Gujarat High Court
Amarben@Samarben Legal Heirs &Wd/O.Of ... vs Laxmanji Bhikaji Thakor & 6 on 23 June, 2014
Author: S.H.Vora
Bench: S.H.Vora
C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 184 of 2013
With
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5019 of 2013
In
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 184 of 2013
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.H.VORA
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any
order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
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AMARBEN@SAMARBEN LEGAL HEIRS &WD/O.OF DEC.RAMJIBHAI
MANEKBHA....Appellant(s)
Versus
LAXMANJI BHIKAJI THAKOR & 6....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR PC KAVINA, SR ADVOCATE with MR SP MAJMUDAR, ADVOCATE for
the Appellant
MR SM SOPARKAR, SR. ADVOCATE with MR JIGAR M PATEL, ADVOCATE
for the Respondent No. 7
MR SN MEHTA, SR. ADVOCATE with MS VIDHI J BHATT, ADVOCATE for the
Respondent Nos. 3 to 6
NOTICE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 1 - 2
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Page 1 of 15
C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.H.VORA
Date : 23/06/2014
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Challenge in this appeal from order is order passed below Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.613 of 2011, whereby learned 6th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) dismissed the injunction application filed by the appellant - original plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff has prayed to restrain the respondents - original defendants from transferring title and possession of the suit land to any person other than the plaintiff and further to make any construction on the land bearing Block No.55, (Final Plot Nos.45 and 60) pending hearing of the suit for specific performance and cancellation of sale deed.
2. Parties to the proceedings would be referred to as their original status in the plaint.
3. Briefly stated, it is case of the plaintiff that her husband Ramjibhai Rabari entered into a sale agreement with defendant Nos.1 and 2 on 31.12.1997 and on the date of agreement, her husband made payment of Rs.11 lac in cash to defendant Nos.1 and 2 i.e. original owners of the suit land. It is case of the plaintiff that by virtue of one another writing executed on the same date, the plaintiff's husband was put into possession of the suit land and since then, her husband and upon demise of her husband on 18.12.2006, the plaintiff was in possession, but defendant Nos.3 to 6 forcibly took disadvantage of her position and in the month of January, 2011, the plaintiff came to be dispossessed forcibly and therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit for performance of the sale agreement dated 31.12.1997 and also cancellation of sale Page 2 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT deed dated 29.9.2003 executed by defendant Nos.1 and 2 in favour of defendant Nos.3 to 6 in respect to suit land.
4. The learned trial Judge, after hearing the submissions of both the sides and considering the pleadings on record and after applying the principles of law in light of decision cited at bar, refused the injunction application filed by the plaintiff.
5. I have heard the submissions of learned Senior Counsel Mr. Kavina appearing with learned advocate Mr. S.P. Majmudar for the plaintiff, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mehta appearing with learned advocate Ms. Vidhi Bhatt for defendant Nos.3 to 6 and learned Senior Counsel Mr. Soparkar appearing with learned advocate Mr. Jigar M. Patel for defendant No.7. Though served, defendant Nos.1 and 2 have preferred to remain absent.
6. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Kavina urged that in light of condition No.6 of sale agreement, it was the duty of defendant Nos.1 and 2 to inform the plaintiff as to the fact of being obtained permission for conversion of land from new tenure to old tenure and therefore, the transaction entered into by defendant Nos.1 and 2 with defendant Nos.3 to 6 are bad in law. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Kavina, after drawing my attention towards various proceedings conducted under the revenue law with regard to nature of land, submitted that the Collector took suo motu into revision Deputy Collector's order on 30.7.2005 and revived the restrictions on the land and therefore, sale effected by defendant Nos.1 and 2 in favour of defendant Nos.3 to 6 is bad in law. According to him, the learned trial Judge ought to have granted relief of injunction Page 3 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT pending the trial and in absence of relief pending hearing of the suit, the plaintiff's suit will become infructuous and it would create multiplicity of litigation if the suit property changes hand pending the trial.
7. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mehta submitted that no decree for specific performance would follow in the present litigation, because even as per condition incorporated in the sale agreement, the sale deed was to be executed within a month after obtaining permission of conversion of the land from new tenure to old tenure from the competent authority. Admittedly, the competent authority granted permission to convert the land from new tenure to old tenure on 6.1.2002 and also considering the fact that the said permission remained challenged before the competent authority, but at the end on 2.1.2007, fresh permission was granted but, the plaintiff has filed the suit in the year 2011. Therefore, the learned trial Judge rightly refused injunction on account of delay. Secondly, it is submitted by him that there is no proof of payment submitted by the plaintiff as to how her husband paid cash amount of Rs.11 lac and further, no attempt is made by the plaintiff's husband to enforce agreement to defendant Nos.1 and 2 till he died on 18.12.2006 i.e. for 9 years. Thirdly, it is submitted by him that defendant Nos.3 to 6 are bona fide purchaser and defendant Nos.3 to 6 have purchased the suit property after giving notice in the newspaper. Such notice was published on 20.6.2003 and after waiting for a period of about three months, defendant Nos.3 to 6 got executed and registered sale deed in their favour on 29.9.2003. Fourthly, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mehta submitted that present suit is time Page 4 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT barred as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, as registered sale deed itself is a deemed notice as per provisions of section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is submitted that the plaintiff has failed to prove all the required ingredients of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the Code") and considering the conduct of the plaintiff and her husband, the plaintiff was never in possession after registration of sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.3 to 6 and still, however, the plaintiff makes false averments in the plaint as to she being dispossessed forcibly in the month of January, 2011 and therefore, the learned trial Judge has rightly refused the injunction and therefore, considering the scope of provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code, the appeal may be dismissed at admission stage, as no perversity in the findings is pointed out by the plaintiff during the course of hearing. In support of his submissions, he pressed into service the following decisions:-
1. Harshadkumar Kantilal Bhalodwala and another Vs. Ishwarbhai Chandubhai Patel and others reported in 2010(1) GLH 151.
2. Veetrag Holdings Private Limited Vs. Gujarat State Textile Corporation Ltd. reported in 1996(1) GLH 179.
3. Daudbhai Kasambhai Vs. Shabbir Isuf Yakub Meda reported in 1999(2) GLH (U.J.) 23.
4. Mandali Ranganna and others Vs. T. Ramachandra and others reported in AIR 2008 SC 2291.
5. Indiraben Navnitbhai Patel Vs. Legal heirs and Rep. Of Nathabhai Ashabhai Valand reported in 2005(1) GLH
735. Page 5 of 15
C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT In the case of Harshadkumar Kantilal Bhalodwala (supra), this Court has held in Head Note A as under:
"[A] CIVIL LAWS: - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O.39, R.1 and R.2 - Grant of interim injunction - Suit for specific performance - Execution of agreement and receipt of part sale consideration by cash, disputed - Nothing produced on record by plaintiff to show source of payment of consideration - Held, no prima - facie case in favour of plaintiff - Besides, third party purchasing the property by registered sale deed after giving public notice and upon payment of full sale consideration - Balance of convenience, held in favour of such bona fide purchasers - No case of grant of interim injunction."
In the case of Veetrang Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (supra), this Court has held in Head Note A & B as under:
(A) The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O.39, R.1 -
Application for temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell an immovable property for restraining transfer during pendency of the suit - Held, though suit for specific performance is within time, equitable relief of temporary injunction can be refused on the ground of delay & laches.
(B) The Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Ss.10, 16 - Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell an immovable property - Application for temporary injunction therein for restraining transfer of property during pendency of suit - Held, though suit for specific performance is within limitation, injunction, being equitable relief can be refused on the ground of delay and laches."
In the case of Daudbhai Kasambhai (supra), this Court has held in Head Note as under:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O.39 - Injunction -Page 6 of 15
C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT In a suit which is filed 13 years after the action and when land is already sold, no prima facie case for injunction can be said to have been made out, for the Trial Court to grant relief - Injunction so granted must be vacated.
In the case of Mandali Ranganna (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"While considering an application for grant injunction, the Court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto, viz. existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. Grant of injunction is an equitable relief. A person who had kept quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the properties exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order of injunction. The Court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one.
Grant of refusal of injunction has serious consequence depending upon the nature thereof. The courts dealing with such matters must make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties. For the said purpose, application of mind on the part of the courts is imperative."
In the case of Indiraben Navnitbhai Patel (supra), this Court in Head Note has held as under:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O.39 R.1 -
Injunction - Appellant filed suit for possession of the suit property - in the revenue record defendant's name continued - Defendant gave public notice asserting their right over the property - Applicant has remained silent for period of seven years - He has not even shown any willingness and never tried to find out what was happened about conversion of the land from new tenure to old tenure - Applicant not even prayed Page 7 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT for a mandatory relief of restoration of possession - In view of the fact that applicant has failed to prove his possession prima facie, the appeals are dismissed subject to the final result of the suit."
8. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Soparkar appearing with learned advocate Mr. Patel for defendant No.7 submitted that both the sale agreement and possession receipt dated 31.12.1997 are bogus and got up. According to him, defendant No.2 agreed to sell the suit property at the rate of Rs.150/- per sq yards and as per sale agreement, the total measurement of land is 7600. Thus, total consideration would come to Rs.11,40,000/- and not Rs.12 lac as indicated in the sale agreement. Not only that second writing in the form of possession receipt indicates that entire consideration has been paid. Still, however, in the sale agreement, it is so stipulated that remaining consideration was required to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed. So, considering the conflicting stipulation made in both the writings with regard to passing of consideration and value of the property, no reliance can be placed upon document in the matter of granting discretionary relief, as no explanation has been placed on record about such discrepancy.
9. I have heard the submissions of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respective parties in detail and also gone through the impugned order, pleadings and documentary evidence.
10. In my view, the suit filed by the plaintiff is prima facie barred by law of limitation. It is so, because defendant Nos.1 and 2 executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant Page 8 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT Nos.3 to 6 on 29.9.2003, whereas the plaintiff has filed present suit in the year 2011. According to Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff is required to file a suit within three years from the date of registration of sale deed, as registration of sale deed itself is deemed notice and thus, limitation would run from the said date. Whenever, a document is registered, the date of registration becomes the date of deemed notice. It has come on record that defendant Nos.3 to 6 purchased the suit property after giving due public notice in the newspaper and further waited for three months after publication of notice in the newspaper and thereafter, sale deed came to be executed and registered. However, in the matter of unregistered agreement, when its execution is seriously executed by the party to the agreement, then it becomes duty of the plaintiff to show as to from which source, the plaintiff paid the cash consideration. Admittedly, the plaintiff has not produced on record any documentary evidence to show source of payment of consideration alleged to have been made by her husband in the year 1997. Under these circumstances, the learned trial Judge has rightly observed that no prima facie case exists in favour of the plaintiff. In the case on hand, defendant Nos.3 to 6 purchased the property by registered sale deed after giving public notice and upon payment of full sell consideration and therefore, the learned trial Judge rightly found that defendant Nos.3 to 6 are bona fide purchaser and therefore, balance of convenience would like in favour of defendant Nos.3 to 6.
11. After hearing the submissions made at bar in this regard, the Court is of the opinion that the learned trial Judge has rightly refused equitable relief of temporary injunction in Page 9 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT favour of the plaintiff on the ground of delay and laches. It requires to be noted that one Mr. Kantilal Joitaram filed Special Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 against defendant Nos.3 to 6 and in the said proceedings, the Court appointed Court Commissioner and the Court Commissioner in the said proceedings, categorically observed that defendant Nos.3 to 6 are in possession of the suit land. It is true that present plaintiff was not party in the said proceedings, nonetheless, such observations though recorded by the Deputy Collector in the proceedings initiated under section 79A of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and when the same were part of the record before the trial Court and not challenged by the plaintiff, it disproves the plaintiff's case, inasmuch as she was in possession till January, 2011. Under the circumstances, this Court finds that the plaintiff has made misstatement of fact about her possession and thus, suppressed the material facts before the trial Court. This conduct of the plaintiff disentitles her to have any discretionary relief in her favour.
12. It is admitted fact that the alleged sale agreement is executed on 31.12.1997 and during the lifetime of plaintiff's husband who expired on 18.12.2006, plaintiff's husband did not take any step to enforce the sale agreement by issuing any notice or approaching defendant Nos.1 and 2 for performance of the sale agreement. The transaction of sale took place during the lifetime of plaintiff's husband and still, however, the plaintiff's husband did not take any step including responded to the public notice issued by defendant Nos.3 to 6 and also did not challenge the observations recorded by the Court Commissioner in the proceedings initiated by one Mr. Kantilal Joitaram in the year 2004, as aforesaid.Page 10 of 15
C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT
13. So, considering the facts at the touchstone of the principles settled in the law cited at bar by defendant Nos.3 to 6 and further considering the scope of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code, the trial Court was perfectly justified in refusing to grant discretionary order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code.
14. Under the circumstances, the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Kavina that if injunction is not granted, the suit would become infructuous and therefore, the suit property may be protected from transfer by granting injunction are without any substance. In court's considered view, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case as well as history of the case as narrated in this order ans also in the pleadings, this is not a case in which the plaintiff deserves to be protected in any manner by granting interim order of injunction. Needless to say that any transaction effected pending hearing of the suit would always be subject to the result of the final outcome of the suit. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to prove all the required ingredients of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 before the trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings so recorded.
15. It is required to be kept in mind that the present Appeal from Order is filed under the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code and challenge in this appeal is a discretionary order passed by the learned trial Judge under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. In case of Matrix Telecom Pvt.Ltd. V/s. Matrix Cellular Services Pvt. Ltd.
reported in 2011(3) GLR 1951, this Court, in paras 6 and 6.1, Page 11 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT observed as under:-
"6. Before proceeding further it is required to be noted that the present appeal is against the rejection of interim relief and the main suit is still pending. If this court elaborately deals with the matter on merits it is likely that the same would prejudice the case of either side. Therefore, it is well settled law that this Court is not required to go into the merits of the entire matter at this stage and what is required to be seen is whether the appellant-plaintiff has made out a prima facie case or not for grant of interim injunction.
6.1. It is required to be noted that it is well settled law that the Appellate Court may not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. The Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion."
16. Similarly, in the case of Wonder Ltd. and another V/s. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1990 (Supp.) SCC 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 of the said decision, after considering the scope of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code in an appeal wherein, the discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court is under challenge, observed as under:-
Page 12 of 15C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT "9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated "...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience lies".
The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted."
17. So, in light of the limited powers of this Court, the Appellate Court can interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court only in exceptional circumstances Page 13 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT and the Appellate Court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except, where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. In nutshell, an appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. To put it differently, the Appellate Court cannot reassess the entire evidence so as to come to its own conclusion contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court, if two views are possible.
18. While parting with the order, it is clarified that this Court has examined the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge within the limited scope of provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code, whereas the main controversy involved in the suit is at large before the trial Court to be adjudicated through full-fledge trial. Therefore, the learned trial Judge shall not be influenced by any observations recorded in the impugned order and observations recorded by this Court herein above while deciding the suit at the end of trial. The findings recorded either by the trial Court or by this Court at interlocutory stage of the suit are tentative in its nature and the learned trial Judge shall decide the case on its merit and as per evidence that may be led during the course of trial and decide the suit in accordance with law.
19. In the result, present appeal from order deserves only fate of dismissal at the admission stage and accordingly, it stands dismissed. Notice is discharged. Consequently, civil application also stands disposed of.
Page 14 of 15 C/AO/184/2013 JUDGMENT
(S.H.VORA, J.)
shekhar
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