Karnataka High Court
Dr. Ramesh Singh Chouhan Thakur And ... vs State By N.T. Pet Police, Bangalore And ... on 9 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: ILR2000KAR3140, 2000(5)KARLJ450
Author: S.R. Venkatesha Murthy
Bench: S.R. Venkatesha Murthy
ORDER
1. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner against the application filed by the complainant in the case for being impleaded as a respondent in the case. The impleading applicant who is the complainant in the case seeks that she may be added as a party-respondent along with the State to enable her to make her submissions in the case.
2. The petitioner's contention is that under Section 301 of the Criminal Procedure Code the State and its agencies such as a public prosecutor can alone prosecute the case before the Court and in accordance with Section 301, sub-section (2) all that a person like the complainant herein can do is to assist the public prosecutor and file written arguments in support of the case. The contention on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted as the petition that is filed under Section 482 seeking quashing of the FIR filed in the case for offences of 465, 467, 478 of the Indian Penal Code and other related offences. Obviously Section 301 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot govern the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code. Section 301 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to proceedings before the Courts subordinate to the High Court. The provisions under Section 482 cannot be regarded as an enquiry or a trial before a Court. The proceedings under Section 482 are in a different plane inasmuch as the inherent power of the Court is invoked to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise secure the ends of justice. In the instant case, it is true that the State has been made a party which is seeking to investigate the complaint that is lodged against the petitioners herein. The complainant is a person really interested in participating in the proceedings to support the action of the State. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the complainant is not, under any provision of the Code, entitled to participate in the proceedings under Section 482. This view cannot be accepted for admittedly there is no specific provision regulating who could be parties to a proceedings under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. When there is no specific provision barring a certain person from either being made a party at the first instance or a party from moving an application for impleadment, it cannot be said that the complainant in the case ought not to be made a party to this proceedings. How such a situation is dealt with is found enunciated in Mary Angel and Others v State of Tamil Nadu, in para 12 of the judgment it is observed as follows:
"12. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that if there is an express provision governing the particular subject-matter then there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court is required to apply, in the manner and mode prescribed, the provisions of the statute which are made to govern the particular subject-matter. But the highest Court in the State could exercise inherent powers for doing justice according to law where no express power is available to do a particular thing and express powers do not negative the existence of such power. It is true that under the Criminal Procedure Code, specific provisions for awarding costs are only those as stated above. At the same time, there is no specific bar that in no other case, costs could be awarded. Further, in non-cognizable cases, Section 359 empowers the Courts including the Appellate Court or the High Court or the Court of Session while exercising its powers of revision to order the convicted accused to pay to the complainant, in whole or in part, the cost incurred by him in the prosecution including the expenses incurred in respect of process fees, witnesses and pleaders' fees which the Court may consider reasonable. Hence, it may be inferred that in a cognizable case and in an appeal or revision arising therefrom, the High Court cannot exercise its inherent power for awarding costs de hors the said provisions. But such an interference is not possible in cases where the Court is exercising powers under Section 482. It is to be stated that in cognizable cases also under Section 357 while awarding compensation out of the fine imposed on the accused, inter alia, the Court is required to take into consideration expenses properly incurred in the prosecution. Hence, exercise of such power would, on the contrary, be in conformity and not in conflict with the powers conferred under Sections 148(3), 342 and 357 or 359 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In appropriate cases, where it is necessary to pass such an order, the Court may award costs for the purposes, namely.-
(i) to give effect to any order passed under the Court;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; and
(iii) to secure the ends of justice as there is no
(a) negative provision for exercise of 'such power'; and
(b) inconsistency with the other provisions.
Further, awarding of costs, as stated above, can be for two purposes, one for meeting the litigation expenses and, secondly, for preventing the abuse of the process of Court or to do justice in a matter and in such circumstances, costs can be exemplary. It is true that this jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly for the aforesaid purposes in most appropriate cases and is not limitless but is to be exercised judiciously".
It is clear from the above observations that when there is no specific bar against the complainant being impleaded in a proceedings under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, impleadment of the complainant is permissible being obviously necessary to secure the ends of justice. Accordingly, the applicant who is the complainant shall be impleaded as second respondent in the case.
2-A. The complainant-the second respondent lodged a complaint to the Sheshadripuram Police Station, Bangalore City against six persons alleging that after the death of her husband T. Someshwar Singh Chouhan, the accused have fabricated a Will purporting to be that of her husband with a view to claiming the properties of her husband worth about 2.25 crores. In the complaint, the second respondent narrated the entire family history of her husband having earned huge moneys in his business when he resided at Canada and of his return to India and of his enterprises in India and of his subsequent untimely demise which resulted in fabrication of the Will with a view to defeating her rights to the vast property of her husband. The complainant has alleged in the complaint that her husband was hale and healthy till his untimely death and had no need or occasion to execute any Will. She has alleged that the accused have either forged the signature of her husband or used blank signed papers to make up a Will by which the vast estate of her husband is sought to be distributed between accused Nos. 1 to 3. She has narrated various reasons as to why the Will alleged by the accused Nos. 1 to 3 is fabricated. The complaint having been so filed has been duly registered and the necessary formalities of submission of the FIR to the Court has been completed. The petitioners 1 to 3 are the near relations, being the brother-in-law etc. and petitioners 4 and 5 are stated to be attestors of the Will. The petitioner's contention is that admittedly, the complainant has no personal knowledge of the events leading to the execution of the Will and that the complaint has been filed solely with a view to harassing the first petitioner who is a highly qualified doctor and the other members of the family. If the investigation is allowed to be continued, it would interfere with the peaceful right of the law abiding citizens to lead a normal life. The police have issued notices to petitioners 2 to 5 who have obtained anticipatory bail. Petitioners 2 and 3 are the parents of the first petitioner and they are residents of Vijayawada in Andhra Pradesh; while petitioners 1, 2 and 5 are permanent residents of Bangalore. It is claimed that the 1st respondent has arrested the first petitioner and released him on bail while petitioners 2 to 5 were released on bail subsequently. The contention of the petitioners is that the validity of the Will is being examined in a suit filed by one of the tenants in respect of a pond where shrimp cultivation was done and the other suit O.S. No. 113 of 1999 has been filed against the complainant and others, where the validity of the Will, it is contended, could be agitated. In the circumstances launching of the prosecution constitute an abuse of the process of law and should be quashed.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon Trilok Singh v Satya Deo Tripathi, to support the contention that even on the allegations made in the complaint that blank papers could have been used for fabrication of the Will would not constitute any offence and so the FIR filed in this case ought to be quashed. The relevant observation is to be found in para 5 of the judgment referred to above and in the left hand side column at page 852, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
".....Obtaining signature of a person on blank sheet of paper by itself is not an offence of forgery or the like. It becomes an offence when the paper is fabricated into a document of the kind which attracts the relevant provisions of the Penal Code making it an offence or when such a document is used as a genuine document".
It is clear from the above observations that mere possession of a blank signed document may not constitute any offence, but where the blank signed document is made up as if it were a genuine document, the offence would be constituted. In the instant case, the basic allegations in the complaint is that such an eventuality has in fact happened. Therefore, it cannot be said that the complaint has not disclosed any offence. The other observations made in Trilok Singh's case, supra, do not apply to the facts of this case, as it was found that the petitioners before the Supreme Court had actually entered into a hire-purchase agreement relating to a truck, and that the petitioner before the Supreme Court was entitled to take possession of the vehicle by virtue of the agreement and so no offence was committed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon the decision in State of West Bengal v Swapan Kumar Guha, the Supreme Court has observed thus that in a case instituted under Article 226, the High Court would be justified in quashing the investigation if the FIR did not disclose commission of a cognisable offence. Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that if on a consideration of the relevant material, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation of the offence to be completed for securing materials in proving the offence and if on the other hand, on a consideration of the relevant material, the Court is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it would be the duty of the Court to interfere with the investigation and to stop the same to prevent any amount of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual. This decision will not be of any help to the petitioners for the allegations made the complaint disclose cognizable offences. Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon decisions in Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU (X), New Delhi v Duncans Agro Industries Limited, Calcutta and India Brewery and Distillery Limited, Bangalore and Others v Shaw Wallace and Company Limited, Bangalore , to support the view that complaint is required to be quashed. Suffice it to state that none of the decisions referred to above support the case of the petitioners, though as a proposition of law there is no question of denying their authority. On behalf of the second respondent, two decisions have been cited which are in Rajesh Bajaj v State N.C.T. of Delhi and Mary Angel's case, supra. In both the cases, the Supreme Court has reiterated the circumstances where power under Section 482 of the Code should be used and in any event, where the complaint prima facie make out a case for investigation, the High Court cannot quash the complaint notwithstanding the fact that one or two ingredients of the offences have not been detailed therein. It is clear from the above decisions of the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be invoked lightly.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner sought to contend that where a document has been produced which purports to be a Will, the presumption of its genuineness must be raised and it is for the complainant to establish in a Civil Court that the Will is not genuine and till then no complaint could be entertained. I am afraid this statement cannot be accepted. Even in civil law, as the propounder of the Will has to establish its genuineness and has to remove any doubt surrendering the execution of the Will. When that it so, when specific allegations are made about the forging of the Will as in this case, it cannot, at this stage, be taken note of to quash the investigation for offences alleged. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that on an examination of all the circumstances of the case, the request of the petitioners to quash the proceedings under Section 482 is misconceived and is rejected. Consequently, the petition is dismissed.