1965 SC 1616 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 550 wherein, after referring to a pre-independence judgment, the yardstick for proving the criminal negligence act under Section 304A of IPC is held to be such that it must be proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of a third party. The relevant paragraph no.3 is reproduced below:
"3. We may in this connection refer to Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap [(1902) IV Bom LR 679] where Sir Lawrence Jenkins had to interpret Section 304-A and observed as follows:
"To impose criminal liability under Section 304-A Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence. It must be the cause causans; it is not enough that it may have been the cause sine qua non."
This view has been generally followed by High Courts in India and is in our opinion the FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 7 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali right view to take of the meaning of Section 304-A. It is not necessary to refer to other decisions, for as we have already said this view has been generally accepted. Therefore the mere fact that the fire would not have taken place if the appellant had not allowed burners to be put in the same room in which turpentine and varnish were stored, would not be enough to make him liable under Section 304-A, for the fire would not have taken place, with the result that seven persons were burnt to death, without the negligence of Hatim. The death in this case was therefore in our opinion not directly the result of a rash or negligent act on the part of the appellant and was not the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence. The appellant must therefore be acquitted of the offence under Section 304-A." (Emphasis supplied)
12.The requirements of this section are that the death of any person must have been caused by the accused by doing any rash or negligent act. In other words, there must be proof that the rash or negligent act of the accused was the proximate cause of the death. There must be a direct nexus between the death of a person and the rash, or negligent act of the accused. To prove the charge under Section 304A IPC, it is necessary to establish that the accused persons, acted in a negligent manner in not maintaining wire of street light pole installed at aforesaid address in such a manner so as to ensure safety of human being which resulted in electric shock to Ganga Ram and caused the death of deceased Ganga Ram due to electrocution.
13. A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 8 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali individual in particular.
14. A negligent act is an act done without doing something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do or act which a prudent or reasonable man would not do in the circumstances attending it. A rash act is a negligent act done precipitately. Negligence is the genus, of which rashness is the species. It has sometimes been observed that in rashness the action is done precipitately that the mischievous or illegal consequences may fall, but with a hope that they will not.
15. Lord Atkin in Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) AC 576 at p.583 : 2 All ER 552 observed as under:
"Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough. For purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence; and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established. Probably of all the epithets that can be applied 'recklessness' most nearly covers the case. It is difficult to visualize a case of death, caused by reckless driving in the connotation of that term in ordinary speech which would not justify a conviction for manslaughter; but it is probably not all embracing, for 'recklessness' suggests an indifference to risk whereas the accused may have appreciated the risk and intended to avoid it, and yet shown in the means adopted to avoid the risk such a high degree of negligence as would justify a conviction."
16. "Rashness" consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness, or FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 9 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. (AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 1621 "State of Karnataka v. Muralidhar")
17. In Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka, (1980) 1 SCC 30, it was held that :
"where negligence is an essential ingredient of the offence, the negligence to be established by the prosecution must be culpable or gross and not the negligence merely based upon an error of judgment."
18. In Kuldeep Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh-AIR 2008 Supreme Court 3062, it was held as under:
7. Section 304A IPC applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done, in all probabilities, will cause death. This provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. Section 304A applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly the cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304A.
8. Section 304A carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299 or murder under Section 300. If a person willfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death is culpable homicide. When the intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 10 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali act, Section 304A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide. The provision of this section is not limited to rash or negligent driving. Any rash or negligent act whereby death of any person is caused becomes punishable. Two elements either of which or both of which may be proved to establish the guilt of an accused are rashness/negligence, a person may cause death by a rash or negligent act which may have nothing to do with driving at all.
Negligence and rashness to be punishable in terms of Section 304 A must be attributable to a state of mind wherein the criminality arises because of no error in judgment but of a deliberation in the mind risking the crime as well as the life of the person who may lose his life as a result of the crime. Section 304A discloses that criminality may be that apart from any mens rea, there may be no motive or intention still a person may venture or practice such rashness or negligence which may cause the death of other. The death so caused is not the determining factor.
9. What constitutes negligence has been analyzed in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition) Volume 34 paragraph 1 (para 3) as follows :
"Negligence is a specific tort and in any given circumstances is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances demand. What amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case. It may consist in omitting to do something which ought to be done or in doing something which ought to be done either in a different manner or not at all. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence, where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which can be reasonably foreseen to be likely to cause physical injury to persons or property. The degree of care required in the particular case depends on the surrounding circumstances, and may vary according to the amount of the risk to be encountered and to the magnitude of the prospective injury. The duty of care is owed only to those persons who are in the area of foreseeable danger, the fact that the act of the defendant violated his duty of care to a third person does not enable the plaintiff who is also injured by the same act to claim unless he is also within the area of foreseeable danger. The same act or omission may accordingly in some circumstances involve liability as being negligent although in other circumstances it will not do so. The material considerations are the absence of care which is on the part of the defendant owed to the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case and damage suffered by the FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 11 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali plaintiff, together with a demonstrable relation of cause and effect between the two".
10. In this context the following passage from Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 19th Edition (1966) at page 38 may be usefully noted :
"Yet a man may bring about an event without having adverted to it at all, he may not have foreseen that his actions would have this consequence and it will come to him as a surprise. The event may be harmless or harmful, if harmful, the question rises whether there is legal liability for it. In tort, (at common law) this is decided by considering whether or not a reasonable man in the same circumstances would have realised the prospect of harm and would have stopped or changed his course so as to avoid it. If a reasonable man would not, then there is no liability and the harm must lie where it falls. But if the reasonable man would have avoided the harm then there is liability and the perpetrator of the harm is said to be guilty of negligence. The word 'negligence' denotes, and should be used only to denote, such blameworthy inadvertence, and the man who through his negligence has brought harm upon another is under a legal obligation to make reparation for it to the victim of the injury who may sue him in tort for damages. But it should now be recognized that at common law there is no criminal liability for harm thus caused by inadvertence. This has been laid down authoritatively for manslaughter again and again. There are only two states of mind which constitute mens rea and they are intention and recklessness. The difference between recklessness and negligence is the difference between advertence and inadvertence they are opposed and it is a logical fallacy to suggest that recklessness is a degree of negligence The common habit of lawyers to qualify the word "negligence" with some moral epithet such as wicked' 'gross' or 'culpable' has been most unfortunate since it has inevitably led to great confusion of thought and of principle. It is equally misleading to speak of criminal negligence since this is merely to use an expression in order to explain itself."
11. "Negligence", says the Restatement of the Law of Torts published by the American Law Institute (1934) Vol. I. Section 28 "is conduct which falls below the standard established for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm". It is stated in Law of Torts by Fleming at page 124 (Australian Publication 1957) that this standard of conduct is ordinarily measured by what the reasonable man of ordinary prudence would do under the circumstances. In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin (1978) 2 All ER 168 it was observed by Lord Diplock that "the reasonable man" was comparatively FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 12 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali late arrival in the laws of provocation. As the law of negligence emerged in the first half of the 19th century it became the anthropomorphic embodiment of the standard of care required by law. In order to objectify the law's abstractions like "care" "reasonableness" or "foreseeability" the man of ordinary prudence was invented as a model of the standard of conduct to which all men are required to conform.
12. In Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka, (1980) 1 SCC 30, it was held that "where negligence is an essential ingredient of the offence, the negligence to be established by the prosecution must be culpable or gross and not the negligence merely based upon an error of judgment. As pointed out by Lord Atkin in Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) (2) All ER 552 simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability, is not enough; for liability under the criminal law a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved. Probably, of all the epithets that can be applied 'reckless' most nearly covers the case."
13. According to the dictionary meaning 'reckless' means 'careless', 'regardless' or heedless of the possible harmful consequences of one's acts'. It presupposes that if thought was given to the matter by the doer before the act was done, it would have been apparent to him that there was a real risk of its having the relevant harmful consequences; but, granted this, recklessness covers a whole range of states of mind from failing to give any thought at all to whether or not there is any risk of those harmful consequences, to recognizing the existence of the risk and nevertheless deciding to ignore it. In R. v. Briggs (1977) 1 All ER 475 it was observed that a man is reckless in the sense required when he carries out a deliberate act knowing that there is some risk of damage resulting from the act but nevertheless continues in the performance of that act.
14. In R. v. Caldwell (1981) 1 All ER 961, it was observed that: "Nevertheless, to decide whether someone has been 'reckless', whether harmful consequences of a particular kind will result from his act, as distinguished from his actually intending such harmful consequences to follow, does call for some consideration of how the mind of the ordinary prudent individual would have reacted to a similar situation. If there were nothing in the circumstances that ought to have drawn the attention of an ordinary prudent individual to the possibility of that kind of harmful consequence, the accused would not be described as 'reckless' in the natural meaning of that word for failing to address his mind to the possibility; nor, if the risk of the harmful consequences was so slight that the FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 13 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali ordinary prudent individual on due consideration of the risk would not he deterred from treating it as negligible, could the accused be described as reckless in its ordinary sense, if, having considered the risk, he decided to ignore it. (In this connection the gravity of the possible harmful consequences would be an important factor. To endanger life must be one of the most grave). So, to this extent, even if one ascribes to 'reckless' only the restricted meaning adopted by the Court of Appeal in Stephenson and Briggs, of foreseeing that a particular kind of harm might happen and yet going on to take the risk of it, it involves a test that would be described in part as 'objective' in current legal jargon. Questions of criminal liability are seldom solved by simply asking whether the test is subjective or objective."
15. The decision of R. v. Caldwell (supra) has been cited with approval in R. v. Lawrence (1981) 1 All ER 974 and it was observed that :
"...... Recklessness on the part of the doer of an act does presuppose that there is something in the circumstances that would have drawn the attention of an ordinary prudent individual to the possibility that his act was capable of causing the kind of serious harmful consequences that the section which creates the offence was intended to prevent, and that the risk of those harmful consequences occurring was not so slight that an ordinary prudent individual would feel justified in treating them as negligible. It is only when this is so that the doer of the act is acting 'recklessly' if, before doing the act, he either fails to give any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or, having recognized that there was such risk, he nevertheless goes on to do it".
16. The above position was highlighted in Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. [2008(1) SCC 791].
19. Thus by applying the above decisions to the present case in hand, in order for the prosecution to prove the ingredients of Section 304A of IPC, there should be clear and cogent evidence to show that the death has taken place due to the direct rash or negligent acts of the accused persons. Secondly, there should be proximity between the rash or negligent act of both the FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 14 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali accused and the factum of death. Thirdly and more importantly, there should not be a third party intervention or contributory negligence.
20. Upon perusal of the oral evidence led by the prosecution it is forthcoming that PW1 to 7 are not eyewitnesses to the incident. However, they have spoken with regard to the death of Ganga Ram due to the electrocution. Unfortunately, for the prosecution PW1 to 7 have not spoken anything with regard to the rash or negligent act of the accused persons. PW2 and PW3 are none other than the brothers of the deceased. Both of them have deposed in their chief examinations that on 25.03.2014 a shopkeeper informed them that his brother Ganga Ram had died. Further, PW6 also has only spoken with regard to the fact that the deceased had died due to electrocution. The accused persons also did not dispute the death of the deceased due to electrocution, however they only denied the rash or negligent act on their part. Upon perusal of the evidence of PW1 to 7 there is no direct evidence to show that under what circumstance the deceased had touched the electric street light pole situated at the footpath near Bankhandi Mandir. As per deposition of PW-4, Inspection Report exhibited as Ex. PW4/B and postmortem report which is Ex. A-3, the reason of death of the deceased was proved as a result of antemortem electrocution. On the basis of the evidence led by PW1 to PW7 the factum of the death due to electrocution can be said to be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
21. In every criminal trial, the identity of the malefactor must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the offender, for even if FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 15 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the offender beyond reasonable doubt. Onus is, thus, on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the person facing the trial is, in fact, the same person who committed the offence.
22. According to the case of the prosecution, accused Ravinder Singh was a lineman and accused R.N. Singh was a JE of the area where the electricity street pole in question was situated. However, the entire prosecution evidence is silent as to how the prosecution had come to this conclusion that the accused persons were discharging duties as alleged on the relevant date and time. There is no oral or documentary evidence to this effect. During the examination of IO/SI Omkar Nath Pandey as PW-5, he deposed that he served notices U/s 41A Cr.P.C to both the accused persons, however, his examination-in-chief is silent as to grounds on the basis of which both the accused are implicated in this case. During the cross-examination of PW-6, he deposed that he had given a telephonic call at the office of BSES who disclosed to him that the accused Ravinder Singh and R.N. Singh was a lineman and the JE of the area. IO/PW-5 further deposed that neither did he record the name of the said person nor his designation who disclosed him qua the names and designations of the accused persons. It is further deposed that he did not make any enquiry as to how many JE and linemen were working in the said area. It is observed that the case of prosecution is based on the presumption of IO that the accused persons were working at the relevant place as lineman and JE. It is settled law that the conviction cannot FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 16 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali be based on the presumptions, suspicions and conjecture, rather it has to be proved by the legal proofs. It would be apposite at this stage to draw reference to the proposition of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paramjeet Singh @ Pamma vs State Of Uttarakhand (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1699 of 2007), wherein it was held that :
"11.A criminal trial is not a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of an interplay between different human emotions. In arriving at a conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case, in the final analysis, would have to depend upon its own facts. The court must bear in mind that "human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions." Though an offence may be gruesome and revolt the human conscience, an accused can be convicted only on legal evidence and not on surmises and conjecture. The law does not permit the court to punish the accused on the basis of a moral conviction or suspicion alone. "The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence." In fact, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused. The fact that the offence was committed in a very cruel and revolting manner may in itself be a reason for scrutinizing the evidence more closely, lest the shocking nature of the crime induce an instinctive reaction against dispassionate judicial scrutiny of the facts and law. "
23. Hence, in the present case the ingredient No.2 is not satisfactorily proved by the prosecution. In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused's constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence may be doubted. The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 17 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali of the defence he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution.
24. Unfortunately, for the prosecution PW1 to PW7 have also failed to speak anything with regard to the rash or negligent acts of the accused persons also. Hence, the prosecution has to rely upon the evidence of PW4 Assistant Electric Inspector who had filed a report as per Ex.PW4/B. Upon perusal of the said report it is forthcoming that after 3 days of the alleged incident PW4 had visited the spot and examined the electric pole. In Ex.PW4/B report it is mentioned by PW4 that the insulation resistance of the electrical installation of the said electric street light pole was found less than 1 MEGA OHM, which is in contravention of requisite regulations. As such it is opined that electric insulation had not been found installed and maintained in a proper manner. Unfortunately, there is no spontaneity to the Ex.PW4/B report submitted by PW4. The alleged incident took place on 24.03.2013 at 9.45 p.m. In order to ascertain the actual defect in the electric pole it was essential for the concerned Electrical Inspector to immediately rush to the spot and examine the defects if any. From the date and time of the accident up to the date and time of examination of the electric pole there could have been third party interference which cannot be ruled out. In a criminal case it is essential for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the delay in examination by the electric pole and issuance of report would certainly create one such doubt against the case set out by the prosecution. As already observed there is nothing in the said report which is Ex.PW4/B to fix FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 18 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali liability of negligence against the accused persons. In fact, PW1 to 7 have not spoken anything with regard to the rash or negligent act of the accused persons.
25. The remaining evidence of the Investigating Officer PW5 is formal in nature. In the absence of independent corroboration, it is of no utility to prove the case set out by the prosecution. In the said circumstance, although ingredients No.(i) is proved by the prosecution, major ingredients No.(ii) and
(iii) as to the identity of the accused persons and as to the rash and negligent act of the accused persons are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the ingredient of Section 304A of IPC is not satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt before this Court.
CONCLUSION:
26. On careful perusal and analysis of the entire evidence, I find that there is no corroborative, consistent and sufficient evidence to make up the edifice of the prosecution case which has been produced by the prosecution for offence u/s 304A IPC. Given the aforementioned facts and circumstances, it has to be concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, both the accused persons are given the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the accused Ravinder Singh S/o Sh. Charan Singh and accused R.N Singh S/o Sh. K.N Singh are hereby acquitted for an offence punishable under Section 304A/34 of FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 19 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali Indian Penal Code.
File be consigned to Record Room subject to compliance of section 437-A Cr.P.C.
Announced in the open court Digitally signed
by MEENA
today i.e 16.11.2023. MEENA CHAUHAN
CHAUHAN Date:
2023.11.16
17:14:47 +0530
(MEENA CHAUHAN)
Metropolitan Magistrate-08
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts/Delhi
[This judgment contains 19 pages and each page bears the initials of undersigned and the last page bears the complete sign of undersigned.] FIR No. 276/2014 Page no. 20 State Vs. Ravinder Singh & Ors.
PS: Kotwali