Kerala High Court
Dr. Cyril Johnson vs The State Of Kerala on 7 October, 2009
Bench: K.Balakrishnan Nair, V.Giri, C.T.Ravikumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C).No. 33661 of 2005(G)
1. DR. CYRIL JOHNSON,
... Petitioner
Vs
1. THE STATE OF KERALA,
... Respondent
2. UNIVERSITY OF KERALA,
3. THE VICE CHANCELLOR,
4. THE SELECTION COMMITTEE CONSTITUTED FOR
5. M.T. SULEKHA,
For Petitioner :SRI.P.C.SASIDHARAN
For Respondent :SRI.S.GOPAKUMARAN NAIR, SC KERALA UTY.
The Hon'ble MR. Justice K.BALAKRISHNAN NAIR
The Hon'ble MR. Justice V.GIRI
The Hon'ble MR. Justice C.T.RAVIKUMAR
Dated :07/10/2009
O R D E R
K.BALAKRISHNAN NAIR, V.GIRI &
C.T.RAVIKUMAR, JJ.
----------------------------------------
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005
----------------------------------------
Dated this the 7th day of October, 2009.
JUDGMENT
Giri, J.
The point that has been formulated for consideration of this bench is whether Antony P.A. V. Krishnadas M.N. {ILR 2007(1) Kerala 244} lays down the correct legal position concerning the powers of the selection committee in evolving norms for a selection. The issue arises in the context of selection to the post of Controller of Examinations in the Kerala University. The committee is constituted in terms of the provisions of the Kerala University First Statutes, 1977 and it should consist of the Vice Chancellor and two other Syndicate members. The Controller is to be appointed by the Syndicate of the University on the recommendation of the selection committee. The First Statutes also provide for the powers and duties of the Controller. The Statutes do not specifically provide for the norms that are to be adopted by the Selection Committee. The Syndicate also did not lay down the norms. W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 2 ::
Norms were evolved by the selection committee on their own, apparently in the course of conducting the selection and they proceeded to select the 4th respondent. Recommendations of the selection committee were accepted by the Syndicate and the 4th respondent was appointed as Controller of Examinations. This has been called in question in these writ petitions.
2. Learned single Judge, before whom the writ petition came up for consideration, referred to the stand taken by the University in their counter affidavit and observed that the selection committee had evolved their own norms for the selection. It was observed that the committee had arrogated to itself the power of framing the norms for selection. This, the learned Judge observed, was clearly inconsistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu and others v. State of Orissa {1995(6) SCC 1}, wherein the Supreme Court held that the selection committee does not have the inherent jurisdiction to lay down the norms for selection, nor can such power be assumed or inferred by implication. Learned single Judge W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 3 ::
observed that a contrary view has been taken by a bench of this court in Antony P.A. V. Krishnadas M.N. {ILR 2007 (1) Kerala 244}. The Bench in Antony held that where the selection committee is statutorily constituted, but the statute which provides for the constitution of the selection committee does not, at the same time, lay down any guidelines or norms to regulate the selection, then the committee is entitled to evolve its own norms, which have to be fair and reasonable.
In other words, the Division Bench proceeded to uphold the power of the selection committee to evolve their own norms in the absence of a specific prescription in that regard in the statute, which in the first place had provided for the constitution of the committee. Learned single Judge, after observing that the dictum in Antony was inconsistent with the principle laid down in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu and others v. State of Orissa {1995(6) SCC 1}, adjourned the writ petitions to be heard by a Division Bench. The Division Bench felt that the matter, requires consideration by a Full Bench, so as to avoid conflicting decisions by co-ordinate benches. Accordingly, these cases as such have been W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 4 ::
referred to a Full Bench and essentially the point for consideration is whether Antony lays down the correct legal position concerning the powers of the selection committee to evolve the norms for selection.
3. Reference to the facts in W.P.(C)No.35595/05, would be comprehensive of W.P.(C)No.33661/05 as well.
4. By Ext.P1 notification dated 25.7.2005, the University of Kerala invited applications for appointment to the post of Controller of Examinations. Copy of the said notification reads as follows:
"The qualifications prescribed are as follows:
"A first or second class Masters Degree or equivalent qualification, about 5 years teaching experience at University level and about 5 years administrative experience in a responsible post, including management of staff in a University or College or Education Department or similar Institutions (Academic qualification, age and experience relaxable in the case of candidates otherwise highly qualified)."
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 5 ::
5. It seems that 35 persons applied and 21 persons appeared for the interview. The selection committee consisted of the Vice Chancellor and two members of the Syndicate of the University.
6. It is common case that the criteria for selection are not either prescribed in the statute or otherwise laid down by the appointing authority viz., Syndicate of the University. It is also common case that the selection committee did not evolve the norms or publish the same, prior to the interview. The selection committee formulated their criteria for selection on the date of interview. It was further contended that the 4th respondent did not have 5 years administrative experience. She was also a member of the Syndicate till 26.11.2005, just three days prior to the interview. In fact, she resigned from the Syndicate vide letter dated 24.11.2005, which was accepted on 26.11.2005. The 4th respondent was able to influence the constitution of the selection committee, it is contended by the petitioner.
7. It was further contended by the petitioners that the criteria for assessing the comparative merits of the W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 6 ::
candidates were formulated by the selection committee only on 29.11.2005, i.e. the date on which they conducted the interview. One aspect, which has been pointed out relates to the awarding of 8 marks to the 4th respondent for guiding P.Hd students at the rate of 2 marks for each P.Hd students. But the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.33661/05 was not awarded any marks for guiding M.Phil Research Scholars. The petitioner further contends that the selection committee had erred in awarding equal marks to him as also to the 4th respondent for administrative experience, since the 4th respondent had only two years and 6 months period of actual experience. Two tabular statements have been given by the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.35595/05 in an attempt to graphically illustrate the impact of the contention that the selection committee had formulated norms, on the date of the interview with the clear intention of facilitating the award of higher marks in favour of the 4th respondent and consequently, ensuring her selection. The following is the statement showing the marks actually awarded to the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.35595/05 and the 4th respondent. W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 7 ::
Dr.Keshav Mohan Dr.M.T.Sulekha (Petitioner) (3rd respondent) Academic qualification 30 30 Addl. Qualification- Ph.D. 10 10 Teaching Experience 10 10 Administrative Experience 7 7 Publication 5 5 For producing Ph.D. - 8 Interview 20 20 Total 82 90
8. If marks were awarded to the petitioner for guiding M.Phil students and if the 4th respondent is awarded marks only for the actual administrative experience which she had acquired, then the statement of marks, according to the petitioner, would read as follows:
Dr.Keshav Mohan Dr.M.T.Sulekha
(Petitioner) (3rd respondent)
Academic qualification 30 30
Addl. Qualification-
Ph.D. 10 10
Teaching Experience 10 10
Administrative
Experience 7 2
Publication 5 5
For producing Ph.D. 10 10
Interview 20 20
Total 92 85
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005
:: 8 ::
9. It was inter alia on these premises that the selection, as such, has been impugned in the writ petition.
10. Similar contentions have been taken up by another candidate, who had participated in the interview, in W.P.(C)No.33661/05 as well.
11. Per contra, the University, as also the selected candidate contend that the selection committee was constituted by the Syndicate in terms of the provisions of the Act and the first statutes. The fact that the 4th respondent was a member of the Syndicate till 24.11.2005 is of no consequence as she had ceased to be a member on 26.11.2005, well before the interview was actually conducted. Neither the Act, nor the statutes specifically provide for any criteria that have to be adopted by the selection committee, called upon to assess the comparative merits of the rival candidates, who participate in the selection to the post of Controller of Examinations. The body is constituted in terms of the statutes. Since the statutes do not specifically provide for the criteria and the Syndicate, the appointing authority also did not lay down the guidelines on W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 9 ::
its own, the selection committee was perfectly competent to adopt such criteria as are reasonable and fair. The allegation that the 4th respondent did not have adequate administrative experience, as prescribed in the notification is also denied. It was further contended that once the criteria are found to be fair and reasonable, going by the parameters normally adopted in cases of judicial review, there is no vitiating factor in the selection, which would warrant interference by this court.
12. We heard Mr.N.Sugathan, Mr.P.C.Sasidharan, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr.Rajagopalan Nair, learned counsel for the University and Mr.George Poonthottam, learned counsel for the 4th respondent, the selected candidate.
13. As we indicated at the outset, the main issue that has been posited for consideration by the Full Bench is whether the selection committee constituted under the Statutes would be competent to evolve and adopt its own criteria for assessing the comparative merits of the candidates. The correctness of the dictum laid down by the W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 10 ::
Division Bench in Antony {ILR 2007(1) Kerala 244} also comes up for consideration.
14. Before we deal with this main issue, we would like to refer to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the selection as such is vitiated since the 4th respondent was a member of the Syndicate till 26.11.2005 and it was the Syndicate which had constituted the selection committee. We do not find any force in this submission. True, the 4th respondent was a member of the Syndicate. But she had tendered her resignation on 24.11.2005 and it was accepted and the factum relating to the resignation was also notified on 26.11.2005. The selection committee had met only on 29.11.2005. There was no statutory bar which stood in the way of the 4th respondent appearing before the selection committee or aspiring for the post of Controller of Examinations. No statutory provision has been brought to our notice which provides that membership of the Syndicate will act as a disqualification to seek appointment under the University.
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 11 ::
15. The fact that the 4th respondent was a member of the Syndicate when the selection committee was actually constituted is also of no consequence as such in the facts and circumstances of the case. The constitution of the selection committee is governed by the provisions of the University Act or the First Statutes. The selection committee could not have been constituted otherwise than in the manner prescribed in the statute. There are no allegations of any personal bias against the individual members of the selection committee and such persons are not eo-nominee parties to the writ petition as well.
16. We do not find any substance in the aforementioned contention taken up by the petitioners.
17. The main issue, which has been debated upon, relates to the competence of the selection committee, constituted by the Syndicate of the University to evolve its own norms for the selection. It is appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions in the statutes at this juncture.
18. Section 9 the University Act provides for the officers of the University and Controller of Examinations is W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 12 ::
one of the officers so enumerated. Section 13 of the Act provides that the Controller of Examinations is a whole time salaried officer appointed in this regard by the Syndicate. Clause 25 of Chapter II of the Kerala University First Statutes, 1977 {hereinafter referred to as the "First Statutes"} provides for the mode of appointment of the Controller of Examinations. Clause 25(1) being relevant is extracted hereunder:
"25. Mode of appointment of the Controller of Examinations: (1) The Controller of Examinations shall be appointed by the Syndicate on the recommendation of Selection Committee consisting of the Vice-Chancellor as Chairman and two other Syndicate members, for a period of one year in the first instance. He shall be a whole time salaried officer of the University and be appointed by a written order. In case his appointment has been continued for over a period of one year, he shall be deemed to be on probation for a period of one year (Commencing from the date of is first appointment) within a continuous period of two years. The written order of his appointment shall be lodged with the Vice-Chancellor."
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 13 ::
19. The qualifications for the post of Controller of Examinations is prescribed in the schedule to the Kerala University First Ordinances and it is prescribed as the same as that of a Registrar. It is this qualification which has been noted in Ext.P1 notification as well.
20. It cannot be gainsaid that the statutory provisions which provide for the post of Controller of Examinations, and that which provides for the method of appointment to the said post (Clause 25 Chapter II of the First Statutes) do not lay down the criteria that have to be adopted by the selection committee while conducting the selection. It also cannot be gainsaid that in the instant case, the selection committee evolved their own criteria, without being guided by either any statutory prescription or any guidelines laid down by the appointing authority in that behalf. Such criteria adopted by the selection committee were not mentioned in the notification. In fact, they were not even published at any point of time, prior to the interview held on 29.11.2005. The criteria, as such, adopted by the selection committee are discernible only from the minutes of W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 14 ::
the selection committee held on 29.11.2005. Those minutes have been produced as Ext.R2(d), along with the counter affidavit filed by the University in W.P.(C)No.33661/05. It would be appropriate to extract the minutes of the meeting of the selection committee so held on 29.11.2005 in its entirety.
"Minutes of the Meeting of the Selection Committee constituted to interview candidates for the post of Controller of Examinations in the University of Kerala.
Venue : VC's Chamber
Time : 10.30 AM
Date : 29.11.2005
Members present:
1. Dr.M.K.Ramachandran Nair,
Vice-Chancellor. Sd/-
2. Dr.V.P.Mohammed Kunju Metharu,
Member, Syndicate. Sd/-
3. Dr.Varghese Perayil,
Member, Syndicate. Sd/-
At the outset the Committee discussed in detail the various aspects to be considered while considering the applications for the post of Controller of Examinations and resolved that:-
1. Weightage at the rate of 25 and 30 be awarded respectively to candidates who secured II class and I class in their PG Exams.
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 15 ::
2. A weightage of 10 marks be awarded to candidates possessing Ph.D Degree.
3. A weightage of 1 mark be awarded for each year of teaching experience subject to a maximum of 10 marks.
4. The weightage for administrative experience be @ 1 mark for one year of service subject to a maximum of 10 marks.
5. To award 1 mark for each research paper/book published limiting the maximum to 5 marks.
6. To award 2 marks for each Ph.D produced, the maximum of which is limited to 10 marks.
And
7. The maximum marks for the interview be 25 marks, so that the total marks come to 100.
Also resolved that while awarding marks for the interview proper weightage be given for the candidate's academic excellence, his/her exposure to and awareness of the University administrative systems in general and the University examination systems in particular and their performance in the interview.
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 16 ::
The process of interview commenced at 11.00 AM. Out of the 35 candidates called for interview, only 21 candidates appeared before the Selection Committee.
After assessing the relative merits of the candidates according to the stipulations above, the Committee unanimously recommended that the post of Controller of Examinations be offered to:-
Dr.M.T.Sulekha, B21, Abhayam, Sreerangam Lane, Sasthamangalam, Thiruvananthapuram-10.
The whole process of interview came to an end at 5 PM."
21. It is also not in dispute that the selection committee had met for the first time on 29.11.2005 and the criteria for assessing the merits of the candidates were apparently evolved by the selection committee on the same day. It is also not in dispute that the candidates including the petitioners and the 4th respondent were also interviewed on 29.11.2005. We find it difficult to brand as fanciful, the W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 17 ::
contention that the selection committee decided to select the 4th respondent and then evolved the criteria for assessing the comparative merits of the candidates. In other words, it is contended that, after having decided to select the 4th respondent, the criteria, the adoption of which would justify her selection, as such, were evolved by the selection committee. When the selection committee commenced its proceedings, the curriculum vitae of the candidates were before it. If it wanted to favour a candidate, norms for awarding marks could be modulated accordingly. Experience in teaching and administrative experience are notified qualifications. If a candidate is having longer experience in teaching and lesser in administration, he can be superseded by lowering the rate of marks per year for teaching and increasing the rate for administrative experience. Ext.P1 notification, which we have already extracted in para 4, does not mention either about publication of research paper/book or production of Ph.D, as desirable qualifications or grounds for preference. Possibility of some candidates not furnishing those details in their curriculum vitae, as they are not W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 18 ::
relevant in terms of Ext.P1, cannot be ruled out. Thus, the above two parameters fixed by the Committee are susceptible to the charge of being tailor-made to suit a particular candidate. This brings us to the question that has to be considered by the Full Bench viz., whether the selection committee, constituted as per the statutory provisions, can evolve its own norms for conducting the selection?
22. There are two facets to this contention. The first would arise in cases where the statutory provisions providing for the constitution of the selection committee by themselves, also lay down the criteria to be followed by the selection committee. It has been the consistent view taken by the Supreme Court that in such cases, the selection committee has no jurisdiction to either relax any of the qualifications laid down by the statutory requirements or follow any method, which is strictly not in terms of the statutory prescriptions. There is neither power of relaxation nor the power to vary, available in this regard to the selection committee [see the decisions in P.K.Ramachandra Iyer v.
Union of India [1984(1) SCC 141], Umesh Chandra W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 19 ::
Shukla v. Union of India [1985(3) SCC 721] and Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa & others [1987(4) SCC 646]}. Any such action taken by the selection committee would be clearly ultra vires, thereby vitiating the selection as such.
23. But, the second facet of the aforementioned contention arises in cases where the statutory provisions providing for the constitution of the selection committee are sub-silentio as regards the criteria to be adopted by the selection committee, while assessing the comparative merits of the candidates. It is contended that in the present case, the provisions of the Act and the first statutes provide for the constitution of a selection committee. But, they are silent as regards the criteria to be evolved by the selection committee.
There is no dispute that the Syndicate is the appointing authority and so constituted by the statutory provisions as such. The petitioners contend that since the statutory provisions providing for the constitution of the selection committee are silent as regards the criteria to be adopted by the selection committee, subject to the criteria being fair, W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 20 ::
reasonable and transparent, it will be open to the committee to evolve its own criteria. Is this so?
24. The petitioners rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu {1995(6) SCC 1} to contend for the position that the selection committee has no jurisdiction in this regard. The Supreme Court was, in the said case, concerned with appointment to the post of Junior Teachers in a College affiliated to the University. Selection was to be done by a Board constituted in accordance with the statutory rules framed in that regard.
The criteria or the norms for selection were not statutorily prescribed. It seems that the members of the selection board decided to adopt the confidential reports of the candidates, who were already employed as a Homoeopathic Medical Officers, as the basis for determining their suitability. This, the Supreme Court held, was impermissible and was ultra vires the powers conferred on the selection board. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34 and 36 of the said judgment contain the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in this regard. They read as follows:
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 21 ::
"32. The members of the Selection Board or for that matter, any other Selection Committee, do not have the jurisdiction to lay down the criteria for selection unless they are authorised specifically in that regard by the Rules made under Article 309. It is basically the function of the rule-making authority to provide the basis for selection. This Court in State of A.P. v. V.Sadanandam observed as under: (SCC PP.583-84, para 17) 'We are now only left with the reasoning of the Tribunal that there is no justification for the continuance of the old rule and for personnel belonging to other zones being transferred on promotion to offices in other zones. In drawing such conclusions, the Tribunal has travelled beyond the limits of its jurisdiction. We need only point out that the mode of recruitment and the category from which the recruitment to a service should be made are all matters which are exclusively within the domain of the executive. It is not for judicial bodies to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the executive in choosing W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 22 ::
the mode of recruitment or the categories from which the recruitment should be made as they are matters of policy decision falling exclusively within the purview of the executive.'
34. The Selection Committee does not even have the inherent jurisdiction to lay down the norms for selection nor can such power be assumed by necessary implication. In P.K.Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, it was observed (SCC PP.180-81, para 44) 'By necessary inference, there was no such power in the ASRB to add to the required qualifications.
In such power is claimed, it has to
be explicit and cannot be read by
necessary implication for the
obvious reason that such
deviation from the rules is likely
to cause irreparable and
irreversible harm.'
35. Similarly, in Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India, it was observed that the Selection Committee does not possess any inherent power to lay down its own standards in addition to what is prescribed under the Rules. Both these decisions were followed W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 23 ::
in Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa, and the limitation of the Selection Committee were pointed out that it had no jurisdiction to prescribe the minimum marks which a candidate had to secure at the viva voce.
36. It may be pointed out that rule-making function under Article 309 is legislative and not executive as was laid down by this Court in B.S.Yadav v. State of Haryana. For this reason also, the Selection Committee or the Selection Board cannot be held to have jurisdiction to lay down any standard or basis for selection as it would amount to legislating a rule of selection."
25. After having observed as above, and after considering the case law on the point, the Supreme Court held, in paragraph 39 of the judgment, as follows:
"39. On the basis of these decisions, we are inclined to say that in order to assess the suitability or real worth of a candidate for the post of junior teacher in the college, the basis, namely, the character rolls, adopted by the Selection Board was wholly arbitrary besides being without authority or jurisdiction."
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 24 ::
26. Thereafter the Government was directed to suitably amend the rule or issue necessary administrative/executive instructions laying down the basis on which the suitability of the candidates shall be determined, before requiring the Selection Board to hold a fresh selection.
27. The principles in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu {1995(6) SCC 1} were adopted and followed by the Supreme Court in a later decision also {Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. B.Swapna, (2005) 4 SCC 154}. Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu {1995(6) SCC 1} should have been treated as an authority for the proposition that a selection committee statutorily constituted has no authority or jurisdiction to lay down the norms for the selection. Such norms should be either statutorily prescribed or in the absence of the same, the norms forming the basis of the selection could be laid down by the appointing authority by means of administrative instructions. But, a Bench of this court in Antony {ILR 2007(1) Kerala 244} took a view that when a selection committee is statutorily constituted, but the Statute does not lay down the manner for selection, W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 25 ::
necessarily, the selection committee shall have the authority to adopt reasonable and fair norms.
28. Antony was concerned with selection to the post of Section Officer in the Sree Sankaracharya University. The selection committee was constituted in terms of the University First Statutes. Qualifications were also prescribed in the statutes. But the basis for the selection or the criteria to be followed were not either prescribed in the statute or laid down by the Syndicate, the appointing authority. Taking note of these aspects, the Division Bench in Antony in paragraph 27 held as follows:
"Statute 8 of Chapter IV provides that the recruitment to posts shall be made on the basis of the recommendations made by a Selection Committee consisting of Vice Chancellor as Chairman, Convener of the Standing Committee of the Syndicate on Staff and the Registrar, who shall be the Member Secretary of the Committee. There is no contention from the writ petitioners that constitution of the Selection Committee was in any way vitiated. Therefore, the Selection Committee was competently constituted to conduct selection. The short listing of the candidates is provided for in Statute 9. That W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 26 ::
provision did not contain any specific norms regarding selection except to direct that the rules of reservation as provided in Rules 14 to 17 of the General Rules in KS & SSR as amended from time to time shall be followed or that the University can also set apart certain number of posts for Special Recruitment confining to the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. At the same time, the Selection Committee is empowered to prepare a short list as if 5 candidates are included for one vacancy notified. Apart from this no norms regarding selection are provided in the Statute. True, if the statute provides any norms, the Selection Committee is bound to follow the said norms. It cannot vary such norms. When a Selection Committee is statutorily constituted, but the Statute which empowers constitution of a Selection Committee does not give any manner for selection, necessarily the Selection Committee shall have to select candidates following reasonable and fair norms ordinarily to be followed for selection. When the University is a statutory creation and comes within the term State under Article 12 of the Constitution, the norms so followed shall be fair, just and reasonable."
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 27 ::
29. With regard to the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu {1995(6) SCC 1}, the Division Bench went on to observe and find that the selection committee in the case of Antony had not decided to look into the reports of the erstwhile employer, about the incumbent concerned, nor had it decided to look into their confidential reports, as in the case of Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu {1995(6) SCC 1}. They only devised a method of awarding marks to the candidates and for this purpose, according to the Bench, the method of segmenting the marks into 5 different segments with certain guidelines alone had been adopted by the Selection Committee as a guideline for themselves. The Division Bench thereafter went on to observe that Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu {1995(6) SCC 1}, therefore, cannot have any relevance.
30. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the dictum in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu was relatable to a case where the statute providing for the selection committee was silent regarding the norms that had to be adopted by the committee, nor were there any administrative W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 28 ::
instructions issued, so as to lay down guidelines for conducting the selection. It was in the aforementioned context, the Supreme Court held in categoric terms that the norms adopted by the selection committee in the said case were not only not fair and reasonable, but also without authority and jurisdiction.
31. We find force in this submission and having gone through the judgment in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu, as also in Antony, we are of the view that the dictum in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu as regards the power and authority of the selection committee, did not admit of any distinguishing feature, as attempted to be delineated by the Bench in Antony v. Krishnadas. The dictum laid down in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu is squarely applicable to a case where a statutorily constituted selection committee evolves and adopts its own guidelines for conducting a selection, on the premise that there is neither a statutorily prescribed guideline nor any administrative instructions issued by the appointing authority in that regard.
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 29 ::
32. If there are no statutory instructions as regards the criteria to be followed by the selection committee, then it is open to the appointing authority to lay down administrative instructions in this regard. But, if there are any administrative instructions, laying down the guidelines, then absence of such administrative guidelines or instructions will not empower the selection committee to lay down its own norms and then conduct the selection. This, as has been held in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu, would be without jurisdiction and authority.
33. Mr.Poonthottam placed reliance on the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Dr.J.P.Kulshrestha and others v. Chancellor, Allahabad University {1980 (3) SCC 418} to contend that the selection committee has inherent jurisdiction to adopt criteria, which is fair and reasonable; in the absence of statutorily prescribed guidelines in that behalf. We have perused the decision in Dr.J.P.Kulshrestha. The same dealt with selection to the post of a reader. The selection committee, in the said case, was constituted as per the Allahabad University Act and the W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 30 ::
statutes framed therein. The Supreme Court noted that "there are statutory provisions regulating the functions of the selection committee". Ordinances prescribed qualifications for the appointment of teachers. The Supreme Court made particular reference to Ordinance No.9 and it is significant to note the proviso to Ordinance 9(2)(iv), which provides that the selection committee may relax the qualifications contained in Clause 3 for the post of reader in the case of candidate whose total length of service as teachers in the University is not less than the period required to teach the maximum of the Lecturer's Grade and who shall have established a reputation as teachers. The Supreme Court then further held in paragraph 5 of the judgment that the statutory exercise of choosing the best among the applicants in conformity with the minimum qualifications is done by the selection committee which recommends to the executive council its panel. After observing so, the Supreme Court took note of the fact that though there is no specific legislative provision regarding the procedure to be adopted by the selection committee, there can be no doubt that self-created W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 31 ::
rules, flexible and pragmatic, fair and functionally viable, may well be fashioned by the selection committee. This observation was made in the context of the fact that the committee had, in the case, adopted the mode of interviewing the candidates.
34. The aforementioned observations were made by the Supreme Court in determining whether the procedure adopted in the said case by the selection committee was fair and reasonable. In fact, major portion of the discussion related to the contention that some of the selected candidates were not qualified. The point which actually came up for consideration in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu viz., whether a statutorily constituted selection committee had the inherent jurisdiction to evolve its own norms, in the absence of statutory prescriptions in that regard, was not really posited for consideration, nor considered in Dr.J.P.Kulshrestha by the Supreme Court. That the proviso to Ordinance 9(2)(iv), as mentioned above, even conferred power on the selection committee to relax the qualifications mentioned in Clause 9(2)(iii), is also noteworthy.
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 32 ::
35. Mr.Poonthottam further contended that the Supreme Court had considered the aspect regarding the jurisdiction of the Selection Committee to evolve its own norms in K.K.Parmar and others v. High Court of Gujarat Through Registrar and others {2006(5) SCC 789}. In Parmar, the Supreme Court was concerned with the challenge to the promotion to the post of Section Officers in the High Court of Gujarat. The rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of the staff were framed by the Chief Justice. Rule 47(2)(a) of the Rules specifically provided that promotion to the post of Section Officer from Assistant will be effected strictly on consideration of efficiency and proof of merits. Merit was to be determined on the basis of the past performance and performance of the written and oral examination to be held by the selection committee, as may be appointed by the Chief Justice. One of the grounds of challenge made by the writ petitioners before the High Court was that the selection committee had not followed Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 47 of the Rules. The challenge was upheld by the learned single Judge. The Supreme Court referred to Rule 47 W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 33 ::
(2) of the Rules and observed that the rules provide for the mode and manner in which the merit should be determined and found that past performance and performance in the written test and performance in the oral test were to be considered by the selection committee. It was further found that the High Court or for that matter, the selection committee could not have ignored the mandate of the Rules.
Thereafter it was observed in paragraph 25 of the judgment, as follows:
"25. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 47 of the Rules specifies the mode and manner in which respective merit of the candidate is to be determined. The High Court or for that matter the Selection Committee could not have ignored the same. In any event, it was for the members of the Selection Committee, in absence of any marks having been allotted under the Rules for judging the past performance of the candidates, to devise a mode therefor. The candidates had no say in the matter. Annual confidential reports of the employees concerned must have been placed before the Selection Committee with a view to W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 34 ::
enable it to prepare a select list. If they had not adopted any criteria in that regard, the employees concerned cannot be blamed therefor."
36. The observation that it was for the members of the selection committee to have devised a mode for judging the past performance of the candidate was made in the context of the fact that the rules had provided the mode and manner in which merits should have been determined and past performance was one of the criteria that was laid down by the rules itself. Apparently, past performance was kept out of consideration by the selection committee and it was in this context, the aforementioned observations were made by the Supreme Court. It is also significant to note that Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu was not considered by the Supreme Court in Parmar's case.
37. Parmar was, therefore, a case where there was a statutory prescription providing the mode and manner in which merit had to be assessed by the selection committee. In fact, Parmar in one sense supports the view in Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu. If the statute provides the W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 35 ::
mode and manner in which merit is to be assessed by the selection committee, the committee cannot deviate from the same. At any rate, Parmar does not take a view different from Dr.Krushna Chandra Sahu.
38. Mr.Poonthottam referred to two other judgments in Inderjeet Khurana v. State of Haryana and others {2007(3) SCC 102} and M.V.Thimmaiah and others v. Union Public Service Commission and others {2008(2) SCC 119}. We are afraid that these two decisions have no application to the present case.
39. Since we have undertaken an elaborate discussion, we consider it appropriate to encapsulate our conclusions:
(1) The selection committee, which has been statutorily constituted, should follow the norms for assessing the merit of rival candidates, if such norms are laid down in the statute.
The selection committee has no jurisdiction or authority to either relax any of the norms or vary the same.
W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 36 ::
(2) If the statute which provides for the constitution of the selection committee does not provide for the norms for the selection committee, then it is open to the appointing authority to lay down instructions and guidelines providing for such norms. In such a case, the selection committee is bound to follow such administrative instructions in conducting selection.
(3) In cases where the norms
governing the selection are not laid
down either in the statutory
provisions or in administrative
instructions, the selection
committee constituted to conduct
selection would not have any
inherent jurisdiction or authority to evolve its own norms for conducting the selection. If it evolves its own norms, then its action will be without authority and jurisdiction and selection would be vitiated.
(4) The dictum laid in Antony P.A. V. Krishnadas M.N. {ILR 2007(1) Kerala 244}, which upholds the W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 37 ::
contrary position does not lay down the correct law and it is hereby overruled.
For all these reasons, we are of the view that the petitioners are entitled to succeed. It is declared that the proceedings of the selection committee constituted by the Syndicate of the Kerala University for conducting selection to the post of Controller of Examinations in the University of Kerala, held on 29.11.2005, as evidenced by Ext.R2(d) produced in W.P.(C)No.33661/05 are illegal and vitiated. So also the selection and consequent appointment of the 4th respondent as Controller of Examinations of the University of Kerala, are declared to be illegal. We have not gone into the question as to whether the 4th respondent possesses the requisite administrative experience for selection to the post of Controller of Examinations and that question is left open for consideration of the selection committee. The Syndicate of the University shall within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, evolve the norms for selection to the post of Controller of Examinations and such norms shall govern - award of marks for academic qualifications and W.P.(C)Nos.33661 & 35595 of 2005 :: 38 ::
experience - as they are the only qualifications, notified for selection. For example; if a candidate has only the minimum marks necessary for second class and another has first class with 90% marks, the latter has to be awarded higher marks. Same should be the case for experience also. A fresh selection to the post of Controller of Examinations from among the candidates, who applied pursuant to Ext.P1 shall be conducted, as early as possible, and shall be completed at any rate, within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Needless to say, qualifications on the last date for receipt of application as per Ext.P1 alone are relevant.
Writ petitions are allowed as above.
Sd/-
(K.BALAKRISHNAN NAIR) JUDGE Sd/-
(V.GIRI) JUDGE Sd/-
(C.T.RAVIKUMAR) JUDGE sk/ //true copy//