Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 24.11.2025 vs Ganesh Dutt Sharma on 17 December, 2025
2025:HHC:43992-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 208 of 2012
.
Reserved on: 24.11.2025
Date of Decision: 17.12.2025.
O.C. Doegar ...Appellant
of
Versus
Ganesh Dutt Sharma ...Respondent
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr Rajiv Sood, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr Neeraj Gupta, Senior Advocate,
with Mr Pranjal Munjal, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 2.11.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 3, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 22025:HHC:43992-DB manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) .
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was of asserted that the complainant was running a hotel in the name and style of M/s Doegar Hotel near Jodha Niwas, Shimla. The rt accused deals in the sale and purchase of property at Solan. The complainant agreed to purchase the property from the accused, who assured the complainant that the sale deed would be registered in his favour on or before 12.6.2007. The complainant contacted the accused on the due date, but the accused expressed his inability to sell the land and returned ₹4.00 lacs to the complainant by a cheque. The complainant presented the cheque to his bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement 'insufficient funds'. The complainant sent a notice to the accused asking him to repay the amount within 15 days from the date of the service of the notice. The notice was duly served upon the accused, but he failed to repay the amount. Hence, the ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:43992-DB complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused as per the law.
.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded of not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. rt The complainant examined himself (CW1) and Baldev Krishan (CW2) to prove his case.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the complainant's case in its entirety. He stated that a false case was filed against him, and the witnesses deposed falsely against him. He had lost the cheque book and informed the bank about the loss. He examined Rameshwar Dutt Sharma (DW1), Baldev Krishan (DW2) and Raj Kumar (DW3) to prove his defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the plea taken by the accused that he had lost the cheque was duly corroborated by the instructions to stop the payment issued in the year 2003. The complainant could not describe the dimensions of the plot that ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:43992-DB was to be purchased by him. He had not verified the papers. He did not enter into any agreement to purchase and did not obtain .
any receipt of payment. The witnesses in whose presence the money was paid did not support the complainant's version. The defence witnesses made the complainant's version doubtful.
Therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.
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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present rt appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The accused failed to prove that the cheque book from which the cheque in question was issued was lost. A notice was served upon the accused, and he failed to reply to it by claiming that the cheque was lost. Reliance was placed upon the document (Ex. D1), but this document was not signed by the Manager, and its authenticity was highly doubtful. No FIR was lodged by the accused to corroborate his version regarding the loss of the cheque. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set-aside.
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8. I have heard Mr Rajiv Sood, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr Neeraj Gupta, learned Senior .
Counsel, assisted by Mr Pranjal Munjal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
9. Mr Rajiv Sood, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the cheque carries with of it a presumption that it was issued in discharge of the debt/liability. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that the rt presumption was rebutted by the evidence of the accused. The accused claimed that the cheque was lost, but he did not make any complaint to the police. He produced a letter written to the bank, but its authenticity was also not established. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement 'insufficient funds' and not 'payment stopped by the drawer', which falsifies the plea taken by the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set-aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tedhi Singh Vs. Narayan Dass Mahant, Crl.
Appeal No. 362 of 2022, decided on 7.3.2022 in support of his submission.
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10. Mr Neeraj Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the complainant has not .
mentioned the date of service of notice upon the accused, and the complaint is premature. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned of Trial Court. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in HDFC Bank Vs. Reena, Cr.MP(M) No. 1634 of 2024, decided on 9.9.2024 in rt support of his submission.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438:
::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 72025:HHC:43992-DB "24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent .
perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."
13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v.
of Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: rt "21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581, and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471."
14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
15. The complainant stated that the accused showed him a plot near PNB, Solan and its price was settled as ₹4.00 lacs. The ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:43992-DB accused assured to get the sale deed registered on 12.6.2007. He went to the accused on 12.6.2007, and the accused told him that .
the sale deed could not be registered. He issued a cheque (Ex.CW1/A) to return the amount. He stated in his cross-
examination that the plot measured 05 biswa. He had not seen the documents. He volunteered to say that he had trusted the of accused. He did not try to find out the ownership of the plot. He volunteered tort say that the accused had assured him telephonically that the plot was purchased by him. He could not tell the length and breadth of the plot. The accused said that the transaction could not go through due to a defect. He had paid ₹4.00 lacs in the presence of the brother of the accused. He denied that no transaction to sell the land had taken place with the accused.
16. Learned Trial Court rightly pointed out that the complainant's testimony is unsatisfactory. He stated that he had paid ₹4.00 lacs to the accused without verifying the title of the land. It is difficult to believe that the complainant would have paid ₹4.00 lacs to the accused for purchasing the land without verifying the title of the land. He had not entered into the agreement to sell with the accused. He had not taken any receipt ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:43992-DB from the accused. All these circumstances made it suspicious that the complainant had handed over ₹4.00 lacs to the accused .
to purchase the land.
17. The complainant claimed that he had paid ₹4.00 lacs to the accused in the presence of the brother of the accused. This version was not supported by Rameshwar Dutt Sharma (DW1), of the brother of the accused. He stated that he and the accused are the only brothers. He did not know the complainant. The rt complainant never met the accused in his presence. No money was paid in his presence by the complainant. He stated in his cross-examination that he does not sit in the office of the accused. He volunteered to say that he has his own independent business. He admitted that the accused has business in the name of Balaji Property, but he did not know that the accused sells and purchases the property. He could not tell the number of people who had visited the office of the accused in the year 2007.
18. The testimony of this witness falsifies the complainant's version that he had paid the money in the presence of the brother of the accused.
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19. It was submitted that he is the brother of the accused and has an interest in favouring the accused. Therefore, his .
testimony should not be relied upon. This submission cannot be accepted. He was put forward as a witness to the transaction by the complainant. Therefore, it is impermissible for the complainant to say that the testimony of the witness should not of be believed.
20. It was submitted that this witness admitted that the rt accused was running the business of sale/purchase of the property, which supports the complainant's version that he had agreed to purchase the property from the accused. This submission will not help the complainant. The complainant was not required to prove that the accused is a property dealer, but that the accused had agreed to sell the property to the complainant. This agreement is not proved merely because the accused is a property dealer.
21. Raj Kumar (DW3) stated that the accused was arrested in Punjab in the year 2002-03. Bimleshwar and Mamta used to manage the office. The accused demanded documents from Bimleshwar, but he said that the documents were ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:43992-DB misplaced, and some of the documents included signed cheques.
He filed an application (Ex.DW2/A) before the Bank. He stated in .
his cross-examination that the accused had not registered him as an employee in any government department. The Manager had received the letter and returned the copy. He admitted that the letter (Ex.DW2/A) does not contain the signatures of the of Manager. He volunteered to say that the endorsement was made by the Manager on the letter. He admitted that the accused was rt looking after his business after he was released from custody. He was not aware whether any FIR was lodged by the accused about the missing documents.
22. The statement of this witness is duly corroborated by the letter (Ex.DW2/A) written on 22.12.2003, in which it was mentioned that the cheque book was misplaced. A copy of this letter was sent by the Bank to the accused vide letter (Ex. D1).
Therefore, it is duly established that the document was received by the Bank on 22.12.2003.
23. The complainant asserted that the cheque was issued by the accused on 12.6.2007. The accused had made a complaint of the loss of the cheque in the year 2003. It was laid down by the ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:43992-DB Uttarakhand High Court in Gaurav Agarwal vs. State of Uttarakhand and Ors. (26.09.2025 - UCHC): MANU/UC/0407/2025, .
that when the accused had issued a stop payment instruction because of the loss of the cheque, much before its presentation, no case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act is made out. It was observed:
of "16. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material on record, this Court finds rt that the continuation of proceedings against the applicant would be wholly unwarranted in law. It stands admitted on record that the applicant had lodged a stop-payment request with his banker on 12.07.2016 in respect of the cheques in question, much prior to the alleged date of issuance, i.e. 05.12.2016. The bank's contemporaneous report dated 15.07.2016 confirms that the stop-payment instructions had been acted upon and charges debited. In such circumstances, the subsequent presentation of the cheque in December 2016, resulting in dishonour on the ground of "insufficient funds," cannot be treated as valid dishonour attracting the penal consequences of Section 138 NI Act. The ratio of Raj Kumar Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), MANU/SC/0727/2009: 2009:INSC:677 : (2009) 6 SCC 72, squarely applies. Once the cheque had been rendered incapable of encashment before the alleged date of issue, there is, in the eye of the law, no "issuance," and therefore no offence under Section 138 can be said to be made out.
24. Allahabad High Court also took a similar view in Bobby Anand v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 4645, wherein it was observed:
::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 132025:HHC:43992-DB "46. In view of the legal proposition as discussed above, this Court is of the view that the essential ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are lacking in the facts of the present case, as the case of a stolen/lost/theft cheque does .
not fall under the ambit of Section 138 of N.I. Act, thus Section 138 N.I. Act will not be applicable in such cases."
25. Kerala High Court also held similarly in K. Sadanandan v. V.S. Satheesh Kumar, 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 16879, as of under:
"10. Considering the above limitation, the question here is whether a cheque returned by the bank on the ground rt "cheque reported lost" will come within the purview of Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The limitations are provided in the above dictum. Therefore, the refusal on the part of the bank to honour the cheque would not bring the matter within the penal provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act."
26. Thus, the letter written by the accused would also make the complainant's version suspect.
27. It was submitted on behalf of the accused that the complaint was premature and the learned Trial Court erred in ignoring this aspect. It was submitted on behalf of the complainant that the accused had not taken a plea of limitation before the learned Trial Court, and it is impermissible to take this plea in the present appeal. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar Ralli v. Maninder Singh Narula, (2014) 15 SCC 245:
::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 142025:HHC:43992-DB (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 640: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 616 that the plea of limitation has to be adjudicated even if it is raised for the first .
time in the High Court. It was observed at page 253:
19. However, when the issue of limitation had come up for the first time before the High Court, it ought to have dealt with the same on merits as per the proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act. The said proviso appended to clause (b) of of Section 142 of the Act was inserted by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002, and the legislative intent was, no doubt, in order to overcome the technicality of the limitation rt period. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Amendment Bill, 2002 suggests that the introduction of this proviso was to provide discretion to the court to take cognizance of offence even after expiry of the period of limitation (see MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan, (2013) 1 SCC 177: (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 424:
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 458]). Only with a view to obviate the difficulties on the part of the complainant, Parliament inserted the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act in the year 2002. It confers a jurisdiction upon the court to condone the delay (see Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah [Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 689: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 834)."
28. The complainant issued a notice (Ex.CW1/E) to the accused asking him to repay the amount. He relied upon the postal receipt (Ex.CW1/F), which shows that the letter was posted on 13.9.2007. This letter was not returned undelivered.
The complainant asserted in the complaint that the cause of action arose on 15.6.2007, thereafter on 16.8.2007 and on ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:43992-DB 13.9.2007 when the notice was issued, when the notice was received and when the accused failed to make the payment .
within the stipulated period. He filed the complaint on 1.10.2007 as per the endorsement. He has not produced any material to show the date of service of notice upon the accused and has relied upon the presumption of service.
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29. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 689:
rt (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 834: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1174 that where a notice was sent by registered post acknowledge due, the presumption of service of notice can be raised within a reasonable time and 30 days must be held to be sufficient for service of notice. It was observed at page 699:
"23. Thirty days ordinarily must be held to be sufficient for service of notice. In fact, when the service of notice is sought to be effected by speed post, ordinarily, the service takes place within a few days. Even under Order 5 Rule 9(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a summons is presumed to be served if it does not come back within thirty days. In a situation of this nature, there was no occasion for the Court to hold that service of notice could not be effected within a period of thirty days."
30. The Jharkhand High Court held in Manoj Kumar Nag v. State of Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine Jhar 458 that when there is ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:43992-DB no evidence regarding the service, the presumption regarding the delivery of the notice can be made after thirty days of the .
issuance of the notice. It was observed:
"22. This Court finds that there is no material on record regarding the service of legal notice dated 03.03.2008 dispatched by registry on 04.03.2008 upon the petitioner, and it is not the case of the complainant that the legal of notice was returned unserved or returned for any other reason. This court is also of the considered view that a presumption regarding service of notice sent through registered cover can be drawn only upon expiry of 30 days rt from the date of dispatch of notice, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2008) 13 SCC 689 (Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Sah). In the said judgment, the notice was sent through speed post, and although the actual date of service of notice was not known, the Complainant proceeded on the basis that the same was served within a reasonable period. It was held that if the presumption of notice within the reasonable period is raised, the deemed service at best can be taken to be 30 days from the date of its issuance and the accused was required to make payment in terms of the said notice within 15 days thereafter and the complaint petition therefore could have been filed after expiry of 15 days given to the accused for payment of money after receipt of notice."
31. A similar view was taken in Anil Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 410, wherein it was observed:
"18. Coming to the facts of the present case, the notice having been sent on 19.09.2012, if the presumption of service of notice within a reasonable time is raised, shall be deemed to have been served, at best, within a period of 30 days from the date of issuance thereof, i.e. 19.09.2012.::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 17
2025:HHC:43992-DB The applicant was required to make payment in terms of the said notice within 15 days thereafter, i.e. on or about 3.11.2012. The complaint, therefore, should have been filed by 03.12.12. Admittedly, the complaint was filed on .
19.11.2012, and therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that no proceedings under Section 138 of the Act could be drawn against the applicant."
32. Madhya Pradesh High Court has also taken a similar view in Vishal Gupta vs. Kishan Batham (04.08.2023 - MPHC):
of MANU/MP/2098/2023, wherein it was observed:
"11. Thus, the learned Trial Court committed no mistake rt in holding that in the absence of any proof of service of notice on a particular day to the accused, it would be deemed to be served on the 30th day of the dispatch of notice."
33. This position was reiterated in Damodar Mallick vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. (08.01.2024 - JHRHC):
MANU/JH/0024/2024 wherein it was observed:
"9. It is crystal clear from plain reading of Section 138 of the N.I. Act that the drawer of a cheque; if it fails to make the payment of the amount of the cheque to the payee within 15 days of the receipt of the demand notice, then the cognisance of the offence can be taken by a learned Judicial Magistrate for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The question arises what if, there is no document to suggest that the demand notice in writing given by the complainant-opposite party No. 2 has been served upon the drawer of the cheque, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of the Subodh S. Salaskar vs. Jayprakash M. Shah & Another reported in MANU/SC/3298/2008 : (2008) 13 SCC 689 and which principle of law has been reiterated by this ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:43992-DB Court in the case of Md. Siraj vs. State of Jharkhand & Another passed in Cr.M.P. No. 1677 of 2022 dated 21st of November, 2023; that the law is well settled that in case there is no material to suggest that such demand notice .
was ever served upon drawer of the cheque or any material that such demand notice has returned unserved within the period of 30 days from the date of the issue of such notice, such demand notice is deemed to have been served on expiry of the period of 30 days from the date of issue of such notice and the cognizance of the offence of punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be taken if the drawer of the cheque fails to pay the amount as per the cheque within 15 days of such deemed service of notice. So considering the claim of the complainant that rt the notice was sent on 15.05.2019 and the complaint was filed on 14.06.2019 without any material to suggest that during that period the petitioner had received notice of demand and 15 days have elapsed after receipt of such notice of demand on or before 14.06.2019, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the complaint is pre-
mature, hence, the cognizance is bad in law."
34. In the present case, the notice was sent on 13.9.2007 and would be deemed to be served on 12.10.2007. The complainant filed the complaint on 1.10.2007 within a period of 15 days available to the accused to repay the amount. Thus, the complaint was premature. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gajanand Burange v. Laxmi Chand Goyal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1711, that no action can be taken on a premature complaint, and the same is liable to be dismissed. It was observed:
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5. The issue which is raised in this appeal is no longer res integra and is covered by a three-judge bench decision of this Court in Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey (2014) 10 SCC 713. Two issues were formulated for .
decision before the three-judge Bench, which were:
"1.1. (i) Can cognisance of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 be taken on the basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be served upon the drawer of the cheque in of terms of Section 138(c) of the Act aforementioned? And, 1.2. (ii) If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, rt can the complainant be permitted to present the complaint again, notwithstanding the fact that the period of one month stipulated under Section 142(b) for the filing of such a complaint has expired?"
6. The first issue was resolved by paragraph 35 of the judgment, which is extracted below:
"35. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines "complaint. According to this definition, a complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognisance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eyes of the law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint, where it is filed before the expiry of 15 days ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:43992-DB from the date on which notice has been served on him; it is no complaint at all under the law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the court from taking cognisance of an offence .
under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of the law, obviously, no cognisance of an offence can be taken on the basis of of such a complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the court is not clothed with rt the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque."
7. In the present case, while the notice was received by the appellant on 8 November 2005, the complaint was filed before the period of fifteen days was complete. The complaint could have been filed only after 23 November 2005, but was filed on 22 November 2005. In view of the legal bar which is created by Section 142 of the NI Act, as explained in the three-judge Bench decision of this Court, taking of cognisance by the Court was contrary to the law and the complaint was not maintainable before the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the date of its receipt by the appellant."
35. Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the accused has to be accepted as correct that the complaint was premature and no action could have been taken on the same.
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36. The judgment in Tedhi Singh (supra) dealt with the presumption of the cheque, which is not relevant in the present .
case, and no advantage can be derived from the cited judgment.
37. No other point was urged.
38. In the present case, the learned Trial Court had taken of a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view taken by the learned rt Trial Court, even if another view is possible.
39. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
40. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:43992-DB receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
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41. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla) of Judge 17th December, 2025 (Chander) rt ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2025 20:37:26 :::CIS